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Abstract 
 
This thesis considers the nature and extent of the United Nations’ obligations to protect the lives 
and physical integrity of civilians.  Over 100,000 UN peacekeeping personnel are currently 
deployed on missions with authority from the Security Council to protect civilians at risk.  
Chapter VII of the UN Charter provides a UN mission with the jus ad bellum authority to use 
force, but is silent on the rules that would govern the resulting actions, which must either be 
found in the jus in bello provisions of international humanitarian law (IHL) or the regulations on 
the use of force contained in international human rights law.  Most existing UN guidance stresses 
the applicability of IHL.  This thesis argues that the positive and negative obligations of 
international human rights law will usually be more appropriate. 
 
Chapter VII contains no references to international human rights law and nor was this initially 
considered a concern of the Security Council.  This has changed considerably in recent decades.  
It is increasingly accepted that humanitarian crises can justify the Security Council’s use of its 
Chapter VII powers, although this has been accompanied by growing concern about the lack of 
accountability with which they are sometimes used.   
 
The UN Charter specifies that its provisions take precedence over all other international treaties.  
There is no mechanism to judicially review the Security Council’s actions and the legal 
immunities that cover UN missions, makes it difficult to scrutinise their records.  UN missions 
mandated to protect civilians have repeatedly failed to do so.  Yet there does not appear to be a 
single case where the UN has taken disciplinary action against senior staff for failing to protect 
civilians in line with a mission mandate.  Mechanisms need to be created to improve the 
accountability of UN missions to those that they are responsible for protecting.   
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1 
 
The Protection of Civilians by UN Peacekeeping Operations Under 
International Law 
 
Introduction 
 
There are now over 100,000 United Nations (UN) uniformed peacekeeping personnel deployed 
around the world in missions that have legal authority from the Security Council, under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter, to use force to protect civilians (POC).1  Although such mandates have 
been given to missions since 1999, POC has only become a central task in more recent years.  Its 
emergence poses challenges to the development of international law that are as significant as the 
original concept of UN peacekeeping itself.  Armed soldiers are being given legal permission to 
enter into the territory of other States in order to protect people from grave violations of 
international human rights and humanitarian law.  The UN has stated that they are ‘legally 
required’ to ‘use force, including deadly force’ to fulfil this mandate.2  This raises two inter-
linked questions: first of all, what gives the Security Council the right to offer such protection 
and secondly, what is the nature of the legal obligation on the mandated mission to provide it?   
 
The UN Charter prohibits both the unilateral use of force and interference in the internal affairs 
of individual States, even by the UN itself.3  The use of force is only permissible, under the 
Charter, in self-defence or when it has been authorized by the Security Council, in response to 
                                                 
1 Surge in Uniformed UN Peacekeeping Personnel from 1991 present, which gives a total of 104,688 for 
all uniformed peacekeeping personnel (soldiers, police and military observers) on 31 March 2015, UN 
peacekeeping documents, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/chart.pdf accessed 15 April 
2016.   
2 Evaluation of the implementation and results of protection of civilians mandates in United Nations 
peacekeeping operations, Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services, UN Doc A/68/787, 7 March 
2014, [Hereinafter OIOS Protection Evaluation 2014], para 15.  See also Mona Ali Khalil, ‘Legal aspects 
of the use of force by UN peacekeepers for the protection of civilians’, in Haidi Willmot, Marc 
Weller, Ralph Mamiya, and Scott Sheeran (eds), The Protection of Civilians, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, March 2016.  Khalil is the Senior Legal Officer in the Office of the Legal Counsel, United Nations 
Office of Legal Affairs, and refers repeatedly to the ‘duty’ on UN peacekeepers to use force, as a last 
resort, to protect civilians. 
3 UN Charter, Article 2.   
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threats to international peace and security.4  Although it is increasingly accepted that 
humanitarian crises and situations of internal armed conflict can constitute such threats, this is a 
recent development and has been accompanied by growing concern about the lack of 
accountability surrounding such decisions and the powers they confer.  POC mandates also blur 
the previous distinction between the ‘core principles’ of traditional peacekeeping, including 
minimum use of force, and Chapter VII ‘peace enforcement’ operations. 
 
A Chapter VII mandate provides a UN mission with the jus ad bellum authority to use force, but 
is silent on the rules that would govern the resulting actions.  These must either be found in the 
jus in bello provisions of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) or the regulations on the use of 
force contained in international human rights law.   
 
Most of the existing guidance provided by the UN appears to be based on the assumption that 
IHL will be the appropriate legal framework for missions with POC mandates.  The UN Infantry 
Battalion of 2102, for example, authorizes peacekeeping soldiers to use force ‘in any 
circumstance in which they believe that a threat of violence against civilians exists’ [emphasis 
added] and a threat is considered ‘imminent’ from ‘the time it is identified as a threat, until such a 
time the mission can determine that the threat no longer exists.’5  Guidance issued in 2015 
repeats this formulation and also draws heavily on IHL language when stressing the importance 
of ‘principles of distinction between civilians and combatants, proportionality, the minimum use 
of force and the requirement to avoid and, in any event, minimize collateral damage’, while also 
                                                 
4 UN Charter Article 51 and Articles 39-42. 
5 UN United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual Volume I, Department of Peacekeeping Operations/ 
Department of Field Support, August 2012 [Hereinafter ÚN Infantry Battalion, Vol. I, 2012], para 6.4.3.   
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stressing the need to abide by customary international human rights law and that ‘deadly force’ 
should only be used as a last resort.6 
 
As will be discussed further in Part II of this thesis, under IHL the military are permitted to kill – 
or capture – enemy combatants and may even inflict harm on civilians when attacking military 
targets so long as they apply criteria such as proportionality.  By contrast, under international 
human rights law, lethal force can only be used when strictly necessary, as a last resort, for 
specified purposes and people may only be deprived of their liberty on certain specific grounds, 
with detailed guarantees concerning their rights in detention.    
 
In 1999, the same year that the UN Security Council gave its first POC mandate to a 
peacekeeping operation, the UN Secretary General issued a Bulletin stating that:  
 
The fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law are applicable to 
UN forces when in situations of armed conflict they are actively engaged therein as 
combatants, to the extent and for the duration of their engagement.  They are accordingly 
applicable in enforcement actions or in peacekeeping operations when the use of force is 
permitted in self-defence.7    
 
There is no similar Bulletin on the applicability of international human rights law.  As will be 
discussed in this thesis, there are a growing number of recent UN resolutions, reports and policy 
documents that do now refer to the relevance of international human rights law to its 
                                                 
6 Policy on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping, Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations / Department of Field Support Ref. 2015.07, 1 April 2015, pp.5-6. See also Protection of 
Civilians: Implementing Guidelines for Military Components of United Nations Peacekeeping Missions, 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations / Department of Field Support, February 2015, p.15.   
7 Secretary General’s Bulletin, Observance by UN Forces of International Humanitarian Law, 
ST/SGB/1999/13, 6 August 1999, [Hereinafter, Secretary General’s Bulletin on IHL 1999]. 
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peacekeeping missions8 and there are an increasing number of references to international human 
rights law in the policy guidance provided to missions with POC mandates.9  In 2013 the UN 
adopted a ‘human rights due diligence policy’ (HRDDP), which acknowledges that the UN has a 
‘responsibility to respect, promote and encourage respect for international humanitarian, human 
rights and refugee law’.10  It also launched a Human Rights Up Front (HRUF) initiative, which 
states that ‘human rights and the protection of civilians’ should be seen as a ‘system-wide core 
responsibility’ and that the UN should ‘take a principled stance’ and ‘act with moral courage to 
prevent serious and large-scale violations.’11  The UN has yet, however, to produce  
comprehensive guidance on how the negative and positive obligations of international human 
rights law apply to UN peacekeeping missions, to ensure that this is fully integrated into the 
training and direction of its personnel and to create mechanisms by which it can be held to 
account under these provisions. 
 
Given the widespread criticism of UN peacekeeping missions with POC mandates for their 
current reluctance to use force to protect civilians against physical harm even when they consider 
themselves to be operating within an IHL framework, it might seem counter-intuitive to wish to 
                                                 
8 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines (Capstone Document), New York: 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2008, p.60; We are United Nations Peacekeepers, New York: 
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations Training Unit, undated; See also: UN Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Security Council Norms and Practice on the Protection of 
Civilians in Armed Conflict: Analysis of Normative Developments in Security Council Resolutions 2009-
2013, OCHA, 2014. 
9 See, for example: DPKO/DFS Policy on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping, Ref. 
2015.07, 1 April 2015; Protection of Civilians: Implementing Guidelines for Military Components of 
United Nations Peacekeeping Missions, Department of Peacekeeping Operations / Department of Field 
Support, February 2015; OCHA, UN Office for the High Commissioner of Human Rights and the UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees, The Protection of Human Rights in Humanitarian Crises, Geneva: 
OHCHR/UNHCR, 8 May 2013; and OHCHR/DPKO/DPA/DFS Policy on Human Rights in United 
Nations Peace Operations and Political 
Missions, Ref. 2011.20, 1 September 2011. 
10 Human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces, UN 
Doc. A/67/775–S/2013/110, 5 March 2013, para 1. [Hereinafter Human Rights Due Diligence Policy 2013 
or HRDDP].   
11 Human Rights Up Front, http://www.un.org/sg/rightsupfront/, accessed 30 July 2015. 
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constrain them to the more restrictive provisions of international human rights law.  It will 
nevertheless be argued in this thesis that this will usually provide a more appropriate legal 
framework and far clearer guidance on the use of force for protective purposes.   
 
It is clearly impossible for peacekeeping soldiers deployed in a conflict, or post-conflict, 
environment to provide protection against all threats of violence to all people at all times.  
Threats to civilians are likely to come from a wide range of sources in such situations and take a 
variety of forms.12  Nevertheless, international human rights jurisprudence does contain a fairly 
clear definition of the ‘positive obligation’ to protect the right to life and physical integrity.  The 
European Court of Human Rights has observed that: 
 
Bearing in mind the difficulties in policing modern societies, the unpredictability of 
human conduct and the operational choices which must be made in terms of priorities 
and resources, the positive obligation must be interpreted in a way which does not 
impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities. Accordingly, not 
every claimed risk to life can entail for the authorities a Convention requirement to take 
operational measures to prevent that risk from materialising. For a positive obligation to 
arise, it must be established that the authorities knew or ought to have known at the time 
of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life or failed to take measures within 
                                                 
12 The protection of women from conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) is understood to be part of a 
POC mandate, but the extent to which UN troops are authorized to protect women against ‘private’ as 
opposed to ‘public’ forms of violence raises issues which go beyond the scope of this thesis adequately to 
explore.  For further discussion of CRSV see, for example, Report of the Secretary-General on Conflict-
related sexual violence, S/2015/203, 23 March 2015.  For a summary of recent resolutions and debates see 
Cross-Cutting Report on Women, Peace and Security, Security Council Report, 14 April 2014.   See also 
UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 of 31 October 2000, 1820 of 19 June 2008, 1888 of 30 September 
2009), 1889 of 5 October 2009, 1960 of 16 December 2010, 2122 of 18 October 2013, and 2106 of 24 June 
2013 on women and peace and security; and Resolution 1314, of 11 August 2000 on the need to provide 
special protection for children in armed conflict. 
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the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid 
that risk.13   
 
It will be argued in this thesis that POC is best understood in similar terms.  It should be seen as a 
positive obligation to protect people from threats to their rights to life and physical integrity, 
while respecting – that is not infringing – these rights in the process.  A positive obligation could 
be deemed to arise if a peacekeeping mission knew, or ought to have known at the time, of the 
existence of a real and immediate risk to civilians and failed to take measures within the scope of 
its powers which, judged reasonably, might be expected to have avoided or ameliorated the risk.  
International human rights law also imposes positive obligations on the appropriate authorities to 
prevent, investigate and punish such acts and provide redress to those who have suffered from 
them, even when they are carried out by private persons or entities.   The lack of an effective 
investigation could itself be a violation of the protections provided in the right to life and 
physical integrity.  
 
These obligations are firmly rooted in international human rights law and will be discussed in 
more detail in Chapter Four of this thesis.  It will be argued that the safeguards contained in this 
legal framework could be interpreted in ways that do not impose impossible or disproportionate 
burdens on UN peacekeeping missions.  Its guidance is both relevant and potentially applicable 
to missions and provides a standard against which the conduct of missions should be judged.   
 
UN missions mandated to protect civilians have repeatedly failed to do so and internal inquiries 
and lessons learned reports have often identified failures of both management and political 
leadership.  Missions have also failed to investigate fully and speak out against violations, 
                                                 
13 ECtHR Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, Appl. No. 22535/93, Judgment 28 March 2000, para 86.  See also 
Osman v. UK, Appl. No. 23452/94, Judgment 28 October 1998, paras 115-6. 
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particularly when these are committed by, or with the acquiescence of, government forces in the 
host State.  In some cases missions have been complicit in these violations by providing support 
to the forces that committed them.  Yet there does not appear to be a single case where the UN 
has initiated disciplinary action against senior mission or headquarters staff for failing to protect 
civilians in line with a mission mandate.  Mechanisms need to be created to improve the 
accountability of UN missions to those that they are responsible for protecting and to provide 
redress for victims of violations.   
 
Individual States contributing troops to UN missions have already faced legal challenges for 
actions, or inactions, which resulted in violations of the right to life.  Both Dutch and Belgian 
courts have upheld claims that their troops on UN peacekeeping missions in the 1990s failed to 
protect some of the victims of the genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica.14  Challenging individual 
troop contributing countries (TCCs) for alleged violations, however, could lead to a potential 
crisis in peacekeeping because States that are party to strong regional human rights mechanisms, 
or with strong domestic human rights accountability, may become even more reluctant to 
participate in such missions.  This thesis argues, instead, that the UN should issue a Secretary 
General’s Bulletin acknowledging the applicability of international human rights law to its 
peacekeeping missions and setting out the obligations that this entails.  Monitoring mechanisms 
should also be established which could receive individual complaints and issue advisory opinions 
on the compliance of missions with these obligations. 
 
If it is accepted that UN peacekeeping missions do have ‘protection’ obligations under 
international human rights law, however, it will be important to clarify the extent of these and 
                                                 
14 Mothers of Srebrenica v. the Netherlands ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2014:8748 (The Hague District Court) 
2014; and Mukeshimana-Ngulinzira and Others v Belgium and Others, Court of First Instance Judgment, 
RG No 04/4807/A, 07/15547/A, ILDC 1604 (BE 2010) 8th December 2010. 
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which rights missions are obligated to protect.  Human rights are often declared to be ‘universal, 
indivisible and interdependent and interrelated’.15  There are a number of both civil and political 
rights and economic, social and cultural rights that will be of obvious relevance during the type 
of humanitarian crises in which UN peacekeeping missions often operate.  Indeed it has been 
argued that ‘human rights protection cannot and must not be reduced to protection against 
violence and oppression, against death or torture, but always has to be protection against basic 
deprivation like hunger, sickness or lack of shelter’16  This poses the question as to whether a UN 
peacekeeping mission with a POC mandate should be obliged to protect the full spectrum of all 
the rights and freedoms contained in the corpus of international human rights law, or if a 
narrower set of ‘core’ obligations can be derived from the ‘purposes, functions and practices’ of 
the mission and an assessment of its ‘effective control’.   
 
At the end of the 1990s, a series of workshops organised under the auspices of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) defined ‘protection’ as: 
 
all activities, aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance 
with the letter and the spirit of the relevant bodies of law (i.e. human rights, humanitarian 
and refugee law). Human rights and humanitarian actors shall conduct these activities 
impartially and not on the basis of race, national, national or ethnic origin, language or 
gender. 17  
 
                                                 
15 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, Adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights in 
Vienna on 25 June 1993.  See also  What are human rights?, OHCHR website, 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/pages/whatarehumanrights.aspx,  accessed 27 October 2014. 
16 Sylvia Maus, ‘Human rights in peacekeeping missions’, Hans-Joachim Heintz and Andrej Zwitter, (eds) 
International Law and Humanitarian Assistance, Berlin: Springer, 2011, p.112. 
17 ICRC Strengthening Protection in War: A Search for Professional Standards, Geneva: International 
Committee of the Red Cross, 2001.  The workshops involved some 50 humanitarian, human rights and 
academic organisations and institutions and, as will be discussed further in Part II of this thesis, this 
definition is now widely used by both UN agencies and non-governmental organisations. 
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The UN has developed a similar definition.18  This is often referred to as humanitarian ‘rights-
based’ protection. Its all-encompassing description is intended to emphasize that humanitarian 
actors have responsibilities to ensure that their work does not harm those that they are trying to 
help.  It clearly obliges humanitarian agencies to remain impartial and not to discriminate.19  The 
wording, however, suggests an aspirational, rather than legal, commitment and humanitarian 
agencies themselves appear to disagree about how it should be interpreted.  POC is often 
conflated with humanitarian ‘rights-based’ protection, but it will be argued here that it should be 
seen as a distinct and narrower legal obligation based on the definition above on protecting the 
right to life and physical integrity. 
 
The term ‘protection’ is often also associated with the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) although, 
as will be discussed in Chapter One of this thesis, this is a political rather than a legal concept.  
There are few references to POC in the existing academic literature and, where it is mentioned, it 
is often treated either as an ‘operationalization’ of R2P or else viewed through the humanitarian 
‘rights-based’ lens.20  This is partly because it is still a comparatively new concept and partly 
                                                 
18 The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in its Glossary of Humanitarian 
Terms: In Relation to the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, OCHA, December 2003, Chapter 4: 
The Field.  This defines protection as: ‘A concept that encompasses all activities aimed at obtaining full 
respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and spirit of human rights, refugee and 
international humanitarian law. Protection involves creating an environment conducive to respect for 
human beings, preventing and/or alleviating the immediate effects of a specific pattern of abuse, and 
restoring dignified conditions of life through reparation, restitution and rehabilitation.’  See also 2015 
Strategic Response Plan, Syrian Arab Republic, UN Country Team, December 2014, p.3, which states that 
‘‘protection’ refers to the protection of all affected civilians including men, women, children, and other 
groups with specific needs from violence, exploitation, discrimination, abuse and neglect.’    
19 See ICRC, Professional Standards for Protection Work carried out by humanitarian and human rights 
actors in armed conflict and other situations of violence, Geneva: International Committee of the Red 
Cross, October 2009; IASC, Growing the Sheltering Tree, protecting rights through humanitarian action, 
Geneva: Inter-Agency Standing Committee, 2002; GPC, Handbook for the Protection of Internally 
Displaced Persons, Global Protection Cluster Working Group, Geneva: December 2007; Sophia Swithern 
and Rachel Hastie, Improving the Safety of Civilians: A protection training pack, Oxford: Oxfam, 
December 2008. 
20 The former is an underlying assumption of Siobhán Wills, Protecting Civilians, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009; Edward Luck, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Growing Pains or Early Promise?’ 
Ethics and International Affairs Vol. 24 Issue 4, September 2010; and Nicholas Tsagourias, ‘Self-defence, 
protection and humanitarian values and the doctrine of impartiality and neutrality in enforcement 
mandates’, in Marc Weller (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on the Use of Force in International Law, Oxford: 
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because POC mandates have mainly developed and adapted in the field ‘below the radar’ of 
much of the current legal and academic discourse.  This thesis, therefore aims to make an original 
contribution to the research in this area. 
 
Thesis road map 
 
The first three chapters provide a general overview of the international legal framework that 
provides ‘protection’ to individuals and discusses why and how UN peacekeeping missions have 
become increasingly tasked with POC mandates.    
 
Chapter One provides historical background to the discussion.  It introduces the main bodies of 
law and examines the tension between promoting the universality of basic rights on the one hand 
and respecting national sovereignty on the other.  It also discusses the arguments surrounding 
‘humanitarian intervention’, and the emergence of R2P.  It argues that while the growing 
prominence of ‘protection’ in international law has helped to reframe debates about the use of 
force for ‘protective purposes, the jus ad bellum justification for this still requires authorization 
of the UN Security Council, unless it can be justified as self-defence.  Attempts to foster a ‘global 
political consensus’ favouring ‘humanitarian interventions’ through R2P have largely failed.    
 
Chapter Two traces the evolution and conceptual development of UN peacekeeping and 
discusses how the principles on which it is traditionally based emerged and developed.  
Peacekeeping expanded rapidly during the 1990s, placing these principles under strain.  The UN 
Security Council increasingly began to use its Chapter VII powers to provide missions with 
                                                 
Oxford University Press, 2014.  The latter view informs the treatment of the chapter on Protection of 
Civilians in Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams, Understanding Peacekeeping, Second Edition, Polity Press, 
2011, pp.337-58. 
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authority to use force for ‘protective purposes’.  The failure of UN peacekeeping missions to 
protect people from genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda, however, led to a crisis of 
credibility in the Organization.  Criticisms grew, particularly amongst western liberal opinion, 
and, in 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) took action in Kosovo without UN 
Security Council authority.  The UN also established transitional administrations in Kosovo and 
East Timor that exercised executive powers over these territories. 
 
Chapter Three analyses the emergence of POC as a new normative concept and the problems of 
turning it into an operational doctrine.   The UN mission to Sierra Leone was the first one to be 
given a POC mandate, in 1999.  POC was not initially considered a significant departure from 
‘traditional peacekeeping’.  It has primarily developed through Security Council resolutions and 
policy guidance from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) based on the 
experiences of it field missions.  These have become increasingly detailed in spelling out POC 
tasks and making it a priority for missions. A lack of clarity about what the term ‘protection’ 
actually means and the legal framework governing the use of such force have, however, 
contributed to the challenges that missions face. 
 
Part Two of the thesis discusses the applicable legal framework governing the use of force for 
protective purposes and the inter-relationship between the different bodies of law.   
 
Chapter Four examines the provisions of international humanitarian, human rights and refugee 
law that may be relevant to a UN peacekeeping mission with a POC mandate. It first sets out the 
relevant provisions of IHL and then the potentially relevant provisions of international human 
rights law governing the use of lethal force and arrest and detention powers.  The applicability of 
refugee law is also briefly considered, particularly in relation to attempts to develop a ‘doctrine 
of protection’ for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).  The chapter argues that the negative and 
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positive obligations of international human rights law provide the most comprehensive and 
relevant guidance for UN peacekeeping missions with POC mandates and that its provisions can 
be applied both extraterritorially and concurrently with IHL.  
 
Chapter Five explores the relationship between the provisions of UN Charter law and 
international human rights law and the problems of holding peacekeeping missions accountable 
for their ‘protection responsibilities’.  Both national courts and the European Court of Human 
Rights have declared inadmissible complaints of human rights violations carried out by troops on 
missions mandated by the Security Council, unless they can attribute responsibility for these acts 
to member States rather than the UN itself.  There is, however, growing acceptance that the 
widening use by the Security Council of its Chapter VII powers has created circumstances in 
which the lack of effective accountability mechanisms is becoming an increasing issue.  This has 
particularly arisen in relation to the Security Council’s use of individual sanctions as well due to 
complaints of sexual abuse by UN peacekeepers.  It also has implications for the use of force and 
detention powers of peacekeeping soldiers, particularly if they become more proactive in 
implementing their POC mandates. 
 
The final section of the thesis provides an overview of four contemporary UN peacekeeping 
missions, which have POC mandates: the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), the UN Organization in Cote d’Ivoire 
(UNOCI), the UN Mission South Sudan (UNMISS) and the UN/AU Mission in Darfur 
(UNAMID).  All four started as ‘traditional’ peacekeeping missions, established to monitor 
ceasefires that were supposed to bring an end to civil wars in each country.21  They are amongst 
                                                 
21 The missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Côte d’Ivoire and Darfur were originally 
deployed to monitor peace agreements and help to organize elections.  UNMISS and UNAMID developed 
out of an earlier UN mission in Sudan (UNMIS), which was established to supervise a referendum on 
independence, agreed by negotiations that ended Sudan’s long running civil war.    
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the UN’s largest missions and together account for over half the total number of personnel 
deployed on missions.22  They also provide a representative cross-section of the places where 
missions have been given POC mandates.   
 
Chapter Six discusses the UN mission to the DRC and, more briefly, the mission to Côte 
d’Ivoire.  Both of these missions have been marked by controversy for failing to provide 
sufficient protection to civilians in many cases, but also because it is alleged that they may have 
become parties to the conflicts that they were sent to try and help to resolve.  MONUSCO has 
developed innovative community outreach measures as part of its POC strategy, but has also 
formed heavily armed brigades to ‘neutralise’ armed groups that threaten civilians.  UNOCI 
participated in military action that brought down the incumbent President of the country, 
although the UN continues to insist that it never actually became a party to the conflict.  This 
chapter highlights the positive obligations of peacekeeping missions to protect civilians and also 
poses the question should a POC mandate be used as justification for UN missions to change 
from peacekeeping to war-fighting postures? 
 
Chapter Seven discusses the missions in Sudan and South Sudan.  Both have been particularly 
criticized for their reluctance to use force to protect civilians. UNAMID has also been accused of 
failing to speak out sufficiently clearly in the face of widespread violations of international 
human rights law and IHL and even providing logistical support to a senior Sudanese official 
under indictment by the International Criminal Court (ICC).  Both missions are, however, 
currently sheltering tens of thousands of civilians on their bases. The chapter also explores the 
                                                 
22 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Factsheet, 31 December 2014.  
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/bnote1214.pdf, accessed 14 January 2015.  This lists a total 
of 13 UN peacekeeping missions with over 122,000 personnel deployed (103,798 of whom are uniformed 
personnel).  Around 68,000 of these are in the four case-study missions. 
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UN’s positive obligations where civilians are under a mission’s effective control, and discusses 
their obligations to investigate and report violations of international human rights law and IHL. 
 
The conclusion of this thesis argues that POC has emerged as a new normative principle guiding 
UN peacekeeping missions.  UN peacekeeping soldiers will never be able to secure to everyone 
within their areas of responsibilities all the rights and freedoms safeguarded by international 
human rights law.  Neither can they realistically protect more than a small fraction of the 
civilians whose lives are at risk in armed conflicts.  In accepting that its missions have POC 
responsibilities, however, the UN also needs to accept its human rights obligations to the people 
it has been sent to protect. 
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PART ONE: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ‘PROTECTION’ AND 
‘PEACEKEEPING’ 
Chapter One  
Laws and wars and rights and wrongs: the general international legal framework relevant 
to protection 
 
Introduction 
 
Provisions relating to ‘protection’ can be found in four main international legal frameworks: 
international human rights law, international humanitarian law (IHL), refugee law and the UN 
Charter.  The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has drawn on these different frameworks when 
considering the negative and positive ‘protection obligations’ that the Charter places on both 
States and the UN itself.  
 
Some believe that the growing prominence of ‘protection’ in international law has helped to 
reframe the debate about ‘humanitarian interventions’, whereby a State, or group of States, may 
forcibly intervene in the territory of another State for humanitarian protective purposes.1  A 
                                                 
1 There is no universally accepted definition for the term ‘humanitarian intervention’, but for further 
discussion see: Marko Marjanovic, ‘Is Humanitarian War the Exception?’, Mises Institute, 4 April 2011; 
Francis Kofi Abiew, The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention, Kluwer 
Law International, 1999, p. 31; and Humanitarian Intervention, Legal and Political Aspects, Copenhagen: 
Danish Institute of International Affairs, 1999, p. 11.   Marjanovic has described it as a State’s use of  
‘military force against another state when the chief publicly declared aim of that military action is 
ending human-rights violations being perpetrated by the state against which it is directed.’   Abew calls it 
‘the theory of intervention on the ground of humanity . . . . [that] recognizes the right of one State to 
exercise international control over the acts of another in regard to its internal sovereignty when contrary to 
the laws of humanity.  The Danish Institute of International Affairs, defines it as ‘coercive action by States 
involving the use of armed force in another State without the consent of its government, with or without 
authorisation from the United Nations Security Council, for the purpose of preventing or putting to a halt 
gross and massive violations of human rights or international humanitarian law.’   
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report published in 2001 also coined the term the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P),2  whose 
proponents describe it as ‘an emerging international norm’, by which the ‘international 
community’ may occasionally substitute itself for the protection that States are expected to 
provide those within their jurisdiction.3   
 
The Protection of Civilians (POC) is sometimes associated with both R2P and ‘humanitarian 
interventions’.   It will be argued here, however, that POC is best understood as a quite separate 
concept that is firmly based in international law and with an emerging normative significance 
that the other two concepts lack.  Indeed, as will be discussed in subsequent chapters, conflating 
them may actually have made it more difficult for UN peacekeeping missions to provide 
effective protection to civilians in practice. 
 
Historical overview 
 
Attempts to replace the use of force with a system of collective security can be traced back to the 
Peace of Westphalia in 1648 by which States agreed to end the European ‘wars of religion’ and 
respect the principle of non-intervention in one another’s internal affairs.4  The Grotian5 theories 
                                                 
2 Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun (Co-Chairs), The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Ottawa: International Development 
Research Centre, 2001 [Hereinafter ICISS 2001]. 
3 R2P, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org, accessed 2 August 2015.  ‘R2P 
is an emerging international norm which sets forth that states have the primary responsibility to protect 
their populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, but that when 
the state fails to protect its populations, the responsibility falls to the international community.’   
4 Amos S. Hershey, ‘History of International Law Since the Peace of Westphalia’, The American Journal 
of International Law, Vol. 6, No. 1, Jan., 1912.  See also Malcolm Shaw, International Law, Sixth Edition, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp.1-65. 
5 Hugo Grotius ‘Comentarius in Theses XI’: An Early Treatise on Sovereignty, the Just War and the 
Legitimacy of the Dutch Revolt, (Commentary Peter Borschenberg), Berne: New York, P. Lang, 199; and T 
M C Asser Instituut (ed) International Law and the Grotian Heritage, 1983. 
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of natural law gave way to the Vattelian6 positivist belief that the rules of international law 
governing the conduct between ‘civilised nations’, were based on common consent.7  Individuals 
were objects not subjects in the latter scheme and only municipal law regulated relations between 
different individuals and the State.8  The first edition of Oppenheim’s International Law, 
published in 1905, for example, declared that individuals had no place in international law, 
except as objects over which a State exercised jurisdiction, or through the protection provided by 
their own State if they were abroad.9   
 
Although the principle of non-intervention was generally accepted as part of the ‘western’ legal 
order of the nineteenth century, certain exceptions to it existed, including the concept of 
‘humanitarian intervention’.10  This doctrine played a role in the interventions by European 
powers in 1827; in support of a Greek uprising against the Turks; by Britain and France in Sicily 
in 1856; by a number of European powers in Syria in 1860; and repeated interventions in the 
                                                 
6 E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations or, The Principles of the Law of Nature Applied to the Conduct and 
Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, 1758, Republished B. Kapossy and R Whatmore (eds), Indianapolis, 
Liberty Fund, 2008.  
7 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Politics of International Law’, European Journal of International Law, No. 4, 
1990, pp.1-32; Prosper Weil, ‘Towards Relative Normativity in International Law’, American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 77, No. 3 July 1983, pp.413-442. 
8 Kate Parlett, The Individual in the International Legal System, continuity and change in international 
law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p.3.  See also Ian Brownlie The Rule of Law in 
International Affairs, The Hague/London/Boston: Martin Nijhoff Publishers, 1998; and Cátia Lopes and 
Noëlle Quénivet, ‘Individuals as Subjects of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law’, in 
Roberta Arnold and Noelle Quénivet (eds), International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, 
Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhof, 2008, pp199-236.  
9 Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, London: Longmans Green & Co., 1905, paras 291-3, 
297-302, 319-22, 344-7 and 347; and Chorzow Factory Case (Germany v. Poland), Indemnity and Merits, 
PCIJ Reports, Series A, No. 17, 1928, where the PCIJ affirmed that in a diplomatic protection claim, the 
rights at issue are States’ rights, not individual rights.  See also Guy Goodwin Gill, The Refugee in 
International Law, Third Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp.173-4; and Parlett, 2011, 
pp.1-26.  Diplomatic protection is often referred to as a ‘fiction’ that transposes wrongs against individuals 
into wrongs against their State of nationality.  
10 For a short overview of the legal debates surrounding ‘humanitarian interventions’ see Peter Malanczuk, 
Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, seventh revised edition, London and New York: 
Routledge, 1999, pp.19-20; and DJ Harris Cases and materials on international law, fifth edition, London: 
Sweet and Maxwell, 1998, pp.624-6. 
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Ottoman Empire in 1866, 1875, 1877 and 1887.11  It was also widely relied upon during the 
‘scramble for Africa’, with many European commentators citing the need to ‘save’ Africa’s 
people from backwardness in general and the Arab-led slave trade in particular.12  Some of the 
treaties that ‘carved up’ Africa’s new borders between the European powers, consequently 
contained clauses relating to the treatment of the native population.13   The British navy also took 
unilateral action against slave-trading ships off the African coast.14 
 
Some international courts did begin to recognise the rights of individuals at the start of the 
twentieth century.15  The Treaty of Versailles of 1919 allowed individuals to bring claims against 
foreign States for war damage and the creation of the League of Nations required some 
modification of the notion that only States had rights and duties in international law.16  Large-
                                                 
11 For an overview see Davide Rodogono, Against massacre: humanitarian intervention in nineteenth 
century Europe, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2011. 
12 See Thomas Pakenham, The scramble for Africa, London: Abacus books, 1991; David Olusoga and 
Casper Erichsen, The Kaisers's Holocaust: Germany’s Forgotten Genocide and the Colonial Roots of 
Nazism. London: Faber and Faber, 2010; Adam Hochschild, King Leopold's Ghost, A Story of Greed, 
Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1998; and Roger Casement, 
Casement Report, Report from His Majesty’s Consul at Boma Respecting the Administration of the 
Independent State of the Congo, Presented to Both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty, 
March 1904. 
13 For further discussion see Tom J Farer and Felice Gaer, ‘Chapter 8’, in Adam Roberts, and Benedict 
Kingsbury, United Nations, Divided World, the UN’s role in international relations, Oxford: Clarendon 
Paperbacks, 1996, pp.241-2.  For example, Article 6 of the General Act of the Berlin Conference in 1884-5 
required: ‘All the Powers exercising sovereign rights or influence in the aforesaid territories bind 
themselves to watch over the preservation of the native tribes, and to care for the improvement of the 
conditions of their moral and material well-being, and to help in suppressing slavery, and especially the 
slave trade. They shall, without distinction of creed or nation, protect and favour all religious, scientific or 
charitable institutions and undertakings created and organized for the above ends, or which aim at 
instructing the natives and bringing home to them the blessings of civilization.’ The Convention Relative to 
the Slave Trade and Importation into Africa of Firearms, Ammunition, and Spiritous Liquors (Brussels 
Conference) of 1890 also urged parties ‘to improve the moral and material conditions of existence of the 
native races.’  Neither treaty provided for monitoring or enforcement mechanisms. 
14 For further discussion see Adam Hochschild, Bury the Chains: The British Struggle to Abolish Slavery, 
London: Macmillan, 2005.  The Royal Navy established the West Africa Squadron (or Preventative 
Squadron) in 1808 after Parliament passed the Slave Trade Act of 1807. At the height of its operations, 
squadron employed a sixth of the entire fleet and Marines.  Britain had previously been the world’s leading 
slave trader and its subsequent efforts to eliminate the practice amongst competitors may have owed as 
much to economics as altruism.  
15 See Parlett, 2011, p.60. These included the Central American Court of Justice and the International Prize 
Court, both established in 1907.  
16 For further details see Francisco Orrego Vicuna, Individuals and Non-State Entities before International 
Courts and Tribunals, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, Vol. 5, 2001, pp.55-6; and A. 
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scale forced migration as a result of the First World War created the need for new arrangements 
for dealing with refugees.17  The drawing of new borders in Europe and the changing status of 
some countries’ colonial possessions also led to mechanisms being devised to protect the rights 
of minorities as well as the inhabitants of mandated territories.18   
 
In the Lotus case of 1927 the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) re-stated the 
classical positivist view that: ‘International law governs relations between independent States. 
The rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in 
conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law.’19  However, in 
Danzig, the following year, the Court held that individual rights could be created by an 
international treaty when this was the clearly expressed intent of the contracting parties.20   
 
The inter-war period saw some strengthening of the laws of armed conflict and the two  Geneva 
Conventions of 1929 were the first humanitarian law treaties to refer to rights for individuals.21  
                                                 
McNair, Oppenheim’s International Law, Fourth Edition, London: Longmans, 1928, Vol. 1, pp.133-4.  
The Treaty of Versailles was one of the five peace treaties imposed on the defeated Central Powers.  These 
imposed reparations and laid the guilt for the war on ‘the aggression of Germany and her allies’ as well as 
awarding German and Ottoman overseas possessions as ‘mandates’ chiefly to Britain and France.  The 
conference also created the League of Nations with the aim of preventing future war. 
17 Ibid.  See also James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp.81-91. 
18 For further discussion on the mandate system see Michael D. Callahan, Mandates and Empire, The 
League of Nations and Africa, 1914–1931, Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 1998.  On minorities see 
Helmer Rosting, ‘Protection of Minorities by the League of Nations’, The American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 17, No. 4, 1923, pp.641-60; and Gaetano Pentassuglia, ‘Minority rights, human 
rights: a review of Basic concepts, entitlements and implementation procedures under international law,’ in 
Mechanisms for the Implementation of Minority Rights, Council of Europe, 2005. 
19 The Case of the S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), PCIJ Reports, Series A, No. 10, 1927, p.18. 
20 Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig (Pecuniary Claims of the Danzig Railway Officials who have passed 
into the Polish Service, Against the Polish Railways Administration, PCJI Reports, Series B, No.15, 1928, 
pp.17-18. 
21  For more details see Susan Tiefenbrun, Decoding International Law: Semiotics and the Humanities, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 147.  In particular, the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in 
War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 1925.  
See also the two Conventions 1929: the (Geneva) Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 
1929; and the (Geneva) Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick 
Armies in the Field 1929. 
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The International Labour Organization (ILO) concluded numerous conventions aimed at 
improving the conditions of workers.22  The 1926 Slavery Convention also imposed obligations 
on States parties to ‘prevent and suppress the slave trade’ pending the ‘complete abolition of 
slavery’.23  Most legal scholars nevertheless continued to argue that individuals could not be the 
subjects of international law and had no rights or duties under it.24  The League of Nation’s 
Covenant made no reference to individual rights, although it expressed a commitment to respect 
principles of humanity.25   
 
The post-Second World War framework saw a significant transformation of this doctrine.  The 
UN Charter, of 1945,26 contains a number of references to human rights, although these are 
mainly ‘promotional’ in character.27  The Charter created the ICJ,28 which can both adjudicate 
inter-state disputes and issue Advisory Opinions. 29  It also provided that the UN General 
Assembly should ‘initiate studies and make recommendations’ for the purposes of ‘assisting in 
the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms’.30   It may also establish ´subsidiary 
                                                 
22 ILO Conventions 1 – 67, See ILOLEX Database of International Labour Standards, 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm accessed 5 December 2012. A total of sixty-seven 
conventions were concluded between 1919 and 1939.  
23 Slavery, Servitude, Forced Labour and Similar Institutions and Practices Convention of 1926 (Slavery 
Convention of 1926), 60 L.N.T.S. 253, entered into force March 9, 1927, Article 2. 
24 Parlett, 2011, pp.16 – 26 provides a summary discussion of the contrasting views of two of the period’s 
leading international scholars on the significance of the Danzig decision Dioniso Anzilotti, Cours de droit 
International, Paris: Librarie de Recueil Sirey, 1929; and Hersch Lauterpacht, The Development of 
International Law by the Permanent Court of International Justice, London: Longmans, 1934. 
25 The Covenant of the League of Nations, the Avalon Project: documents in law, history and diplomacy, 
Yale Law School, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp, accessed 21 January 2013.  
26 UN Charter, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, entered into force Oct. 24, 1945. 
27 There are eight total in total:  in its Preamble, in Article 1.3 (where promotion of human rights is listed as 
one of the UN’s purposes), in Article 13.1 (functions of the UN General Assembly), Articles 55 and 56 
(pledging to promote human rights and take joint action to do so, Article 62 (ECOSOC), Article 68 
(ECOSOC Commissions), Article 76 on international trusteeships.  The references to the promotion of 
human rights in Articles 1.3 and Articles 55 and 56 are the main references for subsequent discussion. 
28 UN Charter, Articles 92 – 96. 
29 The Competence of the Court is defined in Articles 34-8 of its statute.  Article 65, paragraph 1, of the 
ICJ’s Statute provides that ‘[it] may give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of 
whatever body may be authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such 
a request.’ 
30 Article 13(1). 
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organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.´31   The International Law 
Commission (ILC) was also tasked with the codification of international law and its 
progressive development.32  The ICJ’s findings in contentious cases are binding only as 
between the parties to them,33 while its Advisory Opinions are, by definition, non-binding.34  
Nevertheless, its jurisprudence has significantly guided the development of international law 
within the UN Charter framework.35    
 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was proclaimed at the UN in 1948,36 laying 
the basis for the development of subsequent human rights treaties.37  The Geneva Conventions of 
1949 enhanced the provisions of earlier treaties and added a Fourth Convention, which set out the 
rights and duties of an occupying power and expanded the protections due to civilians.38  Two 
                                                 
31 UN Charter, Article 22. 
32 This was established by the UN in 1947.  See http://www.un.org/law/ilc/index.htm, accessed 30 April 
2013.  The ILC has been responsible for drafting of new conventions, such as the Additional Protocols to 
Geneva Conventions 1977; the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 and the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court 1988.  It has also produced reports summarizing existing law, such as the 
Draft Articles on State Responsibility 2001. 
33 Article 59 of the ICJ Statute provides that: ‘The decision of the Court has no binding force except 
between the parties and in respect of that particular case.’  See also Land and Maritime Border (Cameroon 
v. Nigeria), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2002, pp.303 and 406.   
34 Humphrey, ‘The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Its History, Impact and Juridical Character’, in 
B G Ramcharan (ed), Human Rights: Thirty Years After the Universal Declaration (1979), p. 36.   See also 
Erika De Wet, The Chapter VII powers of the United Nations Security Council, Portland, Oregon: Hart 
Publishing, 2004, p.28 and p.126.  She notes that ‘in practice advisory opinions are treated as having the 
same efficacy, authority and precedential value as a judgment in contentious proceedings.  In Difference 
relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, 29 
April 1999, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1999, the Court stated that its advisory opinion on a dispute 
between the UN and a member state, ‘shall be accepted as decisive between the parties.’   
35 Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice lists the means for determining the rules of 
international law as: international conventions establishing rules, international custom as evidence of a 
general practice accepted as law, the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations and judicial 
decisions and the teaching of eminent publicists. See also International Court of Justice, North Sea 
Continental Shelf cases, ICJ Reports 1969, p. 3. 
36 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN General Assembly Resolution 172 A (III), 10 December 
1948. 
37 The first of these, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Adopted 
by Resolution 260 (III) A of the United Nations General Assembly on 9 December 1948 (Genocide 
Convention), was adopted by the UN General Assembly the following day. 
38 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in 
the Field of 12 August 1949; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, 
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of 12 August 1949; Geneva Convention Relative 
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Additional Protocols were adopted, in 1977, the first of which reinforced protections for civilians 
in international armed conflicts, the second addressing the concept of protection in non-
international conflicts.39   
 
The Nuremberg Tribunal, which conducted a trial of leading Nazis between November 1945 and 
October 1946, ruled that individuals could be directly held to account for crimes against peace, 
war crimes, and crimes against humanity, when committed in connection with an international 
armed conflict.40  It also declared that initiating a war of aggression ‘is not only an international 
crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it 
contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole’.41  Certain crimes, such as genocide, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity are now recognised as being so serious that they can be 
prosecuted in third countries regardless of who committed them or where they took place.42  
International criminal tribunals, such as the one for Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993,43 for Rwanda 
(ICTR) in 199444 and the International Criminal Court (ICC) of 2003,45 have also been 
established to bring the perpetrators to justice .46   
                                                 
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949. 
39 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977; Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed 
Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977. 
40 See Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials, London: Bloomsbury, 1993. 
41 International Military Tribunal, judgment of 1 October 1946, in The Trial of German Major War 
Criminals. Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg, Germany, Part 22 
(22nd August 1946 to 1st October, 1946), p.25.  
http://crimeofaggression.info/documents/6/1946_Nuremberg_Judgement.pdf, accessed 1 September 2015. 
42 For an overview discussion see Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law, Second Edition, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008, pp.3-27.   
43 Home page of the ICTY, http://www.icty.org/ accessed 12 December 2012.   
44 Home page of the ICTR, http://www.unictr.org/ accessed 12 December 2012.   
45 Home page of the ICC, http://www.icc-cpi.int/EN_Menus/icc/Pages/default.aspx accessed 12 December 
2012.  Text of the Rome Statute circulated as document A/CONF.183/9 of 17 July 1998 and corrected by 
process-verbaux of 10 November 1998, 12 July 1999, 30 November 1999, 8 May 2000, 17 January 2001 
and 16 January 2002.  The Statute of the ICC was agreed in 1998 and the Court came into existence in 
2003, once it had received 60 state ratifications. 
46 ICTY was established by Security Council Resolution 827 of 25 May 1993.  ICTR was established by 
Security Council Resolution 955 of 8 November 1994.  The ICC was created by a separate treaty, although 
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 In 1950 the UN General Assembly established the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR)47 and the following year it adopted the Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees.48  UNHCR was initially viewed as a temporary organization to address the needs of 
those displaced in Europe by the Second World War, but its global reach was confirmed by a 
Protocol to the Convention in 1967.49  UNHCR has also become the lead UN humanitarian 
agency in a number of complex emergencies and has taken increasing responsibility for 
providing assistance and protection to IDPs.50   
 
                                                 
it has a negotiated relationship agreement with the UN.  See Negotiated Relationship Agreement between 
the International Criminal Court and the United Nations, signed 4 October 2004, pursuant to Article 2 of 
the Rome Statute. 
47 UN General Assembly Resolution 428(V), annex paras. 1,2.  This defined UNHCR’s purposes as being 
to provide ‘international protection’ and to seek ‘permanent solutions for the problems of refugees.’  For an 
overview see, Alexander Betts, Gil Loescher and James Milner, UNHCR: the politics and practice of 
refugee protection, second edition, Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2012; Goodwin Gill, 2007; and 
United Nations Library of International Law, Guy Goodwin Gill, ‘Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees Geneva, 28 July 1951, Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees New York, 31 January 1967’, 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/prsr/prsr.html, accessed 3 December 2012.   
48 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Adopted on 28 July 1951 by the United Nations 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons convened under General 
Assembly resolution 429 (V) of 14 December 1950 [Hereinafter the Refugee Convention 1951].  
49 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Entry into force: 4 October 1967, Text: 606 UNTS 267. 
50 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR's Role in Support of an Enhanced 
Humanitarian Response to Situations of Internal Displacement. Policy Framework and Implementation 
Strategy, 4 June 2007, EC/58/SC/CRP.18.  This will be discussed further in Chapter Four. 
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Refugee law and IHL require States and parties to conflicts, respectively, to recognize persons as 
having a certain status according to their membership of a defined group and treat them 
accordingly. International human rights law, by contrast, provides protections for all human 
beings at all times in all places within a State’s jurisdiction.51 It also includes various measures 
aimed at ensuring effective remedies for persons whose rights have been violated.52   
 
The Council of Europe drafted the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in 1950.53  In 
1966 the UN adopted the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR)54 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).55  There are a 
number of other universal56 and regional treaties,57 protecting a broad range of human rights.  
                                                 
51 For further discussion see Rosalyn Higgins, ‘Human Rights: Some Questions of Integrity’, 
Commonwealth Law Bulletin Vol 2, Issue 15, 1989, p.607; and Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Processes: 
International Law and How We Use It (OUP 1994).  Higgins has noted that, in contrast to the obligations 
that treaties create between States, international human rights laws ‘reflect rights inherent in human beings, 
not dependent upon grant by the state.’  
52 ECHR, Article 13, Article 6 (access to court)  and Article 41(reparations); ICCPR Article 2.3; Article 14 
(fair trial); ACHR, Article 1 and Article 25 (judicial protection); African Charter, Article 7 (fair trial).  See 
also Human Right Committee General Comment No. 31 - Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed 
on States Parties to the Covenant, paras 15-17. 
53 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), 213 U.N.T.S. 
222, entered into force 3 September 1953, as amended by Protocols Nos. 3, 5, 8, and 11which entered into 
force on 21 September 1970, 20 December 1971, 1 January 1990, and 1 November 1998 respectively. 
54 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered 
into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3 (ICESCR). 
55 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 
March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR). 
56 For example: International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(adopted 7 March 1966, entered into force 4 January 1969) 660 UNTS 195 (CERD); International 
Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (adopted 30 November 1973, 
entered into force 18 July 1976) 1015 UNTS 243;  Convention for the Elimination of all forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (adopted 18 December 1979 entry into force 3 September 1981), 
(CEDAW); Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(adopted 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987) 1465 UNTS 85 (CAT) Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3 
(CRC); and the International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (adopted 13 December 
2006, entered into force 3 May 2008), text in UN Doc A/61/611.  
57 For example: the Organization of American States: American Convention on Human Rights, ‘Pact of 
San Jose’, Costa Rica, 1969;  Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture (adopted 9 
December 1985, entered into force 28 February 1987) OAS TS 67; the Additional Protocol to the 
American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (‘Protocol of 
San Salvador’), 16 November 1999, A-52; Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and 
Eradication of Violence against Women (‘Convention of Belem do Para’), 9 June 1994; Inter-American 
Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons Adoption: June 9, 1994. Entry into force: March 28, 1996, 3 
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Courts and monitoring bodies have been established to oversee how these are being respected in 
practice and their case-law has elaborated these provisions in more detail.58  At the World 
Conference on human rights in Vienna, in 1993, the UN declared that: ‘All human rights are 
universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated’.59  This principle has been restated 
many times since.60  
 
‘Humanitarian interventions’ and the UN Charter 
 
The growing prominence of human rights in international law has led some to argue that where a 
State is manifestly failing to protect its own population from widespread violations, other States 
may be justified in intervening on ‘humanitarian’ grounds.61  The doctrine of ‘humanitarian 
                                                 
ILM 1429; Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Persons 
with Disabilities, 7 June 1999, AG/RES. 1608 (XXIX-O/99); African Union: African [Banjul] Charter on 
Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 
(1982), entered into force 21 October 1986; the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, 11 July 2003; African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child (adopted 1990, entered into force 29 November 1999), OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49; Convention 
Governing the specific aspects of Refugee problems in Africa 10 September 1969, 1001 UNTS 45;  
Council of Europe, the European Social Charter ETS No. 035 - Turin, 18.X.1961; European Convention 
for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1987 (adopted 26 
November 1987, entered into force 1 February 1989) ETS 126. 
58 The first human rights treaty to directly confer rights on individuals and corresponding legal obligations 
on States was the ECHR in 1950, which created the European Court on Human Rights.  Individuals may 
directly petition or complain of violations to this court.  The ICCPR, ICERD, CEDAW, CAT, Inter-
American Commission of Human Rights (IACHR) and African Charter also all have individual petition 
mechanisms. 
59 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, Adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights in 
Vienna on 25 June 1993, A/CONF.157/23, 14-25 June 1993. 
60 For further discussion see, for example: Andrew Clapham, Human Rights: A Very Short Introduction, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007; Samuel Moyne, The last utopia, human rights in history, Cambridge 
Mass and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010; Javaid Rehman, International 
Human Rights Law, a practical guide, Harlow: Pearson Education ltd.; Theodor Merron, (ed) Human Rights 
in International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988; and Obrad Savic, The politics of human rights, 
London: Verso, 1999.  
61 For generally supportive arguments see Lillich (ed) Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations, 
University of Virginia Press, Charlottesville, 1973; Jean-Pierre Fonteyne, ‘The customary international law 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention: its current validity under the UN Charter’, California Western 
International Law Journal, 1974, p.203; Nikolaos Tsagourias, Jurisprudence of international law, The 
humanitarian dimension, Manchester University Press, 2000, pp.5-41; Sean Murphy, Humanitarian 
Intervention, The United Nations in an Evolving World Order, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996,  pp. 
7-20; and Brian Lepard, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: A Fresh Legal Approach Based on 
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intervention’ was originally associated with apologias for nineteenth century imperialism.62  The 
revelations about the Holocaust, however, made some legal scholars urge its reconsideration.  In 
the sixth edition of Oppenheim’s International Law, published in 1947, for example, Lauterpacht 
argued that:   
 
There is general agreement that, by virtue of its personal and territorial supremacy, a 
State can treat its own nationals according to discretion. But there is a substantial body of 
opinion and of practice in support of the view that there are limits to that discretion . . . 
when a State renders itself guilty of cruelties against and persecution of its nationals, in 
such a way as to deny their fundamental human rights and to shock the conscience of 
mankind, intervention in the interest of humanity is legally permissible.63 
 
Although some consider ‘humanitarian intervention’ to be an exception to the principle of non-
intervention, it is difficult to see how it is compatible with the system of international relations 
envisaged by the UN Charter and the framework of international law developed since 1945.  
While this does provide greater protection to individuals, it has been balanced by the 
development of three countervailing principles: the strengthening of people’s right to self-
                                                 
Fundamental Ethical Principles in International Law and World Religions, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania 
State University, 2003. 
62 John Stuart Mill, ‘A few words on non-intervention 1859’ in The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, 
Volume XXI - Essays on Equality, Law, and Education [1825], ed. John M. Robson, Introduction by Stefan 
Collini, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984.  See also: See 
Hugo Grotius ‘Comentarius in Theses XI’: An Early Treatise on Sovereignty, the Just War and the 
Legitimacy of the Dutch Revolt, (Commentary Peter Borschenberg), Berne: New York, P. Lang, 199; and T 
M C Asser Instituut (Ed) International Law and the Grotian Heritage, 1983 for the origins of ‘just war’ 
theory.   
63 Hersch Lauterpacht, Oppenheim's International Law, London: Longmans, Green & Co, 1947, p.96. 
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determination;64 restrictions on outside interference in what are properly a country’s internal 
affairs65 and a reaffirmation of the legal prohibition on the unilateral threat or use of force.66    
 
Membership of the UN is open to all ‘peace-loving nations’ irrespective of the nature of their 
government, providing that they accept the obligations of the Charter.67  This enshrines core 
principles of international law including respect for the sovereign equality of nations, a 
prohibition on the unilateral use of force and an obligation to act in good faith.  Article 1 of the 
Charter states the UN’s primary purpose to be the collective maintenance of international peace 
and security.68 The prohibition on the use of force and external intervention is set out in Article 2:  
 
4.  All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. 
7.  Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in 
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the 
Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle 
shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII. 69 
                                                 
64 The ICCPR and ICESCR both place the right to ‘self-determination’ as the first Article in their list of 
human rights. 
65 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, (Merits) Judgment, of 
27 June 1986, ICJ Report 1986, paras 172 – 200; Armed Activities on the Territory of the 
Congo(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, ICJ Report 2005,  para 148 .  
66 International Military Tribunal (Nuremburg Tribunal), Judgment of 1 October 1946, p.25.  See also, 
Annex I, Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International, Criminal Court on the crime of aggression, 
Article 8 bis, Crime of aggression, 1, Resolution RC/Res.6, Adopted at the 13th plenary meeting, on 11 
June 2010, by consensus.  
67 For further discussion see: Christopher Joyner (ed), The United Nations and International Law, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997; Bruno Simma, The Charter of the United Nations A 
Commentary Second Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002; and Michael Matheson, Council 
Unbound: the growth of UN decision-making on conflict and post-conflict issues after the Cold War, 
Washington: US Institute for Peace, 2006; and Malanczuk, 1999, pp.26-9. 
68 UN Charter, Article 1.1.  
69 UN Charter Article 2.  
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The only two explicit exceptions to the prohibition of the threat or use of force in the Charter are 
the ‘inherent right of self-defence’ recognized by Article 5170 and operations authorized by the 
Security Council under Chapter VII.71  Some have argued that Article 2(4) only specifically 
prohibits the threat or use of force ‘against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations’ and that 
this may not preclude its use for other purposes.72  Powerful States who believe that a weak State 
is violating international law may be tempted to rely on this formulation if they decide to take 
matters into their own hands.73   
 
This argument was made in 1949 by the United Kingdom (UK) in the Corfu Channel case, in 
which the British Navy sent minesweepers into Albanian territorial waters after damage suffered 
by their ships and loss of lives.74  The ICJ criticised Albania for neglecting to warn shipping that 
its waters were mined and awarded damages to Britain.75  However it also stated that it could ‘not 
accept’ the UK’s ‘theory of intervention’, which it described as ‘a policy of force . . . and as such 
cannot, whatever be the present defects in international organisation, find a place in international 
                                                 
70 UN Charter Article 51.  See also the Caroline case 1841-42.  Quoted in D J Harris, Cases and Materials 
in International Law 5th Ed. Sweet and Maxwell, 1998, p.894-917. 
71 UN Charter Articles 39-51.  Article 39 provides that the Security Council shall ‘determine the existence 
of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or 
decide what measures shall be taken’.  Article 40 provides for ‘provisional measures’ to be taken.  Article 
41 provides for sanctions and Article 42 provides for the use of military force. 
72 For a summary of this debate see, for example, Christine Gray, Use of Force in International Law, Third 
Edition, Oxford: Oxford, University Press, 2008, pp.6-24 and 32-3; and Noam Lubell, Extraterritorial Use 
of Force Against Non-State Actors, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp.27-8. 
73 Ibid., Israel argued a similar point at the UN Security Council in justification for its raid on the Entebbe 
airport in Uganda in 1976 to rescue a group of hostages being held captive.  However, the majority of 
countries, even those supporting Israel’s actions, did not wish to accept a reduction of the scope of Article 
2(4) in this way.  
74 Corfu Channel Case (UK v. Albania), Judgment of 9 April 1949, ICJ Reports 1949. In the first incident 
British ships entered Albanian territorial waters and came under fire from Albanian fortifications, although 
no one was injured.  In the second incident two British ships struck mines, killing 44 British sailors.  In the 
third incident British ships carried out mine clearing operations in Albanian territorial waters.   
75 Ibid., p.36. Albania refused to pay the damages awarded and the two countries broke off diplomatic 
relations. 
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law.  Intervention is perhaps less admissible in the particular form it would take here, for, from 
the nature of things, it would be reserved to the most powerful States, and might easily lead to 
perverting the administration of international justice itself.’76   
 
In Nicaragua v the United States, in 1986, the ICJ restated its decision in the Corfu Channel case, 
and held that both the principles of non-intervention and the prohibition on the use of force were 
a part of customary international law, and that the principle of non-use of force may also be jus 
cogens. 77  The ICJ rejected the United States (US) justification of collective self-defence, 
because Nicaragua had allegedly helped rebels in neighbouring countries.  It also rejected the US 
argument that its intervention had been justified by the human rights situation in Nicaragua, 
stating that ‘where human rights are protected by international conventions, that  protection takes  
the form  of  such  arrangements for monitoring  or ensuring respect for human rights as are 
provided for in the conventions themselves’:78 
 
In any event, while the United States might form its own appraisal of the situation as to 
respect for human rights in Nicaragua, the use of force could not be the appropriate 
method to monitor or ensure such respect. . . A strictly humanitarian objective cannot be 
compatible with the mining of ports, the destruction of oil installations, or again with the 
training, arming and equipping of the contras.79 
 
                                                 
76Ibid., pp.34-5. It also stated that, ‘Between independent States, respect for territorial sovereignty is an 
essential foundation of international relations. The Court recognises that the Albanian Government's 
complete failure to carry out its duties after the explosions, and the dilatory nature of its diplomatic notes, 
are extenuating circumstances for the action of the United Kingdom Government. But to ensure respect for 
international law, of which it is the organ, the Court must declare that the action of the British Navy 
constituted a violation of Albanian sovereignty.’ 
77 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, Judgment, of 27 June 
1986, ICJ Reports 1986, paras 172-202.  
78 Ibid., para 268. 
79 Ibid..  It concluded that: ‘the argument derived from the preservation of human rights in Nicaragua 
cannot afford a legal justification for the conduct of the United States’. 
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While the ICJ rejected most of the US’s arguments for interfering in Nicaragua’s internal affairs, 
it ruled that not all of the support extended to the contras was unlawful.  It distinguished between 
the delivery of humanitarian aid and weapons to the contras and stated that: ‘There can be no 
doubt that the provision of strictly humanitarian aid to persons or forces in another country, 
whatever their political affiliations or objectives, cannot be regarded as unlawful, or as in any 
other way contrary to international law.’80   
 
In the view of the Court, if the provision of ‘humanitarian assistance’ is to escape 
condemnation as an intervention in the internal affairs of Nicaragua, not only must it be 
limited to the purposes hallowed in the practices of the Red Cross, namely ‘to prevent 
and alleviate human suffering’ and ‘to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the 
human being’; it must also and above all be given without discrimination to all in need in 
Nicaragua, not merely to the contras and their dependents.81   
 
In Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, in 2005, the ICJ restated that the prohibition 
on the threat or use of force is a ‘cornerstone of the UN Charter’82 and ruled that Uganda had 
violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) 
both directly and by actively extending military, logistic, economic and financial support to 
irregular forces that had operated on its territory.83  It also noted that certain provisions in the UN 
Declaration on Friendly Relations – prohibiting the promotion of civil strife, terrorism and armed 
activities in other States – were declaratory of customary international law.84   
                                                 
80Ibid., para, 242. 
81 Ibid., para 243. 
82 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), 
Judgment, ICJ Reports 19 December 2005, ICJ Reports 2005, para 148.   
83 Ibid., paras 160 and 345.   
84 Ibid., para 162; See also ICJ Reports 1986, paras 190 and 202.  ‘Every State has the duty to refrain from 
organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or 
acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts, when 
the acts referred to in the present paragraph involve a threat or use of force’ and ‘no State shall organize, 
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The principle of non-interference and non-intervention has been re-stated on many occasions by 
the UN General Assembly, such as in the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the 
Domestic Affairs of States the Definition of Aggression; the Declaration on Friendly Relations 
and the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs 
of States.85  General proscriptions on intervention have also been written into the Charter of the 
Organisation of African Unity,86 the Charter of the Organisation of American States87 and the 
Principles of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference.88  States are also prohibited from 
transferring weapons and military assistance to non-state groups if these violate UN Security 
Council arms embargos, or other international agreements, or if a State has knowledge that they 
will be used in the commission of grave violations of international human rights law or IHL.89 
 
The crime of aggression was included in the 1998 Rome Statute of the ICC, although it was 
agreed that the Court could only ‘exercise jurisdiction over the crime’ once its elements had been 
                                                 
assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the 
violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in another State.’ 
85 UN General Assembly Resolution 2131 (1965) Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the 
Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty.  See also Resolution 
3314, (1974) On the Definition of Aggression; Resolution 2625 (1970) Declaration on Principles of 
International Laws concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States; Resolution 36/103 
(1981) Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States.    
86 Charter of the Organisation of African Unity, Article 3. 
87 Charter of the Organisation of American States, Article 18. 
88 Principles of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference, 1(a) Declaration on principles guiding relations 
between participating states:  II. Refraining from the threat or use of force. 
89 UN Arms Trade Treaty of 24 December 2013.  For background see Amnesty International, The long 
journey towards an Arms Trade Treaty, 5 June 2013; Andrew Clapham, ‘The Arms Trade Treaty: A Call 
for an Awakening’, European Society of International Law Reflections, Volume 2, Issue 5, May 6, 2013; 
The Arms Trade Treaty (2013), Geneva: The Geneva Academy, June 2013; Matthew Bolton, Helena 
Whall, Allison Pytlak, Hector Guerra and Katelyn E. James, ‘The Arms Trade Treaty from a Global Civil 
Society Perspective’, Global Policy (2014) doi: 10.1111/1758-5899.12171.  During the negotiations that 
led to the treaty’s adoption some argued that a total prohibition of such transfers was implicit in general 
international law.  Although this was not reflected in the final text, the treaty states:  ‘If the export is not 
prohibited under article 6, each exporting state party, under article 7, agrees that, prior to authorization of 
exports, they will assess the potential that conventional arms or related items will undermine peace and 
security or be used to commit or facilitate a serious violation of international humanitarian or human rights 
law, or acts constituting terrorism or transnational organized crimes.’   
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defined at a later date.90  This was finally agreed at the Kampala review conference of 2010, 
which further stipulated that the actual exercise of jurisdiction over the crime is subject to a 
decision to be taken after 1 January 2017.91  A US sponsored amendment, which could have 
exempted some ‘humanitarian interventions’ from these provisions was rejected.92 
 
While the treaty provisions prohibiting unilateral ‘humanitarian interventions’ appear extremely 
clear, some States and some legal scholars have argued that there will be occasions when such 
action is the only way to save lives and prevent mass atrocities.93  Belgium briefly referred to the 
doctrine during its oral submission to a case arising out of the NATO intervention during the 
Kosovo crisis,94 but did not mention it in its written submission.95  Britain has asserted its 
existence in some public statements, although it has not relied on the doctrine in any legal 
cases.96   
                                                 
90 Rome Statute, Article 5.2: The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a 
provision is adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out the 
conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime. Such a provision 
shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.’ 
91 Resolution RC/Res.6, Adopted at the 13th plenary meeting, on 11 June 2010, by consensus.  See Annex 
for full text of the definition of the crime. 
92 For discussion see Matthew Gillett, ‘The Anatomy of an International Crime: Aggression at the 
International Criminal Court’, International Criminal Law Review, Volume 13, Issue 4, 2013, pp.829–864; 
and Carrie McDougall, The Crime of Aggression Under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.  The proposed wording read: ‘It is understood that, 
for purposes of the Statute, an act cannot be considered to be a manifest violation of the United Nations 
Charter unless it would be objectively evident to any State conducting itself in the matter in accordance 
with normal practice and in good faith, and thus an act undertaken in connection with an effort to prevent 
the commission of any of the crimes contained in articles 6, 7 or 8 of the Statute would not constitute an act 
of aggression.’ 
93 Matthew C. Waxman, Intervention to Stop Genocide and Mass Atrocities, New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations, Special Report No. 49 October 2009. 
94 International Court of Justice, The Hague, Public sitting held on Monday 10 May 1999, at 3 p.m., at the 
Peace Palace, Vice-President Weeramantry, Acting President, presiding in the case concerning Legality of 
Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belgium) Request for the indication of provisional measures, p.12.   
95 See International Court of Justice Case Concerning Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belgium) 
Preliminary Objections of the Kingdom of Belgium ICJ Reports, 5 July 2000. 
96 See, for example, Prime Minister’s Office, Guidance, Chemical weapon use by Syrian regime: UK 
government legal position, 29 August 2013, No. 10 Downing Street, London, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/chemical-weapon-use-by-syrian-regime-uk-government-
legal-position/chemical-weapon-use-by-syrian-regime-uk-government-legal-position-html-version 
accessed 7 November 2014.  See also Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, FCO, Written Reply in the 
House of Lords (16 Nov. 1998) in: HL Debs., vol. 594, WA 139-40; and The expanding role of the United 
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Cassese has argued that ‘a new customary rule might be in the process of formation’ legitimising 
such actions ‘in the event of a failure of the UN Security Council to respond to egregious 
violations’.97  Wolf maintains that ‘abstract declarations’ by the UN General Assembly 
supporting the principle of non-intervention should not be taken at face value and that States may 
legitimately intervene ‘to prevent mass slaughter [in cases where this] does not implicate intense 
global rivalries.’98  Greenwood states that unilateral intervention to prevent ‘another Rwanda, 
another Holocaust or even acts of mass killing that cannot be characterised as genocide, must be 
permissible under customary international law.’99  Lillich questions, rhetorically, whether, in the 
absence of ‘collective machinery’ to protect human rights, States should ‘sit by and do nothing 
merely because Article 2(4) arguably was intended by its drafters in 1945 to preclude unilateral 
humanitarian intervention.’100   
 
As will be discussed in Chapter Two these arguments gained force in the 1990s due to the failure 
of UN peacekeeping missions to protect civilians. Forsythe, for example, argued that, ‘if a state 
fail[s] to meet its responsibility to protect internationally recognized human rights standards, then 
the UN Security Council or some other entity might override traditional notions of state 
                                                 
Nations and its implications for UK policy: minutes of evidence, hearing of the Foreign Affairs Committee 
of the House of Commons, 2 December 1992, para 84. Statement of Tony Aust, Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office Legal Counsellor. 
97 Antonio Cassese, ‘A Follow-Up: Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures and Opinio Necessitatis’ 
European Journal of International Law Vo.10, No.4, 1999, pp.791-799; see also Cassese, ‘Ex iniuria ius 
oritur: Are We Moving towards International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in 
the World Community?’, European Journal of International Law, Vol.10, No.1, 1999, p.23-30; and 
Antonio Cassese, International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 321.   
98 Daniel Wolf ‘Humanitarian intervention’, Michigan Yearbook on International Studies, 1998, p.358-359. 
99 Interview with the author of this thesis at seminar on the use of force under international law, Save the 
Children UK Offices, London, June 2002. 
100 Richard Lillich, ‘Humanitarian Intervention: A reply to Dr. Brownlie and a Plea for Constructive 
Alternatives’, in: John Norton Moore (ed.), Law and civil war in the modern world, Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1974, p. 238. 
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sovereignty and try international direct protection of rights.’101  Robertson maintained that since 
requiring Security Council authorization grants a veto to each of its permanent members, such 
decisions ‘cannot be the sole prerogative of the UN, because its defective procedures have 
blocked it [intervention] on many appropriate occasions.’102  Shue has stated that ‘an authorizing 
body for military intervention needs to be either democratic or impartial or both.  The Security 
Council is neither.’103  Others have argued for the creation of a League of Democracies, which 
could take military action in cases ‘where the UN failed to act’.104  Buchanan, for example, 
proposes that liberal democratic States draw up a new treaty containing criteria for when military 
interventions on human rights grounds are permissible and that this would explicitly ‘violate 
existing UN-based law’ which ‘should be regarded as ‘not identical with international law’, but 
only ‘one, historically contingent institutional embodiment of the idea of an international legal 
system.’105   
 
The obvious riposte to these – essentially political – arguments is that unilateral military 
interventions are likely to be prompted by a variety of motives and that humanitarian arguments 
may just be a convenient excuse for an act of aggression.  Decisions involving the use of force 
which may have huge international ramifications are often driven by the domestic considerations 
                                                 
101 David Forsythe, Human Rights in International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000, p.23. [emphasis in original] 
102 Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity: the struggle for global justice, Allen Lane, 1999, p.72.  
He argues that ‘there is an ‘evolving principle of humanitarian necessity’ in which States may, in 
exceptional, conscience-shocking, situations use ‘proportionate force’ to intervene in other States’ internal 
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103 Henry Shue, ‘Let whatever is smouldering erupt’, in Albert Paolini, Anthony Jarvis, and Christian 
Reus-Smit, (eds.) Between sovereignty and global governance: the state, civil society and the United 
Nations, London and New York: Macmillan, 1998, p.73. 
104 Associated Press, ‘McCann favours a League of Democracies’, 30 April 2008, reporting on US 
Presidential candidate John McCain’s support for this proposal.   
105 Allen Buchanan ‘Reforming the law of humanitarian intervention’, in J L Holzgrefe and Robert 
Keohane (eds), Humanitarian Intervention: ethical, legal and political dilemmas, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003, 139.  For other more polemical arguments  in favour of ‘humanitarian 
interventions’ see, for example Norman Geras, Crimes against Humanity: Birth of a Concept, Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2012; James Traub, The Freedom Agenda: Why America Must Spread 
Democracy (Just Not the Way George Bush Did), London: Picador, 2009. 
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of political leaders of powerful States.106  The state practice relied upon is also extremely limited.  
Some cite India’s intervention in Bangladesh in 1971, Tanzania’s intervention in Uganda in 1979 
and Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia as ‘humanitarian’ because they ousted despotic 
regimes.107  As Gray has noted, however, none of the intervening States actually cited 
‘humanitarian intervention’ as the basis for their use of force and so the case seems to be that 
they ‘should have or could have used this justification.’108  Indeed Britain, one of the most 
enthusiastic exponents of the doctrine, had previously displayed marked a scepticism towards it.  
For example, in 1986, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) noted that:  
 
The state practice to which advocates of the right of humanitarian intervention have 
appealed provides an uncertain basis on which to rest such a right.  Not least this is 
because history has shown that humanitarian ends are almost always mixed with less 
laudable motives . . . the best case that can be made in support of humanitarian 
intervention is that it cannot be said to be unambiguously illegal . . . But the 
overwhelming majority of contemporary legal opinion comes down against . . . [it] for 
three main reasons: first, the UN Charter and the corpus of modern international law do 
not seem specifically to incorporate such a right; secondly, state practice in the past two 
centuries, and especially since 1945, at best provides only a handful of genuine cases of 
humanitarian intervention, and, on most assessments, none at all; and finally, on 
                                                 
106 See, for example, Christian Science Monitor, ‘Sudanese factory destroyed by US is now a shrine’, 7 
August 2012.  Reporting on the US bombing of an alleged chemical weapons factory that turned out to be a 
pharmaceutical factory by President Clinton at the height of the Monica Lewinsky scandal. 
107 For example: Warbrick, Colin and Lowe, Vaughan (eds), The United Nations and the Principles of 
International Law: essays in memory of Michael Akehurst, Routledge, London and New York, 1994; 
Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace?  Humanitarian Intervention and International Law, Oxford: 
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prudential grounds, that the scope for abusing such a right argues strongly against its 
creation.109   
 
The non-intervention norm can justified on three main grounds: the ‘Westphalian’ emphasis on 
reducing conflict amongst major States, the ‘liberal’ emphasis on allowing each society to solve 
its own problems and the ‘anti-imperialist’ emphasis on preventing the subordination of small 
independent States.110  It can also be justified ‘negatively’ on the grounds that military 
interventions – whatever their purported justification – often cause great harm.   
 
During the cold war both the US and the Soviet Union intervened in countries that they 
considered within their ‘spheres of influence’, often referring to the supposedly universal 
principles that underpinned their respective political and economic systems.111  Proxy-wars and 
low-intensity conflicts were also fought in parts of Africa, Asia and Latin America, with 
devastating consequences for the people of the countries concerned.112  More recently, the US-led 
interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq have also led to widespread civilians suffering.113 While 
                                                 
109 UK Foreign Office Policy Document, No. 148, Quoted in Harris, 1998, p.918. 
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neither of these two actions was primarily justified on humanitarian grounds, western political 
leaders did use ‘liberal interventionist’ arguments based on the promotion of human rights in 
support of them.114  As will be discussed further in this thesis, some military interventions that 
were undertaken on humanitarian grounds have also exacerbated the crises that they were meant 
to resolve and made things worse for the people they were supposed to help. 
 
One scholar has commented that, ‘saying the phrase “humanitarian intervention” in a room full of 
philosophers, legal scholars and political scientists is a bit like crying “fire” in a crowded 
theatre’,115 while another notes that ‘the only certainty’ within the debate is that ‘as of yet it 
remains unsettled’.116  From the above discussion, however, it is difficult to see how 
‘humanitarian interventions’ can be deemed lawful without the authority of the UN Security 
Council.   
 
The protection provisions of the UN Charter  
 
The UN Charter predates the UDHR and most international human rights treaties and case-
law, so it is now widely accepted that its general references to human rights should be read in 
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115  Keohane, in Holzgrefe and Keohane, 2003, p.1. 
116 Lubell, 2010, p.28. 
38 
 
the context of their subsequent codification and development.117  The ICJ’s decisions clearly 
support the UN Human Rights Committee’s assertion that ‘there is a United Nations Charter 
obligation to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms’.118   As the following section will show, however, these obligations must be 
interpreted in harmony with other rules of international law of which the Charter forms part.119   
 
In its Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of 
Genocide in 1951, the ICJ held that the provisions of the Convention express pre-existing 
customary international law since genocide was a crime that ‘shock[ed]  the  conscience  of 
mankind’ and was ‘contrary to moral law and to the spirit  and aims of the United Nations.’120  
The principles underlying the Convention were, therefore, recognized by ‘civilized nations’ as 
binding on all States, even if they have not ratified the Convention itself.121  In Namibia, the ICJ 
                                                 
117 For an early exposition of this argument see Thomas Franck and Nigel Rodley, ‘After Bangladesh: the 
law of humanitarian intervention by military force’, American Jornal of International Law, Vol. 67, No. 2, 
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above-mentioned Loizidou judgment (preliminary objections), p. 27, para. 73).’  
120 Reservations to the Genocide Convention, Advisory Opinion of 28 May 1951, ICJ Reports 1951, p.23-
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held that South Africa’s policy of imposing apartheid was ‘a flagrant violation of the purposes 
and principles of the Charter.’122 In Barcelona Traction, in 1970, the ICJ ruled that obligations 
erga omnes ‘derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the outlawing of acts 
of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights 
of the human person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination.’123  In Tehran 
Hostages, in 1980, it stated that: ‘Wrongfully to deprive human beings of their freedom and to 
subject them to physical constraint in conditions of hardship is in itself manifestly incompatible 
with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, as well as with the fundamental 
principles enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.124  As Rodley has noted, 
this implies that the UDHR was considered to be ‘a document of sufficient legal status to justify 
its invocation by the Court in the context of a State’s obligations under general international 
law.’125   
 
In the Case Concerning East Timor, in 1995, however, the ICJ decided that it could not rule on 
the lawfulness of the conduct of one State (Australia) when its judgment would imply an 
evaluation of the lawfulness of the conduct of another State (Indonesia) which had forcibly 
invaded East Timor.126  The Court accepted the principle that ‘the right of peoples to self-
determination, as it evolved from the Charter and from United Nations practice, has an erga 
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omnes character’,127 but it could only exercise jurisdiction over a State with its consent.’128  In 
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, in 2012, the Court concluded that ‘under customary 
international law as it presently stands, a State is not deprived of immunity by reason of the fact 
that it is accused of serious violations of international human rights law or the international law 
of armed conflict’129  In Arrest Warrant, in 2002, the ICJ did not even discuss Belgium’s 
argument that jus cogens overrides immunity,130 while in Armed Activities it also did not accept 
that an allegation of genocide could override the principle of consent to jurisdiction.131  
 
In its 2007 judgment in Bosnia Genocide, the ICJ ruled that Serbia had ‘failed to comply both 
with its obligation to prevent and its obligation to punish genocide’132 even though the acts had 
taken place in another country and by forces which were not under the effective control of the 
Serbian State.133  As the facts of this case made clear the responsibility of Serbia was engaged 
because of its very close links with the Bosnian Serb forces that carried out the killings.  The 
Court stated that there was ‘no doubt’ that Serbia ‘was providing substantial support’, including 
‘payment of salaries and other beneﬁts’ to some officers in its army.134  This did not, however, 
mean that their acts could be ‘equated’ with those of the Serbian State because they were not 
‘wholly dependent on it’ and nor were they acting under its ‘effective control’ at the time of the 
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the  
132 Application of Genocide Convention (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment 26 
February 2007, ICJ Report 2007, para 450. 
133 Ibid., paras 385, 394, 402 and 471. 
134 Ibid., para 388. 
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massacre.135  It therefore rejected, by majority votes, the claims that Serbia had committed, 
conspired to commit or incited genocide.136  It nevertheless ruled that there was a ‘due diligence’ 
test when a State ‘manifestly failed to take all measures to prevent genocide which were within 
its power, and which might have contributed to preventing the genocide’ then it could be held 
accountable for the resulting consequences.137   
 
The ICJ had earlier been requested by the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina to issue 
provisional measures in this case, which it did in April and September 1993.138  Bosnia-
Herzegovina had also asked the Court to consider the legality of a Security Council resolution in 
September 1991 imposing an arms embargo on the territories of the former Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY). 139  The embargo had been imposed before Bosnia-Herzegovina had declared 
its independence, but was then reaffirmed on a number of occasions, which Bosnia-Herzegovina 
maintained was preventing it from obtaining the necessary means to exercise its right to self-
defence and protect its people from genocide.140  Bosnia-Herzegovina sought the Court’s opinion 
                                                 
135 Ibid., paras 385-415. 
136 Ibid., para 471. 
137 Ibid., para 430. 
138 Ibid., Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Order of 8 April 1993, para 52; and Further 
Requests for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Order of 13 September 1993, para 61.  The Court 
ordered that the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) ‘should immediately, in pursuance of its 
undertaking in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 
1948, take all measures within its power to prevent commission of the crime of genocide’. 
139 Security Council Resolution 713 of 25 September 1991. 
140 For further discussion see Mark Bromley United Nations Arms Embargoes Their Impact on Arms Flows 
and Target Behaviour Case study: Former Yugoslavia, 1991–96 Stockholm: Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute 2007.  For contrasting views of the conflict and the merits of external intervention 
see Marko Attila Hoare, How Bosnia Armed, London: Saqui books, 2004; and Adam LeBor, Complicity 
with Evil, the United Nations in the age of modern genocide, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006, 
which take a ‘pro-interventionist’ position; David Gibbs, First do no harm: humanitarian intervention and 
the destruction of Yugoslavia, Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2009; and David Chandler, Bosnia: 
Faking Democracy after Dayton, London: Pluto Press, 1999 argue the opposite case.  Bosnia-Herzegovina 
gained admission to the UN on 22 May 1992.  The arms embargo against Bosnia was not formally lifted by 
the UN and European Union until July 1999.  The request for the embargo had been made by the 
Government of Yugoslavia itself and was widely criticised for its disproportionate impact on the Bosnian 
armed forces.FRY inherited the lion's share of the Yugoslav People Army’s arsenal, while the Croatian 
Army could smuggle weapons through its coast, which was not an option for largely land-locked Bosnia-
Herzegovina.  The Bosnian government lobbied to have the embargo lifted but that was opposed by 
Britain, France and Russia. 
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as to whether other parties to the Genocide Convention had the right to supply it with equipment 
for this purpose, despite the embargo, but the ICJ stated that it could not rule on the issue since 
this affected third parties.141  
 
In a separate opinion, however, Judge Lauterpacht noted that while the arms embargo may 
initially have been justifiable, its continued imposition could be contributing ‘to the intensity of 
ethnic cleansing in areas under Serbian control’ and the ‘exposure of the Muslim population of 
Bosnia to genocidal activity’.142   He argued that while the obligations of the UN Charter took 
primacy of other international treaties, the prohibition of genocide, ‘has generally been accepted 
as having the status not of an ordinary rule of international law but of jus cogens’ and that: ‘The 
relief which Article 103 . . .  may give the Security Council in case of conflict between one of its 
decisions and an operative treaty obligation cannot – as a simple hierarchy of norms – extend to a 
conflict between a Security Council resolution and jus cogens’ 143  He maintained that while:  
 
it is not to be contemplated that the Security Council would ever deliberately adopt a 
resolution clearly and deliberately flouting a rule of jus cogens or requiring a violation of 
human rights. But the possibility that a Security Council resolution might inadvertently 
or in an unforeseen manner lead to such a situation cannot be excluded. And that, it 
appears, is what has happened here.144 
 
                                                 
141 Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Order of 8 April 1993, para 47; and Further 
Requests for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Order of 13 September 1993, paras 39 – 41. ICJ 
Report 2007.   
142 Further Requests for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Order of 13 September 1993, Separate 
Opinion of Judge Lauterpacht paras 89-97. 
143 Ibid. para 100. 
144 Ibid., para 102.  He concluded that ‘the Security Council resolution can be seen as having in effect 
called on Members of the United Nations, albeit unknowingly and assuredly unwillingly, to become in 
some degree supporters of the genocidal activity of the Serbs’. 
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Lauterpacht reasoned that the Security Council could not ‘act free of all legal controls’ and that 
the Court had a ‘duty to ensure the rule of law within the UN system.’  He suggested either that 
the ‘relevance here of jus cogens should be drawn to the attention of the Security Council’ or that 
members of the UN should be ‘free to disregard’ the resolution in question.145  He acknowledged, 
however, that the Court could not ‘substitute its discretion for that of the Security Council’ in 
imposing such embargos and so its ‘power of judicial review’ was limited.146  Bosnia-
Herzegovina subsequently withdrew the issue of the arms embargo from its case, which 
prevented further exploration of the legal issues involved.147   
 
Arbour has suggested extrapolating from the Bosnia Genocide judgment a responsibility on 
‘other States Parties to the [Genocide] Convention, and indeed to the wider international 
community’ to intervene in a broad range of circumstances to prevent genocide.148  She argues 
that a failure to act by the five permanent members of the Security Council ‘could carry legal 
consequences’, particularly if they exercised or threatened to use their veto to ‘block action that 
is deemed necessary by other members to avert genocide or crimes against humanity.’149  Carvin, 
however, notes that responsibility for a failure to prevent genocide only exists if there is a real 
risk of it occurring, which is actually quite difficult to determine, given its legal definition.150  
                                                 
145 Ibid., paras 103 and 104. 
146 Ibid., para 96. 
147 For an overall discussion on the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina see Misha Glenny, The Fall of 
Yugoslavia, London: Granta, 1992.  A number of States adopted something close to Lauterpacht’s second 
option, by covertly subverting it The US congress passed two resolutions calling for the embargo to be 
lifted, in a policy that became known as ‘lift and strike’, but both were vetoed by President Bill Clinton. 
Nonetheless, the US used a number of covert routes, including Islamist groups to smuggle weapons to the 
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148 Louise Arbour ‘The responsibility to protect as a duty of care in international law and practice’, Review 
of International Studies, No. 34, 2008, pp.445–58.   
149 Ibid., p.453. 
150 Stephanie Carvin, ‘A responsibility to reality: a reply to Louise Arbour’, Review of International 
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This then leads to problems such as ‘who should make a determination that genocide is to take 
place, who should prevent it and what kind of international approval they would need.’151   
 
The provisions of the Genocide Convention itself clearly indicate that its enforcement provisions 
should be undertaken within the framework of the UN Charter and at the discretion of its 
‘competent organs’.152 The ICJ was also very clear about the scope of its ruling.  It did not: 
 
purport to establish a general jurisprudence applicable to all cases where a treaty 
instrument, or other binding legal norm, includes an obligation for States to prevent 
certain acts.  Still less does the decision of the Court purport to ﬁnd whether, apart from 
the texts applicable to speciﬁc ﬁelds, there is a general obligation on States to prevent the 
commission by other persons or entities of acts contrary to certain norms of general 
international law.153   
 
The clearest opportunity that the ICJ has ever had to rule on the legality of ‘humanitarian 
interventions’ came in Legality of Use of Force, in 1999, when it was asked by the then FRY 
to grant provisional measures against 10 members of NATO over the bombing campaign 
mounted during the Kosovo crisis.154  FRY argued both that there was no ‘right of 
                                                 
151 Ibid., p.50. 
152 Genocide Convention, Article VIII states that any contracting party may ‘call upon the competent 
organs of the UN to take such action under the Charter of the UN as they consider appropriate for the 
prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3.’  Article 
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154 Case concerning Legality of Use of Force, (Provisional Measures) (Serbia and 
Montenegro v. Netherlands); (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium) (Serbia and Montenegro v. 
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humanitarian intervention’ in international law and that even if one could be found the 
modalities of NATO’s intervention, bombing civilian populated areas from a height of 15,000 
feet, could not qualify as such.155  It also invoked Article IX of Genocide Convention as a 
basis for the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.156  The NATO States responded by referring 
to the well-publicised cases of atrocities being committed in Kosovo, as previously highlighted 
in debates at the Security Council.157  They stressed, however, that FRY’s break-up and the 
ambiguity that surrounded its continued UN membership, meant that it was not in fact a State 
party to the statute of the ICJ and, therefore, had no access to the Court. 158  The UK and US 
briefly referred to the need to avert a humanitarian catastrophe, but only Belgium argued for 
the existence of a ‘doctrine of humanitarian intervention’ and then only in its oral 
submission.159 
                                                 
v. United Kingdom) (Yugoslavia v. United States of America), Preliminary Objections, International Court 
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155 Memorial submitted by The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 5 January 2000, ICJ Reports 1999, paras 
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157 See, for example, Preliminary Objections of the Netherlands, 5 July 2000, ICJ Reports 1999.   
158 Ibid.  For further discussion see Christine Gray, ‘The Use and Abuse of the International Court of 
Justice: Cases concerning the Use of Force after Nicaragua’, European Journal of International law Vol. 
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Cambodia, the West African countries’ interventions first in Liberia and then in Sierra Leone. While there 
may have been certain doubts expressed in the doctrine, and among some members of the international 
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These precedents, combined with Security Council resolutions and the rejection of the draft Russian 
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the Kingdom of Belgium 5 July 2000. 
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The Court rejected FRY’s argument that NATO’s bombing campaign amounted to genocide.160  
It also ruled that because FRY had only accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in 
April 1999, a few days before it filed its complaint, and had entered a reservation limiting the 
Court’s jurisdiction to events that had occurred before this date, the ICJ had no jurisdiction on the 
merits of the case, because the start of the bombing campaign pre-dated it.161  In 2004 the ICJ 
subsequently ruled that the States of Serbia and Montenegro, which considered themselves to be 
the successor States of FRY, had not been members of the UN at the time of NATO’s action and 
so had no access to the Court, again, without commenting on the wider issues raised.162 
 
A Responsibility to Protect? 
 
Given that NATO’s ‘humanitarian intervention’ over Kosovo had taken place without the explicit 
approval of the UN Security Council, it was a prime facie violation of the provisions of the UN 
Charter.163  The conflict cost between 5,000 and 10,000 lives, with most of the casualties being 
inflicted after NATO’s intervention.164  By some estimates NATO may have killed 10 per cent of 
                                                 
160 Legality of Use of Force, (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium), ICJ Report 1999, para 41, where it 
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the total civilian death toll,165 mainly due to the decisions to target civilian infra-structure as well 
as military targets and to bomb from such a high altitude.166  Nevertheless, as Koskenniemi, 
observed: ‘Most international lawyers approved of the 1999 bombing of Serbia by the members 
of the North Atlantic alliance. But most of them also felt that it was not compatible with a strict 
reading of the UN Charter . . . most lawyers – including myself – have taken the ambivalent 
position that it was both formally illegal and morally necessary.’167  Some argued that the scale of 
violations of international human rights law and IHL that were allegedly taking place provided at 
                                                 
University of California Press, 1999; David Phillips, Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and US 
Intervention, Belfer Center Studies in International Security, Cambridge, Ma: The MIT Press, 1999. It is 
generally accepted that the death toll before NATO’s intervention in March 1999 was between 1,500 and 
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higher casualty figures, to justify it, while opponents and sceptics cite lower ones.  Both agree, however, 
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165 Human Rights Watch, Civilian deaths in the NATO air campaign, HRW, Vol. 12, No. 1, February 2000, 
puts the number of civilians killed by NATO during its air campaign at between 489 and 520.  See also 
Amnesty International, No justice for the victims of NATO bombings, 23 April 2009.  This notes that: 
‘Approximately 500 civilians were killed and 900 injured during the course of the conflict. Many of these 
casualties were caused by indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks and a failure to take necessary 
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166 See General Wesley Clark in William Joseph Buckley, (ed) Kosovo, Contending voices on Balkans 
interventions, Grand Rapids: William Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2000, p.253.  General Clarke was 
NATO’s Supreme Commander in Europe during the campaign and he states that its ‘first objective’ was 
the ‘avoidance of Allied losses’ to enable the bombing campaign to ‘persist as long as it was needed’.  
Clearly only ground troops could have actually protected civilians from attacks and the failure to deploy 
these undermines the ‘humanitarian’ claims made for the intervention. 
167 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Lady Doth Protest Too Much’ Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in 
International Law’, The Modern Law Review, Vol. 65, No. 2 March 2002. 
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least ‘mitigating circumstances’ for the action.168  One report argued it was ‘unlawful but 
legitimate’.169   
 
In his 1999 General Assembly report Kofi Annan, the then UN Secretary General, famously 
questioned whether a hypothetical coalition of States should have ‘stood aside’, if they had not 
received ‘prompt Security Council authorization’ to stop the genocide in Rwanda, but also 
warned of the danger of ‘military action outside the established mechanisms for enforcing 
international law.’170  Such interventions, he warned, could undermine ‘the imperfect, yet 
resilient, security system created after the Second World War’, and set ‘dangerous precedents’ 
for the future.171  The following year he again posed the question that ‘if humanitarian 
intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to 
Rwanda, to Srebrenica’.172  
 
The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was established in 
response, with the expressed aim of fostering a global political consensus on the issue.173  Its 
original title had been the ‘Commission on Humanitarian Intervention’, but this was changed due 
                                                 
168 For example, Cassese, Antonio, ‘A Follow-Up: Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures and Opinio 
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Gareth Evans, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: An Idea Whose Time Has Come . . . and Gone?’, 
International Relations, Vol. 22, No 3, September 2008, pp.283-298.  
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to concerns that the language would be seen as controversial.174  The report noted that the term 
‘intervention’ can cover a range of activities from the delivery of emergency relief assistance to 
military action.  Its authors stated that ‘the kind of intervention with which we are concerned in 
this report is action taken against a state or its leaders, without its or their consent, for purposes 
which are claimed to be humanitarian or protective.’175  The report recognised that interventions 
were often harmful, destabilizing states and ‘fanning ethnic or civil strife’.’176  Nevertheless, it 
argued that:  
 
The notion that there is an emerging guiding principle in favour of military intervention 
for human protection purposes is also supported by a wide variety of legal sources – 
including sources that exist independently of any duties, responsibilities or authority that 
may be derived from Chapter VII of the UN Charter.177  
 
The report suggested that when the Security Council ‘fails to act’ the ‘responsibility’ may pass to 
the General Assembly178 or Regional Organisations,179 including occasions when the latter act 
outside their area of membership – although it noted the controversy surrounding NATO’s 
intervention in Kosovo.180  As an interim measure it suggested that the Security Council’s 
                                                 
174Ibid. See also ICISS, 2001, para 137-40 and 2.4.  The report recognised ‘the long history, and continuing 
wide and popular usage, of the phrase “humanitarian intervention,” and also its descriptive usefulness in 
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178 ICISS 2001, paras 6.29-30. 
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permanent members adopt a voluntary code of conduct restricting the use of their veto power181 
and ‘consider and seek to reach agreement on a set of guidelines, embracing the “Principles for 
Military Intervention” . . . to govern their responses to claims for military intervention for human 
protection purposes’182 
 
Three years after the publication of the ICISS report, in December 2004, the UN High-Level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change report A More Secure World: Our Shared 
Responsibility, endorsed R2P as an ‘emerging norm’, while specifying that the responsibility was 
‘exercisable by the Security Council . . . as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other large-
scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law.183  The 
following year, in March 2005, the UN Secretary-General’s report In Larger Freedom: Towards 
Development, Security and Human Rights for All used similar language.184   
 
In September 2005, a reference to R2P was incorporated into two paragraphs of the 2005 General 
Assembly World Summit Outcome Document.185  This included a commitment ‘to take collective 
action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the 
Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional 
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181 ICISS 2001, para 6.21.  It also noted that: ‘Those states who insist on the right to retaining permanent 
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Our Shared Responsibility, The United Nations, 2004, para 203: ‘We endorse the emerging norm that there 
is a collective international responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorizing 
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184 In Larger Freedom: Toward Development, Security and Human Rights for All, UN Doc. A/59/2005, 
March 2005, para 135.   
185 General Assembly Resolution 60/1, of A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005, paras 138 and 139. 
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organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities 
manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity.’186  The UN Security Council has also ‘reaffirmed’ these principles.187  
In 2007 the Secretary General appointed a Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect, based 
in the office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide.188   
 
R2P can, therefore, be said to have been endorsed at the UN’s highest decision-making levels and 
to reflect a global consensus, at least in abstract, that people should be protected against such 
crimes.189  As the first UN Special Advisor on R2P has noted the concept has generated a 
‘staggering’ numbers of academic theses and the ‘ever-expanding literature on the responsibility 
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to protect could now fill a small library’.190  There is, however, considerable confusion about 
precisely what – if anything – it really means in practice.191 
 
Arbour, has called R2P ‘the most important and imaginative doctrine to emerge on the 
international scene for decades’,192 while Slaughter has heralded it as ‘the most important shift in 
our conception of sovereignty since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648’.193 Chesterman, however, 
notes that the wording adopted amounts to saying little more than that the Security Council 
should continue authorizing, on an ad hoc basis, the type of interventions that it has been 
authorizing for many years.194 Stahn states that by limiting interventions to four specific 
situations and stipulating that the national authorities concerned must be manifestly failing to 
protect their own populations the language of the text actually raises the threshold needed to get 
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2011; Thomas G, Weiss, and Ramesh, Thakur, Global Governance and the UN: an unfinished journey, 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010; Ramesh Thakur, The United Nations, peace and security: 
from collective security to the responsibility to protect, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006; 
Sara E. Davies, Luke Glanville (eds.) Protecting the Displaced: Deepening the Responsibility to Protect, 
The Hague/ London/ Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2010; and Nicholas Wheeler, ‘The Humanitarian 
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Nations peace operations and the security agenda, London/New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2009. 
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agreement about an intervention adopted by the Security Council.195  Hehir notes that North 
Korea, Iran, Myanmar and Sudan were amongst the States to have endorsed the wording at the 
General Assembly,196 and says its supporters’ claims are ‘overly sanguine and hyperbolic.’197  
Bellamy, a strong supporter of R2P, has also acknowledged that:  
 
Five years ago a majority of academic papers on R2P failed to distinguish between what 
the ICISS proposed in 2001 and what the UN General Assembly had adopted four years 
later.  It was also extremely common to see R2P described as a new norm of 
humanitarian intervention or a new legal principle, despite the fact that what emerged in 
2005 was neither.198   
 
This lack of clarity has led to a number of strikingly conflicting claims about R2P.199  For 
example, Stuenkel states that the emerging powers of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa (the BRICS) have ‘supported R2P in the vast majority of cases’,200 although all are 
notably sceptical about military interventions on humanitarian grounds even when these have 
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been authorised by the Security Council.201  Conversely, government ministers of permanent 
Security Council members have made references to R2P when seeking to justify actions such as 
the invasion of Iraq,202 military intervention in South Ossetia203 and a proposed weakening of the 
protections of the Geneva Conventions,204 which are difficult to define as humanitarian.  It is also 
sometimes cited in relation to the international mediation efforts that followed the violence in 
Kenya in 2007, although this bears little relationship to its original purpose.205  Evans, another 
strong supporter of the initiative has warned that much of this confusion is due to ‘a spectacular 
misuse of R2P principles by the US-led coalition, supported particularly in this respect by the 
UK, in the case of the 2003 invasion of Iraq  – and the suspicion that R2P will be just another 
excuse for neo-colonialist and neo-imperialist interventions.’206  The ambiguity is perhaps best 
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summarized by Weiss, who served as the ICISS Research Director and is one of its leading 
academic proponents:  
 
the proverbial new bottom-line is clear: when a state is unable or unwilling to safeguard 
its own citizens and peaceful means fail, the resort to outside intervention, including 
military force (preferably with Security Council approval) remains a distinct 
possibility.207  
 
As Steenberghe has noted, R2P supporters have gone to considerable lengths to persuade States 
to include references to R2P in their declarations and in the resolutions adopted by the UN 
Security Council and General Assembly in the hope that this will create sufficient opinio juris 
and State practice to transform the concept from a political into a legal norm.208  In the process, 
however, they have consciously distanced the concept from its original association with 
‘humanitarian intervention’ without Security Council authorisation.  For example, the Global 
Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, a non-governmental organization (NGO), published a 
paper in the aftermath of the Libya crisis, clearly differentiating R2P from ‘humanitarian 
interventions’ and criticizing NATO members for going beyond – and breaching – the terms of 
UN Security Council resolution 1973 by promoting regime-change in Libya.209  In 2014 the 
International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, another NGO coalition group, stated that 
R2P could not be used to justify unilateral military intervention in Syria because:  
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The Responsibility to Protect norm, as agreed to in the 2005 World Summit Outcome 
Document, does not sanction a unilateral military response or a response by a “coalition 
of the willing”. Any military response under RtoP must be authorized by the Security 
Council.210 
 
Proponents of R2P commonly describe it as ‘an emerging international norm’, yet the arguments 
surrounding its significance are circular.  It can only claim to be offering a new contribution to 
the ‘protection provisions’ of international law if the precise content of this contribution remains 
hopelessly ambiguous. Orford, however, argues that R2P is best understood not as creating a new 
international norm, but as legitimating existing practice.211  Its significance ‘lies not in its 
capacity to transform promise into practice, but rather in its capacity to transform practice into 
promise’.212   
 
R2P, POC and humanitarian interventions 
 
Both POC and R2P arose out of an initiative by the Canadian government when it occupied the 
Presidency of the Security Council in 1999 and both share the same overall goal of protecting 
civilians from grave violations of human rights and IHL.213  The first Security Council resolution 
to reaffirm the two paragraphs on R2P in the Summit Outcome document, in April 2006, was 
devoted to POC214 and a resolution a few months later on the situation in Darfur also contained 
references to both POC and R2P.215  Some academic writers treat R2P and POC as almost inter-
                                                 
210 International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, Homepage, 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-syria, accessed 8 November 2014. 
211 Orford, 2011, p.2. 
212 Ibid. 
213 van Steenberghe, 2014, pp.81-114. 
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changeable, with Tsagourias, for example, stating that they are ‘subsets– indeed interrelated 
ones–of the same concept’.216  A number of States have made declarations associating the two 
concepts together and the Secretary General’s report on POC in 2007 contains a reference to the 
Summit Outcome document as an advance in POC’s ‘normative framework’.217  A POC strategy 
document published by the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) and 
UNHCR expressly refers to R2P in three paragraphs under a section entitled ‘Rationale and the 
Responsibility to Protect’.218   
 
In his 2012 report on POC, however, the UN Secretary General stated that he was ‘concerned 
about the continuing and inaccurate conflation’ of the two concepts, which, while they may 
‘share some common elements’ also contained ‘fundamental differences’.219  POC ‘is a legal 
concept based on international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law, while the 
responsibility to protect is a political concept.’220  In his report on R2P he noted that: ‘While the 
work of peacekeepers may contribute to the achievement of RtoP goals, the two concepts . . . 
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have separate and distinct prerequisites and objectives.’221  A briefing from the Global Centre for 
the Responsibility to Protect, in 2009, also noted that: 
 
Open debates on POC have indeed been the only occasions within the formal [Security] 
Council agenda to reflect on the development of the R2P norm and its practice.  Yet the 
sensitivities around the inclusion of R2P within the protection of civilians’ agenda have 
increased in recent months. There are concerns that the POC agenda is being needlessly 
politicized by the introduction of R2P into the Council’s work and resolutions on the 
protection of civilians, as those who seek to roll back the 2005 endorsement of R2P raise 
questions about the protection of civilians in the attempt to challenge hard-won 
consensus reached on both issues.222 
 
In April 2015 DPKO guidance issued to peacekeeping missions stated that: ‘While the R2P 
framework shares some legal and conceptual foundations and employs some common 
terminology with POC, they are distinct. Most importantly, R2P may be invoked without the 
consent of the host state, specifically when the host state is failing to protect its population – R2P 
thus envisages a range of action that goes beyond the principles of peacekeeping, which require 
the consent of the host state.’223 As will be discussed further in Chapter Seven, the debates 
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around R2P coincided with discussions in the Security Council about how to respond to the 
humanitarian crisis in Darfur and may have exacerbated the political tensions that weakened the 
peacekeeping mission which was eventually deployed.  The distinctions between R2P and POC 
were further blurred by the UN Security Council authorized military intervention in Libya in 
March 2011.224   
 
NATO’s senior military planners have subsequently stated that their rules of engagement (RoE) 
throughout the campaign were only to hit military targets that had been identified as a specific 
threat to civilians at the time.225  This was a significantly narrower RoE than those used by 
NATO during its campaign over Kosovo and resulted in far fewer civilian deaths.226  
Nevertheless, the fact that the campaign continued until Muammar Gaddafi had been militarily 
deposed and the refusal of NATO to consider a ceasefire or negotiations for a peaceful power 
change of power led many to argue that it had gone beyond the terms of the March Security 
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Council resolution.227 The widespread civilian suffering that has accompanied the subsequent 
disintegration of the Libyan State also weakens the case for such ‘humanitarian interventions’.228   
 
Less than two weeks after the Security Council authorized the use of force to protect civilians in 
Libya, it adopted a resolution in relation to Côte d’Ivoire, which imposed targeted sanctions and 
reinforced the authorisation of the UN mission to use force to protect civilians.229  Acting under 
this mandate the UN mission launched operation ‘Protect the Civilian Population’, using attack 
helicopters to destroy the government’s heavy weapons in the capital city,230 as part of a regime-
change intervention, which led to the arrest of the incumbent President who was subsequently 
transferred to the ICC to stand trial for crimes against humanity.231  In March 2013 the Security 
Council ‘approved the creation of its first-ever “offensive” combat force, intended to carry out 
targeted operations to “neutralize and disarm” rebels groups in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) as part its mission’s POC mandate.232  Both developments will be discussed further 
in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
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In November 2011 the Brazilian government, which had been on the Security Council during 
both the Libyan and Côte d’Ivoire operations,233  published a paper entitled ‘Responsibility while 
protecting’ (RWP), which questioned both the legal and practical implications of such actions.234  
RWP received a fairly mixed reaction.235  It has not been endorsed by the BRICS – some of 
whom regard it as making too many concessions to R2P.236  Some R2P supporters regarded it as 
an attempt to ‘undermine’ the original concept,237 although others see the two as 
complementary.238  It does, however, raise a question about the applicable legal framework 
governing both UN authorized ‘humanitarian intervention’ and peacekeeping missions with POC 
mandates, which will be explored further in subsequent chapters.   
 
Some also argue that the right of ‘humanitarian access’ could create a right of ‘humanitarian 
intervention’.  In 2008, for example, France’s foreign minister Bernard Kouchner cited R2P in 
relation to a proposed forcible intervention to deliver food aid in Myanmar against the wishes of 
its government.239  He was supported by his British counter-part, David Miliband, who claimed 
                                                 
233 Brazil had abstained on the vote authorizing intervention in Libya along with Russia, China, India and 
Germany. 
234 ‘Responsibility while protecting: elements for the development and promotion of a concept’ Letter 
dated 9 November 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations addressed to 
the Secretary-General, 11 November 2011, UN Doc. A/66/551–S/2011/701. 
235 For further discussion see Conor Foley, To save succeeding generations: UN Security Council Reform 
and the protection of civilians, Igarapé Institute and the Brazilian Centre for International Relations, 
August 2012 
236 This view was expressed to the author of this thesis by the Indian and South African Ambassadors to the 
UN at a seminar in Bahia, Brazil in April 2012. 
237
 Foreign Policy, Thomas Wright, ‘Brazil hosts workshop on “responsibility while protecting”’ 29 
August 2012.  He concluded that Brazil’s main motivation for proposing the concept was that its officials 
had felt ‘personally humiliated’ by their treatment on the Security Council by the US, Britain and France 
during the Libya crisis.  He argued that ‘giving the UNSC operational control over a military intervention 
would place troops at great risk and make failure more likely’ and charged that ‘RWP would undermine 
R2P, not strengthen it; . . . that in practice RWP could result in greater harm to civilians because it 
incentivizes such behavior by the adversary; and that it does not offer answers to the very real dilemmas of 
R2P operations or explain what other alternatives might have been possible in R2P cases.’ 
238 Project Syndicate, Gareth Evans, ‘Responsibility while protecting’, 27 January 2012.  He also criticized 
the ‘sneering reaction’ towards RWP of some western diplomats. 
239 French Embassy: France in the UK, Burma – Joint communiqué issued by the Ministry of Foreign and 
European Affairs and Ministry of Defence, Paris, 25 May 2008. 
62 
 
that the UK was considering sending military escorts with aid convoys.240  Neither of these 
statements was, however, followed through with action. 
 
In 2000 a group of humanitarian agencies published a ‘Humanitarian Charter’, which stated that, 
‘those affected by a disaster have a right to life with dignity and therefore a right to assistance . . .  
When states are unable to respond they are obliged to allow the intervention of humanitarian 
organizations’ [emphasis added] although this claim was subsequently dropped from subsequent 
revised editions.241  Francis Deng, the first UN representative on internal displacement and a key 
proponent of R2P, has argued that where a State is unable to fulfil its responsibilities to protect 
its own population, it should ‘invite and welcome’ international assistance to complement its own 
efforts’.242  Goodwin Gill maintains that reports by international monitoring bodies on ‘policies 
and practices that result in displacement’ could conceivably ‘become part of a process leading to 
the provision of international relief, even including protection, that is not contingent on request or 
consent.’243 Kourula claims that: ‘Large-scale humanitarian crises that generate refugee flows 
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could justify ‘non-consensual and forcible rendering of assistance to implement the right of 
peoples to receive assistance in conflict situations.244  
 
As will be discussed further in Chapter Three, UN missions with POC mandates are often 
authorized to help create the necessary safe and secure environment to assist with the delivery of 
humanitarian aid and there are strong grounds for asserting that there is a ‘right of humanitarian 
access’ contained in international law.  All relief activity in non-international conflicts is ‘subject 
to the consent of the High Contracting Party concerned’,245 however, and humanitarian agencies 
are bound by the principle of neutrality as set out in IHL and the ICJ’s judgment in Nicaragua.246  
While a POC mandate might authorize a mission to help create the necessary safe and secure 
environment to assist with the delivery of this aid, and to protect both those delivering and 
receiving it, mission deployments are based on host state consent and the aid itself should be 
delivered according to strictly humanitarian principles, including neutrality and independence.   
As the ICRC has noted, IHL ‘cannot serve as a basis for armed intervention in response to grave 
violations of its provisions’ since ‘the use of force is governed by the United Nations Charter’.247  
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter has provided an historical overview of the concept that civilians are entitled to 
‘protection’ under the general framework of international law.  This concept, which was barely 
recognized at the time when the UN Charter was drafted is now increasingly accepted in the 
                                                 
244 Pirkko Kourula, Broadening the Edges: refugee definition and protection revisited, 
Hague/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997, p.13. 
245 Additional Protocol II, Article 18(2).  See also General Assembly Resolution 46/182, UN Doc. 
A/RES/46/182, 19 December 1991. 
246 ICJ Report 1986, para 242. 
247 Anne Ryniker, The ICRC’s position on “humanitarian intervention”’, International Review of the Red 
Cross, Vol. 83, No. 482, 30 June 2001, pp.527-32. 
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jurisprudence of the ICJ.  Most relevant to the discussion here, it can be noted that the ICJ has 
accepted that States have, in certain circumstances, positive extraterritorial legal obligations to 
prevent genocide and protect civilians from violence by third parties.  At the same time the ICJ 
has repeatedly restated that both the principles of non-intervention and the prohibition on the use 
of force are a part of customary international law, and may also be jus cogens.  As the ICJ held in 
Nicaragua, States may not rely on their ‘own appraisal’ of the human rights situation in other 
States as justification for resort to unilateral use of force.248   
 
Attempts to foster a new ‘global political consensus’ favouring interventions through R2P have 
largely failed.  Indeed, by retreating from the argument – tentatively raised by Lauterpacht 
amongst others  – that UN members might be free to ‘disregard’ the authority of the Security 
Council to prevent an act of genocide, R2P may even have strengthened the non-interventionist 
norm.  If the ‘responsibility to protect’ can only be exercised by the Security Council then it is 
difficult to see how this can be considered an obligation because the Security Council’s jus ad 
bellum powers to authorise the use of force are discretionary and the obligations of the UN 
Charter take precedence over those of other international treaties.249  Nevertheless, this discretion 
is not ‘unbound’.  The UN’s actual use of force must be consistent with the wider ‘protective’ 
legal framework set out in this chapter and which will be discussed further in Part II of this 
thesis. 
  
                                                 
248 ICJ Report 1986, para 268. 
249 UN Charter, Articles 25 and 103.   See also Mothers of Srebrenica v. The Netherlands, The Hague 
District Court C-09/295247/HA ZA 07-2973, para 4.149, 2014, in which the Court noted that the mandate 
of UNPROFOR ‘is indeed regarded as a decision by an international law organisation it only has a powers-
creating character and does not call to life any obligations Claimants can enforce at a court of law.’    
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Chapter 2:  
To save succeeding generations: the evolution and conceptual development of UN 
peacekeeping and the protection of civilians 
 
Introduction 
 
UN peacekeeping is commonly divided into three ‘phases’:1 the forty year period 1948-1988, 
in which the concept emerged and its ‘core principles’ were established; the decade 1989-
1999, in which the number of operations increased dramatically, but in which these principles 
came under harsh scrutiny; and the period from 1999 to the present, in which POC has 
become central to a number of mission mandates.  In June 2015 the High Level Panel report 
on Peace Operations stated that it was ‘convinced’ of the continuing importance of the ‘core 
principles’ of peacekeeping in ‘guiding successful operations’, but that these must be 
‘interpreted progressively and with flexibility in the face of new challenges’ and ‘should 
never be an excuse for failure to protect civilians’.2  This chapter contextualizes the 
development of these principles and the challenges that they subsequently faced.  The next 
chapter will look at the third phase and how POC has been integrated into peacekeeping at 
the global level. 
                                                 
1 The UN Peacekeeping Homepage uses this chronological division, see: 
https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/history.shtml accessed 8 May 2013.  Others have sub-
divided the phases further.  See Ramesh Thakur and Albrecht Schnabel (eds) United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations: ad hoc missions, permanent engagement, New York: United Nations 
University Press, 2001, pp. 9-14; Henry Wiseman, ‘The United Nations and International 
Peacekeeping: a comparative analysis’, in United Nations Institute for Training and Research, The 
United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, Dordrecht: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1987, pp.73-95; Dennis Jett, Why peacekeeping fails, New York: St Martin’s Press, 1999, 
pp.21-4.  See also Joseph Camilleri, Kamal Malhotra and Majid Tehrania, Reimagining the future: 
towards democratic governance: a report of the global governance reform project, La Trobe 
University, 2000, pp.78-9.  These have referred to up to nine different chronological phases: the 
nascent period (1946-56), the assertive period (1956-67), the dormant period (1967-73), the resurgent 
period (1973-8), the maintenance period (1978-88), the transition period (1988-91), the enforcement 
period (1991-6), the moderation period (1996-7), and the period of ambiguity (1998-200).  More 
phases could presumably be added since the publication of this study.    
2 Uniting our strengths for peace – politics, partnerships and people, Report of the High Level Panel 
on United Nations Peace Operations, Advance Copy, 16 June 2015, [Hereinafter High Level Panel 
Report on Peace Operations 2015], Executive Summary, p.x.   
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The first phase of peacekeeping 
 
The UN Charter contains no express basis for peacekeeping.  There is also no universally 
accepted definition of the phrase,3 although it is used here consistently with the UN’s own 
terminology. This states that:  
 
Peacekeeping is a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where 
fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the 
peacemakers. Over the years, peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military 
model of observing cease-fires and the separation of forces after inter-state wars, to 
incorporate a complex model of many elements – military, police and civilian – 
working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace.4   
 
According to this definition, UN peacekeeping ‘began in 1948’ when the Security 
Council authorized the deployment of the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), 
whose role was to monitor the Armistice Agreement between Israel and its Arab 
neighbours.’5  This was followed by the deployment of the UN Military Observer Group in 
                                                 
3 For further discussion see, for example, Indar Jit Rikhye The theory and practice of peacekeeping, 
London: C Hurst & Co., 1984, pp.1-2; Ralph Zacklin, ‘The Use of Force in Peacekeeping Operations’, 
in Neils Blokker and Nico Schrijver, The Security Council and the Use of Force: theory and reality – a 
need for change?, Martin Nijhoff Publishers, 2005. 
4 UN Peacekeeping Homepage, ‘What is peacekeeping’, 
https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peacekeeping.shtml, accessed 6 May 2013.  See also 
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines (Capstone Document), New 
York: Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2008, p.18.  The above definition has subsequently 
been expanded to include considerably more detail on the various elements listed.  See 
https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peacekeeping.shtml, accessed 4 September 2015. 
5 UN Peacekeeping Homepage, ‘History of Peacekeeping, 
https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/history.shtml, accessed 6 May 2013.  See also Helga 
Haftendorn, Robert Keohane and Celeste Wallander (eds), Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions 
Over Time and Space, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp.234-6.  A Special Commission on 
the Balkans (UNSCOB) was established by the UNGA from 1947-51 to monitor alleged infiltration 
into Greece by Communist guerrillas from Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria.  The Security Council 
also created a UN Commission for Indonesia (UNCI) from 1947–51 to monitor the violence that 
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India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), which carried out a similar ceasefire monitoring function.6  
Since then over 70 peacekeeping operations have been deployed by the UN, the vast majority 
of which have taken place in the last twenty-five years.7    
 
In November 1950, in response to political paralysis in the Security Council, the UN General 
Assembly adopted a resolution, which became known as Uniting for Peace.8  This stated that 
where the Security Council ‘because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to 
exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security’ 
then the General Assembly may consider the issue ‘with a view to making appropriate  
recommendations to Members  for  collective  measures,  including in  the  case  of  a  breach  
of  the peace or act of  aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or 
restore  international  peace and security.’9   
 
                                                 
erupted during the decolonization process by the Netherlands.  Both missions included the deployment 
of military observers, although in both cases these remained under the authority of the troop 
contributing countries (TCCs) rather than the UN and they are not usually included in official accounts 
of UN peacekeeping.   
6 UN Peacekeeping Homepage, ‘http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/, accessed 15 March 
2015. 
7 Ibid.  This lists 16 current operations and 56 previous operations.  According to the UN website 54 of 
its missions have taken place since 1988.  As discussed above there are some disagreements about 
what officially counts as a UN peacekeeping mission.  
8 UN General Assembly Resolution 377 A (V), of 3 November 1950. 
9 For a summary overview see Christian Tomuschat, Uniting for Peace, Resolution 377 A (V), New 
York 3 November 1950, UN Audiovisual library of international law, 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/vcltsio/vcltsio.html, accessed 4 February 2013.  In January 1950 the 
Soviet Union walked out of the Security Council in protest at its decision to allocate China’s 
permanent seat to the government of Taiwan, rather than mainland China.  Because the UN Charter, 
Article 27 (3) specifies that ‘the concurring votes of the permanent members’ are necessary for 
decisions the Soviet Union assumed that this would paralyze the work of Council.  However, the 
majority of the Council believed that it could still discharge its functions and during the Soviet Union’s 
absence the Security Council used its Chapter VII powers to provide support to the Republic of (South) 
Korea when it faced an ‘armed attack’ from the north in June 1950.  The Soviet Union returned to the 
Security Council in August 1950 and was able to use its veto to block a resolution condemning North 
Korea, for its ‘continued defiance’ of the UN.  The US government sponsored the Uniting for Peace 
resolution in response.  The ICJ subsequently ruled in Legal consequences for States of the Continued 
Presence of South Africa in Namibia notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970). 
Advisory Opinion, ICJ Report 1971, para 22, that ‘the voluntary abstention of a permanent member 
has consistently been interpreted as not constituting a bar to the adoption of resolutions by the Security 
Council’. 
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On 4 November 1956 the General Assembly used the Uniting for Peace procedure to request 
the Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjold, to draw up an emergency plan to deploy a 
peacekeeping mission to address the ‘Suez Crisis’, after France and Britain had vetoed a 
resolution in the Security Council calling for Israel’s withdrawal from the Sinai.10  Two days 
later Hammarskjold submitted three options for how the Force could be assembled.11  The 
first was to deploy it directly under UN control.12  The other two options – which were 
rejected – were that the UN should either delegate the responsibility to third countries entirely 
outside the UN’s structures, or that the Force should be assembled first and then brought ‘into 
an appropriate relationship’ with the UN later.13 One proposal considered under the third 
option was to ‘blue hat’ the British and French forces already in the region.14 
 
The General Assembly supported the first option, which became the basis for the deployment 
of the first UN Emergency Force (UNEF).15  Troops began to be deployed almost 
immediately, and the Force eventually reached a strength of 7,000.16  UNEF was actually only 
able to deploy on the Egyptian side of the border and a status of forces agreement (SOFA) 
was reached with the Egyptian government through an exchange of letters.17  The government 
                                                 
10 General Assembly Resolution 3276 of 4 November 1956.  For a general overview of the crisis see 
Keith Kyle, Suez: Britain's End of Empire in the Middle East, London: IB Tauris, 2011. 
11 UN General Assembly Resolution A/3302 of 6 November 1956 
12 Ibid., para 4. This stated that it should be deployed ‘on the basis of principles reflected in the 
constitution of the United Nations itself.  This would mean that its chief responsible officer should be 
appointed by the United Nations and that he [sic] in his function should be responsible ultimately to 
the General Assembly and/or Security Council.’  It further stated that ‘His authority should be so 
defined as to make him fully independent of the policies of any one nation and his relations to the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations should correspond to those of [a] Chief of Staff’. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Colonel D.W. Bowett, United Nations Forces: A legal study, New York: Frederick A Praeger, 1964, 
p.91.  The Canadian government initially proposed that the UK and France should be ‘asked to act as a 
United Nations force and should, for this purpose be furnished with the United Nations flag’.   
15 UN General Assembly Resolution A/3276 of 4 November 1956.  UNEF was subsequently legally 
described as ‘a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly established under Article 22 of the Charter’.  
See Exchange of letters constituting an Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of 
Egypt concerning the Status of the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt, New York, 8 February 
1957, UN-doc. A/3526 UNTS Vol. 260, p. 6. 
16 Bowett, 1964, p.91. 
17 Exchange of letters, 8 February 1957, UN-doc. A/3526 UNTS Vol. 260, p. 6. See also UN General 
Assembly Resolution 1126 (XI) 22 February 1957. Amongst other things the agreements granted 
members of UNEF full freedom of movement in the performance of their duties and subjected them to 
the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective national governments in respect of any criminal offences 
committed in Egypt. 
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of Israel initially refused to the deployment, but, under diplomatic pressure, began to 
withdraw its forces from the areas to which UNEF would deploy.18   
 
UNEF’s two main functions were: first to secure and supervise the ceasefire and the 
withdrawal of foreign forces from Egyptian territory and then to maintain peaceful conditions 
in the area by preventing subsequent clashes.19  It also took on ‘limited responsibility for 
administrative and security functions’,20 including ‘measures to protect civilian life and 
public and private property’.21  UNEF was also ‘authorized to apprehend infiltrators and 
persons approaching the demarcation line in suspicious circumstances’ and to hand them over 
to the local police ‘after interrogation’.22    
 
On the face of it, the General Assembly’s actions seem at odds with Articles 11 and 12 of the 
Charter, which specify that it is for the Security Council rather than the General Assembly to 
decide on what ‘actions’ are necessary for the preservation of international peace and 
security.23  In its Advisory Opinion on Certain expenses of the United Nations,24 however, the 
ICJ ruled that while ‘primary responsibility’ for the maintenance of international peace and 
security was conferred upon the Security Council, the Charter made it ‘abundantly clear’ that 
                                                 
18 UN Peacekeeping Operations, Past Missions, UNEF I, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unef1backgr2.html, accessed 4 February 2013.  
Israel initially stated that it would not agree to the stationing of a foreign force, no matter how called, 
in her territory, or in any of the areas occupied by her’, but subsequently agreed to the deployment 
while stating that this was contingent on ‘satisfactory arrangements’ being established to ensure 
security ‘against the recurrence of the threat or danger of attack’. 
19 Report of the Secretary General, Summary of the experiences derived from the establishment and 
operation of the force, UN Doc. A/3943, 9 October 1958, para 10.  UNEF forces were deployed along 
the Egyptian-Israeli armistice demarcation line in the Gaza area and to the south along the international 
frontier.  UNEF came to an end when the Egyptian government withdrew permission for its 
deployment in May 1967, shortly before the outbreak of the Six Day war.  In October 1973 a second 
mission was established – UNEF II – to supervise the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Egypt 
following the Yom Kippur war. 
20 Ibid., para 14. 
21 Ibid., para 54. 
22 Ibid., paras 70 and 165.  Although it made limited use of these powers in practice, this was mainly 
because the mission remained largely peaceful for the ten years of its existence.  It nevertheless 
represents a significant infringement on the right to liberty since detentions are normally only 
permissible ‘in accordance with the law’.  This will be discussed further in Part II of this thesis. 
23 UN Charter, Articles 11 and 12 
24 Certain expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion 
of 20 July 1962, ICJ Reports 1962.  
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the General Assembly could also make decisions on such ‘important questions’.25  Only the 
Security Council, using its Chapter VII powers, had the authority to ‘require enforcement by 
coercive action’, but the General Assembly had been given powers to ‘recommend measures 
for the peaceful adjustment of any situation’.26  The Court reasoned that ‘the word 
“measures” implies some kind of action’ and the only specified limitation was that it should 
not act while the Security Council was dealing with the same matter.27  
 
The UN also published a ‘lessons learned’ report on the mission, which concluded with some 
‘basic principles’ that may ‘provide an adaptable framework’ for subsequent operations.28  
Although Findlay has described this report as a ‘work in progress’, rather than a ‘definitive 
word’,29 its conclusions prefigured most of the principal challenges that peacekeeping 
missions were to encounter as they were to later take on increasing ‘protective’ functions.   
 
The report highlighted the need to obtain the consent of the host State,30 sensitivity about the 
nationality of troop-contributing countries31 and stated that the mission should not get 
involved in internal conflicts or involve itself in political issues.32  It also stressed the need for 
                                                 
25 ICJ Reports 1962, p.163.   
26 UN Charter, Article 14.   
27 ICJ Report 1962, p.163.  ‘The only limitation which Article 14 imposes on the General Assembly is 
the restriction found in Article 12, namely, that the Assembly should not recommend measures while 
the Security Council is dealing with the same matter unless the Council requests it to do so.’  See also 
p.177 in which the ICJ found that the Security Council had the ‘implied power’ to establish 
peacekeeping forces and the competence to delegate this power to the Secretary General 
28 Report of the Secretary General, Summary of the experiences derived from the establishment and 
operation of the force, UN Doc. A/3943, 9 October 1958, para 154.   
29 For further discussion see Trevor Findlay, The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002, p.48.  He states the ‘study was a useful first attempt at describing the 
new phenomenon of peacekeeping, [but] it was rambling, repetitive and at times incoherent. It was 
essentially a work in progress and not the definitive word that some observers today assume it to be.’ 
30Report of the Secretary General, Summary of the experiences derived from the establishment and 
operation of the force, UN Doc. A/3943, 9 October 1958, paras 15 and 155-9.  The force was meant to 
be temporary, although the length of the mission was left open-ended.  It had no rights over the 
territory on which it was deployed other than those necessary for the execution of its functions and was 
defined as ‘more than an observer corps, but in no way a military occupation force’. 
31 Ibid., paras 16 and 44 and 160-1.  The force was recruited ‘from Member States who were not 
permanent members of the Security Council’ and were seen as neutral by parties to the conflict.  
Participation in the mission was voluntary with the Secretary General deciding which contingents to 
accept, partly to ensure the above criteria, but also to take into account the technical needs of the 
mission. 
32 Ibid., para 167. 
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a SOFA which ensured freedom of movement for the mission and that its personnel were 
exempt from the criminal jurisdiction of the host country.33  The mission should not exercise 
authority in a territory either in competition or cooperation with the national authorities, ‘on 
the basis of any joint operation’, although it should have the right to detain people in certain 
specified circumstances.34  The fact that all disciplinary authority had to be exercised through 
national contingents was described as ‘rather anomalous’, but it noted that conferring 
disciplinary authority on the mission Force commander ‘would probably require legislation in 
the participating States.’35  The report concluded that it was ‘essential to the preservation of 
the independent exercise of the functions of such a Force that its members should be immune 
from the criminal jurisdiction of the host state’.36   
 
The use of force was limited to self-defence.  The report noted the danger that a ‘wide 
interpretation of the right to self-defence’ might blur the distinction between peacekeeping 
and combat operations, but the only thing that was expressly forbidden was for UN troops to 
‘take the initiative in the use of armed force’.37  They were, however, permitted to ‘respond 
with force to an attack’ including attempts to make them withdraw from positions they had 
occupied in accordance with their mandate.38  The Force’s military commander, Lt. General 
Prem Singh Gyani, subsequently laid down a set of principles governing the use of such force 
including that it should be no more than necessary in the circumstances, be preventative 
rather than punitive, not involve reprisals or unnecessary physical coercion, that there must be 
justification for each separate act, and that ‘action must not be taken in one place with the 
object of creating an effect in another place.’39 
 
                                                 
33 Ibid., paras 127-9, 162-4 and 136.   
34 Ibid., para 165. 
35 Report of the Secretary General, Summary of the experiences derived from the establishment and 
operation of the force, A/3943, 9 October 1958, para139. 
36Ibid., para 136. 
37 Ibid., paras 178-80. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Instructions for the guidance of troops for protective duty tasks, ref. 2131/7(OPS), UNEF 
Headquarters, Gaza, 1 September 1962.  
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Four years after UNEF’s deployment, on 14 July 1960, the Security Council authorized the 
deployment of the UN Mission to the Congo (ONUC), after a report by Hammarskjold, 
acting under Article 99 of the Charter,40 and a request for military assistance by the 
Congolese government.41  The Security Council called upon Belgium to withdraw its troops 
from the territory  and authorized the Secretary General to ‘take the necessary steps to 
provide the Government with such military assistance as may be necessary’.42  
 
Congo had gained independence from Belgium on 30 June 1960, but a mutiny by the 
Congolese armed forces against their Belgian officer corps, resulted in attacks on European 
civilians.43  The Belgian army redeployed its forces, ostensibly to protect these, but it also 
occupied the mineral-rich province of Katanga, which announced its secession from the 
Congo on 11 July.44  The Security Council passed two more resolutions, the first of which 
supported Congo’s ‘territorial integrity and political independence’,45 the second of which 
                                                 
40 UN Charter, Article 99.  According to Dag Hammarskjold this article ‘more than any other was 
considered by the drafters to have transformed the Secretary-General of the United Nations from a 
purely administrative official to one with explicit political responsibility.  See Wilder, Foote (ed) The 
Servant of Peace: A Selection of the Speeches and Statements of Dag Hammarskjold, London: Bodley 
Head, 1962, pp.334-5. 
41 UN Security Council Resolution 143 of 14 July 1960: ‘Considering the report of the Secretary-
General on a request for United Nations action in relation to the Republic of the Congo, 
Considering the request for military assistance addressed to the Secretary-General by the President and 
the Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo, 1. Calls upon the Government of Belgium to 
withdraw its troops from the territory of the Republic of the Congo; 2. Decides to authorize the 
Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of 
the Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance as may be necessary until, through 
the efforts of the Congolese Government with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the 
national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks. 
42 Ibid. 
43 For a more detailed discussion of the period see Michael Deibert, The Democratic Republic of 
Congo, between hope and despair, London: Zed Books, 2013, pp.9-27; Martin, Meredith, The State of 
Africa, a history of fifty years of independence, Johannesburg and Cape Town: Jonathan Ball 
Publishers, 2006, pp.93-115; Georges Abi-Saab, The United Nations Operation in the Congo 1960-
1964, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978; and Jane Boulden, Peace enforcement: the United 
Nations experience in Congo, Somalia and Bosnia, Westport CT: Praeger Publishing, 2001. 
44 Ibid.  For the UN’s account of events see UN Peacekeeping Operations, Past Missions, ONUC, UN 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and UN Security Council, Situation in the Congo, 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/59-63/Chapter%208/59-63_08-8-
Situation%20in%20the%20Republic%20of%20Congo.pdf; accessed 6 February 2013. 
45 UN Security Council Resolution 145 of 22 July 1960. 
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again called on Belgium to withdraw its forces and reminded member States that they were 
under a legal obligation ‘to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council’.46  
 
Hammarskjold informed the Security Council that ONUC could be based on the same 
principles as UNEF, with similar stipulations regarding non-interference in internal affairs 
and the use of force.47  The UN refused to enter Katanga forcibly, or to expel a group of 
Belgian officers and mercenaries leading and training a secessionist army, despite pleas from 
Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba.48  When the diamond-rich province of Kasai also 
proclaimed its secession Lumumba turned to the Soviet Union, which provided air support 
for an unsuccessful assault on the province.49  ONUC troops stationed there failed to 
intervene during an alleged massacre of hundreds of civilians by Congolese armed forces 
because their rules of engagement (RoE) did not permit them to use force except in self-
defence.50  In September 1960, President Joseph Kasa-Vubu dismissed Lumumba from office 
and suspended parliament.51  The UN closed all airports in the country, cutting Lumumba off 
from his supporters in Stanleyville (Kisangani) in the east of the country.52  He was 
subsequently seized by the army and tortured and murdered while ONUC failed to intervene 
or protect him.53 
 
                                                 
46 UN Security Council Resolution 146 of 9 August1960.  This cited Articles 25 and 49 of the Charter. 
47 First report of the Secretary General on the implementation of Security Council Resolution S/4387 
of 14 July 1960, UN Doc. S/4389, 18 July 1960. 
48 For an overview of the crisis from a UN peacekeeper see Major David Bloomer, Violence in the 
Congo: A Perspective Of United Nations Peacekeeping, Congo (Brazzaville): Marine Corps 
Command and Staff College, Education Center, 1984. 
49 For further discussion see Thomas Mockaitis, Peace Operations and Intrastate Conflict: The Sword 
or the Olive Branch?, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999, pp.11-47. 
50 Ibid.  See also Gordon King, The United Nations in the Congo, New York: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 1962, p. 52. 
51 For a summary see Deibert, 2013, pp.22-3.   
52 Ibid. 
53 Meredith, 2006, pp.108-12. The UN had placed soldiers outside his house to protect him from the 
surrounding Congolese army, but he was seized when he fled in November in an attempt to link up 
with his supporters in Stanleyville.  The Léopoldville government covertly handed Lumumba over to 
the secessionist government in Katanga, where he was viciously tortured and then shot in secret by a 
firing squad, commanded by Belgian officers, in January 1961.  Western involvement in his death was 
officially denied at the time and his body was disposed of covertly. 
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Hammarskjold maintained that the UN should maintain its impartiality, although the country 
was clearly dividing along cold war lines.54  The Security Council paralysed on the issue, due 
to the vetoes of its permanent members, and so the General Assembly met in September, 
under the Uniting for Peace procedure.55  This reaffirmed previous Security Council 
resolutions and gave broad support to the Secretary General’s approach to implementing the 
mandate.56  In October 1960 the UN Secretariat issued a directive which provided that 
‘threatened areas’ could be declared ‘under UN protection’ and ‘marauders or armed bands’ 
would be ‘opposed by force’.57  New RoE allowed for the use of force in response to attempts 
to make UNOC troops withdraw from positions, disarm them, or prevent them from carrying 
out orders.58  Troops were authorized to ‘protect civilians when they were threatened by tribal 
war or violence’, to take ‘preventive action’ to deal with incitement to or preparation of civil 
war’, and to disarm and detain those preparing to attack UN troops’.59 
 
Mission strength was increased to 20,000 troops during 1961, but ONUC was now coming 
under attack both from Katangese secessionist forces and elements in the Congolese army.60   
In his annual report to the General Assembly Hammarskjold stated that in order to ensure ‘the 
protection of the lives of the civilian population in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the Genocide Convention’ it might be necessary for ONUC to undertake a 
‘temporary disarming of military units which . . .  were an obstacle to the restoration of law 
                                                 
54 Foote (ed) 1962 contains a number of reflections on this dilemma.  See also Boulden, 2001, p.27.  
She argues that ONUC was effectively supporting the Léopoldville government and that the 
suspension of parliament also presented a legal and constitutional dilemma for ONUC, since it was 
there at the invitation of a body which no longer existed.  Parliament was reconvened in July 1961 and 
a new government was duly created.  Some African countries, however, withdrew their troops in 
protest at the mission’s alleged bias. 
55 UN General Assembly Resolution ES-1474 of 16 September 1960. 
56 Ibid.  
57 Operations Directive No. 6 of 28 October 1960.  Cited in Mockaitis, 1999, p.44. 
58 Boulden, 2001, p.32. 
59 Boulden, 2001, p.33.  Hammarskjold also stated that political leaders could also be arrested if this 
was requested by both the central government and provincial authorities, however, peaceful 
demonstrations against the UN should be tolerated.    
60 The mission received a further Security Council mandate with UN Security Council Resolution 161 
of 21 February 1961.  This urged UNOC to take ‘all appropriate measures’ to prevent civil war 
‘including the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort’  It also called for an inquiry into the 
circumstances of the death of Lumumba.  See also Boulden, 2001, pp.32-5. 
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and order.’61  In August and September 1961 ONUC launched two operations against 
Katangese secessionist forces.62  The second of these went badly wrong, resulting in the 
deaths of seven UN troops and around 200 Katangese civilians and soldiers.  Hammarskjold 
was killed in a plane crash while trying to bring an end to the fighting.63  Separately, thirteen 
ONUC pilots were murdered in early November by the Congolese army.64 Against this 
background the Security Council passed a second resolution authorizing full military support 
to the Congolese government to ‘maintain law and order and national integrity’.65  The 
Katangese leaders sued for peace that December and ONUC began withdrawing its forces in 
1963, although the mission was not formally ended until June 1964.66  It had cost the lives of 
249 UN peacekeeping soldiers.67 
 
Findlay claims that: ‘So traumatic and enervating was the Congo mission that it produced a 
ground-swell of opinion that the UN should never again become involved in messy internal 
conflicts involving peace enforcement, whether mandated explicitly by the Security Council 
or not.’68  Durch has observed that many UN officials regarded the Congo as ‘the UN’s 
                                                 
61 Annual Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization, June 1960 – June 1961, 
16th Session, UN Doc A/4800, para 11. 
62 For an overview of the crisis from a UN diplomat see Conor Cruise O’Brien, To Katanga and Back, 
a UN case history, London: Hutchinson, 1962.  
63 New York Times, ‘Hammarskjold Dies In African Air Crash; Kennedy Going To U. N. In Succession 
Crisis’, 19 September 1961. 
64 Boulden, 2001, p.36.  The group of Italian pilots were arriving in Kindu on 11 November 1961 when 
they were detained, beaten and shot by the army who then cut up their bodies and distributed pieces to 
a watching crowd. 
65 UN Security Council Resolution 169 of 24 November 1961.  Para 4 authorized ONUC to detain 
‘pending legal action . . . all foreign military and para-military personnel and political advisers not 
under United Nations command, and mercenaries’.  See also Walter Dorn and David Bell, ‘Intelligence 
and Peacekeeping: the UN Operation in Congo 1960 - 64’, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 2, No. 1, 
Spring 1995, pp.11-33.  Deibert, 2013, pp.26-7.  UNOC forcibly removed road blocks and carried out 
air strikes against Katangese positions. 
66 Meredith, 2006, p.114; and Deibert, 2013, pp.26-7.  On 21 December 1961 the leader of the Katanga 
secession, Moïse Tshombe, signed an agreement with the government in Léopoldville formally 
recognizing its authority, although minor clashes continued until early 1963.  Tshombe went into exile 
but was persuaded to return to take up the post of Prime Minister in 1964, but was sacked from this 
post by Kasa-Vubu in November 1965.  A rebellion also broke out in eastern Congo, Lumumba’s 
previous stronghold, in 1964 in which up to a million people may have died.  In November 1965 
General Joseph-Désiré Mobutu staged a coup and declared himself President. 
67 UN Peacekeeping, Fatalities by Mission up to 31 March 2014, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/fatalities/documents/stats_4a.pdf, accessed 28 April 2014. 
68 Findlay, 2002, p.87. 
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Vietnam’ and this was one of the reasons why the organization feared ‘mission creep’ in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and other crises during the 1990s.69  The UN Secretariat were, on the 
whole, however, ‘more interested in forgetting than learning, more interested in avoiding 
future ONUCs than in doing them better’.70  Autesserre notes that ONUC ‘became the 
example of what peacekeeping missions should not do’ – until it was eclipsed by more recent 
failures.71   
 
The other two main missions during the ‘first phase’ of peacekeeping were the UN 
Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) deployed in 1964,72 and the UN Interim Force in 
Lebanon (UNIFIL) deployed in 1978,73 both of which remain in existence to the present day.  
Although both of these missions were deployed to monitor ceasefires or troop withdrawals, 
their mandates were subsequently expanded in response to new outbreaks of violence.  
 
UNIFICYP troops were frequently shot at while trying to protect civilians in the early days of 
the mission74 and an Aide Memoire issued by the UN Secretary General specified, in 
response, that ‘self-defence’ should include responding to attempts to forcibly prevent troops 
from carrying out their mandated activities.75  This was globally endorsed in a Report by the 
                                                 
69 William Durch (ed.), The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis, 
New York: The Stimson Center, 1993, p. 8. 
70 Ibid., p.38.   
71 Séverine Autesserre, The trouble with the Congo: local violence and the failure of international 
peacebuilding, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, p.36.  
72 UNICYP’s original mandate was provided by UN Security Council resolution 186 of 4 March 1964, 
which was supplemented by resolutions 187, 192, 193 and 194 the same year.   The request for the 
mission’s deployment came from both the Cypriot government and from Britain, the former colonial 
power.  For a summary of the background to the mission see UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus 
(UNFICYP) Homepage, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unficyp/, accessed 7 May 2013.   
73 UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unifil/, 
accessed 7 May 2013. 
74 Indar Jit Rikhye, The theory and practice of peacekeeping, London: C Hurst & Co., 1984, p.95. 
75 Aide Memoire of the Secretary General concerning some questions relating to the function and 
operation of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, 10 April 1964, UN Doc. S/5653 of 11 April 1964.  
See also Siobhán Wills, Protecting Civilians, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, p.13.  Wills 
notes that mandated tasks included: providing escorts for civilians and supplies, and patrols to protect 
harvesting and guard government property, as well as procedures to ensure the functioning of the 
postal service and the payment of social benefits. 
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UN Secretary General in 197376 and the concept of ‘self-defence’ as including ‘defence of the 
mission mandate’ has been reflected in the RoEs of subsequent UN missions.77  UNIFCYP 
troops actually engaged in limited combat operations with Turkish troops during their 
invasion of Cyprus, in 1974, to protect both themselves and threatened civilians.78   
 
UNIFIL was deployed at the request of the government of Lebanon following the Israeli 
invasion in 1978.79  It has also frequently come under attack and the nearly 300 fatalities it 
has suffered are one of the highest of any UN mission.80  Neither the government of Israel nor 
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) gave their full consent to UNIFIL’s 
deployment.81   There was also considerable ambiguity about its area of operations.82  During 
Israel’s invasion of 1982 some UNIFIL battalions tried to protect civilians by physically 
interposing themselves in front of the Israeli forces.83 These tactics were largely 
unsuccessful,84 however, its positions were overrun and UNIFIL found itself operating behind 
                                                 
76 Report of the Secretary General on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 340 (1973), 
UN Doc. S/11052/Rev.1, 27 October 1973. 
77 For further discussion see Findlay, 2002, pp.87-123. 
78 For a list of the UNICYP mandates see 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unficyp/resolutions.shtml, accessed 7 May 2013.  See 
also UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unifil/, 
accessed 7 May 2013.  For further discussion see Karl Birgisson, ‘United Nations Peacekeeping Forces 
in Cyprus’, in Durch (ed), 1993, pp. 218-236. 
79 UNIFIL was established by UN Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426 of 19 March 1978.  The 
resolutions authorising it also called upon Israel immediately to cease its military action and withdraw 
its forces from all Lebanese territory.  The mission was tasked with: confirming Israeli withdrawal 
from southern Lebanon; restoring international peace and security; and assisting the Lebanese 
Government in restoring its effective authority in the area.  The concept of UNIFIL operations were 
adjusted following the 1982 Israeli-Lebanese war and its functions were limited primarily to 
humanitarian assistance; and then again after the Israeli withdrawal in 2000, when it resumed its 
military functions.  A third adjustment occurred following the 2006 Israeli-Hizbullah war. 
80 For a summary to the background of the mission See UNIFIL, Homepage, UNIFIL Background, 
http://unifil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=11554&language=en-US accessed 8 May 2013.  For 
its mandate see http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unifil/mandate.shtml, accessed 7 May 
2013.  See also http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unifil/facts.shtml, accessed 8 May 2013. 
81 Report of the Secretary-general on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 425, UN Doc. 
S/12611, 19 March 1978.  See also Wills, 2009, p.15. She notes that the PLO argued that it should only 
be deployed to the area previously occupied by Israel while Israel argued that it should ensure the 
demilitarisation of the whole of southern Lebanon.  
82 Ibid. 
83 For official and personal accounts of these efforts see: E A Erskine Mission with UNIFIL: an 
African soldier’s reflections, New York: St Martin’s Press, 1989, p.108; and United Nations, The Blue 
Helmets: a review of United Nations peacekeeping, Third Edition, New York: UN department of 
Public Information, 1996, p.116. 
84 For critical appraisals see Eugene Yukin ‘UNIFIL’s Mandate and Rules of Engagement’, Middle 
East Policy and Society, Volume 1, 2009, American University of Beirut; and Wills 2009, p.17.  Yukin 
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Israeli lines for three years.85  A non-UN multi-national force, led by the US, organized the 
evacuation of around 7,500 Palestinians, including PLO fighters, from Beirut in August 1982, 
but little was done to protect the civilians left behind who were massacred by an Israeli-
backed militia at Sabra and Shatila refugee camps the following month.86  In 2006 UNIFIL 
was again expanded in strength to 15,000 military personnel in 2006 and a new mandate 
expanded its tasks.87  This includes the ‘protection of civilians’, although the mission 
mandate is not issued under Chapter VII of the Charter.88   
 
The ‘core principles’ of UN peacekeeping and their evolution 
 
The debt incurred from the UN’s first two peacekeeping operations nearly bankrupted the 
Organization and it was the refusal of France and the Soviet Union to pay these costs that led 
to the Certain expenses Advisory Opinion by the ICJ.89  The financial crisis also led to the 
UN establishment of a Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations (C34) to undertake a 
comprehensive review of these missions and tasks.90  The annual reports of the C34 have 
                                                 
notes that: ‘A few attempts were made by Nepalese troops to blockade Israeli soldiers from crossing 
certain roads. Other units attempted to stop the advancing Israeli tanks.  Apart from several attempts 
here and there, Israel’s 1982 invasion completely overrun UN troops, demonstrating the futility of its 
mandate.’  Wills, 2009, cites a variety of damning assessments of the mission, which describe it as 
‘dismal’, ‘so futile as to make its mandate appear absurd’, unlikely to be a model anyone would like to 
emulate’ and ‘an attestation to the weakness and impotence of UN forces when these have been 
confronted with large-scale, offensive military actions’. 
85 See UNIFIL Background, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unifil/background.shtml, 
accessed 9 May 2013.  This cites its total fatalities as 297. 
86 For further details see Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 2001 pp.382-3; Helena Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: people, power, and 
politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. p. 4; and Linda A. Malone, ‘The Kahan 
Report, Ariel Sharon and the Sabra Shatila Massacres in Lebanon: Responsibility Under International 
Law for Massacres of Civilian Populations’, William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository, 
Faculty Publications, Paper 587, 1985.  The massacre killed between 750 and 3,500 civilians and was 
carried out virtually within sight of the Israeli armed forces who received reports that it was occurring, 
but did not to stop it. 
87 UNIFIL, Homepage, UNIFIL Background, 
http://unifil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=11554&language=en-US accessed 8 May 2013.  
Between 1982 and 2000 UNIFIL’s functions were limited to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, 
but it resumed its monitoring functions in 2000, following Israel’s withdrawal.  
88 Resolution 1701 of 11 August 2006 para 12.  
89 See Certain expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory 
Opinion of 20 July 1962, ICJ Report, 1962. 
90 The Committee was established by General Assembly resolution 2006 (XIX) of 18 February 1965 It 
reports to the General Assembly on its work through the Fourth Committee (Special Political and 
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repeatedly reaffirmed that peacekeeping is based on three fundamental principles: consent of 
the parties, impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defence.91   
 
Gray argues that the ‘former operation [UNEF] led to agreement on the basic principles 
underlying what later became known as peacekeeping operations; the latter [ONUC] revealed 
the difficulties that arise when these principles are compromised.’92  Critics maintain that it 
was attachment to these core principles that led to repeated failures to prevent mass human 
rights violations in the 1990s because ‘peacekeepers observed rather than enforced.’93  Wills 
argues that the principles are based on ‘highly idealized’ assumptions that the UN’s authority 
will be respected due to the mere presence of its emissaries.94   
 
From the brief survey above, however, it is clear that those involved in the ‘first phase’ of 
peacekeeping took a far more pragmatic approach.  Although consent of the host State was a 
prerequisite for initial deployments, the explicit consent to and acceptance of the presence of 
a peacekeeping mission by all the parties to the conflict was rarely achieved and resolutions 
mandating them often singled out one particular party for demands and criticisms.95  The use 
                                                 
Decolonization) and is comprised of 147 Member States, mostly past or current contributors to 
peacekeeping operations. 14 other Member States, intergovernmental organizations and entities, 
including the African Union, the European Community, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Criminal Police Organization 
(Interpol), participate as observers. 
91 The annual Reports of the Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations, from 1999 o 2012 can 
be found through the UN peacekeeping home page at 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/ctte/spcmt_rep.htm, accessed 8 May 2013. 
92 Christine Gray, Use of Force in International Law, Third Edition, Oxford: Oxford, University Press, 
2008, p.262. 
93 Adam LeBor, Complicity with Evil, the United Nations in the age of modern genocide, New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2006, p.14.  See also Dominic Donald Neutrality, impartiality and UN 
peacekeeping at the beginning of the 21st Century, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 9, Issue No. 4, 
2002, p.21; and Tsagourias ‘Consent, Neutrality/ Impartiality and the Use of Force in Peacekeeping: 
Their Constitutional Dimension’, Journal of Conflict and Security Law, Vol. 11, No. 3, 25 January 
2007, p.465.  This view also underpins many of the ‘standard’ works on peacekeeping.  See, for 
example: Bellamy and Williams, 2011, Thakur, 2011; Thakur, 2006; and Sara E. Davies, Luke 
Glanville (eds.) Protecting the Displaced: Deepening the Responsibility to Protect, The Hague/ 
London/ Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2010. 
94 Wills, 2009, p.5.  This ‘idealized view’ is also expressed by many contemporary commentators 
writing during the ‘first phase’ of peacekeeping, which reinforces this impression.  See, for example, 
Rikhye, 1984; Bowett, 964; Foote (ed) 1962. 
95 Findlay, 2002, p.17.  He notes that: ‘While both Egypt and Israel accepted the need for the 
deployment of UNEF I and II, it was hardly entirely voluntary: both had to be persuaded to accept it. 
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of force beyond a strict interpretation of self-defence was also implicitly authorized for all 
missions and, from at least 1973, this has been explicitly understood as an authorization to 
use force ‘in defence of the mission mandate.’96   
 
One reason for the gap between the UN’s own theory and practice in the ‘first phase’ of 
peacekeeping can be traced by to the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on Certain expenses.97 The ICJ 
ruled that the General Assembly had been given powers to take ‘measures’ to help preserve 
international peace and security, which could include the establishment of peacekeeping 
missions, but only so long as these did not intrude on the Chapter VII ‘enforcement’ powers 
reserved for the Security Council.98  The lack of an explicit reference to peacekeeping in the 
Charter meant that even the Security Council had to rely on a broad interpretation of its 
‘general powers’, particularly when resorting to Chapter VII.99   
 
Official statements about  the ‘core principles’ of peacekeeping contained in UN reports and 
by senior UN officials should be seen in the context of the political paralysis of the Security 
Council and the controversies surrounding the deployment of the missions that did take place.  
In some cases this seems to have led to deliberate ambiguity or obfuscation, such as when the 
Brazilian representative on the UNEF consultative committee referred to ‘Chapter VI and-a-
                                                 
The Congo mission was deployed without the consent of the Katangans and only reluctantly agreed to 
by Belgium, while the Congolese Government gave its consent only under the impression that it was to 
be a peace enforcement operation. The deployment of the UN Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was sought 
by Lebanon but shunned by Israel. Egypt had the right to ask UNEF I to leave—a right that it invoked 
in 1967. 
96 Simon Chesterman, The use of force in UN peace operations, External study for the Department of 
Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, New York: DPKO, 2003, p.7. 
97 Certain expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion 
of 20 July 1962, ICJ Report 1962.  
98 ICJ Report 1962, p.177. 
99 Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘The Legal basis of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations’, 
Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 43, Winter 2003, pp.486-523.  See also: Hilaire 
McCoubrey, and Nigel White, The Blue Helmets: Legal Regulation of United Nations Military 
Operations, Dartmouth: Dartmouth Pub Co, 1996; Christopher Joyner (ed), The United Nations and 
International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997; Bruno Simma,  The Charter of the 
United Nations A Commentary Second Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002; Rosalind 
Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary, Vol. III: Africa, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980. 
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half’ operations.100  As Orford notes, ‘when the UN was requested to intervene in Egypt and 
the Congo, both the requesting governments and the Secretary-General believed that the UN 
could operate as a neutral force to protect the interests of newly independent states and 
prevent the expansion of Cold War conflicts.’ 101  The ‘first phase’ of peacekeeping took 
place against a backdrop of the decline of the European Empires, and the rise of a new 
superpower rivalry, and this determined its historical specificity. 102 
 
The challenges of the 1990s  
 
UN peacekeeping forces were awarded the Nobel peace prize in 1988103 and most accounts of 
the ‘first phase’ of peacekeeping operations consider them – Congo aside – to have generally 
been a success.104   The main criticism of the UN was not when it acted, but when it failed to 
act, which was mainly a result of the polarised atmosphere in the Security Council during the 
cold war.  In Agenda for Peace, published in 1992, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the newly-
appointed Secretary General, commented that:  
 
Since the creation of the United Nations in 1945, over 100 major conflicts around the 
world have left some 20 million dead. The United Nations was rendered powerless to 
deal with many of these crises because of the vetoes – 279 of them – cast in the 
                                                 
100 Kai Michael Kenkel (ed), South America and Peace Operations: Coming of Age, London: 
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Press, 2011, p.3.  
102 Ibid. 
103 The Nobel Peace Prize1988. Nobelprize.org. 
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Security Council, which were a vivid expression of the divisions of that period.  With 
the end of the cold war there have been no such vetoes since 31 May 1990, and 
demands on the United Nations have surged.105   
 
Boutros-Ghali claimed that: ‘Peace-keeping can rightly be called the invention of the United 
Nations.’106  It was defined in the report as ‘the deployment of a United Nations presence in 
the field, hitherto with the consent of the all the parties concerned’. 107 [emphasis added]  
Agenda for Peace also noted that the recently adopted UN General Assembly on 
humanitarian assistance,108 stressed ‘the need for access to those requiring humanitarian 
assistance’ and claimed that ‘a Government’s request for United Nations involvement, or 
consent to it, would not be an infringement of that State’s sovereignty or be contrary to 
Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter’.109 [emphasis added]  In a perversely prophetic 
passage, the report also stated that: 
 
the basic conditions for success remain unchanged: a clear and practicable mandate; 
the cooperation of the parties in implementing that mandate; the continuing support 
of the Security Council; the readiness of Member States to contribute the military, 
police and civilian personnel, including specialists, required; effective United Nations 
command at Headquarters and in the field; and adequate financial and logistic 
support.110   
 
                                                 
105 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Report of the Secretary-General An Agenda for Peace: Preventive 
Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping UN Doc. A/47/277 - S/24111, 17 June 1992 [Hereinafter 
Agenda for Peace 1992] 
106 Agenda for Peace, 1992, para 46. 
107 Ibid., para 20.   
108 Ibid., para 30 and UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182, of 19 December 1991, para 1.3. 
109 Ibid. See also Additional Protocol I, Article 54, Additional Protocol II, Article 14.  Jean-Marie 
Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005, I, p.1479.  This will be discussed further in Chapters Three and 
Four. 
110 Agenda for Peace 1992, para 50. 
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In December 1991 the General Assembly adopted a resolution on ‘strengthening of the 
coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations’.111  This 
established the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)112 and also contained a set of 
principles relating to the distribution of humanitarian assistance.’113  It emphasized respect for 
‘the sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of States’ and that ‘humanitarian 
assistance should be provided with the consent of the affected country and, in principle, on 
the basis of an appeal by that country.’114  It ‘stressed’ that humanitarian assistance should be 
provided ‘in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality’.115  
However, it also stated that:  
 
The magnitude and duration of many emergencies may be beyond the response 
capacity of many affected countries . . . States whose populations are in need of 
humanitarian assistance are called upon to facilitate the work of these organizations 
in implementing humanitarian assistance, in particular the supply of food, medicines, 
shelter and health care, for which access to victims is essential.116   
 
This resolution was passed despite concerns expressed that the guidelines could be used to 
legitimize infringements on State sovereignty.117  Subsequent resolutions by both the General 
Assembly and Security Council have further codified the principles and set out a framework 
for humanitarian assistance.118  In early 1992 three new UN Departments: DPKO, the 
                                                 
111 General Assembly Resolution 46/182, UN Doc. A/RES/46/182, 19 December 1991. 
112 Ibid., para 38.  The IASC includes UN agencies such as UNHCR, UN Development Programme 
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Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (later to 
become the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - OCHA) were created 
in a major internal restructuring.119  UN agencies such as the UNHCR, the World Food 
Programme (WFP) and the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) also significantly expanded their 
field presence from the start of the 1990s.120  This means that UN agencies are increasingly 
providing direct humanitarian protection, relief and assistance to people in ‘complex 
emergencies’.121  
 
Some UN agencies, such as UNHCR, also acknowledge the potential operational role of 
NGOs in their Statute,122 and most implement projects in partnership with them through 
bilateral agreements.  NGOs gained a direct input into the development of the UN’s 
humanitarian policies and the co-ordination of operational activities through the IASC, whose 
mandated functions include ‘advocacy of humanitarian issues with political organs, notably 
the Security Council’.123  The UN Charter provides that its Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) ‘may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental 
organizations, which are concerned with matters within its competence.’124  This has been 
implemented by successive ECOSOC resolutions that give NGOs various categories of 
                                                 
of the General Assembly, Economic and Social Council and Security Council Resolutions and 
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Restructuring of the Secretariat of the Organization: Report of the Secretary General, UN Doc. 
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121 Ibid., p.67. Complex humanitarian emergencies are generally defined by: the deterioration or 
collapse of central government authority; conflict and widespread human rights abuses; food 
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85-6; and Weiss and Gordenker, 1996, p.67. 
123 For details see OCHA Homepage, ‘What we do, advocacy’, http://www.unocha.org/about-us/who-
we-are, visited 6 March 2015. 
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participatory status within the UN system.125  As will be discussed further below, the 
influence of these agencies became particularly significant by the end of the 1990s due to 
their dual role as both implementers and advocates during humanitarian crises.126   
 
Agenda for Peace contained an ambitious set of proposals for how the UN should respond to 
the new environment127 and its publication can be seen as marking the transition to the 
‘second phase’ of peacekeeping operations.   This saw a vast increase in the number of UN 
peacekeeping operations, along with increasing criticisms of the missions for their failure to 
protect civilians within the areas of their deployment.128   
 
Between 1988 and 1994 the UN mounted almost twice as many peace-keeping or ‘peace 
enforcement’129 operations as it had done over the previous 40 years.130  The upward trend 
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innovation in the relationship between the UN and NGOs’, in Weiss and Gordenker (eds), 1996, p.85; 
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the creation of ‘peace enforcement’ units and more States agreeing to accept the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the ICJ. 
128 Christine Gray, ‘Peacekeeping After the Brahimi Report: Is There a Crisis of Credibility for the 
UN?’, Journal of Conflict and Security Law, Oxford Journals, Vol. 6, Issue 2, 2001, pp. 267-288.   
129 UN Peacekeeping Homepage, ‘Peace Enforcement’, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peace.shtml, accessed 12 March 2015.  ‘Peace 
enforcement involves the application of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military 
force. It requires the explicit authorization of the Security Council. It is used to restore international 
peace and security in situations where the Security Council has decided to act in the face of a threat to 
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has continued since, albeit at a reduced rate.131  The experiences of the missions themselves 
have been well-documented elsewhere, and the purpose of this section is to show how the UN 
coped with the challenges that these posed to the international legal framework governing 
their actions.132    
 
The first major operation in this ‘new phase’ was the ultimately disastrous UN mission to 
Angola, which was originally established in 1988.133  This was followed by the UN 
Transition Group (UNTAG) deployed to Namibia in 1989 to supervise free and fair elections 
                                                 
striking is the fact that in the 40 years of the Cold War between 1948 and 1988, only 13 UN 
peacekeeping operations were launched. But in the six years between1988-1994 there have been a total 
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constitutes a UN peacekeeping mission slightly differently, but the broad trend of the figures is clear.  
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Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa, London: James Currey, 1997; David Rieff, A bed 
for the night: humanitarianism in crisis, London: Vintage, 2002; Fiona Terry, Condemned to repeat? 
The paradox of humanitarian action, Ithaca: Cornell University, Press, 2002; Michael Barnett and 
Thomas G. Weiss (eds), Humanitarianism  in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics, London: Cornell 
University Press, 2008; Michael Barnett, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism, Ithaca, 
NY and London: Cornell University Press, 2011; William Shawcross, Deliver Us from Evil: 
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and the transition to independence.134  The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia 
(UNTAC), established in 1992, was a similar operation, but also tasked with monitoring a 
ceasefire.135  None of the three were deployed with Chapter VII authorization, although 
UNTAC’s RoE provided for the use of force to prevent attacks on civilians as well as to carry 
out arrests of those suspected of human rights violations.136  UNTAC created an office of the 
Special Prosecutor to try certain crimes, but the mission had no jail, requiring the 
establishment of the first UN ‘detention facility’, while flaws in the Cambodian criminal 
justice system meant it was unable to hand detainees over to the local courts.137  For the most 
part, however, detention powers were rarely used and UNTAC and UNTAG confined 
themselves to less controversial tasks such as the distribution of aid, disarmament projects 
and human rights monitoring and training.138  Two far more controversial operations – 
Operation Provide Comfort and Operation Restore Hope – were respectively launched in 
April1991 and December 1992.  
 
Operation Provide Comfort was established to protect the Kurds in northern Iraq following 
their failed uprising at the end of the first Gulf war.139  Over two million Kurds had fled their 
homes fearing revenge attacks by the Iraqi military140 and almost half a million people were 
                                                 
134 UN Security Council Resolution 632 of 16 February 1989. 
135 UN Security Council Resolution 745 of 28 February 1992. 
136 United Nations, The Blue Helmets: a review of United Nations peacekeeping, Third Edition, New 
York: UN Department of Public Information, 1996, p.467.  See also Michael W. Doyle, UN 
Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC’s Civil Mandate, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995, p.47.  
Doyle notes that UNTAC’s civilian police were not armed, and the mission’s interpretation of its 
mandate was that it had no authority to exercise force for such a purpose.  
137 Michael W. Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC’s Civil Mandate, Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner, 1995, p.47.  The Cambodian Prime Minister, Hun Sen, was not prepared to prosecute his own 
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138 Chesterman, 2003, p.14. 
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London: Minority Rights Group, 1992. 
140 Ibid.  See also Marjoleine Zieck, UNHCR and Voluntary Repatriation of Refugees: A Legal 
Analysis, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997, p.180.  The genocidal chemical weapons 
attack at Halabji had taken place less than three years previously. 
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soon trapped on the border with Turkey, which refused to admit them.141  The operation was 
principally undertaken by troops from the US, Britain, France and the Netherlands in April 
1991.142  Around 30 other countries contributed relief supplies and some 50 humanitarian 
agencies participated in this operation.143  The military-humanitarian cooperation in the 
operation proved precedent-setting.144  In his final report to the UN General Assembly, in 
September 1991, UN Secretary General, Perez de Cuellar, argued that such operations were 
reconfiguring the debate about international interventions to protect human rights.145    
 
It is now increasingly felt that the principle of non-interference within the essential 
domestic jurisdiction of States cannot be regarded as a protective barrier behind 
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agencies and the military in humanitarian response’, Humanitarian Practice Network, Overseas 
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which human rights could be massively or systematically violated with impunity . . . 
We need not impale ourselves on the horn of a dilemma between respect for 
sovereignty and the protection of human rights . . . What is involved is not the right 
of intervention but the collective obligation of states to bring relief and redress in 
human rights emergencies.146  
 
The legal justification invoked for the military action was Security Council Resolution 688 of 
5 April 1991, which was adopted by 10 votes to three over objections that it constituted 
interference in Iraq’s domestic affairs.147  The resolution was not adopted under Chapter VII 
but it did use similar language, describing the Iraqi government’s actions, inside its own 
borders, as a threat to international peace and security.148   A subsequent Memorandum of 
Understanding was signed between the UN and Iraq which ‘welcomed humanitarian 
measures to avert new flows of refugees and displaced persons from Iraq.’149  Lightly armed 
UN Guards replaced the coalition forces in July 1991 while allied aircraft remained stationed 
across the border in Turkey to enforce a no-fly zone and deter Iraq’s armed forces from 
returning.150    
 
                                                 
146 Ibid. 
147 Security Council Resolution 688 of 5 April 1991.  Cuba, Yemen and Zimbabwe voted against while 
China and India abstained.   
148 Ibid.  ‘The Security Council . . .  (1) Condemns the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in 
many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish populated areas, the consequences of which 
threaten international peace and security in the region; (2) Demands that Iraq, as a contribution to 
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political rights of all Iraqi citizens are respected; (3) Insists that Iraq allow immediate access by 
international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq and to 
make available all necessary facilities for their operations’. 
149 Quoted in Guy Goodwin Gill, The Refugee in International Law, Second Edition, Clarendon, 1998, 
p.  286. 
150 Cook, 1995, pp.39-44.  For a US military logistics account of this Operation see William J. Allen 
Crisis in Southern Iraq: Operation SOUTHERN WATCH, in Timothy Warnock (ed) Short of War 
Major USAF Contingency Operations 1947-1997, Air Force History and Museums Program in 
association with Air University Press, 2000, pp.189-96.  The northern no-fly zone covered roughly half 
of the Kurdish autonomous area, north of Iraq’s 36th parallel. This was followed by a smaller-scale no-
fly zone, ‘Operation Southern Watch’ in Southern Iraq where the Shi’ite population was similarly 
threatened. 
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The no-fly zones were maintained until the invasion of Iraq in 2003.151  In 1993 the US, 
Britain and France launched air and missile attacks on facilities connected with Iraq’s nuclear 
weapons programme.152   This was followed in 1998 by another massive series of air strikes 
in Operation Desert Fox, although the French had withdrawn from these operations in 1996 
and subsequently questioned their legality.153  Wills states that more cruise missiles were 
fired during the four day operation in 1998 than had been used during the whole of the first 
Gulf war and in 1999 alone the US and Britain used almost 2,000 bombs and cruise missiles 
against Iraq.154   
 
Russia and China repeatedly argued that there was no legal justification either for the no-fly 
zones or continued military strikes against Iraq as the 1990s wore on.155  The US and Britain 
maintained, in response, that their actions were consistent with UN Security Council 
resolutions, 688 and 687, the latter of which had demanded that Iraq get rid of its weapons of 
mass destruction and establish an intrusive inspections regime as a condition of the ceasefire 
that marked the end of the first Gulf war.156  Gray states that in 1999 the US and Britain 
extended the RoE of their aircraft, which were now permitted to take pre-emptive action 
against Iraq’s air defences, on the basis of self-defence and that by 2003, the operations 
originally justified on the basis of ‘protecting the Kurds’ were being used to weaken up Iraq’s 
defences in advance of the invasion.157   
 
Military action in Iraq also seems to have prompted Britain to revise its views on the legality 
of ‘humanitarian interventions’ discussed in the previous chapter.  In 1992 its FCO legal 
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152 Gray, 2008, pp.35-9 and 162-3.   
153 Ibid. 
154 Wills, 2009, p.201. 
155 See for example, Security Council, Meeting, Friday, 17 December 1999, UN Doc. S/PV.4084. 
156 Security Council Resolution 687 of 3 April 1991, paras 7 – 12; and CNN News, Transcript: 
President Clinton explains Iraq strike, Wednesday, December 16, 1998.  According to this argument, 
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157 Gray, 2008, pp.38-9. 
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counsellor stated that while ‘not specifically mandated’ by the Security Council action had 
been taken by States ‘in exercise of the customary international law principle of humanitarian 
intervention’.158  By 1998 the British government was arguing that although there was ‘no 
general doctrine of humanitarian necessity in international law’ there were some cases when 
‘in the light of all the circumstances, a limited use of force was justifiable in support of 
purposes laid down by the Security Council but without the Council’s express 
authorisation.’159   
 
In 2003 Britain’s attorney general stated in private advice to the then prime minister, Tony 
Blair, that the three legal grounds for the use of force were ‘a) self-defence (which may 
include collective self-defence); b) exceptionally to avert overwhelming humanitarian 
catastrophe; and c) authorisation by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter.’160  After the invasion of Iraq, Blair argued that the definition of a ‘humanitarian 
intervention’ should be expanded to include these types of regime-change invasions.161  In 
August 2013 the British government published legal advice stating that it would be lawful to 
take military action, without Security Council authorization, in response to the humanitarian 
crisis in Syria and the alleged use of chemical weapons by its government.162  Britain is in a 
minority in taking this position, but, as will be discussed below, the perceived reluctance of 
                                                 
158 The expanding role of the United Nations and its implications for UK policy: minutes of evidence, 
hearing of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons, 2 December 1992, para 84. 
Statement of Tony Aust, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Legal Counsellor. 
159 Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, FCO, Written Reply in the House of Lords (16 Nov. 1998) 
in: HL Debs., vol. 594, WA 139-40.  It also stated that such cases would be ‘in the nature of things be 
exceptional’ and ‘depend on an objective assessment of the factual circumstances at the time and on 
the terms of the relevant decisions of the Security Council bearing on the situation in question.’  
Operation Comfort was justified on this basis as ‘the only means to avert an immediate and 
overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe’. 
160 Opinion of the Attorney General, “Iraq”, Attorney General’s Office, 7 March 2003. 
161 Text of speech delivered by Prime Minister, Sedgefield, 5 March 2004.  He argued that ‘a regime 
can systematically brutalise and oppress its people and there is nothing anyone can do, when dialogue, 
diplomacy and even sanctions fail, unless it comes within the definition of a humanitarian catastrophe 
(though the 300,000 remains in mass graves already found in Iraq might be thought by some to be 
something of a catastrophe). This may be the law, but should it be?’ 
162 Prime Minister’s Office, Guidance, Chemical weapon use by Syrian regime: UK government legal 
position, 29 August 2013, No. 10 Downing Street, London, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/chemical-weapon-use-by-syrian-regime-uk-government-
legal-position/chemical-weapon-use-by-syrian-regime-uk-government-legal-position-html-version 
accessed 7 November 2014. 
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the Security Council to authorize forceful ‘humanitarian interventions’ came under increasing 
criticism at the end of the 1990s. 
 
While the lack of Chapter VII authorization for Operation Provide Comfort means that its 
legality remains controversial, a case can be made that the refugee crisis created by Iraq’s 
military action against its Kurdish population had, in fact, created a threat to international 
peace and security in a volatile and strategically sensitive region.163  Guerrillas of the Kurdish 
Workers Party (PKK) used the uprising as an opportunity to stage their own rebellion in 
south-east Turkey, seizing control of a number of towns near to the border.164  It took the 
Turkish security forces several years of a counter-insurgency campaign, marked by serious 
violations of international human rights law and IHL to put down the rebellion.165   
 
Many Kurds remain convinced that the reason why their original rising did not receive 
western support was for fear of its de-stabilizing impact on the wider region, particularly 
given Turkey’s membership of NATO.166  A case can also be made that the increasing 
expressed concern by US and British political leaders about the humanitarian situation facing 
the Kurds as the 1990s wore on may also have coincided with their increasing interest in 
promoting regime-change in Iraq.   
 
Chapter VII and humanitarian crises 
 
                                                 
163 Michael M. Gunter, ‘Turkey and Iran Face off in Kurdistan’, Middle East Quarterly, Vol. V, No. 1, 
March 1998, pp. 33-40. 
164 Sheri Laizer Martyrs, Traitors and Patriots: Kurdistan after the Gulf War, London: Zed Books, 
1996, provides a first-hand, but partisan, account of the rising. 
165 Reidy, Hampson and Boyle, “The European Convention on Human Rights in the case of Turkey”, 
Netherlands Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 2, June 1997, p.161 – 173. 
166 New Statesman & Society, Conor Foley, ‘Letter from Kurdistan’, 24 June 1994.  This comment is 
based on interviews carried out by the author with leading PKK activists and rank-and-file fighters in 
Diyabakir, south east Turkey; refugee camps in Northern Iraq; and Belmarsh prison in London during 
1994-5. 
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In Somalia, by contrast, controversy surrounded the Security Council’s decision to authorise 
a Chapter VII intervention in the absence of such a clearly recognised threat to international 
peace and security.167  In December 1992 the Security Council unanimously adopted a 
resolution stating that ‘the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia, 
further exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of humanitarian 
assistance, constitutes a threat to international peace and security.’168  Acting under Chapter 
VII the resolution authorized the Secretary General and member States to ‘use all necessary 
means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief 
operations.’169  It also stated that ‘impediments to humanitarian relief violated international 
humanitarian law’, and that anyone interfering with distribution of relief assistance ‘will be 
held individually responsible in respect of such acts.’170 As UN Secretary General Kofi Anan 
has subsequently noted this was the first time ever that the Security Council had invoked its 
Chapter VII powers with respect to a purely internal conflict.171   
 
In May 1993 around 37,000 troops were deployed to guard deliveries of humanitarian 
assistance and cut down on the theft of supplies from humanitarian organisations.172  Their 
                                                 
167 For the UN’s account of the mission see UN Peacekeeping Homepage, past operations, UNOSOM 
II, Background, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom2backgr2.html, accessed 17 
May 2013.   
168 UN Security Council Resolution 794 of 3 December 1992, preamble. See also UN Security Council 
Resolution 733 of 23 January 1992, which determined that the situation constituted a threat to peace 
and security and imposed an arms embargo under Chapter VII. 
169 Ibid., para 10. 
170 Ibid., para 5. 
171 Kofi Annan, ‘Peacekeeping and National Sovereignty’, in Jonathan Moore, (ed) Hard Choices, 
moral dilemmas in humanitarian intervention, Maryland and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998, 
p.60. 
172 The mission mandate was set out in a Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations and 
Somalia, 3 March 1993, UN Doc S/25354, paras 56-8, which was subsequently endorsed by the 
Security Council in Resolution 814 (1993).  See also UN Security Council Resolutions 733 of 23 
January 1992, 746 of 17 March 1992, 751 of 24 April 1992, 767 of 24 July 1992, 775 of 28 August 
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Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in December and this, in turn was transformed into UNOSOM II in 
May 1993.  For various views of the mission see De Waal, 1997, pp.179-91.  Al-Qaq, 2009, pp.70-96; 
Mark Bradbury and Robert Maletta, ‘When state-building fails’, in Donini (ed), 2012, pp.109-36; Ioan 
Lewis and James Mayall, ‘Somalia’, in Mats and Economides (eds), 2007.  For an interesting 
personalized account written by a journalist based there at the time see Aidan Hartley, The Zanzibar 
Chest, London: Harper Collins, 2003.  For a much less well-informed but more sensationalist account 
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mandate authorized them ‘to take such forceful action as may be required to neutralize armed 
elements that attack, or threaten to attack, such facilities and personnel, pending the 
establishment of a new Somali police force which can assume this responsibility.’173  De Wet 
has argued that the lack of a functioning government in the country meant that the Security 
Council had to invoke Chapter VII since it was impossible to obtain formal host State consent 
for the mission.174  Given that the defence of national sovereignty provided in Article 2(4) of 
the Charter presupposes a government exercising jurisdiction, however, it seems more likely 
that the Chapter VII authorization was simply to emphasize the mission’s authority to use 
force.175  Kelly also notes that, in the absence of a functioning government, the Australian 
contingent in the mission decided to apply the law of occupation, as defined in the Fourth 
Geneva Convention in the areas of Somalia for which they were allocated responsibility.176   
 
In June 1993 a group of 24 UNOSOM Pakistani soldiers were killed and a further 56 soldiers 
injured – three of them American – in a clash with a militia group led by the prominent 
warlord Mohamed Farah Aidid.177  UN Security Council Resolution 837 unanimously passed 
in response authorized the mission ‘to take all measures necessary to arrest and detain those 
responsible’ for carrying out such attacks.178  This and subsequent resolutions expanded 
                                                 
by three UN staff members see Kenneth Cain, Heidi Postlewait and Andrew Thomson, Emergency Sex 
and Other Desperate Measures: A True Story From Hell On Earth, London: Random House, 2004. 
173 Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations and Somalia, 3 March 1993, UN Doc 
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174 Erika De Wet, The Chapter VII powers of the United Nations Security Council, Portland, Oregon: 
Hart Publishing, 2005, pp.155-8.   
175 As will be discussed in Chapters Three and Five, it is now widely accepted that the UN Security 
Council can define a humanitarian crisis or a purely internal conflict as a threat to international peace 
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See, for example, Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Protection of 
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176 For further discussion see Michael Kelly, Restoring and Maintaining Order in Complex Peace 
Operations: The Search for a Legal Framework, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999.   
177 Human Rights Watch, Somalia faces the future: Human rights in a fragmented society, April 1995 
Vol. 7, No. 2. 
178 UN Security Council Resolution 837of 6 June 1993. 
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UNOSOM II’s mandate, to include disarming the main militias, and pledging to bring to 
justice the perpetrators of acts of violence that were hampering the relief effort.179   
 
Over the next few months, hundreds of people were arbitrarily detained and several thousand 
killed or injured as the UN forces tried to hunt down Aidid.180  In July 1993 Africa Rights 
published a report detailing atrocities committed by UN forces, including killing of unarmed 
people, the bombing of a hospital, beating civilians and theft.181  Médecins sans Frontières 
(MSF) published a further detailed communiqué on violations of IHL by UN troops that 
summer.182  Graphic photographs also subsequently emerged of UN soldiers torturing 
people.183  Although these cases led to some criminal prosecutions of the Canadian and 
Belgian soldiers involved, most of these resulted in either acquittals or extremely light 
sentences.184     
 
                                                 
179 See also: Resolutions 865 of 22 September 1993); 878 of 29 October 1993; 886 of 18 November 
1993; 897 of 4 February 1994; 923 of 31 May1994; 946 of 29 September 1994; 953 of 31 October 
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180 Amnesty International, Peace-keeping and human rights, AI Index IOR 40/01/94, January 1994; 
and Human Rights Watch, April 1995.  According to HRW: ‘After the June 5, 1993 ambush of U.N. 
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group urges adherence to Geneva Conventions’, 30 July 1993.  Amongst the most serious violations 
was one incident in which US helicopters attacked a house in which a group of Somali elders had 
gathered, killing 73 people and in another when they fired on a crowd killing 60.   
182 Médecins sans Frontières, Communication on the violations of humanitarian law in Somalia during 
UNSOM operations, MSF, Paris, 23 July 1993.  
183 See Village Voice Front page cover 24 June 1997 and Village Voice 15 July 15 1997; The Seattle 
Times, ‘U.N. Peacekeepers Accused Of Atrocities’, 25 June 1997; and Daily Telegraph, ‘Belgian UN 
Troops Admit to ‘Roasting’ Somali Boy,’’ June 14, 1997.  These included two Belgian soldiers 
dangling a child over an open fire and another urinating on a dead body, Canadian soldiers posing 
beside the battered and bloody corpse of a boy with his hands tied behind his back, and Italian soldiers 
torturing a Somali boy and abusing and raping a girl.  Other reported violations included a child being 
forced to eat pork and drink salt water, and then eat his own vomit, and another boy being placed in 
metal containers and left in the boiling sun for days without food or water where he died. 
184 De Waal, 1997, p.186.  He notes that no Somali victims were brought to testify in the trials of the 
Belgian soldiers.  The court accepted the account of the two accused of ‘roasting’ a child that they had 
merely been ‘playing’ with him.  See Reuters, ‘Belgian soldiers acquitted in Somalia trial’, 30 June 
1997.  See also Sherene Razack. Dark Threats and White Knights: The Somalia Affair, Peacekeeping 
and the New Imperialism. 2004, which describes the actions of the Canadian soldiers and the 
subsequent official investigation which led to the disbandment of the regiment involved.   
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In October 1993 two US Black Hawk helicopters were shot down by Aidid’s militia and 18 
American soldiers were killed.185  Over a thousand Somalis are thought to have died during 
the battle to rescue the surviving US troops.186  Three days later US President Clinton 
publicly announced that all US forces would withdraw from Somalia no later than 31 March 
1994.187  Aggressive actions against Aidid’s forces were halted and the formal end of 
UNOSOM II was declared in March 1995.188  Adid became the country’s self-declared 
President the same year.189     
 
The ‘Black Hawk Down’ incident came two days before the Security Council discussed the 
size of the UN peacekeeping force to dispatch to Rwanda (UNAMIR) and it was scaled-back 
as a direct result.190  At around the same time, another UN force, consisting of US and 
Canadian soldiers, was prevented from landing in Haiti to help restore the country’s 
democratically elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, by a mob of supporters of the 
military dictatorship.191  In May 1994 a US presidential directive sharply reduced US 
                                                 
185 An incident, later famously documented in the film ‘Black Hawk down’. 
186 Frontline ‘Ambush in Mogadishu: interviews: Ambassador Robert Oakley’, no date. 
Ambassador Oakley, the U.S. special representative to Somalia, is quoted as saying: ‘My own personal 
estimate is that there must have been 1,500 to 2,000 Somalis killed and wounded that day, because that 
battle was a true battle . . . a deliberate war battle, if you will, on the part of the Somalis. And women 
and children were being used as shields and some cases women and children were actually firing 
weapons, and were coming from all sides . . .  Helicopter gunships were being used as well as all sorts 
of automatic weapons on the ground by the U.S. and the United Nations. The Somalis, by and large, 
were using automatic rifles and grenade launchers and it was a very nasty fight, as intense as almost 
any battle you would find.’ 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/interviews/oakley.html, accessed 13 May 
2013. 
187 See Key Events in the Presidency of William Jefferson Clinton 1993, The Miller Center, American 
Presidents a reference source, http://millercenter.org/president/keyevents/clinton, accessed 15 May 
2013. 
188 UNOSOM II Homepage, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom2.htm, accessed 
12 May. 2013.  For a description of Somalia from the perspective an international aid worker/journalist 
after the end of UNOSOM II see John Burnett, Where soldiers fear to tread, London: Arrow books, 
2007. 
189 CNN News, ‘Mohamed Farah Aidid: Somali leader, 1935-1996, year.in.review/obituaries/politics, 
1996.  Aidid subsequently died of a heart attack after being hit by a stray bullet in August of the 
following year. 
190 Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society, Oxford 
University Press, 2000, p.215; Samantha Power, ‘Bystanders to Genocide: Why the United States let 
the Rwandan tragedy happen’, The Atlantic Monthly, September 2001. 
191 Some contemporary reports of the above incident claim that the mob chanted Aidid’s name to taunt 
the US soldiers.  It has, however, also been argued that this event was actually staged with the 
connivance of elements within the CIA who were opposed to President Clinton’s policy of restoring 
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participation in UN peacekeeping missions.192  The US Ambassador to Sierra Leone at the 
time notes that the US effectively withdrew from UN peacekeeping operations in Africa in 
the aftermath of these events.193  It also resulted in a wild oscillation of US policy towards the 
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia as Clinton’s administration opposed any settlement that 
legitimated ‘ethnic cleansing’, but refused to countenance deploying ground troops to 
strengthen the UN mission.194   
 
The UN Protection Force for the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) was initially established 
in Croatia in February 1992.195  Its mandate evolved as the conflict continued and the focus of 
its efforts shifted to Bosnia-Herzegovina.196  In August 1992 the Security Council invoked its 
Chapter VII powers to demand that the parties to the conflict grant ‘humanitarian access’197 
and in September UNPROFOR was authorized to use force ‘in self-defence’ to secure the 
delivery of humanitarian aid.198 In April and May 1993 the Security Council used its Chapter 
                                                 
democracy to Haiti.  See Peter Hallward, Damming the flood: Haiti and the politics of containment, 
London: Verso, 2010, p.49. 
192 US Presidential Directive 25 (PPD 25), 3 May 1994, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-
25.pdf, accessed 12 May 2013. 
193 John Hirsch, Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the struggle for democracy, Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Reinner, 2001, p.63.  
194 Spyros Economides and Paul Taylor, ‘Former Yugoslavia’, in Berdal and Economides (eds), 2007, 
pp.65-108.  The policy was sometimes dubbed ‘fighting to the last Fijian’.  
195 UN Security Council Resolution 743 of 21 February 1992 was adopted unanimously.  After 
reaffirming resolutions 713 (1991), 721(1991), 724 (1991), 727 (1992) and 740 (1992), and 
considering that the situation in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia constitutes a threat to 
international peace and stability, the Council established a peacekeeping mission in the country, with 
the aim of reaching a peaceful political settlement in the region.  For an overview of the conflict see: 
Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia, London: Granta, 1992; Misha Glenny, The Balkans 1804 – 
1999, Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, Granta, 2000, p.641-642.  There are many, far more 
partisan accounts, including: Marko Attila Hoare,  How Bosnia Armed, London: Saqui books, 2004; 
Adam LeBor, Complicity with Evil, the United Nations in the age of modern genocide, New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2006, pp.1-132; David Gibbs,  First do no harm: humanitarian intervention and 
the destruction of Yugoslavia, Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2009. 
196 Security Council Resolution 758, of 8 June 1992, authorized the Secretary General to deploy 
military observers and other personnel.  It also condemned all parties responsible for the violation of 
the ceasefire, urging them to comply with a ceasefire and urged all parties to guarantee the safety 
of humanitarian workers and the delivery of aid to Sarajevo and other areas in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  
197 Security Council Resolution 770, of 13 August 1992 was adopted by twelve votes to none, with 
three abstentions from China, India and Zimbabwe.  For discussion see Gray, 2008, pp.282-6. 
198 Security Council Resolution 776 of 14 September 1992, para 2. ‘Authorizes, in implementation of 
paragraph 2 of resolution 770 (1992), the enlargements of UNPROFOR's mandate and strength in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina recommended by the Secretary-General in that report to perform the functions 
outlined in the report, including the protection of convoys of released detainees if requested by the 
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VII powers to declare a number of besieged towns to be ‘safe areas’.199  In June a further 
Chapter VII resolution authorised UNPROFOR to: 
 
deter attacks against the safe areas . . .  promote the withdrawal of military or 
paramilitary units . . .  occupy some key points on the ground, in addition to 
participating in the delivery of humanitarian relief . . . acting in self-defence, to take 
the necessary measures, including the use of force, in reply to bombardments against 
the safe areas by any of the parties or to armed incursion into them or in the event of 
any deliberate obstruction in or around those areas to the freedom of movement of 
UNPROFOR or of protected humanitarian convoys.200   
 
The actual delivery of humanitarian assistance was primarily carried out by UNHCR, which 
became the de facto lead humanitarian agency during the conflict.  Its relief effort was 
unprecedented in scope and scale,201 but it often had to choose between either arranging the 
evacuation of civilians from areas in which their lives were threatened – which made it an 
agent of ‘ethnic cleansing’ – or sustaining populations in places where they could not be 
protected.202  Criticism grew that aid was being used as ‘a palliative, an alibi, an excuse to 
cover the lack of political will to confront the reality of war.’203  The New York Times 
famously described the Bosnians as ‘well-fed dead’, asking: ‘What good will it do for them to 
have food in their stomachs when their throats are slit?’204 
                                                 
International Committee of the Red Cross.’  See also Security Council Resolutions 779 and 780 of 6 
October 1992 and 787 of 16 November 1992. 
199 Security Council Resolution 819 of 16 April 1993 and 824 of 6 May 1993. 
200 Security Council Resolution 836 of 4 June 1993, paras 5 and 9.  See also Haidi Willmot and Ralph 
Mamiya, ‘Mandated to Protect: Security Council Practice on the Protection of Civilians’, in Marc 
Weller (ed), The Oxford Handbook on the Use of Force in International Law, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2014; and Findlay, 2002, pp. 221-231. 
201 David Reiff, A bed for the night, Vintage 2002, p.138. It is estimated that UNHCR provided 
assistance to 2.7 million people out of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s pre-war total of 4.5 million, spending up 
to $1 million a day airlifting supplies into besieged areas and organizing land convoys between the 
conflict’s front lines 
202 Landgren, 1995, pp.437-458.   
203 The High Commissioner’s Special Representative for former Yugoslavia.  Quoted in Goodwin Gill, 
1997, p. 289. 
204 New York Times, ‘The Well-Fed Dead in Bosnia’, 15 July 1992. 
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UNPROFOR’s concept of operations (CONOPS), approved by the Security Council, was to 
provide ‘protective support’ to UNHCR’s humanitarian convoys.205  Commanders were 
initially given little guidance as to what this meant in practice. One British commander, 
Colonel Alistair Duncan, initially saw his task as simply to:  
 
provide an escort to the convoys from the UNHCR through our area of operations at 
their request. In addition we were to provide assistance to endangered people as 
required. That was all. There was no further close direction either from the UN or 
from the British Government or military.206   
 
Duncan stated that his forces opened fire on 69 occasions killing over 30 people and 
establishing himself as the ‘most powerful man in Central Bosnia’.207  He soon, however, 
recognized the limitations of ‘upping the ante’ through the use of force and subsequently 
devised his own CONOPS, to ‘create the conditions whereby aid could be delivered’ in his 
force’s area of responsibility.208  This concept has been developed further in subsequent 
missions and the authorization to ‘facilitate the delivery’ of humanitarian assistance is now 
often interpreted far more widely as creating conditions conducive to it delivery.209  
 
                                                 
205 UN Security Council Resolution 836 of 4 June 1993.  See also Findlay, 2002, p.139.   
206 IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin, Colonel Alistair Duncan, ‘Operating in Bosnia’, 
International Boundaries Research Unit, University of Durham, Vol. 2, No. 3, October 1994, p. 47. 
https://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/ibru/publications/full/bsb2-3_duncan.pdf, accessed 9 May 2014 
207 Ibid. He noted that ‘there was no backlash whatsoever’ over these killings, either from the local 
commanders or the British public ‘who did not mind me shooting a few of the Bosnian locals’.  While 
he regretted the killings they were ‘necessary to show robustness and a positive attitude’. 
208 Ibid., p.48. 
209 Draft DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations, 2009, para 13’.  It also noted that: ‘Police also contribute to this activity 
through the provision of route security or security in refugee/IDP camps, as well as public order 
management during relief item distribution. Eleven missions are currently mandated with this task.’ 
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In February 1994, the UN Secretary General formally requested NATO to carry out air strikes 
against Bosnian Serb artillery which had been used to shell civilians in Sarajevo.210  In the 
months that followed UNPROFOR also increasingly called on NATO for close air support.211  
The Serbs responded by kidnapping UNPROFOR soldiers and holding them hostage against 
attacks.212  This combination of factors along with the ambiguous wording of the UN 
resolution and a failure to demilitarise the ‘safe areas’,213 meant that when the Serbs 
eventually attacked Srebrenica, in July 1995, UNPROFOR did not defend it and thousands of 
civilians were massacred in the resulting genocide.214  In the aftermath of this attack NATO 
began a more determined bombing campaign against the Bosnian Serb forces, which 
eventually helped to bring the war to an end in October 1995.215   
 
The genocide in Srebrenica came a year after similar massacres of civilians killed up to 
800,000 civilians in Rwanda, again despite the presence of a UN peacekeeping force, which 
failed to protect them.216  UNAMIR had originally been deployed as a Chapter VI mission to 
monitor a ceasefire agreed between Hutu-dominated Rwanda’s army and the largely-Tutsi 
                                                 
210 For discussion see Marc Weller, Daniel Bethlehem (eds), The Yugoslav Crisis in International Law, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
211 New York Times, ‘US Hits Bosnian Serb target in air raid’, 6 August 1994.  This was the first such 
action in Sarajevo and was described by Lieut. General Sir Michael Rose, as a ‘pinprick air strike’. 
212 For further discussion see Weller and Bethlehem, 1997.   
213 For contrasting views of the UN’s failure to de-militarize the ‘safe areas’, see LeBor, 2006, pp.23-
111 and Landgren, 1995, pp.437-458. Srebrenica was regularly used as a base for attack on Serb-held 
villages in the surrounding Naser Orić the commander of the Bosnian forces in Srebrenica was 
subsequently sentenced to two years imprisonment for war crimes by ICTY, although the Appeals 
Chamber reversed this conviction on 3 July 2008.   
214 Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35, The fall of 
Srebrenica, A/54/549, 15 November 1999. 
215 Operation Deliberate Force was carried out between 30 August and 20 September 1995, involving 
400 aircraft and 5,000 personnel from 15 nations. Commentators differ in assessing whether it was this 
external intervention or the increasing effectiveness of the Bosnian armed forces which proved 
decisive. Hoare, 2004, pp.102-28 provides a detailed, although partisan pro-Bosnian, account.  Gibbs, 
2009, covers similar ground from an ‘anti-imperialist’ perspective.   
216 For further discussion see: Linda Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide, Verso: 
New York, 2004, Linda Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide, 
London: Zed Books, 2000; Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, 
Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda, Princeton University Press, 2002; Romeo Dallaire,  Shake 
hands with the devil, The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda, Boston: Da Capo Press, 2004; Samantha 
Power, A problem from hell, America and the age of genocide, London/New York: Harper Collins, 
2007; Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families: 
Stories from Rwanda, New York: Picador, 1999; Human Rights Watch, Leave None to Tell the Story: 
Genocide in Rwanda, 1 April 2004; and Meredith, 2006, pp.485-523. 
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Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).217  Its RoE did provide authority for the use of force to 
protect civilians, but its commander, Romeo Dallaire, was repeatedly denied authority to use 
force except in self-defence.218  The genocide began on 6 April 1994 and was only effectively 
brought to an end by the RPF’s victory in June.219  Amongst its first victims were 10 Belgian 
UNAMIR troops, who were gruesomely tortured to death.220  This led Belgium to withdraw 
its 400 soldiers, who had been the key component of the UNAMIR force.221  On 21 April the 
Security Council further reduced UNAMIR to a token force of 270 soldiers.222  UNAMIR is 
credited with saving the lives of several thousand civilians who sought shelter in its bases, 
although many others died when it either failed to defend them or evacuated.223  In one case 
when Belgian soldiers abandoned 2,000 civilians sheltering in a school, these begged the 
peacekeepers to shoot them rather than leave them to the militia’s machetes.224  UNAMIR’s 
soldiers did not open fire on any occasion during the genocide.225    
 
On 17 May the Security Council voted to increase UNAMIR to 5,500 soldiers and mandated 
it to ‘contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at 
                                                 
217 Ibid.  See also Dallaire, 2003, pp.12, 229 and 233.  During the crisis, General Dallaire argued that 
UNAMIR should be able to protect civilians based on the idea that the principle of ‘self-defence’ 
included the ‘defence of the mandate’. 
218 Ibid. 
219 Ibid.  The RPF was a force mainly composed of Tutsi exiles that had fled from Rwanda to escape a 
previous genocide 30 years beforehand.  These had been integrated into the Ugandan armed forces 
after Yoweri Museveni seized power in his country’s civil war.  Around 4,000 RPF members left the 
Ugandan army to participate in an invasion of Rwanda in 1990, taking their uniforms and weapons 
with them.  The invasion, in 1990, prompted France to intervene militarily in support of the Rwandan 
President Habyarimana.  Rwanda’s armed forces rapidly expanded and its government unleashed a 
wave of repression against its internal opponents.  The RPF was initially beaten back, but, under Paul 
Kagame’s leadership transformed itself into an effective guerrilla force using hit-and-run tactics.    
220 Guardian, ‘UN troops stand by and watch carnage’, 12 April 1994. 
221 Bruce Jones, ‘Rwanda’ in Berdal and Economides (eds), 2007, p.155.  One Rwandan official 
subsequently explained that the decision to mutilate the corpses, whose genitalia were hacked off and 
stuffed in their mouths, was inspired by the effect that the Black Hawk down incident had been shown 
to have on western resolve.  ‘We watch CNN too you know’, he is said to have commented. 
222 Security Council Resolution 912 of 21 April 1994. 
223 For an overview see Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during 
the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, S/1999/1257, 16 December 1999. 
224 Guardian, ‘What's the point of peacekeepers when they don't keep the peace?, 17 September 2015. 
225 Dallaire, 2003.  Also interviews conducted by the author with Brent Beardsley, Dallaire’s chief of 
staff, in Montevideo in September 2012 and Washington DC in April 2013. Dallaire was apparently a 
terrible shot and so his staff frequently emptied the bullets from his revolver, without his knowledge, in 
case he lost his temper and shot someone by accident. 
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risk in Rwanda, including through the establishment and maintenance, where feasible, of 
secure humanitarian areas’.226  This force was not given a Chapter VII mandate and did not in 
fact arrive in Rwanda until after the killing had ended, so the meaning of the term ‘secure 
humanitarian areas’ was never tested.  On 22 June the Security Council passed a Chapter VII 
resolution, creating a new French-led force, Operation Turquoise.227  This ‘blue hatted’ a 
French military intervention and was vigorously opposed by both the new Rwandan 
government and Dallaire who viewed the French as allies of the previous regime.228  One 
consequence was to facilitate the escape of most of the regime leadership and Hutu power 
militias into neighbouring Zaire (as the Congo was then known).229   
 
The reluctance of the UN to describe the situation in Rwanda as genocide until the end of 
May 1994230  has been much debated,231 with most observers agreeing that this was mainly 
because of concern by the US, in particular, that it would lead to increased pressure for a 
more forceful intervention.232  As discussed previously, the ICJ subsequently stated in Bosnia 
Genocide, in 2007 that there is a test of ‘due diligence’ by which State conduct should be 
                                                 
226 Security Council Resolution 918 of 17 May 1994, paras 3 and 5.  Para 4 ‘recognize[d] that 
UNAMIR may be required to take action in self-defence against persons or groups who threaten 
protected sites and populations, UN and other humanitarian personnel or the means of delivery and 
distribution of humanitarian relief.’ 
227 Security Council Resolution 929 of 22 June 1994. 
228 Human Rights Watch, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda, 1 April 2004. 
229 Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide 
in Rwanda, S/1999/1257, 16 December 1999. 
230 Secretary General’s Report on the situation in Rwanda, UN Doc. S/1994/640, 31 May 1994: ‘on 
the basis of evidence that has emerged there can be little doubt that [the situation in Rwanda] 
constitutes genocide’. 
231 See. For example, Samantha Power, ‘Bystanders to Genocide: Why the United States let the 
Rwandan tragedy happen’, The Atlantic Monthly, September 2001.  Power quotes Susan Rice, then a 
senior official in the US National Security Council as asking during an inter-agency telephone 
conference ‘if we use the word “genocide” and are seen as doing nothing, what will be the effect on the 
November election?”.  Rice has stated that she does not remember uttering the sentence.  See also 
Foreign Policy, ‘Exclusive: Rwanda Revisited.  Former President Clinton said he never knew the 
extent of suffering during Rwanda's genocide. But America's diplomats on the ground knew exactly 
what was happening -- and they told Washington’, 5 April 2015. 
232 Dallaire, 2003, pp.333 and 339 notes that UNAMIR itself was describing the killings as genocide 
from mid-April as were NGOs such as Oxfam.   On 10 May the newly appointed UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights reported on a fact-finding mission which said that genocide was 
taking place.  Medicins sans Frontieres also took out newspaper adverts in France saying that ‘one 
cannot stop a genocide with doctors’.   
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assessed even when applied to a third country233 and that when a State ‘manifestly failed to 
take all measures to prevent genocide which were within its power, and which might have 
contributed to preventing the genocide’ then it could be held accountable for the resulting 
consequences.234   
 
In July 2014 a Dutch court partially upheld the claimants in the Mothers of Srebrenica and 
the Netherlands case ruling that the Dutch State was responsible for the deaths of 300 
civilians sheltering inside the Dutch Battalion compound during the genocide in Srebrenica in 
1995.235  Both Dutch domestic courts and the European Court of Human Rights had 
previously rejected a similar challenge to the UN’s failure to protect the inhabitants of the UN 
‘safe haven’. 236  In this case, however, the Court ruled that the Dutch Battalion still exercised 
‘effective control’ over its own compound at the point that a decision was made to expel this 
group of civilians, while absolving the Battalion of responsibility for the acts that were taking 
place outside.237  The Court relied heavily on the fact that the Dutch government was 
preparing to withdraw its forces from Bosnia-Herzegovina when it made the decision to 
evacuate from Srebrenica and this gave it ‘effective control’ of its compound for the purposes 
of allocation of responsibility.238 In 2010 a Belgium domestic court similarly ruled in 
Mukeshimana-Ngulinzira that a decision by Belgium troops to abandon a de facto IDP camp 
                                                 
233 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia 
and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), 26 February 2007, ICJ Report 2007, para 430. 
234 Ibid. 
235 Mothers of Srebrenica v. the Netherlands ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2014:8748 (The Hague District 
Court), 2014. 
236 Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and others v. Netherlands, Appl. No. 65542/12, Admissibility 
Decision, 11 June 2013.  See also Mothers of Srebrenica/Netherlands and United Nations, District 
Court of the Hague, De Rechtspraak BD6795 (Neth.), 10 July 2008; and Judgment of the Supreme 
Court of the Netherlands, in the case of the Mothers of Srebrenica, First Division 10/04437, EV/AS, 13 
April 2012.  For further discussion see Asser Institute, Centre for International and European Law, 
http://www.asser.nl/default.aspx?site_id=36&level1=15248&level2=&level3=&textid=39956, 
accessed 8 March 2013. 
237 For an unofficial translation of the Court’s reasoning on its own website see Mothers of Srebrenica 
against the State. Effects of the fall of Srebrenica. Unlawful act on behalf of the State; international 
law; attribution of actions of the State?; unlawful acts of the State?; the law applicable to torts, 
http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2014:8748, accessed 20 
November 2014. 
238 Ibid., para 5.18.  For discussion see Paolo Palchetti, ‘The allocation of responsibility for 
internationally wrongful acts committed in the course of multinational operations’, International 
Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 95. No. 891/892 Autumn/Winter 2013, pp.727-42. 
104 
 
 
that they had been guarding during the Rwandan genocide was attributable to Belgium rather 
than the UN mission.239 
 
The implications of these rulings for the future of peacekeeping have been the subject of 
considerable debate.240  One observer has noted that the Dutch verdict ‘might result in a 
visible decline in the willingness of States to contribute troops to international peacekeeping 
missions’.241  Another has argued it was wrong to consider the Dutch soldiers to have been 
responsible for the deaths when the rest of the world just ‘stood watching’.242  The ruling also 
highlights the confusion of events during the Serbian advance on the town as the Dutch 
Battalion repeatedly requested – and was denied – air support up the UN chain of command 
and the legal ambiguity that this created about who was really in effective control of the area 
as the situation unfolded.  Although the Court tried to use the notion of ‘effective control’ to 
limit the Dutch Battalion’s responsibility, both geographically and temporally, the UN’s 
exclusion from the proceedings meant that it could not address the most important underlying 
questions about whether or not the inhabitants of Srebrenica could really have been saved 
from the unfolding genocide.  Questions surrounding UN accountability and attribution of 
conduct will be discussed further in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
 
Humanitarian interventionism 
 
                                                 
239 Mukeshimana-Ngulinzira and Others v Belgium and Others, Court of First Instance Judgment, RG 
No 04/4807/A, 07/15547/A, ILDC 1604 (BE 2010) 8th December 2010. 
240 Ibid.  See also: Opinio Juris, ‘Mothers of Srebrenica Decision: Dutch Court holds The Netherlands 
Responsible for 300 Deaths in 1995 Massacre’, Kirsten Boon, 17 July 2014, 
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September 2014, http://www.e-ir.info/2014/09/24/mothers-of-srebrenica-v-the-netherlands-the-law-as-
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241 Ibid. 
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The well-publicised failures of the UN’s peacekeeping missions in the mid-1990s led to a 
serious crisis of legitimacy for the Organization.243  A Supplement to Agenda for Peace was 
published in January 1995, restating the ‘core principles’ of traditional peacekeeping and 
asserting that ‘peace-keeping and the use of force (other than in self-defense) should be seen 
as alternative techniques and not as adjacent points on a continuum, permitting easy transition 
from one to the other.’244  Others, however, drew the opposite conclusion and criticism of 
both the UN and ‘traditional’ peacekeeping grew, particularly amongst liberal western 
opinion.245   
 
The prominent French philosophers Glucksman and Levy, for example, launched scathing 
attacks on the small unarmed UN observer mission to East Timor in 1999, that had helped to 
oversee a referendum.   Glucksman wrote wrote: ‘The UN lured the Timorese into an 
ambush: it offered them a free referendum, they vote under its guarantee, it delivers them to 
the militias knives . . . the UN knows, the UN keeps quiet, the UN withdraws’.246  Levy 
concluded that: ‘The time of the UN has passed.  We have to finish off this macabre farce that 
the UN has become.’247  Robertson, a high-profile British human rights lawyer, also stated 
that the bloodshed in East Timor ‘was all the UN’s doing’ and made a scornful reference to 
how the mission, headed by a former Secretary General of Amnesty International, had 
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Oxford University Press, 2000; Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity, the struggle for global 
justice, third edition, London: Penguin books, 2006, pp.470-477; and JL Holzgrefe, and Robert 
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‘quickly evacuated itself to Darwin’ when the violence started.248  In fact sixteen of the UN’s 
local staff were massacred by the militias and, despite this, a group of the UN’s international 
staff refused to be evacuated unless provision was made to protect 1,500 East Timorese 
civilians who had sought shelter in their compound.249  
 
Many western-based NGOs also stepped up their advocacy in public campaigns for military 
interventions.  CARE, for example, lobbied hard for military intervention in Somalia in 
1992250 and MSF ran a campaign implicitly calling for more forceful military intervention in 
Rwanda in 1994.251  After the fall of Srebrenica in 1995, World Vision and Human Rights 
Watch called for military strikes against the Serb forces besieging the remaining ‘safe 
havens’.252  Oxfam urged military intervention in Eastern Zaire in 1996,253 Kosovo in 1998254 
and in Sierra Leone in 2000.255  As well as lobbying through the UN’s own decision-making 
structures, they were able to mobilise their membership in letter-writing campaigns and their 
visible – and often unprotected – presence in many crises was able to generate significant 
media coverage.   
 
                                                 
248 Robertson, 2006, p.498.   
249 Samantha Power, Chasing the flame: Sergio Vierra de Mello and the fight to save the world, 
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stop genocide’, 1 August 1995.   
253 Statement on the crisis in Eastern Zaire, Oxfam UK and Ireland, 5 November 1996.  
254 For discussion see, Tony Vaux, The Selfish Altruist, Relief Work in Famine and War, London: 
Earthscan, 2001.  Vaux, a senior Oxfam official, notes that the call was framed obliquely as ‘action to 
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The humanitarian crises of the early 1990s had led to a significant increase in humanitarian 
relief funding,256 which grew by an estimated six-fold over a decade.257  The upward trend 
has continued reaching a record $22 billion in 2013.258  While development assistance is 
often provided for overtly political projects and disaster relief has traditionally come ‘without 
strings’, humanitarian aid was traditionally given on conditions of strict neutrality.259  As 
Francoise Bouchet-Saulnier, the former legal advisor to MSF, has noted, however, these 
distinctions have narrowed in the last few decades as the world has entered ‘a period of 
chronic crisis and conflict in which emergency humanitarian action has become the only 
available form of political expression’.260  She warns that whatever its short-term benefits, the 
use of humanitarian assistance to influence a given military confrontation ‘distorts the very 
meaning of these actions and imperils the presence of humanitarian actors in the field’.261 
 
Many NGOs, however, are involved in both humanitarian and development work and often 
implement projects such as ‘peace-building’ and for the promotion and protection of human 
rights, even though this may compromise their strict neutrality.262  Anderson argues that 
while humanitarian aid workers try to be neutral, they should recognise that ‘the impact of 
their aid is not neutral regarding whether conflict worsens or abates’. 263  Assistance should, 
                                                 
256 Andrew Natios in, Weiss and Gordenker (eds), 1996, p.71.  Natios notes that the combined budgets 
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therefore explicitly be provided in ways that contribute to ‘justice, peace and 
reconciliation.’264 Ignatieff has similarly observed that ‘the doctrine of neutrality has become 
steadily more controversial as the new politics of human rights has entered the field.’265  UN 
Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali noted in 1996 that NGOs had often helped to 
mobilise western public opinion to ‘clear the way’ for ‘humanitarian interventions’.266 The 
original R2P report, in 2001, even tentatively suggested that humanitarian agencies could be 
integrated into the process of deciding when military interventions for ‘protective purposes’ 
would be justified.267  
 
Kosovo and East Timor 
 
It was against this background of disenchantment with the UN’s ability to intervene 
effectively during humanitarian crises that, in March 1999, NATO took action in Kosovo 
without Security Council approval.  NATO forces subsequently became the core of KFOR, 
which was mandated to provide security in Kosovo by the same resolution that established 
the UN Mission to Kosovo (UNMIK). 268  KFOR remained under NATO command and 
control and the forces that had initially launched military action without UN Security Council 
authorization were essentially ‘blue hatted’ by this resolution.269   
                                                 
264 Ibid. 
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268 UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999. 
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In September 1999, an Australian-led, UN-authorized, International Force for East Timor 
(INTERFET) force was deployed to East Timor, to supervise the country’s transition to 
independence. 270  INTERFET was deployed to East Timor with the formal consent of the 
Indonesian government, but was considered by many Indonesians as an invasion.271  The 
force was deliberately not put under UN command and had instructions to ‘seize and hold’ 
positions if it encountered resistance from the Indonesian army.272  INTERFET initially 
provided military support to the new UN Transitional Administration in East Timor 
(UNTAET),273 until this assumed sole responsibility for security in the territory.   
 
Both UNTAET and UNMIK were clearly intervening in matters that were ‘essentially within 
the domestic jurisdiction’ of their territorial States.274  Both were also confronted with the 
dilemma of administering territories whose ultimate constitutional status was still in flux and 
so were given executive powers for the transitional period.  The Security Council resolutions 
establishing them contained extensive references to international human rights law.275  The 
Security Council resolution creating the UNMIK specified that its responsibilities would 
include ‘protecting and promoting human rights’,276 while one of the earliest regulations of 
UNTAET stated that ‘all persons undertaking public duties or holding public office in East 
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Timor shall observe internationally recognized human rights standards’.277  Both missions 
were also granted immunity in line with the UN’s standard practice.278   
 
UNMIK was authorized to deploy an ‘international civil presence in Kosovo in order to 
provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy 
substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY], and which will 
provide transitional administration’ pending the establishment of ‘democratic self-governing 
institutions.’279  Mandated tasks included ‘maintaining civil law and order, including 
establishing local police forces and meanwhile through the deployment of international police 
personnel to serve in Kosovo’.280  FRY’s continuing sovereignty over the province was 
explicitly recognized and the resolution even stated that ‘an agreed number of Yugoslav and 
Serb military and police personnel will be permitted to return to Kosovo’.281  In practice 
though most Serbs fled the province and never returned,282 while the minority that stayed 
suffered a campaign of continual terrorist attacks, which depleted them further.283 
 
Confronted with considerable ongoing discrimination and violence against Kosovo’s non-
Albanian ethnic minorities and a weak judicial system, widely seen as politically biased and 
pliant, UNMIK and KFOR frequently resorted to using Executive Orders to overturn judicial 
                                                 
277 UNTAET Regulation No. 1999/1. 
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decisions, particularly in relation to detentions.284  One observer, who served in the mission, 
noted that its civilian and military components ‘declared themselves above regulation, 
overturning even the most basic of human rights laws, that of requiring all detention to be by 
order of a judge.’285  Two others commented that: ‘UNMIK’s and KFOR’s executive actions 
have clearly contravened human rights standards but remained beyond any legal 
challenge.’286  
 
Amnesty International claims that both UNMIK police and the Kosovo national police, 
whom they were mentoring, contravened international standards on the use of force by 
beating and tear-gassing peaceful demonstrators, and shooting people dead in circumstances 
that were not properly investigated.287  Both KFOR and UNMIK police failed to protect 
minority communities and the Kosovo national police may have actually participated in some 
violent attacks against them.288 On one occasion UNMIK police shot dead two civilians and 
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seriously wounded two others with plastic bullets so hardened with age that they penetrated 
the skulls of their victims.289 
 
In August 2001 a Detention Review Commission was established to review Executive Orders 
of detention, but this fell significantly below international standards required by international 
human rights law.290  It consisted of three members appointed directly by the head of 
UNMIK, whose actions they were supposed to review, who only served for a limited period 
and who only came to Kosovo to deal with a limited number of specific cases.291  UNMIK 
also established an Ombudsman Institution whose mandate included dealing with ‘cases 
involving the international security presence’.292  National KFOR contingents proved 
reluctant to cooperate with this body, however,293 and dealt with complaints using their own 
domestic legal systems, which varied considerably in their timeliness and effectiveness.294  In 
a report published in 2001 the Ombudsman criticised ‘the blanket lack of accountability’  
over KFOR and UNMIK, noting that immunity was being granted to what was an effective 
surrogate State.295  As will be discussed further in Chapter Five, challenges before the 
European Court of Human Rights were deemed inadmissible because the Court declared it 
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could not review cases where alleged violations of Convention rights were attributable to 
subsidiary organs of the UN.296   
 
In 2006 the Kosovo Human Rights Advisory Panel was established to investigate individual 
complaints of alleged human rights violations committed by or attributable to UNMIK.297  
Although this can only issue advisory opinions, it has provided for some scrutiny over 
UNMIK’s record.  In February 2016, for example, it ruled that UNMIK had failed ‘to comply 
with the applicable human rights standards in response to the adverse health condition caused 
by lead contamination’ in camps it established on toxic wasteland for Roma people displaced 
from their homes in 2000, which poisoned a number of children and were eventually 
demolished in 2010.298  The advisory panel called on UNMIK to make a ‘public apology’ to 
those affected and take ‘appropriate steps toward payment of adequate compensation,’ 
without specifying how this should be calculated.299 
 
The Security Council resolution that established UNTAET noted that that the East Timorese 
people had ‘expressed their clear wish to begin a process of transition under the authority of 
the United Nations towards independence, which it regards as an accurate reflection of the 
views of the East Timorese people’.300  Nevertheless it specified that the mission would be 
‘endowed with overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor and will be 
empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the administration of 
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justice’.301  These transitional arrangements seemed modelled on the one that created 
UNMIK, where the constitutional position was far from defined, and caused outrage amongst 
the East Timorese resistance leaders as well as considerable unease amongst UN staff. 302  At 
the same time, increasing concern began to be expressed at the human rights situation.303  An 
Amnesty International report published in July 2001, for example, noted that:  
 
Detainees have gone for weeks or even months before having access to legal counsel 
. . . At the same time, the UN Civilian police (Civpol), currently responsible for law 
enforcement in East Timor, have not always responded effectively where civil 
disturbances have occurred and in some cases its members have committed violations 
themselves in their efforts to prevent such disturbances . . . illegal detention and 
torture . . . have not been effectively addressed.304 
 
UNTAET came to an end in May 2002, with most of its functions being handed over to the 
new government.  A new UN Mission of Support to East Timor was also created with far 
more limited powers.305   In February 2008 Kosovo’s parliamentary assembly unilaterally 
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proclaimed their State’s independence306 and UNMIK ‘significantly modified’ its functions to 
take on a monitoring, information-exchanging and advisory role.307   
 
Conclusions  
 
This chapter provided an overview of the evolution and conceptual development of UN 
peacekeeping and the protection of civilians, showing how the two have become increasingly 
and more explicitly intertwined.  It discussed how peacekeeping developed first in the context 
of the decolonization and cold war era and then in the humanitarian crises of the 1990s.  The 
failure of missions to protect people from genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda led 
to a crisis of credibility in the organization and this provides the background to the adoption 
of the first POC resolution in 1999, which will be discussed in the next chapter.    
 
 
Some, such as Bellamy and Williams, dismiss the ‘core principles’ of peacekeeping as a 
‘holy trinity’ associated with an outdated deference to national sovereignty.308  They argue 
that the UN has moved from a ‘Westphalian conception of peace’ to a ‘post-Westphalian’ 
one, in which the primary purpose of peace operations is to build ‘liberal democratic regimes 
and societies’.309  The experiences of UNMIK and UNTAET in taking on executive powers 
and governance functions was not, however, generally seen as successful and the UN has 
subsequently opted for a much ‘lighter footprint’ approach in all missions.310  
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A variety of sovereignty-intruding tasks, such as ‘peace-building’, ‘peace support operations’ 
and ‘stabilization’, have, however, now entered the peacekeeping discourse and are 
sometimes used synonymously with the concept of ‘protection’.311  Most missions that have 
taken on POC mandates remain ‘traditional’ in the sense that they were originally set up to 
monitor ceasefires in the aftermath of armed conflicts.  The UN has also repeatedly 
reaffirmed the centrality of the ‘core principles’ of peacekeeping in guiding its operations.  
Nevertheless, POC mandates do raise questions relating to accountability over the use of 
force and arrest and detention powers, as well as the negative and positive obligations of UN 
peacekeeping missions, which will be discussed further in subsequent chapters. 
  
                                                 
“light footprint”’.  For further discussion see: Thorsten Benner, Stephan Mergenthaler and Philipp 
Rotmann, The New World of UN Peace Operations, learning to build peace, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011; Mats Berdal and Spyros Economides (Eds), United Nations interventionism 
1991 – 2004, Cambridge University Press, 2007; Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? 
Humanitarian Intervention and International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001; Steven 
Jermy Strategy for Action: Using force wisely in the 21st Century, London: Knightstone, 2011; and 
Francis Kofi Abiew, The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention, The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999; and Mats Berdal, Whither UN peacekeeping? An analysis of 
the changing military requirements of UN peacekeeping with proposals for its enhancement, Adelphi 
Paper No. 281, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993. 
311 See, for example, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines [Hereinafter 
Capstone Doctrine 2008], New York: Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2008;  The New 
Horizon Initiative, Progress Report No. 2, Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of 
Field Support, New York, December 2011; Simon Bagshaw and Diane Paul, Protect or Neglect? 
Toward a More Effective United Nations Approach to the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons, 
Washington, DC: The Brookings-SAIS Project on Internal Displacement and the UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, November 2004. 
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Chapter Three: 
Competing conceptions: the protection of civilians in UN peacekeeping operations 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter describes the emergence of POC as a normative doctrine and its integration into 
the mandated tasks of UN peacekeeping missions.  The vast majority of UN personnel 
currently deployed are in missions that have POC mandates.1  The integration of POC tasks 
into peacekeeping missions has been an incremental and reactive process, much like the 
original development of peacekeeping itself.  POC has been driven forward through a 
succession of Security Council resolutions, which have themselves been largely based on the 
experiences of its missions in the field.  These resolutions have normative significance 
because they represent the endorsement by the Security Council of practices that are 
significantly transforming the ‘traditional’ understanding of UN peacekeeping.2  A number of 
independent reviews have, however, been sharply critical of the progress to date.3  The High 
Level Panel Report on Peace Operations of 2015, for example, noted that despite a vast 
increase in resources, research and policy guidelines, and specialized personnel these have 
‘yet to transform reality on the ground, where it matters.’4   
 
                                                 
1 OIOS Protection Evaluation 2014, para 5 notes that in 2014 nine missions had POC mandates and 
these comprised 97 per cent of all uniformed peacekeepers.  The High Level Panel Report 2015, para 
88 states that: ‘More than 98 percent of military and police personnel deployed in UN peacekeeping 
missions today have a mandate to protect civilians, as part of integrated mission-wide efforts.’ 
2 See, for example, UN Security Council Resolution 2086 of 21 January 2013.  The preamble of this 
reaffirms ‘that respect for the basic principles of peacekeeping, including consent of the parties, 
impartiality, and non-use of force, except in self-defence and defence of the mandate, is essential to the 
success of peacekeeping Operations’.  It also notes, however, that ‘peacekeeping ranges from 
traditional peacekeeping missions, which primarily monitor ceasefire, to complex multidimensional 
operations, which seek to undertake peacebuilding tasks and address root causes of conflict’ It 
encourages ‘further progress on a comprehensive, coherent and integrated approach to the maintenance 
of international peace and security by preventing conflicts, preventing relapse and building sustainable 
peace through effective preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding 
strategies’.  
3 Victoria Holt and Glyn Taylor, Protecting civilians in the context of UN peacekeeping operations, 
New York: United Nations, 2009; and OIOS Protection Evaluation 2014. 
4 High Level Panel Report on Peace Operations of 2015, para 82. 
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It will be argued that while many of the difficulties relate to lack of resources and political 
will, these have been exacerbated by a lack of clarity about the international legal framework 
governing POC.   Peacekeeping missions have been given Chapter VII authority to use force 
to protect civilians from grave violations of IHL and international human rights law while at 
the same time remaining bound by the ‘core principles’ of traditional peacekeeping: host state 
consent, neutrality and minimum use of force.  Most existing guidance suggests that IHL will 
provide the appropriate legal framework governing their Rules of Engagement (RoE) 
although international human rights law appears prime facie to provide a more appropriate 
framework, unless they become a party to the conflict that they were sent to resolve.  The 
term ‘protection’ itself is also understood differently by different actors within missions.  The 
result is often confusion about how and when to use force for protective purposes.   
 
The first protection of civilians mandate 
 
On 12 February 1999, one month before NATO began military action in Kosovo, the UN 
Security Council held an open meeting on the protection of civilians in armed conflict.5  This 
noted with concern that civilians and humanitarian aid workers ‘continued to be targeted in 
instances of armed conflict, in flagrant violation of international humanitarian and human 
rights law’ and requested that the Secretary General submit ‘a report with recommendations 
on how it could act to improve both the physical and legal protection of civilians in situations 
of armed conflict.’6  The report was published in September 1999 and contained a series of 
recommendations on how the Security Council could ‘compel parties to conflict to respect 
the rights guaranteed to civilians by international law and convention.’7  In welcoming its 
                                                 
5 Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/1999/6, 12 February 1999.  The Council 
had also considered two Secretary General’s reports, the previous year, which addressed the issue 
indirectly.  See The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable 
development in Africa, S/1998/883, 13 April 1998; and Protection of humanitarian assistance to 
refugees and others, S/1988/883, 22 September 1998. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians in Armed 
Conflict, S/1999/957, 8 September 1999.  See also Report of the Secretary-General on the protection 
of civilians in armed conflict,  S/2001/331, 30 March 2001; Report of the Secretary-General on the 
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publication, the Security Council adopted the first in a series of resolutions on the Protection 
of Civilians in Armed Conflict.8   
 
The first resolution noted, in its preamble, the ‘importance of taking measures aimed at 
conflict prevention and resolution’ and the ‘need to address the causes of armed conflict in a 
comprehensive manner in order to enhance the protection of civilians on a long-term basis, 
including by promoting economic growth, poverty eradication, sustainable development, 
national reconciliation, good governance, democracy, the rule of law and respect for and 
protection of human rights’.9  More specifically it expressed its ‘willingness to consider how 
peacekeeping mandates might better address the negative impact of armed conflict on 
civilians’10 and requested the Secretary General ‘to ensure that United Nations personnel 
involved in peace-making, peacekeeping and peace-building activities have appropriate 
training in international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law.’11  The following month 
the Security Council authorized a peacekeeping Mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), which 
included the following mandate: 
 
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, decides that in the 
discharge of its mandate UNAMSIL may take the necessary action to ensure the 
                                                 
protection of civilians in armed conflict, S/2002/1300, 26 November 2002; Report of the Secretary-
General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, S/2004/431, 28 May 2004; Report of the 
Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, S/2005/740, 28 November 2005; 
Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, S/2007/643, 28 
October 2007; Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians 
in Armed Conflict, 29 May 2009, S/2009/277;  Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council 
on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 11 November 2010, S/2010/579;  Report of the 
Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, S/2012/376, 22 May 2012; Report 
of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, S/2013/689, 22 November 
2013.  
8 UN Security Council Resolution 1265 of 17 September 1999.  See also 1296 of 19 April 2000; 1502 
of 26 August 2003; 1612 of 26 July 2005; 1674 of 28 April 2006; 1882 of 4 August 2009; 1894 of 11 
November 2009; 1998 of 12 July 2011.  See also 2068 of 19 September 2012 on children and armed 
conflict; and 1325 of 31 October 2000; 1820 of 19 June 2008; 1888 of 30 September 2009; 1889 of 5 
October 2009; 1960 of 16 December 2010; and 2106 of 24 June 2013 on women, peace and security. 
9 UN Security Council Resolution 1265 of 17 September 1999, preamble. 
10 Ibid., para 11. 
11 Ibid., para 14. 
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security and freedom of movement of its personnel and, within its capabilities and 
areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of 
physical violence taking into account the responsibilities of the Government of Sierra 
Leone.12 
 
The debate that led to the POC UNAMSIL resolution being adopted was notable for the 
emphasis that was placed on the ‘protection provisions’ of international law.13  It was opened 
by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict 
who detailed atrocities being committed against children by rebel groups. 14  He was followed 
by the representative of the government of Sierra Leone who noted that the previous UN 
Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) ‘was not equipped to deal with certain 
situations’ in the country and stated that: 
 
This is why the Sierra Leone delegation could not help but highlight paragraph 14 of 
the draft resolution, which says that acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the new 
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, in discharge of its mandate, may take the 
necessary measures to ensure the safety and freedom of movement of United Nations 
personnel and, circumstances permitting, to afford protection to civilians under 
imminent threat of physical violence. In the view of my delegation, whatever 
interpretation others may give to this particular paragraph, we regard it as an 
insurance policy for both international peacekeepers and innocent civilians.15 
 
Russia chaired the debate, so did not express a view on the resolution, but the other four 
permanent members of the Security Council all spoke in favour of it, along with Malaysia, 
                                                 
12 Security Council Resolution 1270 of 22 October 1999, para. 14.  The resolution also refers to the 
role of ECOMOG, which is discussed below. 
13 UN Security Council, 4054th Meeting, Friday, 22 October 1999, S/PV.4054. 
14 UN Security Council, 4054th Meeting, Friday, 22 October 1999, S/PV.4054, pp.2-5. 
15 Ibid., p.6. 
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Gambia, the Netherlands, Brazil, Argentina, Canada and Bahrain.  This represented an 
extremely broad range of support for what was understood at the time to be a significant 
policy development within the UN.16  China’s representative spoke of the ‘many rounds of 
consultations’ that had gone into agreeing a draft.17  Argentina described the resolution as 
introducing ‘a new, fundamental political, legal and moral dimension’ that showed ‘the 
Council . . . will not remain indifferent to indiscriminate attacks against the civilian 
population’.18  Brazil said that it ‘augured well’ for creating the conditions for ‘vigorous 
peacekeeping involvement of the United Nations in other conflicts in Africa’.19 
 
The conflict in Sierra Leone had started in March 1991 as a spill-over from neighbouring 
Liberia.20 The two countries had long suffered similar problems of misgovernment and the 
two civil wars also took place in parallel. 21  In August 1990 a group of West African States, 
led by Nigeria, had announced a peacekeeping mission to Liberia, at the invitation of its 
                                                 
16 For further discussion see Christine Gray, ‘The Use of Force for Humanitarian Purposes’ in Nigel 
White and Christian Henderson (eds) Research Handbook On International Conflict And Security 
Law: Jus ad Bellum, Jus in Bello and Jus post Bellum, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013.  
Malaysia, Brazil and Argentina are all leading members of the non-aligned movement who, along with 
Russia and China, have traditionally taken a sceptical or hostile position towards ‘humanitarian 
interventions’.   
17 UN Security Council, 4054th Meeting, Friday, 22 October 1999, S/PV.4054, p.14. 
18 Ibid., p.15. 
19 Ibid., p.15. 
20 For a more detailed discussion on Sierra Leone’s civil war see: Ibrahim Abdullah, Between 
Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Leone Civil War. Dakar: Council for the Development of Social 
Science Research in Africa, 2004; David Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone. Oxford: James 
Currey 2005; and Brett Sillinger, Sierra Leone: Current Issues and Background. New York: Nova 
Science Publishers, 2003. 
21 For a more detailed discussion on Liberia’s civil war see: Stephen Ellis, The mask of anarchy: the 
destruction of Libera and the religious dimension of an African civil war, London: Hurst and Co., 
2001; Adebajo Adekeye Liberia's Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and Regional Security in West 
Africa. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002; Martin, Meredith, The State of Africa, a history 
of fifty years of independence, Johannesburg and Cape Town: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2006, pp.545-
74; and Robert Kaplan, The ends of the earth: a journey to the frontiers of anarchy, New York: 
Random House, 1996, pp.32-70.  Charles Taylor had been a student radical who subsequently served 
in the finance ministry of President Samuel Doe.  He fled the country having allegedly embezzled $1 
million and was imprisoned in the United States on corruption charges.  He escaped from prison, 
possibly with the help of the US intelligence services, in 1985.  In 1989 he mounted an invasion of 
Sierra Leone from Côte d’Ivoire with an initial force of 100 soldiers.  This had swelled to several 
thousand by the time it reached the capital Monrovia, mainly through the recruitment of child soldiers.   
Taylor was elected President of Liberia in 1997, with election slogans that included: ‘He killed my ma, 
he killed my pa, I will vote for him.’ Ellis states the election was the fairest ever held in Liberia and 
Taylor’s overwhelming victory was partly due to fear that the war would restart if he lost and partly 
due his cultivation of a ‘strong man’ image.  
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government and under the aegis of the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). 22   ECOMOG had no Security Council 
authorisation and some viewed it as an attempt to keep the previous government in power. 23  
It also soon became notorious for its corruption and looting.24  Both countries were 
devastated in the fighting that followed, with civilians bearing the brunt of well-publicised 
atrocities that included the use of child soldiers, cannibalism, slave labour and the common 
practice of hacking off people’s limbs.25   
 
Sierra Leone suffered two military coups, in 1992 and 1997, during the second of which the 
country’s armed forces formed an alliance with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), led by 
Foday Sankoh, who captured the capital Freetown.26  ECOMOG forces re-took Freetown, in 
March 1998, but the RUF launched another assault on the city in January 1999, expressively 
entitled Operation No Living Thing.27  More than 7,000 civilians were killed along with over 
100 Nigerian ECOMOG soldiers. 28  ECOMOG forces were also accused of committing 
widespread violations against civilians during the fighting.29  In May 1999 Nigeria began 
withdrawing its forces from ECOMOG, which was costing it around $1 million US dollars a 
day and had by now claimed the lives of hundreds of Nigerian soldiers.30  This forced the 
                                                 
22 See Human Rights Watch, Waging War to Keep the Peace: The ECOMOG Intervention and Human 
Rights, June 1993.  ECOMOG forced Taylor to retreat from the capital, Monrovia, but he remained in 
control of most of the rest of the country and retaliated by sponsoring an invasion of Sierra Leone, 
which had been ECOMOG’s rear base, by a 100 rebels and mercenaries who styled themselves the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF).  The RUF leader Foday Sankoh – a former Corporal in Sierra 
Leone’s army – had first met Taylor in a Libyan training camp. 
23 Human Rights Watch, Liberia: The Cycle of Abuse, Human Rights Abuses Since the November 
Cease-Fire, October 1991; Liberia: A Human Rights Disaster, Violations of the Laws of War by All 
Sides to the Conflict, October 1990; Flight From Terror, Testimony of Abuses in Nimba County, May 
1990; and Human Rights Watch, World Report 1993, p. 20-25. 
24 Foley, 2010, p.191.  Anecdotal evidence based on working in Liberia in 2006.  ECOMOG, for 
example, gained the nickname ‘Every Car Or Moving Object Gone’. 
25 See, for example, Ishmael Beah, A Long Way Gone: Memoirs of a Boy Soldier, New York: 
Macmillan/Sarah Crichton Books, 2008. 
26 Human Rights Watch, Getting Away with Murder, Mutilation, Rape: New Testimony from Sierra 
Leone, July 1999. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Adekey Adebajo and David Keen, ‘Sierra Leone’, in Berdal, Mats and Economides, Spyros (eds), 
United Nations Interventionism 1991 – 2004, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp.246-
73. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
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government of Sierra Leone to sue for peace that July.31 Sankoh became Vice-President and 
chairman of a commission that oversaw Sierra Leone’s diamond mines, in return for which 
he agreed to demobilize his forces through a Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 
(DDR) process under UN supervision.32 
 
UNAMSIL was originally created to monitor adherence to the ceasefire and peace agreement, 
as well as supervising the disarmament process and securing the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance.33  It initially consisted of 6,000 military personnel, including 260 military 
observers,34 replacing a far smaller observer force established in June 1998.35  Its strength 
was gradually increased to 17,500 soldiers by March 2001.36  An over-hasty attempt to 
forcibly disarm RUF fighters led to four peacekeeping soldiers being killed while 500 were 
taken hostage in May.37  Rebel forces advanced on Freetown and a British expeditionary 
force was deployed, with air support, ostensibly to evacuate foreign nationals.38  
 
The British refused to integrate their forces into UNAMSIL but did help to secure 
Freetown.39  British forces were only involved in one direct clash with the rebel forces and 
                                                 
31 For details see Abdullah, 2004; Keen, 2005; Sillinger, 2003; Ellis, 2001; Adekeye 2002; Adebajo 
and Keen, 2007.  The Lomé Peace Accord was signed on 7 July 1999 in Togo between Sankoh, as 
leader of the RUF and President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, representing the government of Sierra Leone.  
It repeated many of the provisions of the Abidjan Peace Accord of November 1996. As well as 
granting Sankoh a position in the transitional government it also gave an amnesty for him and all 
combatants.   The UN representative, Francis Okelo, also signed the agreement with the caveat that the 
UN would not recognize amnesty for acts of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other 
serious violations of international humanitarian law. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Security Council Resolution 1270 of 22 October 1999, para 8. 
34 UNAMSIL, United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, Accessed from UN Peacekeeping homepage, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamsil/index.html, accessed 29 August 2013. 
35 Security Council resolution 1171, of 5 June 1998.   
36 Security Council Resolution 1346, of 30 March 2001.  Resolution 1289, of 7 February 2000 
increased it from 6,000 to 11,000, while Resolution 1299, of 19 May 2000 brought this up to 13,000. 
37 Adebajo and Keen, 2007, p.261; and Thorsten Benner, Stephan Mergenthaler and Philipp Rotmann, 
The New World of UN Peace Operations, learning to build peace, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011, p.173.   
38 Paul Williams, ‘Fighting for Freetown: British military intervention in Sierra Leone’ Contemporary 
Security Policy, Vol. 22, Issue 3, pp.2001, 140–168. A total of 4,500 British military personnel were 
deployed, including an aircraft carrier and harrier jump-jets.  The arrival of these forces coincided with 
a decision by a group of Kenyan UNAMSIL soldiers to fight their way out of a siege by rebel forces.   
39 Ibid. 
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one with a militia group notionally allied to the government.40  UNAMSIL was also quite 
reticent about interpreting its POC mandate proactively.  An informal poll revealed that 
contingents would return fire if attacked, but considered themselves under no obligation even 
to rescue other contingents’ soldiers.41  One significant operation was, however, undertaken 
to rescue UN personnel taken hostage, which might have helped to check a further RUF 
advance through a show of force.42   
 
Sankoh was taken into custody after soldiers guarding his house opened fire on civilian 
protesters and a new UN Security Council resolution helped to cut the RUF’s funding by 
tackling the trade of illicit diamonds.43  The Guinean air force made cross-border bombing 
raids against RUF-controlled villages and a Sierra Leonean ‘self-defence’ militia, the 
Kamajors, launched attacks on their weakened forces, which were finally defeated in January 
2002.44  President Charles Taylor of Liberia, who had sponsored the RUF, was ousted from 
power the following year and, in April 2012, he became the first head of State since the 
                                                 
40 Adebajo and Keen, 2007, p.258.  The West Side Boys, which consisted mainly of ex-soldiers and 
criminals, captured 11 British soldiers in August 2000.  A British rescue operation freed them all and 
killed several militia members, which was believed to have sent out a strong signal of resolve to use 
military force when necessary.  
41 International Crisis Group, ‘Sierra Leone: time for a new military and political strategy’, ICG Africa 
Report no. 28, Freetown, London and Brussels, 11 April 2001. 
42 Ibid., See also The Official Website of the Indian Air Force, IAF Contingent 2000, to UNAMSIL, 
Special Achievements, Rescue Operation Khukri, 
http://indianairforce.nic.in/show_page.php?pg_id=137#special, accessed 30 August 2013.  Operation 
Khukri was a multinational military operation to rescue a group of Indian UNAMSIL soldiers who had 
been surrounded by rebel forces.     
43 UN Security Council Resolution 1306, adopted unanimously on 5 July 2000. 
44 For details see Abdullah, 2004; Keen, 2005; Sillinger, 2003; Ellis, 2001; Adekeye 2002; Williams, 
2001; and Adebajo and Keen, 2007. The Kamajors were a group of traditional hunters from the south 
and east of Sierra Leone, who were originally employed by local chiefs.  Under the leadership 
of Samuel Hinga Norman, a government minister, the force was expanded to over 20,000 men.  The 
Kamajors fought alongside ECOMOG to recapture Freetown in 1998 and to defend it the following 
year. A number of Kamajor leaders, including Norman were indicted before the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone in 2003. 
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Nuremburg trials to be convicted by an international or hybrid tribunal of war crimes or 
crimes against humanity.45 
 
Protection and the ‘third phase’ of UN peacekeeping 
 
In the same year that the UN adopted its first POC resolutions it also published two reports 
on the failure of its missions to prevent genocide in Rwanda46 and Srebrenica.47  A 
subsequent resolution, in April 2000, also indicated the Council’s intention to provide 
peacekeeping missions with appropriate mandates and resources to protect civilians and 
called on peacekeepers to consider the use of ‘temporary security zones for the protection of 
civilians and the delivery of assistance in situations characterized by the threat of genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and war crimes against the civilian population.’48   
 
In August 2000 the UN published the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace 
Operations, chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi, (the Brahimi Report).49  This listed the logistical 
and resources-based challenges that the UN faced in deploying peace-keeping troops in 
sufficient time and number and contained a series of recommendations designed to remedy 
these problems.  It argued that ‘the Secretariat must tell the Security Council what it needs to 
know, not what it wants to hear, when formulating or changing mission mandates.’50  It stated 
that UN peacekeepers ‘who witness violence against civilians should be presumed to be 
                                                 
45 Human Rights Watch, Sierra Leone: 50-Year Sentence for Charles Taylor, 30 May 2012.  Taylor 
had been indicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone whilst still in power in Liberia.  In 2006, he 
was extradited from Nigeria, where he had been living in exile and he was found guilty in 2012 of all 
charges levied against him and sentenced to 50 years in prison.  The only previous head of State to be 
convicted was Karl Dönitz who became Adolph Hitler’s successor after the latter’s suicide on 30 April 
1945 and ordered Germany’s surrender a week later.  Dönitz was convicted at Nuremburg and 
sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. 
46 Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide 
in Rwanda, S/1999/1257, 16 December 1999. 
47 Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35, The fall of 
Srebrenica, A/54/549, 15 November 1999. 
48 UN Security Council Resolution 1296, of 19 April 2000, para. 15. 
49 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305–S/2000/809, 21 August 2000. 
50 Ibid., para 64(d). 
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authorized to stop it’, but that ‘operations given a broad and explicit mandate for civilian 
protection must be given the specific resources needed to carry out that mandate.’51  It also 
noted that there ‘are hundreds of thousands of civilians in current United Nations mission 
areas who are exposed to potential risk of violence, and United Nations forces currently 
deployed could not protect more than a small fraction of them even if directed to do so.’52 
Nevertheless, it argued that: ‘Once deployed, United Nations peacekeepers must be able to 
carry out their mandate professionally and successfully . . .  Rules of engagement should not 
limit contingents to stroke-for-stroke responses but should allow ripostes sufficient to silence 
a source of deadly fire that is directed at United Nations troops or at the people they are 
charged to protect.’53  The report also stated that: 
 
There are many tasks which United Nations peacekeeping forces should not be asked 
to undertake and many places they should not go. But when the United Nations does 
send its forces to uphold the peace, they must be prepared to confront the lingering 
forces of war and violence, with the ability and determination to defeat them.54 
 
The publication of these set of reports is widely seen as marking the start of the ‘third phase’ 
of UN peacekeeping.55  In the light of Brahimi’s recommendations, in 2002, the UN revised 
its rules on the use of force to permit all missions, regardless of their mandate to use force ‘to 
                                                 
51 Ibid., para 62. 
52 Ibid., para 63. 
53 Ibid., para 49. 
54 Ibid., para 1. 
55 See Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams, Understanding Peacekeeping, Second Edition, Polity Press, 
2011; Siobhán Wills, Protecting Civilians, the obligations of peacekeepers, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009; Christine Gray, International law and the use of force, Third Edition, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008, pp. 254 – 249;  Peter Danchin and Horst Fischer, (eds), United Nations reform 
and the new collective security, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010; Elizabeth G. Ferris, 
The Politics of Prevention: The Limits of Humanitarian Action, Washington DC: Brookings Institution 
Press, 2011; Thomas G Weiss, Humanitarian Intervention: War and Conflict in the Modern World, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007; William Durch, Victoria  Holt, Caroline Earle and 
Moira Shanahan, The Brahimi Report and the Future of Peace Operations, Washington, DC: The 
Henry L. Stimson Center, December 2003. 
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defend any civilian person who is in need of protection’.56  Missions have also become 
increasingly multi-dimensional.  The Capstone Doctrine, published in 2008, for example, 
lists as a part of the ‘Core Business’ of UN peacekeeping the ‘[creation of] a secure and 
stable environment while strengthening the State’s ability to provide security, with full 
respect for the rule of law and human rights.’ 57  It states that: 
 
Most multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations are now mandated 
by the Security Council to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical 
violence. The protection of civilians requires concerted and coordinated action 
among the military, police and civilian components of a United Nations 
peacekeeping operation and must be mainstreamed into the planning and conduct of 
its core activities. United Nations humanitarian agencies and non-governmental 
organization (NGO) partners also undertake a broad range of activities in support of 
the protection of civilians. Close coordination with these actors is, therefore, 
essential.58 
 
This reasonably describes what UN missions often do.  However, it uses the same term 
‘protection’ to include actions by the military and police where there is an ‘imminent threat of 
physical violence’ as well as a ‘broad’, but undefined, range of activities by UN humanitarian 
agencies and NGOs.  The High Level Panel Report on Peace Operations of 2015 also urged 
UN missions to ‘harness or leverage’ the capabilities of humanitarian organizations to 
‘support the creation of a protective environment.’59  Much of the current discourse on 
                                                 
56 United Nations Master List of Numbered ROE, Guidelines for the Development of ROE for 
UNPKO, Provisional Sample ROE, Attachment 1 to FGS/0220.001, United Nations, April 2002, Rule 
1.8.  This authorises the use of force ‘up to, and including deadly force, to defend any civilian person 
who is in need of protection against a hostile act or hostile intent, when competent local authorities are 
not in a position to render immediate assistance’. 
57 Capstone Doctrine 2008, p.24. 
58 Ibid. 
59 High Level Panel Report on Peace Operations of 2015, para 87.  ‘Humanitarian organizations play 
essential roles in protecting civilians. Where appropriate, timely coordination between missions with 
humanitarian actors is indispensable in pursuing unarmed strategies as these partners often work 
closely with communities, especially internally displaced persons.  Many non-governmental 
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‘stabilization’ adopts a similar approach.60  As will be discussed below this can lead to 
considerable confusion about who is to be protected, from what, by whom, to what extent and 
until when.   
 
POC’s normative significance   
 
Although the Security Council was aware of the significance of the POC tasks that it had 
inserted into UNAMSIL’s mandate, this does not seem to have been considered a significant 
separate task within the mission at the operational or tactical level.61  The first mission report 
                                                 
organizations, national and international, also ensure protection by their civilian presence and 
commitment to non-violent strategies for protection.  Missions should make every effort to harness or 
leverage the non-violent practices and capabilities of local communities and non-governmental 
organizations to support the creation of a protective environment 
60 There is a vast and growing literature on the latter concepts.  See for example:  Robert Muggah, (ed), 
Stabilization operations, security and development: states of fragility, London and New York: 
Routledge, 2014; Oliver Ramsbotham, Hugh Miall, Tom Woodhouse, The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: 
Confronting the Contradictions of Post War Peace Operations, Abingdon: Routledge, 2009; Ronald 
Hatto, ‘From peacekeeping to peacebuilding: the evolution of the role of the United Nations in peace 
operations’, International Review of the Red Cross, Multinational operations and the law, Volume 95 
Number 891/892 Autumn/Winter 2013, pp.495–515; Beth Cole and Emily Hsu , Guiding Principles 
for Stabilization and Reconstruction, Washington: United States Institute for Peace, 2009; OECD-
DAC Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility: Policy Guidance, DAC 
Guidelines and Reference Series, Paris: OECD, 2011; Craig Cohen, Measuring Progress in 
Stabilization and Reconstruction, Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009; Michael W. 
Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2006; Michael Barnett, ‘Building a Republican Peace: 
Stabilizing States after War’, International Security, Spring 2006, Vol. 30, No. 4, pp.87-112; Alex J. 
Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, ‘Who’s Keeping the Peace? Regionalization and Contemporary Peace 
Operations, International Security, Spring 2005, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp.157-195; Philip Wilkinson, The 
Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations, Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 3-50, Second 
Edition, Shrivenham: Ministry of Defence, 2004; Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic, Eliot M. 
Goldberg (eds), Policing The New World Disorder: Peace Operations And Public Security, 
Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1998. 
61 For the UN’s distinction between Strategic, Operational and Tactical levels, see Authority, 
Command and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations Department of Field Support Ref. 2008.4, Policy February 2008.  The 
management of a peacekeeping operation at UN Headquarters level in New York is considered to be 
the strategic level.  The Security Council provides the legal authority, high-level direction and political 
guidance for all UN peacekeeping operations, which is then vested in the Secretary-General and 
delegated to the Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations (USG DPKO).  The field-based 
management of a peacekeeping operation is considered to be the operational level and includes: the 
Head of Mission, Head of Police and Military components, Deputy Special Representative(s) of the 
Secretary-General (DSRSG); and Director of Mission Support/Chief of Mission Support (DMS/CMS).   
The management of military, police and civilian operations below the level of Mission Headquarters 
and the supervision of individual personnel is considered to be at the tactical level and is exercised by 
Brigade, Regional, Sector Commanders for the military and the management of the mission’s 
regional/sector/field offices by the civilian heads of offices. 
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to the Security Council, in December 1999, contained no references to POC, although it did 
have separate sections on the security situation, DDR, human rights and humanitarian 
issues.62  The language of the reports suggests that it was assumed that the protection of 
civilians would be accomplished through the success of the mission’s overall objectives.  A 
report in March 2001, for example, stated that: 
 
The main objectives of UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone remain to assist the efforts of the 
Government of Sierra Leone to extend its authority, restore law and order and 
stabilize the situation progressively throughout the entire country, and to assist in the 
promotion of a political process which should lead to a renewed disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration programme and the holding, in due course, of free 
and fair elections.63 
 
The notion that the best means of protecting civilians is to bring an end to the conflict in 
which they are suffering and so the success of the mission’s overall political objectives 
should take priority over specific mandated tasks remains a strong.64  The reports of the 
Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations (C34) to the UN General Assembly continue 
to stress the importance of missions supporting ‘comprehensive peace processes’ while 
abiding strictly to the ‘core principles’ of peacekeeping: host state consent, impartiality and 
minimum use of force.65  These principles are also restated in the High Level Panel Report on 
                                                 
62 First Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, S/1999/1223, 
6 December 1999. 
63 Ninth report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, S/2001/228, 
14 March 2001, paras 57-8. 
64 See, for example, the High Level Panel Report on Peace Operations of 2015, Executive Summary 
and para 37.  ‘First, politics must drive the design and implementation of peace operations. Lasting 
peace is achieved not through military and technical engagements, but through political solutions. 
Political solutions should always guide the design and deployment of UN peace operations. When the 
momentum behind peace falters, the United Nations, and particularly Member States, must help to 
mobilize renewed political efforts to keep peace processes on track.’ [emphasis in original] 
65 See, for example, Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations 2012 substantive 
session (New York, 21 February-16 March and 11 September 2012), UN Doc. A/66/19, paras 21 and 
24-7. 
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Peace Operations of 2015, the Capstone Doctrine and other recent policy documents.66  
References to POC have gradually entered into the reports of the C34 as a mandated task 
since 2009, although with very little discussion of the direct physical protection that 
peacekeeping soldiers can provide.67  
 
The cautious wording of the original UNAMSIL mandate has been repeated many times 
since and mission staff members sometimes emphasize the caveats and limitations contained 
in the original resolution.68  Nevertheless, the Security Council is becoming increasingly 
detailed in spelling out the POC tasks of UN peacekeeping missions, drawing on their field 
experiences.  
 
The first Secretary General’s report on POC in 1999 included a recommendation that 
‘regional or international military forces’ must be ‘prepared to take effective measures to 
                                                 
66 High Level Panel Report 2015, paras 121-5; Capstone Document 2008, p.31.  See also The New 
Horizon Initiative, Progress Report No. 2, New York: Department of Peacekeeping Operations and 
Department of Field Support, December 2011; Early Peace building Strategy, New York: Department 
of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, June 2011; and Draft Operational 
Concept on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, New York: 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations–Department of Field Support, 2010. 
67 Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations 2012 substantive session (New York, 
21 February-16 March and 11 September 2012), UN Doc. A/66/19, paras; 191-205; Report of the 
Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations 2011 substantive session (New York, 22 February-18 
March and 9 May 2011) UN Doc. A/65/19, paras 172-83; Adopted by UN General Assembly 
Resolution 65/310; Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations 2010 substantive 
session (New York, (22 February-19 March 2010), UN Doc. A/64/19, paras 145-51, Adopted by UN 
General Assembly Resolution 64/266; Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations 
2009 substantive session (New York, 23 February-20 March 2009)), UN Doc. A/63/19, paras 127-8, 
Adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution 63/280.  POC was not mentioned at all in the Report of 
the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations 2008 substantive session (New York, 10 March-4 
April and 3 July 2008), UN Doc. A/62/19.   
68 Interview in November 2013 with Séverine Autesserre, a former aid worker and author of The 
trouble with the Congo: local violence and the failure of international peacebuilding, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010, which is based on hundreds of interviews carried out in the DRC 
between 2004 and 2007.   She notes that some mission staff stress that the mandate’s use of the word 
‘may’ indicates that the Chapter VII authorization is discretionary.  The phrase ‘to ensure the security 
and freedom of movement of its personnel and, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to 
afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence’ is also sometimes interpreted 
sequentially.  The mission will first ensure its own security and freedom of movement, then that of 
international humanitarian aid workers and only after that will it consider protecting local people.  
These views also reflect the author’s own observations of some UN staff in missions with POC 
mandates.    
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protect civilians. Such measures could include compelling disarmament of the combatants or 
armed elements’.69  It also recommended that the Security Council: 
 
Establish, as a measure of last resort, temporary security zones and safe corridors for 
the protection of civilians and the delivery of assistance . . . subject to a clear 
understanding that such arrangements require the availability, prior to their 
establishment, of sufficient and credible force to guarantee the safety of civilian 
populations making use of them, and ensure the demilitarization of these zones and 
the availability of a safe-exit option.70 
 
The two subsequent reports on POC, published in 2001 and 2002, however, failed even to 
mention the role of internationally-mandated forces in protecting civilians against violence.71  
They instead emphasised the primary responsibility of governments to protect their own 
people, with the role of the UN limited to advocating that these fulfil their responsibilities.72  
The only ‘direct protection’ tasks envisaged for missions were coordinating and facilitating 
the delivery of humanitarian aid and negotiating access to vulnerable populations.73 An Aide 
Memoire, published in December 2003, followed much the same approach.74 
 
The Secretary General’s report, published in 2004, more assertively stated that ‘the stronger 
protection focus in peacekeeping mandates has been complemented by swifter deployments 
of peacekeeping troops when needed to avert an immediate crisis of protection and to restore 
                                                 
69 Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians in Armed 
Conflict, S/1999/957, 8 September 1999, para 35.   
70 Ibid., para 39. 
71 Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, S/2001/331, 30 
March 2001; and Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, 
S/2002/1300, 26 November 2002.   
72 For example, Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, 
S/2001/331, 30 March 2001, paras 9-13 contained a list of ‘measures to enhance protection’, which 
were: Prosecutions of violations of international criminal law, Denial of amnesty for serious crimes, 
Impact of criminal justice, Importance of national jurisdictions and Truth and Reconciliations efforts.     
73 Ibid., paras 14-25. 
74 Annex to Statement of the President of the Security Council, Protection of civilians in armed conflict, 
Aide Memoire, S/PRST/2003/27, 15 December 2003. 
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order’, making specific to the UN mission to the DRC.75  UN peacekeeping forces were said 
to be ‘holding local militias in check and maintaining the peace in a precarious situation’.76  
The 2005 report noted that UN peacekeepers ‘can provide the necessary security environment 
to prevent displacement and facilitate an early return’ and ‘may also be the only means of 
ensuring that the civilian character of camps for displaced populations is maintained by 
preventing the infiltration of armed elements and combatants.’77   
 
The 2007 report again referred to the UN’s DRC mission (MONUC)  as illustrating the 
‘critical role that peacekeepers can play in protecting civilians, through a concept of 
operations that prioritizes the provision of security by a deterrent military presence and direct 
involvement to prevent and end violations of human rights and humanitarian law’.78  When 
the Security Council revised MONUC’s mandate the same year, it stated that ‘the protection 
of civilians must be given a priority in decisions about the use of available capacity and 
resources’.79  The Council also established an Informal Expert Group on the Protection of 
Civilians, in the same year to consider a wide range of protection issues, based on briefings 
by relevant UN agencies and departments.80   
 
                                                 
75 Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, S/2004/431, 28 May 
2004, para 9. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, S/2005/740, 28 
November 2005, para 23. 
78 Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, S/2007/643, 28 
October 2007, para 14. 
79 Security Council Resolution 1794 of 21 December 2007, para 5. 
80 For further details see UN OCHA Home Page, Thematic Areas: Protection, 
http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/policy/thematic-areas/protection, accessed 5 August 2015.  See, 
also, Security Council Report, Cross-Cutting Report, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, May 
2015, pp.2 and 4.  The group was established in response to a recommendation in the Secretary-
General’s 2007 report on the Protection of Civilians.  It is Chaired by the United Kingdom and 
serviced by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).  It includes experts 
from Security Council Members with inputs from relevant UN Secretariat departments, agencies, 
Humanitarian Coordinators, and non-governmental organizations.   It met 10 times in 2012, 11 times in 
2013 and 9 times in 2014.  Since 2013 representatives from other UN entities have also been invited to 
address these meetings. 
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The following year POC was made MONUC’s highest priority.81  The resolution also 
removed the reference to ‘without prejudice to the responsibility to the government’ and 
mandated MONUC to: ‘Ensure the protection of civilians, including humanitarian personnel, 
under imminent threat of physical violence, in particular violence emanating from any of the 
parties engaged in the conflict’.82 [emphasis added]  In 2009 the Security Council stressed, 
for all missions, that ‘mandated protection activities must be given priority in decisions about 
the use of available capacity and resources, including information and intelligence resources, 
in the implementation of mandates’ and recognized, that POC ‘requires a coordinated 
response from all relevant mission components’.83   
 
In 2011 the Security Council mandated the UN mission to Côte d’Ivoire to ‘prevent the use of 
heavy weapons against the civilian population’84  In 2013 the Security Council created a 
Force Intervention Brigade to conduct ‘targeted offensive operations’ against rebel groups 
which threatened civilians.85  In 2014 the word ‘imminent’ was removed from the 
formulation in the DRC mission’s mandate.86  Guidance produced by the DPKO and OCHA 
in 2010 and 2011 stated that while the protection of civilians is primarily the responsibility of 
the host government and the mission is deployed to assist and build the capacity of the 
government in the fulfilment of this responsibility:  
 
in cases where the government is unable or unwilling to fulfil its responsibility, 
Security Council mandates give missions the authority to act independently to protect 
                                                 
81 Security Council Resolution 1856 of 22 December 2008, para 2: ‘Requests MONUC to attach the 
highest priority to addressing the crisis in the Kivus, in particular the protection of civilians, and to 
concentrate progressively during the coming year its action in the eastern part of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo.’  
82 Ibid., para 3 (a).  
83 Security Council Resolution 1894 of 11 November 2009, para 19. 
84 Security Council Resolution 1975 of 30 March 2011, para 6. 
85 Security Council Resolution 2098, 28 March 2013, para 12(b).  
86 Security Council Resolution 2147, of 28 March 2014, para 4 (a) (i) 
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civilians [meaning that] missions are authorized to use force against any party, 
including elements of government forces.87 [emphasis added]  
 
The Secretary General’s report on POC in 2009 hailed ‘ten years of normative progress’88 and 
stated that it had ‘increasingly permeated the country-specific deliberations and decisions of 
the Council’, which had resulted in ‘concrete proposals and decisions’ to improve the 
protection of victims of conflicts.89  While a decade previously ‘members of the Security 
Council questioned whether situations of internal armed conflict constituted a threat to 
international peace and security’, this was now ‘firmly recognized’ by all.90  The report 
identified five core challenges: enhancing compliance with international law; enhancing 
compliance by non-state armed groups; enhancing protection through more effective and 
better resourced peacekeeping missions; enhancing humanitarian access; and enhancing 
accountability for violations.91  It also warned, however, that POC ‘remains largely undefined 
as both a military task and as a mission-wide task. Each mission interprets its protection 
mandate as best it can in its specific context.’92  There was a need for a ‘broader policy 
framework that includes clear direction as to possible courses of action, including in 
situations where the armed forces of the host State are themselves perpetrating violations 
against civilians, as well as indicative tasks and the necessary capabilities for their 
implementation.’93 
 
                                                 
87 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Framework for Drafting Comprehensive 
Protection of Civilians (POC) Strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operation, UN OCHA, 2011.  See also 
Draft Framework for Drafting Mission-wide Protection of Civilians Strategies in UN Peacekeeping 
Operations, UN DPKO, 2010 
88 Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians in Armed 
Conflict, 29 May 2009, S/2009/277, paras 8-13. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid., para 3. 
91 Ibid., para 26.  For an elaboration of these see paras 27-73. 
92 Ibid., para 52. 
93 Ibid. 
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In 2009 UN DPKO and OCHA commissioned an independent review whose report marked a 
significant milestone in the mainstreaming of POC into peacekeeping.94  This found that 
while progress had been made over the previous decade, ‘the presumed “chain” of events to 
support protection of civilians – from the earliest planning to the implementation of mandates 
by peacekeeping missions in the field is often broken’.95  In 2010 a concept note by DPKO 
stated that:  
 
A number of senior mission leaders, mission personnel and troop and police 
contributors now feel that the absence of a clear, operationally-focused and practical 
concept for protection of civilians . . . has contributed to the disconnect between 
expectations and resources. . . . a wide range of views regarding what protection of 
civilians means for UN peacekeeping missions has taken root. Troop and police 
contributors, Member States, the Security Council, bodies of the General Assembly, 
as well as staff within the missions, DPKO and DFS, often understand POC in ways 
that may contradict one another, causing friction, misunderstanding and frustration in 
missions.96   
 
At a workshop on the use of force in UN peace operations held in 2004, several former UN 
Force commanders stated that ‘protection’ often ‘requires pre-emptive or preventive actions, 
yet they are often prohibited from acting except in response to opposing forces’ actions.’97 At 
another, in 2010, participants complained that the Security Council had ‘started mandating 
the use of force to protect civilians, however they do not authorise sufficient resources and 
                                                 
94 Victoria Holt and Glyn Taylor, Protecting civilians in the context of UN peacekeeping operations, 
New York: United Nations, 2009. 
95 Ibid., p.5. 
96 DPKO/DFS Draft Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in Peace Operations, UN 
DPKO/DFS, 2010,  paras 4 and 9.  
97 Victoria Holt and Tobias Berkman, The Impossible Mandate? Military Preparedness, the 
Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace Operations, The Stimson Center, 2006, p.53. 
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instead caveat the activity with the unclear phrases ‘within the areas of deployment’ and 
‘within capabilities’’.98   
 
In 2010 DPKO produced its first Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians and this 
has been used as the basis for subsequent mission-specific protection strategies.99  This noted 
that the term protection was understood differently by different actors, but that for ‘the 
purposes of this operational concept, it is not necessary to fully reconcile these paradigms.’100  
POC was conceived as encompassing three ‘tiers’ of activities: (i) protection through political 
process; (ii) protection from physical violence; and (iii) establishment of a protective 
environment.101  The Three Tiers concept has now been integrated into the protection 
strategies of other missions and is also frequently used in the structure of mission reports.  
The concept paper noted that it:  
 
rests on the understanding that POC tasks undertaken by UN peacekeeping missions 
must reflect and uphold the principles of UN peacekeeping, namely, consent of the 
host government and the main parties to the conflict, impartiality, and the non-use of 
force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate. It also recognizes that the 
protection of civilians is primarily the responsibility of the host government.102 
 
                                                 
98 Scott Sheeran (Research Director), UN Peacekeeping and The Model  Status of Forces Agreement , 
United Nations Peacekeeping Law Reform Project, School of Law, University of Essex, 20011, p.16. 
99 Draft Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations, New York: Department of Peacekeeping Operations–Department of Field Support, 2010.  
Much the same language appears in the UNOCI, MONUSCO, UNAMID and UNMISS protection 
strategies produced between 2010 and 2012, which are on file with the author of this thesis.  See also 
Policy on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping, Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations / Department of Field Support, Ref. 2015.07, 1 April 2015; and Protection of Civilians: 
Implementing Guidelines for Military Components of United Nations Peacekeeping Missions, 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations / Department of Field Support, February 2015.   
100 Ibid., paras 9 and 11. 
101 Ibid., para 2. 
102 Ibid., para 7. 
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The tasks listed in Tiers I and III were described as ‘well-established activities in UN 
peacekeeping’.103  Activities listed in Tier II included ‘preventive measures, such as political 
engagement with parties to the conflict by senior mission leadership, preventive tactical 
deployments of the peacekeeping force in areas where civilians are potentially at risk, as well 
as direct use of force in situations where serious international humanitarian law and human 
rights violations are underway, or may occur.’104  It was stressed that protection of civilians 
from physical violence should not just been seen as a military task and that other mission 
components and activities contributed to this.105  Only when a threat of physical violence was 
apparent and all measures had been exhausted should the deployment ‘of police and/or direct 
military action . . . be considered as an option, such as the interposition of peacekeepers 
between a vulnerable population and hostile elements or the use of force as a last resort when 
the population is under imminent threat of physical violence.’106   
 
The pacific assumptions underlying this operational strategy are in marked contrast both to 
other guidance, referred to in this chapter and to statements and UN Security Council 
resolutions in relation to the Force Intervention Brigade in the DRC, that will be discussed 
further in Chapter Six.  Guidance in 2015, did not refer to the ‘interposition’ of forces and 
stated that: ‘peacekeepers will act to prevent, deter, pre-empt or respond to threats of physical 
violence in their areas of deployment, no matter the scale of the violence and irrespective of 
the source of the threat’ as well as repeating that force could be used against government 
soldiers threatening civilians.107 It also stated that missions could undertake ‘credible 
deterrence actions or engaging in offensive operations to prevent violence against 
civilians.’108  
                                                 
103 Ibid., para 13. 
104 Ibid.  
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid., para 19. 
107 Policy on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping, Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations / Department of Field Support, Ref. 2015.07, 1 April 2015, p.6-7. 
108 Ibid., p.11. 
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These apparent differences in emphasis may reflect divergent views within the UN.  It may 
also, however, be based on a dichotomous approach to the use of force for POC purposes: 
that missions must either maintain the traditional ‘core principles’ of peacekeeping or become 
a party to the conflict that they were sent to help resolve.  As Holt and Berkman have noted, 
‘“protection” is often vague and undefined, particularly in the more challenging, non-
permissive environments where mass killing is likely to occur . . . Deploying peacekeepers 
without either a clear vision of how to protect civilians or the means and authority to do so 
may result in a tragic shortfall.’109  The High Level Panel Report on Peace Operations of 
2015 also stated that there was a growing expectation on UN missions to protect civilians, but 
that while these ‘have at times responded with conviction to prevent such threats from 
materializing or worsening, and to provide safety to civilians, at other times, they have failed 
to show sufficient resolve and action’110   
 
In March 2014 a report by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) stated that 
while POC mandates create a ‘legal obligation’ on missions to ‘use force, including deadly 
force . . . within their capabilities when civilians are in imminent physical danger or actually 
being attacked in their areas of deployment’111 they routinely avoided doing so, intervening in 
only 20 percent of cases and that ‘force is almost never used to protect civilians under 
attack.’112  Only four missions indicated that they had ever fired a warning shot, and only 
                                                 
109 Holt and Berkman, 2006, pp.5 and 50. 
110 High Level Panel Report on Peace Operations of 2015, para 27. 
111 OIOS Protection Evaluation 2014, para 55. 
112 Ibid. para 19: ‘Of the 507 incidents involving civilians reported in Secretary-General’s reports from 
2010 to 2013, only 101, or 20 per cent, were reported to have attracted an immediate mission response. 
Conversely, missions did not report responding to 406 (80 per cent) of incidents where civilians were 
attacked. The rate of reported response varied across missions, reflecting the seriousness of incidents 
and the availability of early warning, the accessibility of incident sites and other factors.’  In an annex 
to the report UNDPKO accepted its main conclusions and recommendations but noted that: ‘The 
report, however, misses an important opportunity to assess the implementation of protection of 
civilians mandates in their full scope. It focuses on a last resort option — the use of force — which we 
should expect and hope will be a rare occurrence where missions have so many other tools at their 
disposal.’ 
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three indicated that they had ever fired a shot with lethal intent.113  It also noted that: 
‘Interviews revealed widespread understanding in missions concerning the host 
Government’s primary responsibility to protect civilians, but less understanding concerning 
the mission’s legal obligation to act, including with force, when host Governments cannot or 
will not do so.’114   
 
Interviewees also referred to gaps at the tactical level on the issue of how to respond 
to complex and ambiguous situations that might require the use of force. They 
included issues such as intervening in fighting between two or more armed groups 
when civilian casualties were likely; when armed groups were openly visible in 
communities, committing extortion through fear but without physical violence; when 
the imminence of the threat could not be evaluated; when troops were outnumbered; 
when reinforcements were unavailable; when it would be difficult or impossible to 
reach the site; or when the use of force might provoke more violence or cause more 
civilian casualties. Guidance, official documents, including Rules of Engagement, 
and training, despite considerable efforts, including scenario-based training, do not 
seem to adequately address such situations.115 
 
DPKO responded to the OIOS report by regretting ‘that the approach of the report over 
emphasizes one element of military action and devalues the importance of political solutions 
and other aspects of the comprehensive approach peacekeeping operations take in 
implementing their protection mandate.’116  The High Level Panel Report of 2015 also 
emphasised that lasting peace is ‘achieved not through military and technical engagements, 
                                                 
113 Ibid., para 25. 
114 Ibid., para 40. 
115 Ibid., para 52. 
116 Ibid. Annex I, Comments on the draft report received from the Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations and the Department of Field Support, para 4. 
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but through political solutions. Political solutions should always guide the design and 
deployment of United Nations peace operations.’117   
 
The first Security Council resolution on POC, in 1999, had highlighted the importance of 
‘conflict prevention’ and the ‘need to address the causes of armed conflict’ by ‘promoting 
economic growth, poverty eradication, sustainable development’ and ‘good governance, 
democracy, the rule of law and respect for and protection of human rights’.118  Since 2010 
DPKO has produced a variety of policy papers and guidance that stress the need for advocacy 
with the national authorities and capacity-building of state institutions to enhance the 
protection of civilians.119  Clearly protection through political process and the creation of a 
protective environment are key POC tasks and mission reports often stress these activities, 
sometimes as an apparent counter-weight to their reluctance to use force for protective 
purposes.  The monitoring and advocacy activities of UN missions with POC mandates often 
overlap with what is often referred to as humanitarian ‘rights-based’ protection, but as the 
next two sections of this chapter will discuss the two should in fact be clearly distinguished 
from one another.   
 
POC and humanitarian ‘rights-based’ protection 
                                                 
117 High Level Panel Report on Peace Operations 2015, p.10. 
118 UN Security Council Resolution 1265 of 17 September 1999, preamble. 
119 DPKO/DFS Draft Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in Peace Operations, UN 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations /Department of Field Support, 2010; Lessons Learned Note 
on the Protection of Civilians, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2010; Draft Matrix of 
Resources and Capability Requirements for Implementation of Protection of Civilians Mandates in UN 
Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2010; Guidelines for Protection of 
Civilians for Military Components of UN Peacekeeping Missions, UN Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations, 2010; Draft Framework for Drafting Mission-wide Protection of Civilians Strategies in 
UN Peacekeeping Operations, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2010; and MONUC 
Protection Strategy Narrative – Draft 8, March 31 2009 – MONUC ODSRSG; UN Organization 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) & UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 
‘UN System-Wide Strategy for the Protection of Civilians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, 
January 2010 [Hereinafter MONUC Protection Strategy 2010].  See also Kyoko Ono, Actions Taken by 
MONUC to Implement the Security Council Mandate on Protection of Civilians, UN DPKO, 
Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, June 2008; and Lessons Learned Note on the Protection of 
Civilians, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2010; and MONUC Protection Strategy 
Narrative – Draft 8, March 31 2009 – MONUC ODSRSG (all on file with author). 
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Humanitarian agencies tend to use the term ‘protection’ in its broadest sense of ‘protecting all 
rights’ in the applicable bodies of international law.120  There are, however, three crucial 
distinctions between POC and humanitarian ‘rights-based’ protection.  The first is that UN 
peacekeeping missions with POC mandates have both the military capability and legal 
authority to use force for protective purposes, while humanitarian aid workers do not.  The 
second is that the right of access to humanitarian assistance provided in international law 
specifies that its distribution is a strictly humanitarian responsibility, to be conducted 
according to humanitarian principles.121  UN missions with POC mandates, by contrast, have 
developed ‘protection strategies’ with overtly political objectives, such as bolstering peace 
processes, and, as will be discussed further in Part III of this thesis, some missions may have 
even become a party to the armed conflicts that they were sent to try and help to resolve. 
 
The third distinction concerns how UN peacekeeping missions and humanitarian agencies 
confront the dilemma of whether or not to investigate and speak out against egregious 
violations of IHL and international human rights law if this may jeopardize their operational 
presence.  Humanitarian aid agencies provide life-saving assistance and so a denial of access 
to affected populations can have catastrophic consequences.  Some, nevertheless, seek to 
                                                 
120 ICRC Strengthening Protection in War: A Search for Professional Standards, Geneva: International 
Committee of the Red Cross, 2001.  See also Ashley Jackson, Protecting civilians: the gap between 
norms and practice, Humanitarian Policy Group, Policy Brief 56, London: Overseas Development 
Institute, April 2014; Norah Niland,  Riccardo Polastro,  Antonio Donini,  and Amra Lee,  Independent 
Whole of System Review of Protection in the Context of Humanitarian Action, Norwegian Refugee 
Council, May 2015, [Hereinafter Whole of System Review of Protection 2015], pp.31-3; and Bellamy 
and Williams, 2011, pp.337-58. 
121 The Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, 1986.  
These were proclaimed by the 20th International Conference of the Red Cross (ICRC), Vienna, 1965 
and subsequently incorporated into the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Movement, adopted by the 25th International Conference of the Red Cross, Geneva, 1986.  The 
principles are: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity and 
universality.  See also Jean Pictet, The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross, Henri Dunant 
Institute, Geneva, 1979; and Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against 
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America). Merits, Judgment. ICJ Report, 1986, para 243.  
The ICRC specifies that the principle of neutrality means that: ‘In order to continue to enjoy the 
confidence of all, the Movement may not take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies 
of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature.’ 
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‘bear witness’ to egregious violations, while others argue that the ‘humanitarian imperative’ 
may sometimes require more discretion.122  UN authorized missions with POC mandates can 
face a similar dilemma in maintaining host state consent to the mission’s deployment if these 
forces are responsible for the violations.  It will be argued in this thesis, however, that UN 
missions should consider that they have a duty to investigate and report on violations as an 
integral part of a POC mandate. 
 
Both IHL and international human rights law contain clear ‘positive obligations’ on the 
appropriate authorities to investigate and report on violations, which is quite different from 
the ‘protection monitoring’ carried out by humanitarian agencies.123  These provisions will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter Four of this thesis and it will be argued in Chapter Five, 
that the core provisions of this legal framework are potentially applicable to the conduct of 
UN peacekeeping missions.  Conflating the concepts of POC and humanitarian ‘rights-based’ 
protection risks compromising the neutrality of those engaged in delivering humanitarian 
assistance, while weakening the rigour with which missions should be required to investigate 
and report on egregious violations of IHL and international human rights law.   
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, UNHCR became the lead UN humanitarian agency, 
providing ‘protection and assistance’, in a number of complex emergencies during the 1990s.  
By 2014 it estimated that it was helping around 46.3 million of the more than 51 million 
uprooted people worldwide.124  In 2005, as part of a wider process of humanitarian reform, 
                                                 
122 Bearing witness to violations is closely associated with Médecins sans Frontieres (MSF) which 
split from the ICRC during the Biafra crisis over the latter’s perceived reluctance to speak out publicly 
against violations of international human rights law and IHL committed by the Nigerian government.  
For a brief overview see MSF USA Homepage ‘The founding of 
MSF’http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/about-us/history-principles/founding-msf, accessed 7 
March 2015.  For the ICRC’s view of events see David P. Forsythe, ‘The International Committee of 
the Red Cross and humanitarian assistance - A policy analysis’, International Review of the Red Cross, 
October 1996, ICRC publication No. 314, p.512-531. 
123 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ExComm Note on International Protection, UN 
Doc. A/AC.96/989, 3 July 1998, para 47. 
124 UNHCR Home Page, History of UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646cbc.html, accessed 
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UNHCR established the Global Protection Cluster (GPC), as an inter-agency forum for 
standard and policy setting as well as collaboration and coordination of activities.125  UNHCR 
often convenes Protection Working Groups (PWGs) at the field level to coordinate 
‘protection-related’ activities.126  UNHCR’s definition of ‘protection’, however, derives from 
its humanitarian mandate, which it clearly distinguishes from human rights work.  As a Note 
on International Protection stressed in 1998: 
 
While human rights monitoring missions must investigate and encourage prosecution 
of human rights violations, action in support of refugees and returnees is essentially 
humanitarian, encouraging confidence-building and creation of conditions conducive 
to peace and reconciliation.127 
 
Recent years have seen a growing number of attacks on humanitarian aid workers as these are 
often deliberately targeted in many places, partly because attempts have been made to use aid 
delivery for political tasks such as ‘stabilization’.128  Attacks on humanitarian aid workers 
more than quadrupled between 2003 and 2013129 and most agencies have concluded that 
                                                 
returnees, 3.5 million stateless people, more than 1.2 asylum-seekers and 752,000 other people of 
concern. 
125 Global Protection Cluster, http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org, accessed 20 January 2014.  See 
also Inter-Agency Standing Committee, The Centrality of Protection in Humanitarian Action, 
Statement by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Principals Endorsed by the IASC 
Principals on 17 December 2013.  
126 Ibid.  UNHCR often provides direct support to projects such as legal aid services and ‘protection 
monitoring’.  Protection Working Groups often also have sub-clusters dealing with issues such as 
human rights, land and property, children’s rights and women’s rights which may be chaired by other 
UN agencies such as OHCHR, UN Habitat, UN Women and UNICEF.   
127 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ExComm Note on International Protection, UN 
Doc. A/AC.96/989, 3 July 1998, para 47. 
128 For further discussion see: Mark Duffield,  Development, Security and Unending War: Governing 
the World of Peoples, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007; Sarah Collinson and Mark Duffield, Paradoxes 
of presence: risk management and aid culture in challenging environments, Humanitarian Policy 
Group, Overseas Development Institute, March 2013; Larissa Fast, Aid in danger: the perils and 
promise of humanitarianism, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania, 2014; and Tennant, Doyle and 
Mazou, Safeguarding Humanitarian Space: A Review of Key Challenges for UNHCR, Geneva: UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees, 2010. 
129 See, for example, The Aid Worker Security Database, ‘Major attacks on aid workers 2003-13’, 
https://aidworkersecurity.org/incidents/report/summary, accessed 23 June 2015.  In 2003 there were a 
total of 63 attacks and 143 victims of whom 87 were killed, 49 injured and seven kidnapped.  By 2013 
the number of incidents had increased to 264 and the victims to 474 of whom 155 were killed, 178 
injured and 141 kidnapped. 
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maintaining a policy of strict neutrality is the best means of maintaining the acceptance of the 
communities that they serve.130  Humanitarian agencies have become increasingly cautious 
about anything that may jeopardize this, including efforts by the UN to ‘integrate’ its 
humanitarian and political mandates.131  
 
The views of humanitarian actors about what constitutes ‘rights-based’ protection also appear 
to be in considerable flux.132 A review of protection in the context of humanitarian action, 
published in 2015, noted that ‘notwithstanding significant effort to make protection concerns 
central to humanitarian decision-making, there is very little common understanding as to 
what that means in practice.’133  A paper published by the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) 
                                                 
130 Operational Security Management in Violent Environments, Good Practice Review, Humanitarian 
Policy Group of the Overseas Development Institute, 2010; Shaun Bickley, Safety First: A safety and 
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McCready, International Alert Security Manual, International Alert, August 2013; UN Guidelines on 
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humanitarian community, Oxfam Australia, 2013; Victoria Metcalfe,  Protecting civilians? The 
interaction between international military and humanitarian actors, HPG Working Paper, London: 
Overseas Development Institute, August 2012; Cedric De Coning, Walter Lotze and Andreas Øien 
Stensland, Mission-Wide Strategies for the Protection of Civilians, A Comparison of MONUC, 
UNAMID and UNMIS, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs 2011; Jane Barry with Anna 
Jefferys, ‘A bridge too far: aid agencies and the military in humanitarian response’, Humanitarian 
Practice Network, Overseas Development Institute, January 2002; Hugo Slim, Military intervention to 
protect human rights: the humanitarian agency perspective, International Council on Human Rights 
Policy, March 2001; Danielle Coquoz,  ‘The involvement of the military in humanitarian activities’, in 
The challenges of complementarity, fourth workshop on protection for human rights and humanitarian 
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in 2011stated that ‘it is generally accepted that protecting civilians in armed conflict and 
other situations of violence relates to violations of international humanitarian and human 
rights law, and is not limited to mere physical security but rather encompasses the broader 
spectrum of human security and human dignity’.134  Four years previously, however, an HPG 
paper had stated that humanitarian agencies were seeking to develop ‘more accessible 
working definitions which emphasise safety rather than rights . . . Put simply, protection is 
about seeking to assure the safety of civilians from acute harm.’135   
 
Others have questioned the usefulness of the concept itself.  Marc DuBois of MSF, for 
example, argues that the ‘obsession with protection’ has become a ‘sort of self-flagellation in 
the humanitarian community over the death and destruction of our beneficiaries.’136  Claims 
by humanitarians that they can ‘develop truly practical programming that protects people 
from all forms of violation, exploitation, and abuse during war and disaster’  amount to 
‘delusions of grandeur’, since it is ‘not the lack of protection activities or legal protections in 
the first instance, but the surplus of violence that is the primary problem’.137  He concluded 
that ‘the protection of civilians during periods of violent crisis (in the sense of providing 
physical safety) is not our job’.138  His MSF colleague Bouchet-Saulnier, by contrast, argues 
that: 
 
Protecting means recognizing that individuals have rights and that the authorities who 
exercise power over them have obligations.  It means defending the legal existence of 
individuals, alongside their physical existence.  It means attaching the juridical link 
                                                 
134 Victoria Metcalfe, Protecting civilians? The interaction between international military and 
humanitarian actors, HPG Working Paper, London: Overseas Development Institute, August 2012.  
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135 Sorcha O’Callaghan and Sara Pantuliano, Protective action: incorporating civilian protection into 
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of responsibility to the chain of assistance measures that guarantee the survival of 
individuals . . . When providing relief in times of conflict, humanitarian organizations 
therefore must not separate the provision of assistance from protection.139 
 
A position paper by CARE International, in 2006, seems to straddle both positions.  It stated 
that: ‘Agency staff must know the basics of human rights law and IHL.  Staff must know who 
is protected, and the threats from which they are protected.’140  The advice on what staff 
should do when they see violations, however, is fatally ambiguous:   
 
Sometimes speaking out publicly is necessary . . . The questions for an organization 
like CARE, however, is to establish thresholds for speaking out, since it will lead to 
obvious organizational and personal risks. Over time, we have gained some 
experience with establishing these thresholds (basically we feel obligated to speak 
out until such a time as a Country Director determines that speaking out will 
endanger staff or other program commitments).141   
 
A study, in relation to Darfur, the following year similarly noted that: ‘Advocacy by 
operational aid actors is frequently juxtaposed with programming, with speaking out weighed 
against potential costs to programmes, staff and beneficiaries.’142  The implication of this 
position, that agencies might need to stop denouncing violations once they reach a certain 
level of severity, was graphically highlighted by the experiences of those working in Sri 
Lanka, at the end of its long-running civil war, in the spring of 2009.143  There was no UN 
                                                 
139 Bouchet-Saulnier, Francoise, The practical guide to humanitarian law, Maryland/ Oxford: MSF and 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2002, p.308.   
140 Dan Maxwell, Humanitarian Protection:  Recommendations towards Good Practice for Non-
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peacekeeping mission in the country, but there was a UN Country Team and a substantial 
number of UN and NGO humanitarian agencies, most of which failed to speak out publicly 
while government forces killed somewhere between 40,000 and 70,000 people – most of 
them civilians – in the closing months of the conflict.144  A UN appointed panel noted that the 
Organization ‘did not adequately invoke principles of human rights that are the foundation of 
the UN but appeared instead to do what was necessary to avoid confrontation with the 
government.’145  Some UN agencies even cooperated in the construction of ‘closed camps’ 
into which the survivors were herded for screening.146  As the UN report noted: 
 
civilians emerging from the conflict zone were severely malnourished, traumatized, 
exhausted, and often seriously injured. The security forces, attempting to identify 
LTTE [Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam] cadres, screened everyone and detained 
280,000 people in military-run closed internment camps – which the Government 
referred to as ‘welfare villages’. In the camps, IDPs were screened again and the 
military detained those suspected of LTTE affiliations in ‘surrender’ camps. There 
were persistent allegations of human rights violations at the screening points and in 
IDP camps but the UN was not permitted fully independent protection monitoring 
access. . .  UN officials said they were confronted with a dilemma over whether to 
hold back and insist on respect for principles or to provide urgently needed assistance 
                                                 
A/HRC/25/L.1/Rev.1, 26 March 2014, para 2.  The latter resolution called on the Sri Lankan 
government ‘to conduct an independent and credible investigation into allegations of violations of 
international human rights law and international humanitarian law, as applicable; to hold accountable 
those responsible for such violations; to end continuing incidents of human rights violations and abuses 
in Sri Lanka and to implement the recommendations made in the reports of the Office of the High 
Commissioner.’ 
144 Ibid.  The author of this thesis was also working in Sri Lanka between February and April 2009 and 
witnessed the strong campaign of harassment and threats by the Sri Lankan authorities during this 
period.  One senior national staff member of the organization that he was working for was detained 
without trial on security grounds.  Another was shot dead while working in the conflict zone.  See 
Conor Foley, Guardian, ‘Dire times in Sri Lanka’s war zone’, 19 March 2009; Conor Foley, Guardian, 
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through camps that were operating in violation of international standards. The UN 
chose to support the camps.147 
 
An internal review of the performance of the UN’s performance in Sri Lanka subsequently 
concluded that there had been a ‘systemic failure’ to protect the civilian population.148  In 
November 2013, the UN launched Human Rights Up Front (HRUF), based on lessons learnt 
from this experience to ‘place the protection of human rights and of people at the heart of UN 
strategies and operational activities’.149  The initiative states that ‘human rights and the 
protection of civilians’ should be seen as a ‘system-wide core responsibility’ and that the UN 
should ‘take a principled stance’ and ‘act with moral courage to prevent serious and large-
scale violations.’ 150  
 
The review of protection in humanitarian action in 2015 noted that HRUF is still ‘widely seen 
as a UN headquarters agenda’ and there is little knowledge or buy-in to it in the field. 151  It 
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also stated that the ‘all-encompassing nature of the formal definition [of protection] fuels 
confusion’, which ‘can give rise to unhelpful illusions that anything and everything can be 
deemed to be protective . . .  [this] works against sound needs assessments, strategic 
prioritisation, coordination and the ability to monitor and evaluate programme 
implementation including outcomes.’152  The report argued that the ‘rhetoric’ and ‘confusion’ 
about what the term ‘protection’ actually means had ‘created major expectations among all 
stakeholders, including, importantly, at-risk groups.’  
 
From the Tamils besieged on Mullaitivu beach in 2009, to Haitians trapped under 
fallen masonry after the 2010 earthquake, to the South Sudanese who fled to the 
bases of the UN Mission in South Sudan when hostilities erupted in December 2013, 
or the Yazidis stranded on a barren mountain top in Iraq in August 2014, there is 
evidence of the increasing expectation that those facing imminent risks will be 
rescued.153 
 
Such an expectation is not in fact unreasonable for a UN peacekeeping mission with a POC 
mandate, which should be required to take measures within the scope of its powers that, 
judged reasonably, might be expected to provide such protection.  As will be discussed in 
Chapter Seven of this thesis the UN has defended civilians sheltering in its bases in South 
Sudan.  Protection in this sense may include the use of force and so missions need to be clear 
about the applicable legal framework governing such actions and this will be briefly 
discussed in the final section of this chapter.  Humanitarians may also decide to ‘bear 
witness’ to such violations or decide that the ‘humanitarian imperative’ requires them to 
remain silent.  As the following section of this chapter shows, there is a clear right of 
humanitarian access in international law, but this is contingent on the observance of 
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humanitarian principles such as neutrality, which is quite clearly different from a Three Tier 
POC strategy.  
 
The right of humanitarian access  
 
The right of humanitarian access is firmly established in IHL and international human rights 
law.  The Geneva Conventions and both Additional Protocols prohibit the use of starvation as 
a weapon of war against civilian populations.154  Attacks on objects indispensable to the 
survival of the civilian population are prohibited.155  If the civilian population of a territory, 
that is either occupied or otherwise under the control of a party to the conflict, is not 
adequately provided with food, medical attention and other necessary materials the party 
must agree to allow the free passage of relief supplies which are purely for humanitarian 
purposes.156  Humanitarian organizations have the right to offer their assistance to parties to a 
conflict, without this being construed as an unfriendly act.157  States must also not interpret 
the Conventions in such a way as to create obstacles to genuine humanitarian activity.158   
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The ICRC’s right of ‘humanitarian access’ in international armed conflicts is explicitly 
acknowledged.159  Its core functions include working to ‘provide humanitarian help for 
people affected by conflict and armed violence and to promote the laws that protect the 
victims of war’.160  This includes visiting prisoners of war and civilian internees in 
international conflicts as well as carrying out independent humanitarian evaluations on the 
situation and needs of people in occupied territory.161  The use of the phrase ‘such as’ in the 
Geneva Conventions162 shows that the ICRC is not the only agency whose humanitarian 
mandate may be recognized and this was also recognised by the ICJ’s ruling in Nicaragua.163   
 
The IHL treaty provisions relating to the delivery of humanitarian assistance in a non-
international armed conflict are much weaker.164  Additional Protocol II states that starving 
civilians as a method of combat is prohibited165 and recognizes the right of humanitarian 
initiative,166 but it also emphatically restates the prohibition on interference in a State’s 
internal affairs.167  All relief activity is ‘subject to the consent of the High Contracting Party 
concerned’168 and can only take place ‘whenever circumstances permit’.169  In its study on 
customary IHL,  however, the ICRC has stated that:  
 
The fact that consent is required does not mean that the decision is left to the 
discretion of the parties. If the survival of the population is threatened and a 
humanitarian organization fulfilling the required conditions of impartiality and non-
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discrimination is able to remedy this situation, relief actions must take place . . . The 
authorities responsible for safeguarding the population in the whole of the territory of 
the State cannot refuse such relief without good grounds . . . as the population would 
be left deliberately to die of hunger without any measure being taken.170   
 
A report by the UN Secretary General in 1998 also noted that a right of humanitarian access 
should be regarded as ‘an essential subsidiary or ancillary right that gives meaning and effect 
to the core rights of protection and assistance.’ 171  Such access should ‘not be regarded as 
interference in the armed conflict or as an unfriendly act so long as it is undertaken in an 
impartial and non-coercive manner.’172  The ICJ has also affirmed the applicability of 
economic, social and cultural rights obligations in a situation to which IHL is applicable.173  
The ICESCR does not contain an individual petition mechanism and so individuals may not 
complain to it directly, but the Committee that oversees it has made a number of General 
Comments, suggesting a ‘right to humanitarian assistance’ can be read into its provisions.174  
It has, for example, affirmed that States have a core obligation to address survival 
requirements of their populations including water and ‘essential foodstuffs’ and must 
demonstrate that they have made a maximum effort to use all the resources at their disposal to 
ensure that these minimum needs are met.175  It has also stated that ‘the prevention of access 
to humanitarian food aid in internal conflicts or other emergency situations’ is ‘necessarily a 
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violation’ of the right to adequate food.’176  In its General Comment on the right to health the 
Committee has stated that: 
 
States parties have a joint and individual responsibility, in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations and relevant resolutions of the United Nations General 
Assembly and of the World Health Assembly, to cooperate in providing disaster 
relief and humanitarian assistance in times of emergency, including assistance to 
refugees and internally displaced persons.177 
 
The text of the ICECSR makes clear that State parties are required ‘to take steps, individually 
and through international assistance and co-operation . . . with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization of the rights.’178  This suggests that while there is an 
immediate obligation on States to provide access to international humanitarian assistance, if 
this is the only way of alleviating widespread suffering, the actual obligation to provide the 
assistance itself is a progressive one that requires States to work together over time for its 
realization.179  The physical delivery of aid may also require the exercise of rights such as 
freedom of movement,180 freedom of expression,181 freedom of assembly,182 and the right to 
privacy and private property.183  It can, therefore, be argued that preventing a humanitarian 
aid organization from delivering aid, by placing unjustified restrictions on its activities 
                                                 
176 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 12, The Right to Adequate 
Food, 6, UN Doc E/C.12/1999/5, para 19 
177 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 14, The Right to Highest 
Attainable Standard of Health, 43(b)-(c), UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (2000), para 38. 
178 ICESCR, Article 2. 
179 Rohan Hardcastle and Adrian Chua, ‘Humanitarian Assistance: towards a right of access to victims 
of natural disasters’ International Review of Red Cross and Red Crescent, December 1998  ICRC 
publication No. 325, pp.589-609. 
180 Article 13 of the UDHR; Article 12 of the ICCPR; Protocol 4, Article 2 of the ECHR; Article 22 of 
the ACHR; Article 12 of the African Charter.   
181 Articles 18 and 19 of the UDHR; Articles 18 and 19 of the ICCPR; Articles 9 and 10 of the ECHR; 
Articles 12 and 13 of the ACHR; Articles 8 and 9 of the African Charter.   
182 Article 20 of the UDHR; Article 22 of the ICCPR; Article 11of the ECHR; Article 15 of the ACHR; 
Article 11 of the African Charter.   
183 Articles 12 (privacy); and 17 (private property) of the UDHR; Article 17 of the ICCPR (privacy); 
Article 8 (private and family life) and Protocol 1, Article 1 (private property) of the ECHR; Articles 11 
(privacy) and 21 (private property) of the ACHR; Article 14 (property) of the African Charter   
154 
 
 
amounts to a violation of more fundamental rights such as the rights to life and physical 
integrity of the affected population. 
 
From the start of the 1990s the Security Council has also passed a number of resolutions 
demanding unimpeded access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need 
of assistance.184 A series of UN General Assembly resolutions have expressed similar 
views.185  This has led to a growing body of resolutions on the importance of ensuring that 
access to such assistance is not arbitrarily prevented.186  For example, Security Council 
resolution 1502 after the attack on the UN headquarters in Baghdad in 2003 urged ‘all those 
concerned to allow full unimpeded access by humanitarian personnel to all people in need of 
assistance, and to make available, as far as possible, all necessary facilities for their 
operations’.187   
 
                                                 
184 See for example, UN Security Council Resolution 794 (1992), preamble in relation to Somalia; UN 
Security Council Resolution 770, of 13 August 1992 and UN Security Council Resolution 836 of June 
1993, paras 5 and 9  in relation to Bosnia-Herzegovina; Resolution 1216 of 21 December 1998 on the 
crisis in Guinea-Bissau; UN Security Council Resolution 1265 (1999); Security Council Resolution 
1296 of 19 April 2000; and Security Council Resolution 1674 of 28 April 2006; Security Council 
Resolution 1738 of 23 December 2006, all of which were adopted under the thematic heading of 
Protection of Civilians; and UNSC Resolution 1502 adopted on 26 August 2003, para 6, in relation to 
Iraq. 
185  See for example, UN General Assembly Resolutions  A/RES/49/139 (1994); A/RES/51/194 
(1996); A/RES/54/233 (1999); A/RES/58/114 (2003); A/RES/59/141(2004); A/RES/60/124 (2005); 
A/RES/61/134 (2006); A/RES/62/94 (2007); A/RES/63/141 (2008); A/RES/63/139 (2008); 
A/RES/63/138 (2008); A/RES/63/137 (2008); and A/RES/63/136 (2008).  Some of these were generic 
concerning the strengthening of coordination of coordination of humanitarian assistance or protection 
of humanitarian personnel, while others concerned specific country situations.  For example, UN 
General Assembly Resolution 63/139, paras 25 and 26, on Strengthening of the coordination of 
emergency  humanitarian assistance of the United Nations, passed in 2008 ‘calls upon all States and 
parties in complex humanitarian emergencies, in particular in armed conflict and in post-conflict 
situations, in countries in which humanitarian personnel are operating, in conformity with the relevant 
provisions of international law and national laws, to cooperate fully with the United Nations and other 
humanitarian agencies and organizations and to ensure the safe and unhindered access of humanitarian 
personnel, as well as delivery of supplies and equipment, in order to allow them to efficiently perform 
their task of assisting affected civilian populations, including refugees and internally displaced 
persons’.  It also designates 19 August as World Humanitarian Day in memory of the UN staff killed 
in the bombing of Baghdad in 2003. 
186 Compilation of United Nations Resolutions on Humanitarian Assistance: Selected resolutions of the 
General Assembly, Economic and Social Council and Security Council Resolutions and Decisions, 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Policy Development and Studies Branch, Policy 
and Studies Series, (OCHA) 2009.   
187 Security Council Resolution 1502 of 26 August 2003, para 6. 
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In 2011, the UN Security Council authorizing military intervention in Libya also demanded 
‘that the Libyan authorities comply with their obligations under international law, including 
international humanitarian law, human rights and refugee law and take all measures to protect 
civilians and meet their basic needs, and to ensure the rapid and unimpeded passage of 
humanitarian assistance’188 In August 2014, it condemned violence and intimidation against 
those involved in humanitarian operations in Syria, urged States to ensure accountability for 
crimes against humanitarian workers and asked the Secretary General to include information 
on the safety and security of humanitarian workers in his reports on country-specific 
situations.189  The fact resolutions usually demand access not only from the respective 
governments, but from ‘all parties concerned’, reflects a growing acceptance that non-state 
actors are obliged under customary international law to grant access for humanitarian 
assistance.190  The first DPKO concept note on POC in 2009 also lists ‘creating conditions 
conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance’ as a POC task and states that:  
 
The provision of humanitarian assistance to conflict affected civilians has long been 
viewed by the humanitarian community as at the core of protection activity. Missions 
may be called upon to help create the necessary safe and secure environment to assist 
with the delivery of aid, and, in extremis, may be requested to support the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance by military means.191 
 
Clearly, though, as the ICJ’s ruled in Nicaragua, only organizations that accept humanitarian 
principles – such as neutrality – have a right of humanitarian access and the delivery of 
assistance itself should take place on a purely needs-based criterion.192   As discussed above, 
                                                 
188 Security Council Resolution 1973, of 17 March 2011, para 3. 
189 Security Council Resolution 2175, of 29 August 2014. 
190 Gregor Schotten and Anke Biehler, ‘The Role of the UN Security Council in Implementing 
International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law’, in Roberta Arnold & Noelle Quénivet (eds) 
International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, Leiden and Boston: Martin Nijhof, 2008. 
191 Draft DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations, 2009, para 13.   
192 ICJ Reports 1986, para 242. 
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while some ‘protection monitoring and advocacy’ activities carried out by humanitarian 
agencies might overlap with the POC tasks of a UN mission there are good grounds for also 
distinguishing between them.  Guidance from DPKO in 2015 also stresses that: 
‘Humanitarian actors rely upon their neutrality, impartiality and operational independence 
(the “humanitarian principles”) for their acceptance by all actors and thus their security and 
ability to access those in need to deliver assistance. Consequently, maintaining a clear 
distinction between the role and function of humanitarian actors from that of political and 
military actors, particularly in conflict and post-conflict settings, is a key factor in creating an 
operating environment in which humanitarian organisations can discharge their mandate 
effectively and safely.’193 
 
The rest of this chapter will briefly discuss the legal framework that UN missions consider 
themselves to be subject to when using force for protective purposes and the particular 
provisions relating this will be discussed in more detail in Part II of this thesis. 
 
Rules of engagement, IHL and international human rights law 
 
In 1999 a UN Secretary General’s Bulletin stated that: ‘The fundamental principles of 
international humanitarian law are applicable to UN forces when in situations of armed 
conflict they are actively engaged therein as combatants, to the extent and for the duration of 
their engagement.  They are accordingly applicable in enforcement actions or in 
peacekeeping operations when the use of force is permitted in self-defence.’194 [emphasis 
added]  This was confirmed by the Capstone Doctrine in 2008, which stated that UN 
                                                 
193 Policy on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping, Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations / Department of Field Support, Ref. 2015.07, 1 April 2015, p.7. 
194 UN Secretary General, UN Secretary General’s Bulletin, Observance by UN Forces of 
International Humanitarian Law, ST/SGB/1999/13, 6 August 1999.  
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peacekeepers ‘must have a clear understanding of the principles and rules of international 
humanitarian law and observe them in situations where they apply.’195  
 
Some argue that because UN mandated multinational forces are operating on behalf of the 
international community as a whole and bound by ‘peacekeeping principles’, they could 
never be considered a party to an armed conflict.  Kouchner, for example, stated, as French 
Foreign Minister in 2008, that France was not engaged in armed conﬂict in Afghanistan, 
because its troops were operating under a UN Security Council resolution.196  Norway’s 
Prime Minister similarly stated that Norwegian soldiers participating in NATO operations in 
Libya, in 2011, could not be considered legitimate targets because they were on a UN 
mandated mission.197  A Canadian court ruled, in 1996, that a soldier accused of aiding and 
abetting the torturing to death of a Somali boy had no legal obligation to ensure the safety of 
his prisoner because IHL did not apply to a peacekeeping mission.198  A Belgian military 
court similarly concluded that IHL did not apply to its UN soldiers in both Somalia and 
Rwanda.199   
 
The ICRC has, however, consistently maintained that IHL can be applicable to all UN 
peacekeeping forces and has urged UN member states to ‘use their influence’ to ensure its 
provisions are applied.200  During the Korean War, for example, in which troops under UN 
                                                 
195 Capstone Doctrine 2008, p. 15. 
196 Tristan Ferraro, ‘The applicability and application of international humanitarian law to 
multinational forces’, International Review of the Red Cross, Volume 95 Number 891/892 
Autumn/Winter 2013, pp.560-612. 
197 Ibid. 
198 Her Majesty the Queen v. Private DJ Brocklebank, Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada, Court 
File NO. CMAC-383; 2 April 1996. 
199 Judgment of the Belgian Military Court regarding violations of IHL committed in Somalia and 
Rwanda Nr 54 AR 1997, 20 November 1997, published in Journal des Tribunaux, 4 April 1998, p.286. 
For further discussion see Ray Murphy, UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia and Kosovo: 
Operational and Legal Issues, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007 p.274.   
200 See International Committee of the Red Cross, Statement made in the Fourth Committee, UN 
General Assembly, New York: ICRC, 31 October 2013.  ‘The applicability of IHL to UN forces, just 
as to any other forces, is determined solely by the circumstances prevailing on the ground and by 
specific legal conditions stemming from the relevant provisions of IHL, irrespective of the 
international mandate assigned to the forces by the Security Council. 
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command were engaged in active combat, their commander agreed to abide by the 
humanitarian provisions of the Geneva Conventions following lobbying by the ICRC.201  The 
ICRC has also noted that while ‘the mandate and legitimacy of a UN mission’ are issues 
which fall within the scope of the UN Charter, these ‘have no bearing on the applicability of 
IHL to peacekeeping operations’.202  It is also a well-recognised principle of IHL that the 
determination of whether or not an armed conflict exists, and who is a party to it, is based is 
solely on an analysis of the facts on the ground and not to the subjective views of the parties 
themselves.203   There is, therefore, now widespread – although not universal – acceptance 
that IHL does apply to situations in which UN forces are fighting as combatants.204   
The applicability of IHL to UN peacekeeping missions, which are not party to a conflict, 
however, is more complex.  In 1961 the ICRC reminded governments providing contingents 
to the UN Force in the Congo (ONUC) of their positive obligations under IHL.205  In 1993 it 
expressed concern that the UN had not issued a formal statement on the applicability of IHL 
                                                 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/2013/united-nations-peacekeeping-2013-10-
31.htm, accessed 5 May 2015.   
201 See, for example, Zwanenburg, Marten, ‘United Nations and International Humanitarian Law,’ in 
Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, 
http://www.grotiuscentre.org/page11731058.aspx, accessed 24 March 2015.  For an overview of this 
debate, see Daphna Shraga and Ralph Zacklin, ‘The Applicability of International Humanitarian Law 
to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Conceptual, Legal and Practical Issues’, Report to the 
Symposium on Humanitarian Action and Peacekeeping Operations, 22–24 June 1994, ICRC, Geneva, 
2004, pp. 39–48.  These describe the debate about the various positions without endorsing this 
particular argument. 
202 ICRC, Statement made in the Fourth Committee, UN General Assembly, 31 October 2013. 
203 ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Boškovski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber II), 10 July 
2008, para. 174; ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96–3-T, Judgment (Trial 
Chamber I), 6 December 1999, para. 92; ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Limaj et al., Case No. IT-03–66-T, 
Judgment (Trial Chamber II), 30 November 2005, para. 90.  See also Jean Pictet, Commentary on the 
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in 
the Field, ICRC, Geneva, 1952, p. 32: ‘any difference arising between two States and leading to the 
intervention of armed forces is an armed conflict within the meaning of Article 2, even if one of the 
Parties denies the existence of a state of war. It makes no difference how long the conflict lasts, or how 
much slaughter takes place.’ For a summary see How is the Term "Armed Conflict" Defined in 
International Humanitarian Law?, Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Opinion 
Paper, March 2008. 
204 For discussion see Jeremie Labbe and Arthur Boutellis, ‘Peace operations by proxy: implications 
for humanitarian action of UN peacekeeping partnerships with non-UN security forces’, International 
Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 95 No. 891/892 Autumn/Winter 2013, pp.539-60; Umesh Palwankar, 
‘Applicability of international humanitarian law to United Nations peacekeeping force’, International 
Review of the Red Cross, No. 294, 30 June 1993 and Daphna Shraga, ‘The Secretary-General’s 
Bulletin on the Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law: a decade 
later’, Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, Vol. 39, 2009, p. 357.   
205 Umesh Palwankar, ‘Applicability of international humanitarian law to United Nations peacekeeping 
force’, International Review of the Red Cross, No. 294, 30 June 1993.  
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rules to its forces in Yugoslavia and Cambodia.206  It also criticized the ‘ad hoc’ application 
of IHL to UN operations in Somalia and Haiti in the 1990s.207   
 
In 1972 the UN Secretariat had stated that it was ‘not substantively in a position to become a 
party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which contain many obligations that can only be 
discharged by the exercise of administrative and judicial powers’.208  Clauses stating that the 
UN forces ‘shall observe the principles and spirit of the general international conventions 
applicable to the conduct of military personnel’ were, however, included in the regulations 
for the UN Emergency Force in the Middle East (UNEF),209 the UN Mission in the Congo 
(ONUC)210 and the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).211  Similar clauses, 
which specifically refer to the four Geneva Conventions and two Additional Protocols, were 
included in the model agreements between the UN and mission hosting and personnel 
contributing States in 1990 and 1991.212   
 
A report of the United Nations Secretary General in 1996 stated that: ‘The applicability of 
international humanitarian law to United Nations forces when they are engaged as 
combatants in situations of armed conflict entails the international responsibility of the 
Organization and its liability in compensation for violations of international humanitarian law 
                                                 
206 Ibid. 
207 Michael H. Hoffman, ‘Peace-enforcement actions and humanitarian law: emerging rules 
interventional armed conflict’, International Review of the Red Cross, No. 837, 31 March 2000. 
208 Marten Zwanenburg, Accountability Of Peace Support Operations, The Hague/London/Boston: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2005, p.164.  See also Marten Zwanenburg, ‘International humanitarian law 
interoperability in multinational operations’, International Review of the Red Cross, No.891/892, 31 
December 2013, pp.681-705. 
209 Regulations for the United Nations Emergency Force, ST/SGB/UNEF/1, 20 February 1957, 
Regulation 44. 
210 Regulations for the United Nations Force in the Congo, ST/SGB/ONUC/1, 15 July 1963, 
Regulation 43. 
211 Regulations for the United Nations Force in Cyprus, ST/SGB/UNFICYP/1 25 April 1964, 
Regulation 40. 
212 Model Agreement between the United Nations and Member States Contributing Personnel and 
Equipment to United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations: Report of the Secretary-General, 23 May 
1991, (A/46/185) para. 28; Report of the Secretary General on the Model Status of Forces Agreement 
for Peacekeeping Operations, UN Doc. A/45/594, 9 October 1990, Annex 1, Paragraph 12. 
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committed by members of United Nations forces.’213 [emphasis added]  The UN Safety 
Convention of 1994,214 which makes it a crime under international law to attack UN staff and 
associated personnel, specifies that this is in all cases except when they ‘are engaged as 
combatants against organized armed forces and to which the law of international armed 
conflict applies’.215   
 
While it is clear from the Secretary General’s 1999 Bulletin that IHL will be applicable to 
UN peacekeeping missions with POC mandates, it is not clear whether this means that its 
peacekeeping soldiers have civilian or military status.  Since UN peacekeepers will not 
generally be engaged in an armed conflict as combatants, their legal status under IHL would 
seem to be that of civilians.216 As such they are protected from attack except when taking a 
direct part in hostilities.217  Clearly they lose this protection when engaged in an armed 
conflict as combatants, but it is less clear what their status will be when using force in ‘self-
defence’, which, as previously discussed, is understood to include ‘defence of their 
mandates’.218  For example, during the post-election crisis in Côte d’Ivoire in 2011, the UN 
claimed that its peacekeeping mission (UNOCI) was not a party to the conflict on the same 
                                                 
213 Cited by Keiichiro Okimato, ‘Violations of International Law by United Nations forces and their 
legal consequences’, in Timothy McCormack, Avril McDonald (eds), Yearbook of International 
Humanitarian Law – 2003, The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2006, p.223. 
214 Convention on the Safety of UN and Associated Personnel, New York, 9 December 1994.  
215 Ibid., Article 2. For further discussion of some of the weaknesses of the Convention see Dieter 
Fleck ‘The legal status of personnel involved in United Nations peace operations’, International 
Review of the Red Cross, Volume 95 Number 891/892 Autumn/Winter 2013, pp.613-36.  Very few 
States have ratified this Convention but its main provisions are often referred to in status of forces 
agreements (SOFAs) or status of mission agreements (SOMAs) between the UN and host States. 
216 Rule 33 of the ICRC study on customary international humanitarian law states that: ‘Directing an 
attack against personnel and objects involved in a peacekeeping mission in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians and 
civilian objects under international humanitarian law is prohibited’.  See also Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, Articles 8.2(b) (iii) and 8.2(e) (iii)) which makes it a war crime to attack 
personnel involved in a peace-keeping mission ‘as long as they are entitled to the protection given to 
civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict’. 
217 Common Article 3 to the Four Geneva Conventions.  
218 For further discussion see Alexandre Faite and Jerémie Labbé Grenier, (eds), Report on Expert 
Meeting on Multinational Peace Operations: Applicability of International Humanitarian Law and 
International Human Rights Law on UN mandated forces, Geneva, 11-12 December 2003; Christopher 
Greenwood, ‘Protection of peacekeepers’, 7 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 185 
(1996-1997); Katarina Grenfell, ‘Perspective on the applicability and application of international 
humanitarian law: the UN context’, International Review of the Red Cross, July 2014, pp.645-52. 
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day that its helicopters were firing missiles at the besieged forces of President Gbagbo.219  
Nevertheless, in November 2012, UNOCI soldiers allegedly refused to defend an IDP camp 
from an armed mob on the basis that their RoE did ‘not allow them to open fire if civilians 
are attacking other civilians’, which implies they believed they were operating within an IHL 
paradigm.220  Similar controversy has surrounded the actions of the UN mission in the DRC 
and these will be discussed further in Chapters Six.221 
 
The assumption that IHL will always provide the appropriate legal framework regulating the 
use of force by UN peacekeeping missions is reflected in much of the UN’s existing 
guidance.  A Security Council Resolution in 2009, marking the tenth anniversary of the first 
POC mandate, for example, refers to IHL as constituting ‘the basis for the legal framework 
for the protection of civilians in armed conflict’.222  The UN Infantry Battalion Manual, 
published in 2012, states that the rules of engagement (RoE) of peacekeeping missions: 
 
are governed by the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and relevant 
principles of international law, including the Law of Armed Conflict. Military 
personnel are required to comply with International Law, including the Law of 
Armed Conflict, and to apply the ROE in accordance with those laws.  UN 
peacekeepers are also expected at all times to make a clear distinction between 
civilians and combatants and between civilian objects and military objects. Under 
                                                 
219 Guardian, ‘Ivory Coast: Laurent Gbagbo under siege’, Tuesday 5 April 2011.  See also Secretary 
General Statement, expressing concern over violence in Côte d’Ivoire, informing that the United 
Nations has undertaken military operation to prevent heavy weapons use against civilians, Office of 
the Secretary General 4 April 2011. 
220 Inner-City News, ‘UN Peacekeepers Inaction on IDP Killings in Cote d'Ivoire Due to DPKO 
Rules?’, 23 October 2012.   
221 Security Council Resolution 2098 of  28 March 2013, established the Intervention Brigade, a 
special combat force, as part of MONUSCO, which consisted of three infantry battalions, one artillery 
and one Special force and Reconnaissance company, which was mandated ‘to carry out targeted 
offensive operations . . . to prevent the expansion of all armed groups, neutralise these groups, and to 
disarm them’. 
222 Security Council Resolution 1894 of 11 November 2009, preamble refers to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949, which together with their Additional Protocols constitute the basis for the legal 
framework for the protection of civilians in armed conflict’.  
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International Humanitarian Law, civilians are ‘protected persons’ – they cannot be 
targeted and their life and dignity must be respected.223   
 
There are far fewer references to international human rights law in this manual and these are 
much less specific.  Numerous mission-specific SOFAs have references to IHL, but not to 
international human rights law224 and public statements by senior DPKO staff refer to IHL 
but not international human rights law.225  As previously discussed, however, this appears to 
be changing and guidance from DPKO issued in 2015 now refers to both bodies of law.226 
 
The practical implications of this distinction are considerable.  Holt and Berkman, for 
example, argue for a POC strategy that would seem only to be permissible if the 
peacekeeping force was prepared to become an active party to the conflict:  
 
                                                 
223 United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual Volume I, Department of Peacekeeping Operations/ 
Department of Field Support, August 2012, p.50.  See also p.102 which specifies that: ‘battalion 
commanders need to be aware of and, if needed, inform parties about the political consequences that 
come with specific violations of international humanitarian law (sexual violence, child recruitment, 
attacks on schools and hospitals, killing and maiming of children, etc.)’. 
224 Scott Sheeran, (Research Director), Background Paper Prepared for the Experts’ Workshop, 26 
August 2010, London, UK, Hosted by the New Zealand High Commission, United Nations 
Peacekeeping Law Reform Project, School of Law, University of Essex, 2010, p33.  For example, in 
UNMIS (2004), para 6(a)(b), MONUC(2000), para 6(a)(b), UNMISET (2002), para 6(a) and (b), the 
following provision has appeared: ‘Without prejudice to the mandate of [name of mission] and its 
international status: (a) The United Nations shall ensure that [name of mission] shall conduct its 
operations in the territory with full respect for the principles and rules of the general conventions 
applicable to the conduct of military personnel. These international conventions include the Four 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 and the 
UNESCO Convention of 14 May 1954 on the Protection of Cultural Property in the event of armed 
conflict; (b) The Government undertakes to treat at all times the military personnel of [name of 
mission] with full respect for the principles and rules of the general international conventions 
applicable to the treatment of military personnel. These international conventions include the Four 
Geneva Conventions of 12 April 1949 and their additional Protocols of 8 June 1977.  Less detailed 
references to respecting the ‘principles and spirit’ of IHL can be found in earlier mission SOFAs from 
the 1990s, that predated the UN Secretary General’s 199 Bulletin.  
225 See, for example, ‘Interview with Lieutenant General Babacar Gaye United Nations Military 
Adviser for Peacekeeping Operations’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 95 No. 891/892 
Autumn/Winter 2013, p.490, in which he stated that: ‘It is no longer possible to engage in 
peacekeeping operations without having a clear idea of the body of rules contained in the law of war’. 
226 Policy on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping, Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations / Department of Field Support, Ref. 2015.07, 1 April 2015; and Protection of Civilians: 
Implementing Guidelines for Military Components of United Nations Peacekeeping Missions, 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations / Department of Field Support, February 2015.   
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If a force charged with protection reacts to an attack on civilians after the fact . . . it 
will already have failed in its goal of providing protection . . . success will often 
require taking aggressive action prior to the use of violence. This requirement shifts 
the burden from reacting to a defined state (e.g., an attack) to reacting to a threat for 
which there may not be a clear trigger or definition. It could require direct action 
targeting bad actors or preventing such actors from operating in the first place.227   
 
Kelly similarly maintains that where ‘armed actors’ have ‘demonstrated a determination to 
attack civilians as part of their pattern of operations, the threat they represent to the 
population does not dissipate between specific incidents.’ 228  They, therefore, remain ‘an 
imminent threat until they lack either the intent or capacity to inflict violence against the 
civilian population . . . UN PKOs may use force proactively to address such threats, including 
through offensive operations.229  The UN Infantry Battalion manual contains similar language 
and this guidance is also provided in DPKO’s pre-deployment training to all mission staff.230   
 
A threat of violence against a civilian is considered ‘imminent’ from the time it is 
identified as a threat, until such a time the mission can determine that the threat no 
                                                 
227 Victoria Holt and Tobias Berkman, The Impossible Mandate? Military Preparedness, the 
Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace Operations, The Stimson Center, 2006, p.54. 
228 Max Kelly, Protecting Civilians, Proposed Principles for Military Operations, Washington 
DC: Stimson Center, May 2010, pp.40-1.  He states that this was: ‘First explicitly elaborated by 
the Eastern Division Headquarters of MONUC in 2005, the approach has also been applied in 
other UN PKOs, notably MINUSTAH.’  The Rules of Engagement (ROE) for the Military 
Component of the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(MONUC): Annex B – Definitions (MPS/0651) (10 February 2009) state the following:  ‘The 
threat of imminent and direct use of force, which is demonstrated through an action or behaviour 
which appears to be preparatory to a hostile act. Only a reasonable belief in the hostile intent is 
required, before the use of force is authorized. Whether or not hostile intent is being demonstrated 
must be judged by the on-scene commander, on the basis of one or a combination of the following 
factors: a. The capability and preparedness of the threat; b. The available evidence which indicates 
an intention to attack; c. Historical precedent within the Mission’s Area of Responsibility.   
229 Ibid. 
230 See ‘UN Tactical Level Protection of Civilians Training Modules’, Peacekeeping Resources Hub, 
http://peacekeepingresourcehub.unlb.org/pbps/Pages/Public/viewdocument.aspx?id=2&docid=1368, 
accessed 10 March 2014. 
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longer exists. Peacekeepers with a POC mandate are authorized to use force in any 
circumstance in which they believe that a threat of violence against civilians exists.231  
 
In October 2014 Lieutenant General Dos Santos Cruz, MONUSCO’s Force Commander, 
stated that UN troops ‘should not wait for armed groups to come and terrorize communities; 
it should not give them freedom of movement’ and the ‘assumption that military action may 
create collateral damage should not prevent us from taking the necessary action.’232  The 
OIOS Protection Evaluation 2014 also welcomed MONUSCO’s ‘targeted offensive 
operations’.233 
 
According to Findlay, writing in 2002, the use of military force by UN peacekeepers ‘is 
subject to certain conditions which have been codified by international law and practice. The 
most significant of these are necessity and proportionality. Force must only be used in self-
defence when absolutely necessary, as a last resort and in proportion to the threat.’234  He 
states, however,  that ‘in an ideal peace operations world . . . all missions involving armed 
military personnel would receive a Chapter VII mandate, [which] should make it explicit that 
the United Nations is obliged to protect civilians at risk of human rights abuses or other forms 
of attack’.   
 
A Chapter VII operation, in contrast to a Chapter VI operation, may therefore be 
authorized to use force beyond self-defence for enforcement purposes. This 
understanding was confirmed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in July 1962 
when it ruled that, while the UN has an inherent capacity to establish, assume 
                                                 
231 United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual Volume I, Department of Peacekeeping Operations/ 
Department of Field Support, August 2012. 
232 UN Security Council debate on UN Peacekeeping Operations, S/PV.727, 9 October 2014, pp.2-3. 
233 OIOS Protection Evaluation 2014, para 28 
234 Findlay, 2002, pp.14 and 16. 
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command over and employ military forces, these may only exercise ‘belligerent 
rights’ when authorized to do so by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII.235  
 
The ICJ Certain Expenses case did not in fact refer either to IHL or ‘belligerent rights’.  The 
sentences on which the above interpretation is based read that: ‘the operations of ONUC did 
not include a use of armed force against a State which the Security Council, under Article 39, 
determined to have committed an act of aggression or to have breached the peace. The armed 
forces which were utilized in the Congo were not authorized to take military action against 
any State. The operation did not involve ‘preventive or enforcement measures’ against any 
State under Chapter VII’.236 [emphasis added]   
 
Given that the original concept of ‘threats to international peace and security’, was primarily 
based on inter-state conflicts, it is understandable why it would be assumed that a Chapter 
VII mandated operation would be conducted against a State within the IHL rules relating to 
international armed conflict.237  For IHL rules to be applicable, in a non-international armed 
conflict, however, first of all there must be a level of organised violence sufficient to 
categorize the situation as an armed conflict and secondly the rules will only be binding on 
recognized parties to that conflict.238  If these two preconditions are not satisfied then IHL 
will not be the applicable legal framework.239   
                                                 
235 Ibid., p.8, citing International Court of Justice, ‘Certain expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, 
para. 1), Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962’, ICJ Reports 1962. 
236 Ibid., p.177.   
237 Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, which sets out the IHL rules applying to non-
international armed conflict, was not negotiated until several years later.  
238 Tadic, IT-94-1-T, Decision of 2 October 1995, para 70.  See also How is the Term “Armed 
Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law?, Geneva: International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) Opinion Paper, March 2008.  This notes that: International humanitarian law 
distinguishes two types of armed conflicts, namely: international armed conflicts, opposing two or 
more States, and non-international armed conflicts, between governmental forces and 
nongovernmental armed groups, or between such groups only. IHL treaty law also establishes a 
distinction between non-international armed conflicts in the meaning of common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and non-international armed conflicts falling within the definition 
provided in Art. 1 of Additional Protocol II.  Legally speaking, no other type of armed conflict exists.’ 
239 For further discussion see Noam Lubell, Extraterritorial Use of Force Against Non-State Actors, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp.105-11. 
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There have been cases where UN-mandated forces have very clearly become parties to a 
conflict,240 but, as will be discussed in Chapter Six, the situation has been more ambiguous or 
disputed in others.241  Chesterman has noted, in a report for DPKO, that the UN has often 
been ‘confronted with situations of internal armed conflict that were in significant part 
policing rather than military problems.’242  The UN Infantry Battalion manual also notes that: 
‘The tasks of the UN military components have become increasingly complex because 
conflicts in which they intervene no longer involve national military forces alone but irregular 
forces, guerrilla factions and even armed criminal gangs.’243   
 
The High Level Panel Report on Peace Operations of 2015 concluded that: ‘UN 
peacekeeping missions, due to their composition and character, are not suited to engage in 
military counter-terrorism operations.   They lack the specific equipment, intelligence, 
logistics, capabilities and specialized military preparation required, among other aspects.’244  
The report also noted that  it was ‘the prerogative of the Security Council to authorize UN 
peacekeeping operations to undertake enforcement tasks, including targeted offensive 
operations, and that it has done so in the past as in Somalia in 1993 and in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo in 2013.’245  It urged ‘extreme caution’ about such operations, 
however, as these involved ‘a shift from tactical decisions around the proactive and pre-
emptive use force to protect civilians and UN personnel from threats, to a fundamentally 
different type of posture that uses offensive force to degrade, neutralize or defeat an 
                                                 
240 The Korean war of 1950 and the first Gulf war of 1991 are the most often cited examples. 
241 For discussion see Christine Gray, Use of Force in International Law, Third Edition, Oxford: 
Oxford, University Press, 2008, pp. 281-302 and 327-66. 
242 Simon Chesterman, The use of force in UN peace operations, External study for the Department of 
Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, New York: DPKO, 2003, p.2.  He also states that ‘the absence of a 
deployable civilian police capacity led to a reliance on the military to undertake responsibility for 
emergency law and order, but this reliance has often been implicit rather than explicit.’ 
243 United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual Volume I, Department of Peacekeeping Operations/ 
Department of Field Support, August 2012, p.57. 
244 High Level Panel Report on Peace Operations of 2015, para 116. 
245 Ibid., para 118.  It further stated that: ‘Such operations should be undertaken by the host 
government or by a capable regional force or an ad hoc coalition authorized by the Security Council.’ 
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opponent.’246  It noted that such operations must be conducted in ‘full respect’ of IHL, but 
that these could also ‘make the UN forces, and the mission as a whole, a party to the conflict 
and require attention to the humanitarian and other consequences that invariably flow from 
the sustained use of force.’247  In his response to the report the UN Secretary General noted 
that: ‘a United Nations peace operation is not designed or equipped to impose political 
solutions through sustained use of force. It does not pursue military victory.’248 
 
If the conduct of UN peacekeeping operations is not governed by IHL then it would seem, 
prime facie, that the appropriate legal framework governing the use of force would be 
international human rights law as it is employed in the context of law enforcement 
operations.249  As will be discussed further in Chapter Four of this thesis, there may also be 
occasion when the two bodies of law are concurrently applicable and, since international 
human rights law can be applied extraterritorially, it could impose obligations on military 
forces deployed in other countries.   
 
The extent to which the UN considers its operations to be bound by these provisions, 
however, is much less clear and this will be discussed further in Chapter Five.250  The first 
UN Security Council resolution on POC ‘requested the Secretary-General to ensure that 
United Nations personnel involved in peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building 
activities . . . [received] appropriate training in international humanitarian, human rights and 
                                                 
246 Ibid., paras 118-9. 
247 Ibid. 
248 The future of United Nations peace operations: implementation of the recommendations of the 
High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, Report of the Secretary-General, A/70/357–
S/2015/682, 2 September 2015, para 15. 
249 See, for example, Lubell, 2010, p.236.  ‘If . . . . measures are occurring outside the context of an 
armed conflict then the regulation of forcible measures must be in accordance with their interpretation 
in human rights law and the rules of law enforcement.’ 
250 Frederic Megret & Florian Hoffman, ‘The UN as a Human Rights Violator? Some Reflections on 
the UN’s Changing Human Rights Responsibilities’ (2003) 25(2) Human Rights Quarterly pp. 314–
334.  These suggest there are three different ways in which the UN could be bound by human rights 
obligations: through customary law (an external conception), by its obligation under the Charter to 
promote human rights (an internal conception) and by virtue of its members own human rights 
commitments (a hybrid conception).   
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refugee law.’251  The Capstone Doctrine also refers to human rights as ‘an integral part of the 
normative framework of peace operations’ and asserts that peacekeeping operations ‘should 
be conducted in full respect of human rights’ that UN personnel ‘should act in accordance 
with international human rights law’ and ‘should strive to ensure that they do not become 
perpetrators of human rights abuses’.  Those that commit abuses ‘should be held 
accountable’252 [emphasis added].  All new personnel who participate in a UN peacekeeping 
mission are supposed to receive a short brochure ‘We are United Nations Peacekeepers’, 
which informs them of their obligation to comply with ‘the applicable portions of the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights’.253  The text is also annexed to the model 
Memorandum of Understanding between the UN and personnel contributing States, which 
specifies that all members of national contingents must comply with UN standards of 
conduct.254 
 
These general statements, however, fail to clarify the different legal regimes governing the 
use of lethal force, arrest and detention powers, and the negative and positive obligations of 
international human rights law and IHL respectively, which will be discussed more fully in 
Chapter Four.  The European Union (EU), by contrast, has stated that: ‘When IHL does not 
apply, the EU primarily looks towards human rights law as the appropriate standard for the 
conduct of EU military operations (furthermore, human rights may be relevant when IHL 
does apply as both regimes may apply concurrently).255  The ICRC has also stressed that 
when UN troops perform law enforcement tasks they must abide by international human 
                                                 
251  UN Security Council Resolution 1265 of 17 September 1999, para 14. 
252 Capstone Doctrine 2008, p.60. 
253 UN Peacekeeping Homepage, We are United Nations Peacekeepers, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/un_in.pdf, accessed 6 March 2013 and 31 July 2015. 
254 Letter dated 22 February 2008 from the Chairman of the 2008 Working Group on Contingent-
Owned Equipment to the Chairman of the Fifth Committee, 29 January 29, 2009, (A/C.5/63/18) 
Chapter 9, Article 7 bis, p. 165. 
255 Frederik Naert ‘Observance of international humanitarian law by forces under the command of the 
European Union’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 95 No. 891/892 Autumn/Winter 2013, 
pp.639-40.   
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rights law.256  Security Council resolutions have also called on some UN-authorized 
operations, such as the missions in Somalia and Mali, to comply with international human 
rights law,257 although there is no such requirement on other operations, including the four 
case-study missions that will be discussed in Part III of this thesis.   
 
In April 2015 new DPKO guidance on POC specified that: ‘When using force peacekeeping 
operations must abide by customary international law, including international human rights 
and humanitarian law, where applicable. They must also abide by the mission-specific 
military rules of engagement (ROE) and the police Directive on the Use of Force (DUF), 
including the principles of distinction between civilians and combatants, proportionality, the 
minimum use of force and the requirement to avoid and, in any event, minimize collateral 
damage.’258 As was discussed in the previous chapter, on the two occasions in which the UN 
established administrations with executive powers over their respective territories,259 the 
regulations establishing the applicable law explicitly included references to international 
                                                 
256 See International Committee of the Red Cross, Statement made in the Fourth Committee, UN 
General Assembly, New York: ICRC, 31 October 2013.  ‘UN peacekeepers – troops and police alike – 
may well have to perform law enforcement tasks in the course of their mission. The ICRC considers it 
important that UN personnel involved in law enforcement operations are fully aware of and adhere 
scrupulously to the rules and standards applicable to these situations, in particular human rights law’, 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/2013/united-nations-peacekeeping-2013-10-
31.htm, accessed 5 May 205. 
257 See, for example, Security Council Resolution 2100 of 25 April 2013, para 24.  ‘Reiterates that the 
transitional authorities of Mali have primary responsibility to protect civilians in Mali, further recalls 
its resolutions 1265 (1999), 1296 (2000), 1674 (2006), 1738 (2006) and 1894 (2009) on the protection 
of S/RES/2039 (2012) 10 12-24771 civilians in armed conflict, its resolutions 1612 (2005), 1882 
(2009), 1998 (2011) and 2068 (2012) on Children And Armed Conflict and its resolutions 1325 
(2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), and 1960 (2010) on Women, Peace and Security and 
calls upon MINUSMA and all military forces in Mali to take them into account and to abide by 
international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law, and recalls the importance of training in 
this regard.’ [emphasis added] See also Security Council Resolution 2093 of 6 March 2013, para 12, 
on Somalia, ‘Requests AMISOM to ensure that any detainees in their custody are treated in strict 
compliance with AMISOM’s obligations under international humanitarian law and human rights law’. 
258 Policy on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping, Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations / Department of Field Support Ref. 2015.07, 1 April 2015, pp.5-6.  
259 The UN mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor 
(UNTAET), 
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human rights law.260  As was also shown, however, these formal statements proved of little 
value without effective mechanisms of accountability.   
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter has described the emergence of POC as a new normative doctrine that is being 
increasingly integrated into UN peacekeeping.  As Willmot and Mamiya have observed: 
‘While the international community struggled with the revolutionary strategic concepts of 
humanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to Protect, a quiet evolution was taking 
place through UN peacekeeping’, through the development of POC.’261  POC was once 
dubbed the ‘impossible mandate’ to implement,262 but it now appears that the UN accepts that 
its peacekeeping missions do have a responsibility to protect civilians from grave violations 
of IHL and international human rights law.  It has been noted that no POC mandate has ever 
been lifted during a mission’s lifetime.263  The record of missions in actually implementing 
their mandates has been mixed, however, and will be discussed further in Part III of this 
thesis.  The next two chapters will discuss in more detail the inter-relationship between the 
different bodies of law that are potentially relevant to peacekeeping missions with POC 
mandates and the difficulties of using them to hold missions to account.   
 
  
                                                 
260 UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/24 on the Law Applicable in Kosovo (Dec. 12, 1999) UNTAET 
Regulation No. 1999/1, 27 December 1999, on the Authority of the Transitional Administration in East 
Timor,  9 November 2010. 
261 For details see Haidi Willmot and Ralph Mamiya, ‘Mandated to Protect: Security Council Practice 
on the Protection of Civilians’, in Marc Weller (ed), The Oxford Handbook on the Use of Force in 
International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.  
262 Holt and Berkman , 2006. 
263 OIOS Protection Evaluation, 2014, para 15. 
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PART TWO: THE APPLICABLE LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING THE USE 
OF FORCE FOR PROTECTIVE PURPOSES 
 Chapter 4:  
Relevant provisions of international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the provisions in three bodies of international law that are potentially 
most relevant to UN peacekeeping missions with mandates from the Security Council to use 
force for protective purposes: IHL, international human rights law and refugee law.  As was 
previously discussed, UNHCR has played a leading role in many humanitarian crises where 
UN missions with POC mandates are present.  UN Security Council resolutions and other 
documents on POC often refer to refugee law and this chapter will briefly consider the 
attempts to draw up a ‘doctrine of protection specifically tailored to the needs of the 
internally displaced.’1  Most of the provisions of most relevance to the use of force, however, 
can be found in international human rights law and IHL, which will be the main focus of the 
discussion of this chapter.  It will be argued that in most situations the negative and positive 
obligations of international human rights law provide the most comprehensive and relevant 
guidance for UN peacekeeping missions with POC mandates.   
 
It is now widely agreed that the traditional paradigm by which international human rights law 
governed relations between States and their own citizens in times of peace, while IHL 
primarily regulated the conduct of international armed conflicts is outdated.2  It is also 
                                                 
1 Report of the Representative of the Secretary- General on Internally Displaced Persons, Commission 
on Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/44, 22 February 1996. 
2  For further discussion of the historical evolution of this debate see, for example, Jean Pictet, 
Humanitarian Law and the Protection of War Victims, Geneva: Henri Dunant Institute, 1975, p.15; 
Gerald Irving Anthony Dare Draper, in Michael Meyer and Hilary McCoubrey, Reflections on law and 
armed conflicts: the selected works on the laws of war by the late Professor Colonel G.I.A.D. Draper, 
OBE, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998; and Gerd Oberleitner, Human Rights in Armed 
Conflict: law, practice, policy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp.9-77. 
172 
 
 
increasingly recognised that IHL and international human rights law may be concurrently 
applicable.3  While there is continuing debate about the extent of international human rights 
law’s extraterritorial application, it is widely accepted that States are under an obligation to 
respect and ensure respect for its provisions to anyone within their power or effective control, 
even if not situated within their territory.4  International human rights law is, therefore, 
potentially applicable to peacekeeping soldiers and this chapter will discuss its provisions 
relating to arrest and detention and the use of lethal force in more detail.  The next chapter 
will discuss the specific problems of applying international human rights law to UN Security 
Council authorized operations. 
 
Relevant provisions of IHL 
 
IHL prohibits attacks on civilians and civilian objects, while permitting combatants in an 
international armed conflict to directly engage in hostilities without this being considered a 
criminal act.5  In order to ensure respect for this provision: ‘Parties to the conflict shall at all 
times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian 
objects and military objectives’.6   The term ‘civilian’ is defined negatively as anyone who is 
not a member of the armed forces or of an organized military group belonging to a party to 
                                                 
3 Legality or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports 1996; 
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion of 9 July 2004, ICJ Reports 2004; Armed activity on the territory of the Congo (Democratic 
Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment of 19 December 2005 ICJ Reports 2005.  See also 
General Comment No. 31 on the Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on State Parties to 
the Covenant, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 26 May 2004, para 1. 
4 Al-Skeini and Others v. UK, Appl. No. 55721/07, Judgment (Grand Chamber) 7 July 2011.   See also 
Bankovic v. Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States, Appl. No. 52207/99, (Grand Chamber), 
Decision on Admissibility 19 December 2001, para 37 and 43-57; and Human Rights Committee, 
General Comment No. 31, para 10.   
5 For further discussion see International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘International humanitarian law 
and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts Document prepared by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross for the 30th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, 
Geneva, Switzerland, 26–30 November 2007’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 89 No. 867 
Geneva: ICRC, September 2007.  These provisions can be found in Common Article 3 to the Four 
Geneva Conventions and in Additional Protocol II, Articles 13-18. 
6 Additional Protocol I, Article 48. 
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the conflict.7  Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions states that: ‘In case of doubt 
whether a person is a civilian that person shall be considered a civilian’.8   
 
The provisions of IHL will only be relevant to situations of armed conflict.  An armed 
conflict has been defined as existing whenever ‘there is resort to armed force between States 
or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups 
or between such groups within a State.’9 [emphasis added] There is an obvious difference 
between these two thresholds and IHL will only apply in non-international conflicts when the 
second one has been reached.  Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions, which 
regulates conduct in non-international armed conflicts, specifies that it ‘shall not apply to 
situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of 
violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts.’10    
 
The four Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I all apply to international armed 
conflicts.  Common Article 3 of these Conventions and Additional Protocol II apply to non-
international armed conflicts.  The ICC’s statute also contains two separate lists of war 
crimes, those committed in international and those in non-international conflicts.11  The treaty 
provisions relating to IHL in non-international armed conflict are much less extensive than in 
those relating to international armed conflicts but, have been ‘enriched and upgraded’ by 
decisions of the Security Council and the case law of international criminal tribunals.12  The 
                                                 
7 ICTY: Prosecutor v. Galic, Trial Chamber, Case No. IT-98-29-T, 5 December 2003, para 47. 
8 Additional Protocol I, Article 50. 
9 ICTY: Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, 2 October 1995, para 70; Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj et. 
al. Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment of 3 April 2008, paras 49 and 60.  See also ICRC Commentary on 
the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949, Commentary - Art. 2. Chapter I: General provisions.  ‘Any 
difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention of members of the armed forces is 
an armed conflict within the meaning of Article 2, even if one of the Parties denies the existence of a 
state of war. It makes no difference how long the conflict lasts, or how much slaughter takes place. The 
respect due to the human person as such is not measured by the number of victims.’ 
https://www.icrc.org/ihl/COM/365-570005?OpenDocument, accessed 22 August 2015. 
10 Additional Protocol II, Article 1. 
11 ICC Rome Statute, Article 8.   
12 Paper by Robert Kolb, ‘Applicability of international humanitarian law to forces under the command 
of an international organization’, in Alexandre Faite and Jerémie Labbé Grenier, (eds), Report on 
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ICRC states that most of the treaty provisions governing IHL in international conflicts can 
also be considered to be customary law in non-international conflicts.13   
 
While there is some debate about the applicability of some of these provisions,14 there is no 
doubt that the ‘elementary considerations of humanity’ contained in Common Article 3 are of 
customary nature.15  ICTY has also stated that principles of customary international law 
applicable in internal armed conflict exist independently of common Article 3 and Additional 
Protocol II and that: 
 
In the area of armed conflict the distinction between interstate wars and civil wars is 
losing its value as far as human beings are concerned.  Why protect civilians from 
belligerent violence or ban rape, torture or the wanton destruction of hospitals, 
churches, museums or private property as well as proscribe weapons causing 
unnecessary suffering when two sovereign States are engaged in war, and yet refrain 
                                                 
Expert Meeting on Multinational Peace Operations: Applicability of International Humanitarian Law 
and International Human Rights Law on UN mandated forces, Geneva, 11-12 December 2003, p.68.  
See also Françoise J. Hampson, ‘The relationship between international humanitarian law and human 
rights law from the perspective of a human rights treaty body’, International Review of the Red Cross, 
Vol. 90 No. 871 September 2008, pp.549-72. 
13 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, I.  This is available online at Customary International 
Humanitarian Law Database – ICRC, http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/home, first 
accessed 11 December 2012.   
14 John B. Bellinger III, and William J. Haynes II, ‘A US government response to the International 
Committee of the Red Cross study Customary International Humanitarian Law’, International Review 
of the Red Cross, Vol. 89 No. 866, June 2007, pp.443-71.  These made detailed criticism of four rules:  
Rule 31(protection of humanitarian relief personnel), Rule 45 (prohibition on causing long-term, 
widespread and severe damage to the environment), Rule 78 (prohibition of the use of anti-personnel 
exploding bullets) and Rule 157 (right to establish universal jurisdiction over war crimes).  They  also 
expressed concern ‘about the methodology used to ascertain rules and about whether the authors have 
proffered sufficient facts and evidence to support those rules’ and accused them of an over-reliance of 
policies set out in training manuals and of failing ‘to pay due regard to the practice of specially 
affected States.  For a rebuttal of these criticism see Jean-Marie Henckaerts, ‘Customary International 
Humanitarian Law: a response to US Comments’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 89 No. 
866 June 2007, pp.473-88. 
15 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, Judgment, of 27 
June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, para 221.  See also Corfu Channel Case (UK v. Albania), Judgment of 9 
April 1949, ICJ Reports 1949 para 215. 
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from enacting the same bans or providing the same protection when armed violence 
has erupted ‘only’ within the territory of a sovereign State? 16  
 
IHL ‘must set forth realistic rules governing the use of deadly force’, given the nature of 
armed conflicts.17  It specifies that, in international armed conflicts, ‘precautions should be 
taken to try and ensure’ that civilians are not killed or injured in attacks on military targets, 
without expressly forbidding them.18  Military commanders are also required to ‘consider the 
impact that their actions may have on civilians’ and to apply the principle of ‘proportionality’ 
when considering whether or not to attack a particular military target.19  Civilians may, 
however, be forcibly displaced from their homes and property may be seized or destroyed on 
grounds of military necessity.20  Food can be requisitioned for use by the occupation forces, 
and administrative personnel, although this should be subject to fair payment and only if the 
requirements of the civilian population have been taken into account.21   
 
The ICRC has argued that the principles of military necessity and humanity may require an 
attempt to detain rather than kill combatants in certain circumstances,22 because ‘it would 
defy basic notions of humanity to kill an adversary or to refrain from giving him or her an 
opportunity to surrender where there manifestly is no necessity for the use of lethal force’.23  
Others believe that ‘a reasonable military commander would not order an attack against an 
isolated fighter who is at home asleep, if a capture appears to be possible in the circumstances 
                                                 
16 ICTY: Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, October 1995, paras 96-127. 
17 Kenneth Watkin, ‘Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights Norms in Contemporary 
Armed Conflict’, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 98:1, 34 (2004).  See also Robert Kolb 
and Gloria Gaggioli, (eds), Research Handbook on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham Glos. and Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar, 2013; and Françoise J. 
Hampson, ‘Direct participation in hostilities and the interoperability of the law of armed conflict and 
human rights law,’, International Law Studies, Vol. 87, US Naval War College, 2011, p.192. 
18 Additional Protocol I, Article 48. 
19 Additional Protocol I, Articles 48-57.  
20 Geneva Convention IV, Articles 49 and 53 and Additional Protocol II, Article 17(1).  
21 Geneva Convention IV, Article 55. 
22 Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under 
International Humanitarian Law, Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 2009, pp.77-82. 
23 Ibid., p.82. 
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without additional risk to the armed forces.’24  A debate remains, however, about whether this 
is a matter of law or merely policy.25   
 
Combatants in an international armed conflict are entitled to prisoner of war (POW) status 
upon capture.26  Conversely, while civilians enjoy protection from attack so long as they do 
not directly engage in hostilities, should they do so they will lose this protection and may also 
be prosecuted under the relevant domestic law.27  There are no equivalent provisions for 
combatants in the treaty provisions relating to IHL in non-international armed conflict, since 
such acts will almost certainly be offences under the relevant domestic criminal law.  
According to the ICRC ‘practice is ambiguous as to whether members of armed opposition 
                                                 
24 International Committee of the Red Cross, Expert Meeting: The use of force in armed conflicts: 
Interplay between the conduct of hostilities and law enforcement paradigms, Geneva: ICRC, 2013, 
[Hereinafter ICRC Expert Meeting, 2013] p.59. 
25 For further discussion see Noam Lubell, Extraterritorial Use of Force Against Non-State Actors, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010 p.161.  Lubell argues that it ‘portrays what is only a potentially 
desirable policy as existing law, which it is not’.  See also W. Hays Parks, ‘Part IX of the ICRC ‘Direct 
Participation in Hostilities’ Study: No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect,’ New York 
University Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol. 42, No. 3, Spring 2010, pp. 769-830; Nils 
Melzer, ‘Keeping the Balance between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four 
Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities’, 
New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol. 42, No. 3, Spring 2010, pp. 831-
916.   
26 For details see ICRC Prisoners of War and Detainees, http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-
law/protected-persons/prisoners-war/ accessed 23 April 2014. The rules protecting prisoners of war 
(POWs) are specific and were first detailed in the 1929 Geneva Convention. They were refined in the 
third 1949 Geneva Convention, following the lessons of World War II, as well as in Additional 
Protocol I of 1977.  POWs are usually members of the armed forces of one of the parties to a conflict 
who fall into the hands of the adverse party.   POWs cannot be prosecuted for taking a direct part in 
hostilities.  Their detention is not a form of punishment, but only aims to prevent further participation 
in the conflict. They must be released and repatriated without delay after the end of hostilities. The 
detaining power may prosecute them for possible war crimes, but not for acts of violence that are 
lawful under IHL.  POWs must be treated humanely in all circumstances. They are protected against 
any act of violence, as well as against intimidation, insults, and public curiosity. IHL also defines 
minimum conditions of detention covering such issues as accommodation, food, clothing, hygiene and 
medical care.   
27 Additional Protocol I, Article 51.3.  ICRC Resource Centre, The relevance of IHL in the context of 
terrorism, 1 January 2011.  This states that ‘if civilians directly engage in hostilities they are 
considered “unlawful” or “unprivileged” combatants or belligerents.’ However, the treaties of 
humanitarian law do not expressly contain these terms.  See also Amicus Curiae brief submitted by 
Professors Francoise Hampson and Noam Lubell in the case of Hassan v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 
29750/09, Human Rights Centre, University of Essex, 2013, para 29: ‘when attempting to detain a 
civilian who does not pose a direct threat at that precise moment, in an area under the complete control 
of the military and in which they can operate unhindered. In such circumstances, even if the individual 
may have lost civilian protection under LOAC/IHL due to rules on participation in hostilities, human 
rights law may require a graduated use of force rather than direct lethal force.’ 
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groups are considered members of armed forces or civilians’.28   It notes that persons taking a 
‘direct part in hostilities’ in non-international armed conflicts ‘are sometimes labelled 
“combatants”  . . . However, this designation is only used in its generic meaning and indicates 
that these persons do not enjoy the protection against attack accorded to civilians, but this 
does not imply a right to combatant or prisoner-of-war status, as applicable in international 
armed conflicts.’29   
 
IHL contains extensive provisions relating to detention during international armed conflicts, 
principally in the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I.30  The 
Third Geneva Convention defines the rights of POWs, while the Fourth provides protection 
for civilians, including those who have been interned during an international armed conflict.31  
Additional Protocol I refers to both POWs and civilians.32   
 
                                                 
28 ICRC Customary IHL Rule 3, Definition of Combatants, http://www.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter1_rule3, accessed 12 December 2012.   
29 Ibid.  See also Melzer, 2009.  Although the existing rules suggest that individuals fighting against 
the state in a non-international armed conflict should be classified as civilians, but lose their protection 
while taking a ‘direct part’ in hostilities, the ICRC has proposed a third category of persons who are 
‘members of organised groups belonging to a non-state party to the conflict’ and who ‘cease to be 
civilians for as long as they remain members by virtue of their continuous combat function’.  For 
further discussion see Lubell, 2010, p.148. 
30 The four Geneva Conventions contain more than 175 provisions regulating detention.  The main 
ones are in Articles 13-77 of Geneva Convention III; Articles 79-135 in Geneva Convention IV; and 
Additional Protocol I, Articles 43-7 and 75, the latter of which is considered to reflect customary 
international law.   
31 Geneva Convention IV, Articles 41, 42, 64 and 78 provide a legal basis for the internment of 
civilians, but only if justified by imperative reasons of security. Detention on these grounds, while 
permissible, cannot be used as a form of punishment. This means that each interned person must be 
released as soon as the reasons which necessitated his or her internment no longer exist.  The treatment 
of internees in such circumstances is dealt with by Section IV of Geneva Convention IV and there are 
52 articles that deal with various aspects of treatment such as places of internment, health and hygiene 
of internees, religious and intellectual activities, administration and discipline, and relations with the 
exterior.  Article 147 of Geneva Convention IV defines the ‘unlawful confinement of a protected 
person’, to be a grave breach of the Convention.  Additional Protocol I, Article 73 extends the 
definition of protected persons to include refugees or stateless persons. Article 75 establishes 
fundamental guarantees that detained people should be treated humanely.  Articles 76-78 consider the 
specific rights and vulnerabilities of women and children.   
32 For an overview see Jelena Pejic, ‘Procedural principles and safeguards for 
internment/administrative detention in armed conﬂict and other situations of violence’, International 
Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 87 No. 858 June 2005, pp.375-91. 
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The Fourth Geneva Convention specifies that detentions can only be made as ‘an exceptional 
measure and only if necessitated by imperative reasons of security’.33  Unlawful confinement 
of protected persons is a grave breach of the Fourth Convention.34  Detentions must also be 
subject to review ‘as soon as possible by an appropriate court or administrative board 
designated by the Detaining Power for that purpose’.35  Decisions must be made according to 
a ‘regular procedure’ prescribed by law and detained individuals must be permitted to appeal 
against the decision ‘with the least possible delay’.36  The reviewing body ‘must operate 
under the guarantees of independence and impartiality’, but it could be a military 
administrative board rather than a civilian court.37  Neither the Fourth Convention nor 
Additional Protocol I provide details about the procedural rights of internees, nor the legal 
framework that a detaining authority must implement.’38  Protocol I states, however, that its 
provisions relating to ‘treatment of persons in the power of a party to the conflict’ are 
‘additional’ to the rules contained in the Fourth Convention, ‘as well as to other applicable 
rules of international law relating to the protection of fundamental human rights during 
international armed conflict.39  International human rights law can, therefore, be utilised to 
‘fill the gaps’ in the detention regime.40   
 
The provisions relating to detention in non-international armed conflicts are much less 
extensive.  Treaty law does not expressly contain a power to detain, although it assumes that 
                                                 
33 Geneva Convention IV, Article 78. 
34 Geneva Convention IV, Article 147. 
35 Geneva Convention IV, Article 43. 
36 Geneva Convention IV, Article 78.  
37 ICRC Commentary to Articles 43 and 78.  For further discussion see Hampson and Lubell, 2013, 
para 39.  They note that this is one of the few areas regarding detention where there may be a prime 
facie clash between international human rights law and IHL. 
38 Pejic, 2005, p.377.  See also Jakob Kellenberger, ‘Official Statement of ICRC: Strengthening Legal 
Protection for Victims of Armed Conﬂicts’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 92, No. 879, 
September 2010;  and ‘Remarks by Knut Dormann, head of the legal division at the ICRC informal 
meeting of legal advisers, United Nations, New York, 24 October 2011’, 3 November 2011,  ICRC 
Website, http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/31-international-conference-ihl-
statement-2011-11-03.htm, accessed 7 May 2014.   
39 Additional Protocol I, Article 72. 
40 For further discussion see Hampson and Lubell, 2013, paras 38-40.  
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detention occurs and regulates certain aspects of it.41  Common Article 3 and Additional 
Protocol II simply state that detainees must ‘be treated humanely, without any adverse 
distinction’.42  The ICRC has stated, however, that the prohibition of arbitrary detention is ‘a 
norm of customary international law applicable in both international and non-international 
conflicts’ since it is not compatible with the requirement of humane treatment.43  The 
obligation to ‘protect’ persons and objects on which IHL prohibits attacks is also considered 
by the ICRC to be a part of customary international law.44 
 
Common Article 1 of the four Geneva Conventions requires States to ‘respect and ensure 
respect’ for the Conventions in ‘all circumstances’.45  This means that they have an obligation 
                                                 
41 Pejic, 2005, pp.375-7.  See also Serdar Mohammed v. Secretary of State for Defence, Case No: 
HQ12X03367, [2014] EWHC 1369 (QB), 2 May 2014, para 243-5; and Just Security, Jonathan 
Horowitz and Christopher Rogers, ‘Does IHL Need Human Rights Law?: The Curious Case of NIAC 
Detention’, 5 May 2014, http://justsecurity.org/2014/05/05/guest-post-ihl-human-rights-law-curious-
case-niac-detention-serdar-mohammed/, accessed 15 May 2014.  See also Georgia v. Russia (II) 
38263/08 Amicus Curiae brief submitted by Professor Francoise Hampson and Professor Noam 
Lubell, Human Rights Centre, University of Essex, 2014, para 35.  The English High Court stated that 
there is ‘nothing in the language’ of the IHL articles relating to a non-international armed conflict ‘to 
suggest that those provisions are intended to authorise or themselves confer legality on any such 
detentions.’ However, as Hampson and Lubell note ‘It would indeed be strange if international law 
allowed certain people to be killed (those taking a direct part in hostilities) but did not allow them to be 
detained. The ground of detention in a NIAC is presumably that the detainee represents a serious 
security threat to the armed forces and/or the civilian population.’   
42 International Committee of the Red Cross, Strengthening Legal Protection for Persons deprived of 
their Liberty in relation to Non-International Armed Conflict, Regional Consultations 2012-13, 
Background Paper, Geneva: ICRC, January 2014, p3.  ‘In spite of the attention that IHL gives to 
deprivation of liberty, the most superficial examination of existing law reveals a substantial disparity 
between the robust and detailed provisions applicable in international armed conflicts, and the very 
basic rules that have been codified for non-international armed conflict.’ For all of the background 
papers and statements see, ICRC, Strengthening Legal Protection for Victims of Armed Conflict, 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/what-we-do/other-activities/development-ihl/strengthening-protection-
victims-armed-conflict.htm, accessed 7 May 2014. 
43 ICRC Customary IHL Rule 99, Arbitrary deprivation of liberty is prohibited, 
https://www.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter32_rule99?OpenDocument&highlight=fundamental,guarantees, accessed 
8 April 2015 
44 ICRC Customary IHL, Rule 151 Individual Responsibility, http://www.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter43_rule151?OpenDocument&highlight=151; accessed 5 February 2014.  
This notes that the ICRC’s appeals in relation to the conflict in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe in 1979 and to the 
Iran-Iraq War in 1983 and 1984 involved calls to ensure respect for rules not found in the Geneva 
Conventions but in the Additional Protocols (bombardment of civilian zones and indiscriminate 
attacks) and the parties alleged to have committed these attacks were not party to the Protocols.  It also 
notes that these appeals were addressed to the international community, that no State objected to them 
and that several States not party to the Additional Protocols supported them.   
45 For further discussion see Marko Divac Öberg, ‘The absorption of grave breaches into war crimes 
law’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 91 No. 873 March 2009, pp.163-83.   
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to criminalize certain violations of IHL, investigate allegations of such violations and to 
punish those responsible through their national courts if they occur.46  Military commanders 
must also act both proactively and reactively to ensure compliance with the law, and exert 
their influence to stop violations by third parties through, for example, investigating 
violations and prosecuting perpetrators.47  This obligation to examine and investigate alleged 
violations is not restricted merely to the nationals and service personnel of a party to a 
conflict, but applies to every State in relation to every person present in its territory who is 
suspected of having committed such violations.48  It includes the adoption of penal or 
disciplinary sanctions, usually through the enactment of criminal legislation, and also 
searching for, trying and punishing convicted perpetrators of serious violations.49 
 
The ICRC states that these positive obligations are customary in nature and apply to 
international and non-international conflicts.50  The ICJ stated in Nicaragua that the duty to 
respect and ensure respect for humanitarian law does not solely derive from the Geneva 
Conventions, but from the general principles of humanitarian law to which the Conventions 
merely give specific expression’.51  UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions 
have also stressed the importance of ‘ensuring’ that IHL’s rules are universally upheld.52   
 
                                                 
46 Geneva Convention I, Article 52; Geneva Convention II, Article 53; Geneva Convention III, Article 
132; Geneva Convention IV, Articles 146 and 149; and Additional Protocol I, Article 85. 
47 Additional Protocol I, Article 87. 
48 Geneva Convention I, Article 49; Geneva Convention II, Article 50; Geneva Convention III, Article 
129; Geneva Convention IV, Article 146; Additional Protocol I, Articles 85 and 86(1). 
49 Ibid. 
50 ICRC Customary IHL, Rule 151 on Individual Responsibility, http://www.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter43_rule151?OpenDocument&highlight=151; and Rule 144 Ensuring 
Respect for International Humanitarian Law Erga Omnes, http://www.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v1_rule144, both accessed 5 February 2014. 
51  ICJ Reports 1986, para 221.   
52 For example UN Security Council Resolution 681, of 20 December 1990, paras 4 and 5.  ‘Urges the 
Government of Israel to accept de jure applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, to all 
the territories occupied by Israel since 1967, and to abide scrupulously by the provisions of the said 
Convention; Calls on the high contracting parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 to ensure 
respect by Israel, the occupying Power, for its obligations under the Convention in accordance with 
article 1 thereof.’ See also UN General Assembly Resolutions 32/91; 37/123; 38/180; and 43/21. 
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The Fourth Geneva Convention also obliges ‘occupying powers’ to ‘maintain the orderly 
government of the territory’ and ensure ‘the effective administration of justice’.53  The ICJ 
ruled in Armed Activities that this imposed on Uganda a responsibility to ‘take measures to 
respect and ensure respect for human rights and international humanitarian law’ and to ‘take 
all measures in its power to restore, and ensure as far as possible, public order and safety in 
the occupied area, to protect the inhabitants of the occupied territory against acts of violence 
and not to tolerate such violence by any third party’.54  It is, therefore, widely accepted that 
international human rights law is applicable during a military occupation.55 
 
Once a conflict has started, IHL will continue to apply beyond the cessation of hostilities 
until a general conclusion of peace has been reached or, in the case of a non-international 
armed conflict, until a peaceful settlement has been achieved, whether or not actual combat 
takes place there.56  IHL will, therefore, be applicable in situations where an armed conflict 
exists, including situations in which UN peacekeeping missions have been deployed to 
monitor ceasefire agreements or peace processes.  As discussed in the previous chapter, if 
such a mission becomes a party to the conflict it will then be directly bound by IHL’s 
provisions.57  It will also lose the protection that IHL provides to civilians58 as well as the 
                                                 
53 Geneva Convention IV, Article 64.  
54 ICJ Reports 19 December 2005, para 345 and 178. See also ICJ Reports 1996, para 25; and ICJ 
Reports 2004, para 106. 
55 For further discussion see Tom Ruys and Sten Verhoeven, ‘DRC v. Uganda: The Applicability of 
International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law in Occupied Territories’ and Ralph Wilde, 
‘Triggering State Obligations Extraterritorially: The Spatial Test in Certain Human Rights Treaties’, in 
Roberta Arnold and Noelle Quénivet (eds), International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, 
Leiden and Boston: Martin Nijhof, 2008; and Noam Lubell, ‘Human rights obligations in military 
occupation’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 94 No. 885 Spring 2012, pp.317-37.    
56 ICTY: Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, October 1995, para 70. 
57 UN Secretary General, UN Secretary General’s Bulletin, Observance by UN Forces of International 
Humanitarian Law, ST/SGB/1999/13, 6 August 1999. 
58 ICRC Customary IHL Rule 33, Personnel and Objects Involved in a Peacekeeping Mission  
https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule33, accessed 5 September 2015.  ‘Directing 
an attack against personnel and objects involved in a peacekeeping mission in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians and 
civilian objects under international humanitarian law is prohibited’.   
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specific protections provided to UN personnel by both the UN Safety Convention of 199459 
and the ICC.60   
 
If the situation to which a UN peacekeeping mission has been deployed has not reached the 
threshold of an armed conflict, or no longer fulfils this criteria, then it is difficult to see how 
IHL could be the appropriate legal framework regulating the tactical use of force.61  Even if 
such a conflict exists, if the UN is not a party to it and enjoys legal protection against attack 
from its parties, then it cannot simultaneously enjoy the ‘belligerent rights’ of IHL, since this 
would contradict a basic principle of reciprocity on which jus in bello rests.62  Some have 
argued that the responsibilities of a UN peacekeeping mission may be analogous to those of 
an occupying power as defined in the Fourth Geneva Convention.63  This would severely 
stretch the concept of ‘belligerent occupation’, however, since peacekeeping missions are 
deployed with host state consent and the authority of the Security Council.64   
 
Where UN peacekeeping missions are authorized to use force in pursuant of a POC mandate, 
but have not become a party to an armed conflict, then the provisions of international human 
                                                 
59 Convention on the Safety of UN and Associated Personnel, New York, 9 December 1994, Article 2, 
which makes it a crime under international law to attack UN staff and associated personnel, specifies 
that this is in all cases except when they ‘are engaged as combatants against organized armed forces 
and to which the law of international armed conflict applies’.  
60 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Articles 8.2(b)(iii) and 8.2(e)(iii)) which makes it 
a war crime to attack personnel involved in a peace-keeping mission ‘as long as they are entitled to the 
protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict’. 
61 For further discussion see: Bruce ‘Ossie’ Oswald,, ‘The Law on Military Operations: Answering the 
Challenges of Detention during Contemporary Peace Operations’ Melbourne Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 8, 2007, pp.1-16; and Chris Faris, ‘The Law of Occupation and Human Rights: Which 
Framework Should Apply to United Nations Forces?’, Australian International Law Journal, Vol.  12, 
2005, pp.6. 
62 See, for example, Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, Marten Zwanenburg, 
‘United Nations and International Humanitarian Law,’ in 
http://www.grotiuscentre.org/page11731058.aspx, accessed 27 March 2014; and François Bugnion, 
‘Just Wars, Wars of Aggression and International Humanitarian Law’, International Review of the Red 
Cross, Vol. 84, No. 847, September 2002, pp.523-546. 
63 Siobhán Wills, Protecting Civilians, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.  See Chapter Four, 
‘The Applicability of Occupation Law to Peacekeeping and other Multinational Forces’, pp.171-245.   
64 For further discussion see Simon Chesterman, You, the People: The United Nations, Territorial 
Administration, and State-Building, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, pp.152- 239; and Steve 
Ratner, ‘Foreign Occupation and International Territorial Administration: The Challenges of 
Convergence’ European Journal of International Law, Vol.16, No. 4, 2005, pp.695-719. 
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rights law as it applies to a criminal law enforcement paradigm would seem to be provide a 
more appropriate legal framework than IHL.  Chapter Five will discuss the potential 
applicability of this legal framework to UN peacekeeping missions with POC mandates in 
more detail.  The rest of this chapter will first outline the provisions of international human 
rights law that could be of most relevance in places where such a mission might be deployed.  
It will then consider international human rights law’s inter-relationship with IHL and the 
scope of its extraterritorial applicability.  This will be followed by a brief discussion of the 
potential relevance of refugee law to people internally displaced within their own country by 
a conflict. 
 
Relevant provisions of international human rights law 
 
International human rights law applies to all human beings at all times in all places within a 
State’s jurisdiction.65  It imposes both ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ obligations. A ‘negative’ 
obligation is a duty to ‘respect’, or not to directly violate, a particular right.  A ‘positive’ 
obligation is a duty to ‘ensure’ its protection.66  For example, Article 1 of the ECHR obliges 
contracting parties to ‘secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms’ 
contained in the Convention, while Article 1 of the American Convention on Human Rights 
(ACHR) obliges State parties to ‘undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized 
herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction.’67  It is also now generally 
accepted that States may be held accountable for acts carried out by private individuals if it 
supports or tolerates them, or fails in other ways to provide effective protection in law against 
                                                 
65 The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Respect for Human Rights in Armed 
Conflicts, 25, UN Doc. A/8052 (1970); ‘Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action’, World 
Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, A/CONF.157/23, 14-25 June 1993.   
66 For further discussion see Dinah Shelton and Ariel Gould, ‘Positive and Negative Obligations’, in 
Dinah Shelton (ed) The Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights Law, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, December 2013. 
67 Ibid. The American Declaration does not contain an explicit jurisdictional provision; however the 
Inter-American Commission has applied the same principles of ‘authority and control’. 
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them.68  This can include ‘in certain well-defined circumstances a positive obligation on the 
authorities to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual’ from threats to 
their life and physical integrity.69 
 
It is also widely accepted that some of the most basic human rights have attained the status of 
jus cogens, which is a ‘peremptory norm’70 of general international law that can only be over 
ridden by another peremptory norm.71  The use of jus cogens as a means of resolving legal 
disputes by national or international courts and tribunals has actually been quite rare72 and 
                                                 
68 In L.C.B. v. UK, Appl. No. 14/1997/798/100, Judgment 9 June 1998, para 36, the European Court 
stated that ‘the first sentence of Article 2.1 enjoins the State not only to refrain from the intentional and 
unlawful taking of life, but also to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its 
jurisdiction’ and that the task of the Court was ‘to determine whether, given all the circumstances of 
the case, the State did all that could have been required of it to prevent the applicant´s life from being 
avoidably put at risk’.  See also: Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy, Appl. No. 32967/96, (Grand Chamber) 
Judgment 17 January 2002; Erikson v. Italy, Appl. No. 37900/97, Decision on Admissibility 26 
October 1999; Edwards v UK, Appl. No. 46477/99, 2002, paras 55-64; Alex Menson and others v. UK, 
Appl. No. 47916/99, Decision on Admissibility 6 May 2003; Shanaghan v. UK, Appl. No. 37715/97, 
Judgment 4 May 2001;  Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, Appl. No 22535/93, Judgment 28 March 2000; 
Kontrova v. Slovakia, Appl. No. 7510/04, Judgment (Grand Chamber) 31 May 2007; Kayak v. Turkey, 
Appl. No. 60444/08, Judgment 10 July 2012. 
69 Osman v UK, Appl. No. 23452/94, Judgment 28 October 1998, paras 115-6.  The case concerned a 
teacher who stalked and eventually attacked a former pupil and killed his father.  The Court did not 
find a violation of the right to life, but did rule that the policy forbidding legal challenges to cases 
where the police had allegedly failed in their ‘protection responsibilities’ was a violation of the right to 
a fair trial.  For further discussion see Ewan McKendrick, ‘Negligence and human rights: reconsidering 
Osman’, in Daniel Friedmann and Daphne Barak-Erez (eds), Human Rights in Private Law, Oxford 
and Portland Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2001.  See also Inter-Am. Ct HR Velásquez Rodríguez Case, 
Judgment 29 July 1988, Inter-Am. Ct HR Series C, No. 4.  This case which involved an abduction and 
‘disappearance’ allegedly carried out by members of the Honduran armed forces. 
70 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, Article 53.  For further discussion see Prosper 
Weil, ‘Towards Relative Normativity in International Law’,  American Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 77, No. 3, July 1983, pp.413-42. 
71 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 24 (52), General comment on issues relating to 
reservations made upon ratification or accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or 
in relation to declarations under article 41 of the Covenant, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994), 
para 10. The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, in its Statement on racial 
discrimination and measures to combat terrorism, has confirmed that the prohibition of racial 
discrimination is a norm of jus cogens, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-seventh 
Session, Supplement No. 18 (A/57/18), chap. XI, sect. C, para. 4.  See also, International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v Delalic and Others, Case IT-96-21-T, Judgment 16 
November 1998, paras 452, 454; Prosecutor v Furundzija, Case IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment 10 December 
1998, paras 139 and 143; Prosecutor v Kunarac and Others, Case IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/I-T, para 
466. 
72 For discussion see Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘The Impact of Peremptory Norms on the 
Interpretation and Application of United Nations Security Council Resolutions’, European Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 16 No.1, 2005, pp.59−88; and Orakhelashvili, Alexander, ‘State Immunity and 
Hierarchy of Norms: Why the House of Lords Got It Wrong’, European Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 18, No. 5, 2008, pp.955−970.  See also Marko Milanovic, ‘Norm Conflict in International Law: 
whither human rights?’, Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law, Vol. 20, 2009, p.71, who 
cites Ian Brownlie in Antonio Cassese and Joseph Weiler (eds) Change and Stability in International 
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there is still considerable discussion about exactly which basic international human rights and 
IHL rules have attained this status.73  It is widely agreed, however, that the prohibitions on 
aggression, genocide, slavery, systematic racial discrimination, crimes against humanity, 
torture and apartheid as well as the right to self-determination are jus cogens.74  Some argue 
that the right to a fair trial and the prohibition of prolonged arbitrary detention also have jus 
cogens status.75  
 
During a ‘public emergency which threatens the life of the nation’, it is possible for States to 
derogate from certain rights, but each derogation, for each right, must be justified by the 
extent that is strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.76  Some rights are considered 
so fundamental that they are non-derogable. These include protections against torture, the 
                                                 
Law-making,  Berlin: De Gruyter, 1988 in describing jus cogens as ‘like a car which has never left the 
garage.’  
73 For an overview of the debate about which rights contained in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights reflect customary international law see Helen Duffy, The ‘war on terror’ and the framework of 
international law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p.278.  She cites Richard Lilich, 
‘Civil Rights’, in T Merron (ed) Human Rights in International Law,  Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1988; and O Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice, Dordrecht, 1991.  Lilich 
argues that a ‘substantial’ number have attained this status, while Schachter maintains it is a more 
limited list of ‘slavery, genocide, torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.’  Duffy 
argues that ratification of human rights treaties is now so widespread that the significance of this 
debate is diminishing.  See also Malcolm Shaw, International Law, Sixth Edition, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp.123-7.  
74 See ILC Commentaries to Articles on State Responsibility, Introductory Commentary to Part Two, 
Chapter III; Human Rights Committee, General Comment 24 (52), General comment on issues relating 
to reservations made upon ratification or accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, 
or in relation to declarations under article 41 of the Covenant, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 
(1994), para 10.  In Kadi v. Council & Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R. II-3649 the Court of First Instance stated 
that the right to property was also a jus cogens norm, although this decision has been widely criticized.  
See, for example, Gráinne De Burca, ‘The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order 
After Kadi’, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 51, No. 1, Winter 2010. 
75 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29 States of emergency, 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 31 August 2001, para 11; and Human Rights Committee, General Comment 
24 (52), General Comment on issues relating to reservations made upon ratification or accession to the 
Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in relation to declarations under article 41 of the 
Covenant, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994), para 10.  
76 Article 4 of the ICCPR;  Article 15 of the ECHR; and Article 27 of the ACHR provide, in certain 
strictly defined circumstances, that States may derogate from certain specified obligations, to the 
extent that is strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. The African Charter contains no 
emergency clause and therefore allows no such derogation.  Ireland, the UK and Turkey and have 
derogated in relation to violence arising out of the situations in Northern Ireland and South East 
Turkey.  See ECtHR Lawless v. Ireland, Appl. No. 332/57, Judgment 1 July 1961; Ireland v UK, Appl. 
No. 5310/71, Judgment 18 January 1978; Brogan and others v. UK, Appl. No. 11209/84, Judgment 29 
November 1988; Brannigan and MacBride v. UK, Appl. No.14553-4/89, Judgment 24 May 1993; 
Aksoy v. Turkey, Appl. No. 21987/93, Judgment 18 December 1996.   
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right to life, the right not to be held in slavery, freedom of conscience and the right to non-
discrimination.77  Other rights have a potentially non-derogable core.78   For example, while 
the right to liberty79 is potentially derogable, the right to challenge the lawfulness of a 
detention may be non-derogable.80  The UN Human Rights Committee has stated that:  
 
principles of legality and the rule of law require that fundamental requirements of fair 
trial must be respected during a state of emergency. . . In order to protect non-
derogable rights, the right to take proceedings before a court to enable the court to 
decide without delay on the lawfulness of detention, must not be diminished by a 
State Party’s decision to derogate from the Covenant.81 
 
The Human Rights Committee has noted that non-derogable rights are ‘related to, but not 
identical with’ the peremptory norms of international law and under no circumstances can a 
State ever cite a national emergency as a justification ‘for acting in violation of humanitarian 
law or peremptory norms of international law, for instance by taking hostages, by imposing 
collective punishments, through arbitrary deprivations of liberty or by deviating from 
fundamental principles of fair trial, including the presumption of innocence.’ 82  The ILC lists 
the prohibitions of aggression, genocide, slavery, and racial discrimination, crimes against 
humanity, torture, apartheid, the basic rules of IHL and the right to self-determination as 
                                                 
77 Article 4 of the ICCPR also includes prohibition of imprisonment because of inability to fulfil a 
contractual obligation, the principle of legality in the field of criminal law, and the recognition of 
everyone as a person before the law.   
78 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29 States of emergency, 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 31 August 2001. 
79 Article 9 of the UDHR; Article 9 of the ICCPR; Article 5 of the ECHR; Article 7 of the ACHR; 
Article 6 of the African Charter. 
80ECtHR Aksoy v. Turkey, Appl. No. 21987/93, Judgment 18 December 1996; Inter-Am Ct HR, 
Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (American Convention on Human Rights Arts 27(2), 25(1) 
and 7(6)), Advisory Opinion OC-8/87. 30 January 1987, (Ser. A) No. 8 (1987).  See also ECtHR 
Brogan and others v. UK, Appl. No. 11209/84, Judgment 29 November 1988; and Brannigan and 
MacBride v. UK Appl. No. 14553-4/89, Judgment 24 May 1993.   
81 General Comment No. 29, para. 16. 
82 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29 States of emergency, 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 31 August 2001, para 11. 
187 
 
 
being generally accepted as norms from which no derogation is permitted.83  These 
obligations are, therefore, binding on States at all times.84  
 
For the purposes of this discussion, the most relevant provisions for a UN peacekeeping 
mission with a POC mandate will relate to the use of force and detention powers and the 
rights of those deprived of their liberty.  Human rights law also contains ‘positive 
obligations’ towards people in detention, often referred to as a ‘duty of care’85  and these 
standards have been elaborated in greater detail by a variety of ‘soft-law’ instruments.86   
 
Prisoners retain all of their human rights except those which are specifically forfeited as a 
consequence of the deprivation of their liberty and there is a corresponding obligation on the 
                                                 
83 See ILC Commentaries to the 2001 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts, Introductory Commentary to Part Two, Ch. III.   
84 The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, in its Statement on racial 
discrimination and measures to combat terrorism, has also confirmed that the prohibition of racial 
discrimination is a norm of jus cogens, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-seventh 
Session, Supplement No. 18 (A/57/18), chap. XI, sect. C, para. 4.  See also, ICTY Prosecutor v Delalic 
and Others, Case IT-96-21-T, Judgment 16 November 1998, paras 452, 454; Prosecutor v Furundzija, 
Case IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment 10 December 1998, paras 139 and 143; Prosecutor v Kunarac and 
Others, Case IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/I-T, para 466.  For further discussion see Kjetil Mujezinovic 
Larsen, The Human Rights Treaty Obligations of Peacekeepers, Cambridge Studies in International 
and Comparative Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, p.330. 
85 For example, ICCPR, Articles 7 and 10(1); ACHR, Article 5; CRC, Article 37; CEDAW, Article 1; 
Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against 
Women, Articles 2 and 4.  See also Human Rights Committee, General Comment 21, Article 10 
(Forty-fourth session, 1992), Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations 
Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1 at 33 (1994), para. 3. 
86 These include: the UN Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of 
Detention or Imprisonment - Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 43/173 of 9 December 1988; 
the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials - Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 
34/169 of 17 December 1979; the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (SMR), 
Adopted by the First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of 
Offenders, held at Geneva in 1955, and approved by the Economic and Social Council by its 
resolutions 663 C (XXIV) of 31 July 1957 and 2076 (LXII) of 13 May 1977; the Basic Principles for 
the Treatment of Prisoners, Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly Resolution 45/111 of 14 
December 1990; the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, 
Adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of 
Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 27 August to 7 September 1990; the UN Principles of Medical Ethics 
relevant to the Role of Health Personnel, particularly Physicians, in the Protection of Prisoners and 
Detainees against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Adopted 
by General Assembly Resolution 37/194 of 18 December 1982; The Declaration on the Protection of 
All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, Adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution 47/133, 18 
December 1992; and the UN Guidelines for Action on Children in the Criminal Justice System - 
Recommended by Economic and Social Council resolution 1997/30 of 21 July 1997. 
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State to ‘respect, protect and fulfil’ these rights.87  The UN Human Rights Committee has 
noted that States cannot claim a lack of material resources or financial difficulties as a 
justification for inhumane treatment.88  The European Court of Human Rights has stated that 
deprivation of liberty in conditions which do not meet these basic standards can amount to 
inhuman or degrading treatment in contravention of international human rights law.89  Both 
the Human Rights Committee and the Inter-American Court have spelled out the obligations 
on States to provide all detainees and prisoners with services that will satisfy their essential 
needs, including adequate food and recreational facilities in a number of cases.90   
 
                                                 
87 For further discussion see: Nigel Rodley with Matt Pollard, The treatment of prisoners under 
international law, Third Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011; Association for the 
Prevention of Torture, Optional Protocol: A Manual for Prevention, Geneva: APT 2005; Association 
for the Prevention of Torture Establishment and Designation of National Preventive Mechanisms, 
Geneva: APT 2006; Malcolm Evans and Rod Morgan, Preventing Torture: A study of the European 
Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998; Penal Reform International, Making Standards Work: an 
international handbook on good prison practice (2nd edn), London: PRI, 2001; Istanbul Protocol: 
Manual on Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, United Nations, 2004; Conor Foley, Protecting Brazilians 
Against Torture, London and Brasilia: International Bar Association and Brazilian Ministry of Justice, 
2013. 
88 Human Rights Committee General Comment 21, para 4. 
89 ECtHR: Kalashnikov v Russia, Appl. No. 47095/99, Judgment 15 July 2002 and Peers v Greece, 
Appl. No. 28524/95, Judgment 19 April 2001. 
90 See, for example, Human Rights Committee:  Kelly v Jamaica (1991) UN Doc 
CCPR/C/41/D/253/1987; Brown v Jamaica (1999) UN Doc CCPR/C/65/D/775/1997, paras 6.5 and 
6.13; Lantsova v Russian Federation (2002) UN Doc CCPR/C/74/D/763/1997, paras 8.2–9.3; Kennedy 
v Trinidad and Tobago, (2002) UN Doc CCPR/C/74/D/845/1998; Mulezi v Democratic Republic of 
Congo, (2004) UN Doc CCPR/C/81/D/962/2001;  Elahie v Trinidad and Tobago (1997) UN Doc 
CCPR/C/60/D/533/1993, para 8.3; Lewis v Jamaica (1997) UN Doc CCPR/C/60/D/708/1996, para 8.5; 
Blaine v Jamaica (1997) UN Doc CCPR/C/60/D/696/1996, para 8.4; Hill v Spain (1997) UN Doc 
CCPR/C/59/526/1993, para 13; Cabal and Pasini Bertran v Australia (2003) UN Doc 
CCPR/C/78/D/1020/2001; Vargas Mas v Peru (2005) UN Doc CCPR/C/85/D/1058/2002, paras 3.3-
6.3; Gorji-Dinka v Cameroon (2005) UN Doc CCPR/C/83/D/1134/2002, para 5.2; Sextus v Trinidad 
and Tobago (2001) UN Doc CCPR/C/72/D/818/1998, paras 2.1, 2.4, 3.6; Xavier Evans v Trinidad and 
Tobago (2003) UN Doc CCPR/C/77/D/908/2000, para 6.4; Arutyunyan v Uzbekistan (2004) UN Doc 
CCPR/C/80/D/917/2000, para 6.2; Lobban v Jamaica (2004) UN Doc CCPR/C/80/D/797/1998, para 
8.2; Francesco Madafferi v Australia (2004) UN Doc CCPR/C/81/D/1011/2001, para 9.3; Abdelhamid 
Benhadj v Algeria (2007) UN Doc CCPR/C/90/D/1173/2003, para 8.5.  See also the following cases 
taken to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Suarez-Rosero v Ecuador, Series C No. 35, para 
91; Tibi v Ecuador (2004) Series C No. 114, para 150;  Bulacio v Argentina (2003) Series C No. 100, 
para 126; Cantoral-Benavides v Peru (2000) Series C No. 69, paras 85–9; Loayza-Tamayo v Peru 
(1997) Series C No. 33 [Merits], para 58; Lori Berenson-Mejia v Peru (2004) Series C No. 119, paras 
106–109; Montero-Aranguren et al. (Detention Center of Catia) v Venezuela (2006) Series C No. 150, 
paras 85–104 [citing also ECPT standards on cell size]; Yvon Neptune v Haiti (2008) Series C No. 180, 
paras 127–39; Raxcaco-Reyes v Guatemala (2005) Series C No. 133, paras 99–102. 
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The Human Rights Committee has also stressed that the protection of the detainee requires 
prompt and regular access be given to doctors and lawyers91 and that ‘all persons arrested 
must have immediate access to counsel’ for the more general protection of their rights.92  The 
European Court has expressed concern that the denial of access to legal advice during an 
extended detention may violate the right to a fair trial,93 but that access to a lawyer is also a 
‘basic safeguard against abuse’ during periods of extended detention.94  The absence of such 
safeguards during an extended detention would leave a detainee ‘completely at the mercy of 
those detaining him.’95  The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights considers that a 
basic safeguard against torture is that a detained person should be interrogated only in the 
presence of his or her lawyer or a Judge96  and that the right to counsel applies on the first 
interrogation.97  A number of soft-law guidelines, such as the Basic Principles on the Role of 
Lawyers, also stress that ‘all persons arrested or detained, with or without a criminal charge, 
shall have prompt access to a lawyer’98 and this point has also been emphasized by UN 
Special Rapporteurs.99  
                                                 
91 General Comment No. 20: Article 7 (Prohibition of Torture, or Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment) Adopted at the Forty-fourth Session of the Human Rights Committee, on 10 
March 1992, para 11. 
92 Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Georgia, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.74, 
9 April 1997, para 28; and Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Israel, UN Doc 
CCPR/CO/78/ISR, 5 August 2003, para 13. 
93 ECtHR: Murray v UK, Appl. No. 30054/96, Judgment 8 February 1996, para 72. 
94 ECtHR: Brannigan and MacBride v UK, Appl. No. 14553-4/89, Judgment 26 May 1993, para 66. 
95 ECtHR: Aksoy v Turkey, Appl. No. 21987/93, Judgment 18 December 1996, para 83. 
96 Inter-Am Com HR Report on the Situation of Human Rights of a Segment of the Nicaraguan 
Population of Miskito Origin, OEA Ser.L/V/11.62, doc.10, rev. 3, 1983, at 100. 
97 Ibid.  See also Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission, 1985-1986, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.68, 
doc. 8 rev. 1, 1986, El Salvador, p. 154. 
98 Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers 1990, principle 7.  See also The UN Body of Principles for 
the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment 1988, principle 13; and 
The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, General Report, Council of Europe, October 2001, CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1, p.6, para. 38.  
The CPT considers that this is a right which must exist from the very outset of detention that is from 
the first moment that a person is obliged to remain with the police, and that this includes ‘in principle, 
the right for the person concerned to have the lawyer present during interrogation.’ 
99 The UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers has recommended that ‘it is 
desirable to have the presence of an attorney during police interrogation as an important safeguard to 
protect the rights of the accused. The absence of legal counsel gives rise to the potential for abuse.’  
See Report on the Mission of the Special Rapporteur to the United Kingdom, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/1998/39/add.4, para 47, 5 March 1998.  See also See Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
Torture, UN Doc. A/56/156, July 2001, para 39(f).  ‘In exceptional circumstances, under which it is 
contended that prompt contact with a detainee’s lawyer might raise genuine security concerns, and 
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The right to challenge the legality of detention applies to all persons deprived of their liberty 
and not just to those suspected of committing a criminal offence.100  Decisions by the Human 
Rights Committee, the European Court and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights have established that the authority in question must be a formally constituted court or 
tribunal with power to order the release of the detainee.101  It must be impartial and 
independent from the body making the decision to detain the person and must also make its 
decision without delay.102  The Inter-American Court has stated that if a Judge is not 
officially informed of a detention, or is informed only after significant delay, the rights of a 
detainee are not protected.103  The African Commission has stated that denying detainees the 
opportunity to appeal to national courts violates the African Charter.104 The European Court 
has stated that the review of the lawfulness of the detention must ensure that the detention is 
authorized and carried out according to procedures established by national law, as well as not 
being arbitrary according to international standards.105   
 
Detainees may only be held in officially recognized places of detention106 and records of all 
detentions must be kept up to date and be made available to courts and other competent 
                                                 
where restriction of such contact is judicially approved, it should at least be possible to allow a meeting 
with an independent lawyer, such as one recommended by a bar association.’   
100 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 8, Article 9 (Sixteenth session, 1982), Compilation of 
General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. 
Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1 at 8 (1994), para.1. 
101 ECtHR: Brincat v Italy, Appl. No. 13867/88, Judgment 26 November 1992; and De Jong, Baljet 
and van den Brink, Appl. No. 8805/79; 8806/79; 9242/81, Judgment 22 May 1984.  See also 
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Belarus, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.86, 19 
November 1997, para. 10; and Rencontre Africaine pour la défense de droits de l’homme v Zambia, 
(71/92), 10th Annual Report of the African Commission, 1996 -1997, ACHPR/RPT/10th. 
102 HRC Vuolanne v. Finland (1989) UN Doc CCPR/C/35/D/265/1987; Torres v Finland, (1990), UN 
Doc CCPR/C/38/D/291/1988, para.7; ECtHR: Chahal v UK, Appl. No. 22414/93, Grand Chamber 
Judgment 15 November 1996 ; and Navarra v. France, Appl. No. 13190/87, Judgment 23 November 
1993. 
103 Inter-Am Com HR, Second Report on the Human Rights Situation in Surinam, OEA/Ser. L/V/II.66, 
doc. 21 rev. 1, 1985, p. 24. 
104 Rencontre Africaine pour la défense de droits de l’homme v Zambia, (71/92), 10th Annual Report of 
the African Commission, ACHPR/RPT/10th, 1996 -1997. 
105 ECtHR: Navarra v France, Appl. No. 13190/87, Judgment 23 November 1993, para. 26; and ECtHR: 
Storck v Germany Appl. No. 61603/00, Judgment 16 June 2005, para 102. 
106 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 20, para 11: ‘to guarantee the effective protection of 
detained persons, provisions should be made for detainees to be held in places officially recognized as 
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authorities, the detainee, or his or her family.107  Places of detention must also be visited 
regularly by qualified, experienced and independent monitors, who have the right to 
communicate freely and in full confidentiality with the detainees.108  While international 
human rights law does not expressly prohibit incommunicado detention, the Human Rights 
Committee has found that the practice of incommunicado detention is conducive to torture 
and should be avoided.109  
 
The European Court has stated that ‘where an individual is taken into police custody in good 
health but is found to be injured at the time of release, it is incumbent on the State to provide 
a plausible explanation as to the cause of the injury.’110  Complaints must be investigated 
promptly, independently, thoroughly and impartially by competent authorities, with a 
reasonable amount of transparency.111  This should include the taking of witness statements 
                                                 
places of detention and for their names and places of detention, as well as for the names of persons 
responsible for their detention, to be kept in registers readily available and accessible to those concerned, 
including relatives and friends.’  
107ECtHR Çakici v Turkey, Appl. No 23657/94, Judgment 8 July 1999, paras 302 and 104. See also 
The UN Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or 
Imprisonment, Principle 12.  The authorities must keep and maintain up-to-date official registers of all 
detainees, both at each place of detention and centrally. 
108 UN Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or 
Imprisonment, Principle 29.  A number of human rights treaties and the mandates of some 
international and regional bodies provide for access to persons deprived of their liberty. For example, 
the UN Subcommittee on the Prevention of Torture as well as the National Preventive Mechanism 
established under the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, or the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture 
created by the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment.  
109 Preliminary Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Peru, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.67, 25 
July 1996, paras 18 and 24; and Human Rights Committee General Comment 20, para 11.   
110 ECtHR: Aksoy v Turkey, Appl. No. 21987/93, Judgment 18 December 1996, para 61.  See also: 
Assenov and others v Bulgaria 28 October 1998, Kurt v Turkey Appl. No. 15/1997/799/1002 Judgment 
25 May 1998; Çakici v Turkey, Appl. No 23657/94, Judgment of 8 July 1999, Akdeniz and others v 
Turkey, Appl. No. 25165/94, Judgment 31 May 2001; and Inter-Am Ct HR, Case of the Rochela 
Massacre v Colombia Series C No. 163, 2007, paras 195 and 295. 
111 ECtHR: Yeşil and Sevim v. Turkey Appl. No. 34738/04, Judgment 5 June 2007; Cafer Kurt v. 
Turkey Appl. No. 56365/00, Judgment 24 July 2007; Fazıl Ahmet Tamer and Others v. Turkey Appl. 
No. 19028/02, Judgment 24 July 2007; Cobzaru v Romania Appl. No. 48254/99, Judgment 26 July 
2007; Maslova and Nalbandov v. Russia Appl. No. 839/02,  Judgment 24 January 2008; Khashiyev 
and Akayeva v. Russia Appl. Nos. 57942/00 and 57945/00, Judgment 24 February 2005, paras 156–66, 
178–80.  See also Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31, para 15; Committee against 
Torture: Nikoli and Nikoli v Serbia and Montenegro (2005) UN Doc CAT/C/35/D/174/2000, and 
Khaled M’Barek (re: Faisal Baraket) v Tunisia (1999) UN Doc CAT/C/23/D/60/1996; Human Rights 
Committee, Rajapakse v Sri Lanka (2006) UN Doc CCPR/C/87/D/1250/2004, paras 9.4–9.5; and 
Blanco Abad v Spain (1998) UN Doc CAT/C/20/D/59/1996. 
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and the gathering of forensic evidence capable of leading to the identification and punishment 
of those responsible.112  States must also hold those responsible to account for such acts 
whether the involvement has been through ‘encouraging, ordering, tolerating or perpetrating’ 
them.113   
 
International human rights law also obliges States to carry out investigations of torture and 
other forms of ill-treatment, even if there has not been a formal complaint, and to provide 
individuals with a right to complain, to have their complaints investigated and to be offered 
protection against any consequent threats or ill-treatment.114  The absence of an adequate 
investigation has itself been found to constitute a violation of the corresponding articles of the 
European and American Conventions by their respective courts.115 
 
As discussed above, IHL provisions relating to ‘treatment of persons in the power of a party 
to the conflict’ expressly acknowledge the applicability of international human rights law.116  
All detainees are entitled to protection from torture or other ill-treatment and so the detailed 
safeguards set out here in international human rights law would also apply to those being 
detained under IHL provisions.  As will be discussed later in this chapter, it is now generally 
agreed that that detainees, by virtue of their detention, are brought under the jurisdiction of 
                                                 
112 Ibid. See also ECtHR, Sevtap Veznedaroglu v. Turkey, Appl. No. 32357/96, Judgment 11 April 
2000; and Kelly and Others v. UK, Appl. No. 30054/96, Judgment 4 May 2001. 
113 Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 7: Article 7, Prohibition of Torture or Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Adopted at the Sixteenth Session of the Human 
Rights Committee, on 30 May 1982, para 1; Human Rights Committee General Comment no. 20: 
Torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’ (1992), paras 13 and 14.  See also 
Rodriguez Veiga v. Uruguay (1994) UN Doc CCPR/C/51/D/487/1992 . 
114 UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
Articles 12, 13 and 16. 
115 ECtHR: Aydın v. Turkey, Appl. No. 23178/94 Judgment (Grand Chamber) 25 September 1997, para 
103; Assenov v. Bulgaria, Appl. No.24760/94, Judgment 29 October 1998,  para 102; Labita v. Italy  
Appl. No. 26772/95, Judgment 6 April 2000,  para 131; İlhan v Turkey Appl. No. 22277/93, Judgment 
27 June 2000, paras 89–93; Bekos and Koutropoulos v Greece Appl. No. 15250/02,  13 December 
2005, paras 45–55; Corsacov v Moldova Appl. No. 18944/02, Judgment 4 April 2006, paras 66–82; 
H.L.R. v France, Appl. No. 24573/94, Judgment 29 April 1997; D. v UK, Appl. No. 30240/96, 
Judgment 2 May 1997.  See also Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Velásquez-Rodríguez v. 
Honduras (1988) Series C No. 4 [Merits], paras 159–88 and 194; and Bueno-Alves v. Argentina (2007) 
Series C No. 164, paras 88–90 and 108. 
116 Additional Protocol I, Article 72. 
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the detaining State – even if this happens in another country.  There are, however, 
uncertainties about some aspects of the legal regime applicable to such detentions when 
carried out during international military operations, including peacekeeping missions and 
these will be discussed further in Chapter Five.   
 
Under international human rights law, lethal force is only permissible in circumstances where 
it is ‘absolutely necessary’ for certain specified purposes.117   After some initial reluctance118 
a series of cases at the European Court relating to Northern Ireland, Cyprus, south-east 
Turkey, Chechnya and the Caucasus have established a considerable jurisprudence on alleged 
violations of the right to life in conflict-related situations.  The first of these was McCann and 
Others v UK, in 1995, where the Court narrowly ruled that the overall planning of an anti-
terrorist operation that killed three members of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Gibraltar 
had resulted in a violation of their right to life.119  The Court found that the soldiers, acting ‘in 
obedience to superior orders . . . honestly believed, in the light of the information that they 
had been given . . .  that it was necessary to shoot the suspects’.120  It held that the allegation 
that the killings were ‘premeditated or the product of a tacit agreement amongst those 
involved’ was ‘unsubstantiated’.121  However, since the authorities had received prior 
                                                 
117 While the ICCPR and the IACHR simply prohibit ‘arbitrary’ killings, the European Convention 
contains a very specific list of the permitted grounds in which the deadly use of force can be exercised.  
ECHR, Article 2 (2). ‘Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this 
Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: (a) in defence 
of any person from unlawful violence; (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a 
person lawfully detained; (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.’ 
Similar provisions and restrictions can be found in the Report on the Basic Principles on the Use of 
Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officers 1990. 
118 Stewart v. UK, Appl. No. 10044/82, Decision on Admissibility, 10 July 1984.  In this case the Court 
simply deferred to the domestic court’s acceptance of the circumstances in which British soldiers 
justified the shooting dead of a 13 year old boy in Belfast.    
119 McCann and others v. UK, Appl. No. 18984/91, (Grand Chamber) Judgment of 5 September 1995.   
120 Ibid., para 184. 
121 Ibid., para 200.  See also paras 179-80 where the Court said that ‘it would need to have convincing 
evidence before it could conclude that there was a premeditated plan, in the sense developed by the 
applicants . . . . the Court does not find it established that there was an execution plot at the highest 
level of command in the Ministry of Defence or in the Government, or that Soldiers A, B, C and D had 
been so encouraged or instructed by the superior officers who had briefed them prior to the operation, 
or indeed that they had decided on their own initiative to kill the suspects irrespective of the existence 
of any justification for the use of lethal force and in disobedience to the arrest instructions they had 
received. Nor is there evidence that there was an implicit encouragement by the authorities or hints and 
innuendoes to execute the three suspects.’ 
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notification of the attack and had placed the three under close observation, the decision not to 
arrest them as they entered Gibraltar could only have been based either on prior knowledge 
that they did not have a bomb or else ‘a serious miscalculation by those responsible for 
controlling the operation.’122  Having rejected the first hypothesis, the Court found a violation 
due to the second.123  
 
In Ergi v. Turkey, in 1998, the Court found a violation in relation to the death of a woman 
whose relatives claimed she had been killed in an attempted ambush by government forces, 
while the Turkish government insisted she had been killed in cross-fire with guerrillas of the 
PKK.124  Unable to rule who had fired the fatal shots, the Court used similar reasoning to that 
in McCann when it stated that a State’s responsibility for violations of the right to life may be 
engaged where its agents ‘fail to take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and 
methods of a security operation mounted against an opposing group with a view to avoiding 
and, in any event, to minimising, incidental loss of civilian life.’125   
 
In Albekov v. Russia, in 2009, the Court found that it was not necessary to determine who had 
laid anti-personnel mines around a village in Chechnya, which subsequently killed and 
injured several people, since the government did not deny that it was aware of them and 
therefore had a positive obligation to either clear or mark the site.126  In Matzarakis v. Greece 
the Court found that deficiencies in the domestic legal framework on the use of lethal – or 
potentially lethal – force or in the training and instructions given to law enforcement officials 
                                                 
122 Ibid., para 205. 
123 Ibid., para 206-8.  According to the Court: ‘A number of key assessments were made. . . . [all of 
which] turned out to be erroneous. . . .  it might have been thought unlikely that they would have been 
prepared to explode the bomb, thereby killing many civilians, as Mr McCann and Ms Farrell strolled 
towards the border area since this would have increased the risk of detection and capture  . . .  It might 
also have been thought improbable that at that point they would have set up the transmitter in 
anticipation to enable them to detonate the supposed bomb immediately if confronted. . . . a series of 
working hypotheses were conveyed to Soldiers A, B, C and D as certainties, thereby making the use of 
lethal force almost unavoidable’.  
124 ECtHR: Ergi v. Turkey, Appl. No. 23818/94, Judgment 28 July 1998. 
125Ibid., para 79.   
126 ECtHR: Albekov v. Russia, Appl. No, 68216/01, Judgment 6 April 2009, paras 85-6. 
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can, in themselves, amount to a violation of the right to life.127  In Gorovenky and Bugara v. 
Ukraine128 and Sašo Gorgiev v. the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia129 the Court 
found violations because the authorities had not vetted police officers to ensure that they were 
fit to be issued with weapons.  In Hamiyet Kaplan and others v. Turkey, the Court found a 
violation because security force officers attempting to arrest armed PKK members in a house 
raid did not have non-lethal weapons and were not trained in non-lethal methods of arrest.130 
 
A series of cases have also found violations due to a lack of an effective investigation into the 
circumstances surrounding the use of lethal force by the security forces followed by 
appropriate remedies.131  In Kelly and Others v. UK,132 in 2001, the Court found a procedural 
violation because inquests in Northern Ireland cannot apportion blame, the victims’ relatives 
had been denied access to relevant documents, and due to the excessive delays, in holding the 
hearings.133  The Court has ruled that official investigations into the use of lethal force must 
                                                 
127 Matzarakis v. Greece, Appl. No. 50385/99 Judgment (Grand Chamber) 20 December 2004.  See 
also Putintseva v. Russia, Appl. No. 33498/04, Judgment 10 May 2012; Nachova and Others v. 
Bulgaria, Appl.  No. 43577/98, Judgment (Grand Chamber), 6 July 2005; Soare and Others v. 
Romania, Appl. No. 24329/02, Judgment 22 February 2011. 
128 ECtHR: Gorovenky and Bugara v. Ukraine, Appl. Nos. 36146/05 and 42418/05, Judgment 12 
January 2012. 
129ECtHR: Sašo Gorgiev v. the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Appl. No. 49382/06 
Judgment 19 April 2012. 
130 ECtHR: Hamiyet Kaplan and others v. Turkey, Appl. No. 36749/97, Judgment 13 September 2005. 
131 ECtHR: McCann and others v. UK, Appl. No. 18984/91, 5 September 1995, para 161.  The Court 
stated that:  ‘a general legal prohibition of arbitrary killing by the agents of the State would be 
ineffective, in practice, if there existed no procedure for reviewing the lawfulness of the use of lethal 
force by State authorities. The obligation to protect the right to life under this provision, read in 
conjunction with the State’s general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to “secure to everyone 
within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in [the] Convention”, requires by implication 
that there should be some form of effective official investigation when individuals have been killed as 
a result of the use of force by, inter alios, agents of the State.’  See also ECtHR: Kashiyev and Akayeva 
v. Russia, Appl. Nos. 57492 and 57945/00, Judgment 24 February 2005; Yaşa v. Turkey, Appl. No 
22495/93, Judgment of 2 September 1998; Wasilewska and Kalucka v. Poland, Appl. Nos. 28975/04 
and 33406/04, Judgment 23 February 2010; Finogenov and Others v. Russia Appl. Nos. 18299/03 and 
27311/03, Judgment 20 December 2011.  Human Rights Committee, General Comment 6, Article 6 
(Sixteenth session, 1982), Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted 
by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, UN Doc HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1 at 6 (1994), para 4; Herrero Rubio v. 
Colombia, HRC 2 November 1987, UN Doc. A/43/40, 190, para 10.3; Bautista de Arellana v. 
Columbia, HRC 27 October 1995, UN Doc. A/51/40, Vol.II, 132, para 8.2, 10. 
132 ECtHR: Kelly and Others v. UK, Appl. No. 30054/96, Judgment 4 May 2001.  This concerned the 
killing of eight IRA members and one uninvolved civilian, as a result of what the claimants alleged 
was a shoot to kill ambush, based on prior information received from an informant.  
133 Ibid., paras 119-134.  See also Guardian, ‘Delay, delay, delay: Northern Ireland troubles inquests 
still outstanding’, 14 April 2014, reporting that some 70 inquests into disputed killings in the province 
remain to be completed, with many delayed for several decades.  
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be pro-active, independent, prompt, effective, allow for an element of public scrutiny and 
involve the next of kin of the victim ‘to the extent necessary to safeguard his or her legitimate 
interests’.134 Similar provisions requiring an obligation to investigate can be found in ‘soft 
law’ instruments.135   
 
The obligation to investigate may also include cases where killings have been carried out by 
non-state actors. In Velásquez Rodríguez the Inter-American Court found that even when a 
killing had been carried out by a private individual there was a duty on the State ‘to use the 
means at its disposal to carry out a serious investigation of violations committed within its 
jurisdiction, to identify those responsible, to impose the appropriate punishment and to ensure 
the victim adequate compensation.’136  In Finucane v. UK the European Court also found a 
violation because the authorities had ‘failed to provide a prompt and effective investigation 
into the allegations of collusion by security personnel’ with loyalist paramilitaries that 
resulted in the killing of a lawyer who had been prominently involved in challenging alleged 
shoot-to-kill operations by the security forces.137  The Human Rights Committee has also 
stated that: ‘A failure by a State Party to investigate allegations of violations could in and of 
itself give rise to a separate breach of the Covenant.138 
                                                 
134 Öğur v. Turkey, Appl. No. 21594/93, Judgment 20 May 1999, para 92; Seidova and Others v. 
Bulgaria, Appl. No. 310/04, Judgment 18 November 2010; Ergı v. Turkey, Judgment of 28 July 1998, 
paras 83-84; Kaya v. Turkey, Judgment 19 February 1998, para 87; Salman v. Turkey, Judgment 27 
June 2000, para 106; Tanrıkulu v. Turkey, Judgment (Grand Chamber) 8 July 1999, para109; Yaşa v. 
Turkey, Judgment 2  September 1998, paras 102-104; Cakıcı v. Turkey, Judgment 8 July 1999, paras 
80, 87 and 106; Tanrikulu v. Turkey, Judgment  8 July 1999, para  109; Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, 
Judgment  28 March 2000, paras 106-107; Ertak v. Turkey, Judgment 9 May 2000; Kılıç v. Turkey, 
Judgment 28 March 2000; Anguelova v. Bulgaria, Appl No. 38361/97, Judgment 13 June 2002, para 
137; Jasinskis v. Latvia, Appl. No. 45744/08, Judgment  21 December 2010, para 72; Paul and Audrey 
Edwards v. UK, Appl. No. 46477/99, Judgment 14 March 2002; Kolevi v. Bulgaria, Appl. No. 
1108/02, Judgment 5 November 2009; Ognyanova and Choban v. Bulgaria, Appl. No. 46317/99, 
Judgment 23 February 2006. 
135 For example, the UN Basic Principles, Use of Force and Firearms 1990, Article 22; and the Principles 
on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions, Article 
9.. 
136 Inter American Court of Human Rights Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras (1988) Series C No. 4 
[Merits].  
137 ECtHR: Finucane v UK, Appl. No. 29178/95, Judgment, 1 July 2003, para 84. See also Osmanoglu 
v. Turkey Appl. No. 488804/99, Judgment 24 January 2008, para 75; and Koku v. Turkey, Appl. No. 
27305/95, Judgment 31 May 2005, para 132. 
138 General Comment 31 of the Human Rights Committee, paras 15 and 18. 
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In a series of cases brought in relation to alleged abductions carried out by military forces in 
Chechnya the European Court has stated that: ‘it is sufficient for the applicants to make a 
prima facie case of abduction by servicemen, showing that their relatives fell within the 
control of the authorities, and it is then for the Government to discharge their burden of proof 
. . . by providing a satisfactory and convincing explanation of how the events in question 
occurred.’139  In Al-Skeini v. UK the Court emphasized that ‘the procedural obligation under 
Article 2 continues to apply in difficult security conditions, including in a context of armed 
conflict’.140   In Kaya v. Turkey it stated that: 
 
Neither the prevalence of violent armed clashes nor the high incidence of fatalities 
can displace the obligation under Article 2 to ensure that an effective, independent 
investigation is conducted into deaths arising out of clashes involving the security 
forces.141 
 
In some cases the Court has found violations due to the direct use of excessive force.  For 
example, in Gulec v. Turkey, in 1998, in which a 15 year old boy was shot dead when 
members of the security forces used machine gun fire to break up a demonstration142 and in 
Gul v. Turkey, in 2000, where the security forces had deliberately fired a long burst of 
machine gun fire into a door behind which they knew the victim was standing.143  In Isayeva, 
                                                 
139 ECtHR: Malika Yusupova and Others v. Russia, Appl. Nos. 14705/09, 4386/10, 67305/10, 
68860/10 and 70695/10, Judgment 15 January 2015, para 176.  See also Aslakhanova and Others v. 
Russia, Appl. Nos. 2944/06 and 8300/07, 50184/07, 332/08, 42509/10, Judgment 18 December 2012, 
para 99; Tovsultanova v. Russia, Appl. No. 26974/06, Judgment 17 June 2010, paras 77-81; Movsayevy 
v. Russia, Appl. No. 20303/07, Judgment 14 June 2011, para 76; and Shafiyeva v. Russia, Appl. No. 
49379/09, Judgment, 3 May 2012, para 71. 
140 ECtHR: Al-Skeini and Others v. UK, Appl. No. 55721/07, Judgment (Grand Chamber) 7 July 2011, 
para 164.    
141 ECtHR: Kaya v. Turkey, Appl. No. 22729/93, Judgment 19 February 1998, para 9.  See also Jularić 
v. Croatia, Appl. No. 20106/06, Judgment 20 January 2011 and Skendžić and Krznarić v. Croatia, 
Appl. No. 16212/08, Judgment 20 January 2011 both of which related to a lack of proper 
investigations during the conflict in Croatia. 
142 ECtHR: Güleç v. Turkey, Appl. No. 21593/93, Judgment of 27 July 1998, para 82. 
143 ECtHR: Gul v. Turkey, Appl. No. 22676/93, Judgment of 14 December 2000, para 93.   
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Yusupova and Bazayeva v. Russia, the Court found a violation on the facts of the case, noting 
‘an insurmountable discrepancy’, ‘incomplete accounts’ and a general lack of credibility in 
the government’s evidence. 144  However, it also stated that:  
 
The Court accepts that the situation that existed in Chechnya at the relevant time 
called for exceptional measures on behalf of the State in order to regain control over 
the Republic and to suppress the illegal armed insurgency. These measures could 
presumably include employment of military aviation equipped with heavy combat 
weapons.145   
 
It has been argued that some of the cases on which the European Court of Human Rights has 
based its decisions may have constituted non-international armed conflict, but that the States 
concerned were reluctant publicly to admit this for political reasons.146  For example, in 
McCann the Court was faced with choosing between accepting the British government’s 
official explanation, which had already been significantly undermined by investigative 
journalists,147 or the appellants’ claim that there was an undeclared non-international armed 
conflict between the IRA and Britain’s security forces.148  Even though it rejected this claim, 
                                                 
144 ECtHR: Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva v. Russia, Appl. No. 57947-49/00, Judgment 24 February 
2005, para 179. 
145 Ibid., para 178.  
146 Hampson, 2008, p.555 and 561 lists south-east Turkey, Chechnya and Northern Ireland at certain 
points during the troubles.  See also Reidy, Hampson and Boyle, ‘The European Convention on 
Human Rights in the case of Turkey’, Netherlands Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 2, June 
1997, p.161-173; Aisling Reidy, ‘The Approach of the European Commission and Court of Human 
Rights to International Humanitarian Law’, International Review of the Red Cross, No. 324, 30 
September 1998, pp.513-30; and Oberleitner, 2015, pp.295-309.   
147 For example, Thames Television broadcast a documentary ‘Death on the Rock’, on 28 April 1988, 
which included interviews with witnesses who claimed that the three had either been shot without 
warning or had tried to surrender and had also been shot at point-blank range while lying on the 
ground.  The television station came under sustained criticism from Conservative politicians in the 
wake of this broadcast and was forced to close after losing its licence two years later.  See 
Independent, ‘Sudden death and the long quest for answers’, 28 September 1995; and Open 
Democracy, ‘Death on the Rock: 21 years later and still the official version lives on’, 23 November 
2009. 
148 For differing perspectives on the nature of the conflict and the status of those imprisoned as a result 
of it see David Beresford, Ten Men Dead, London: Grafton Books, 1987; and Padraig O’Malley, 
Biting at the grave, the Irish hunger strikes and the politics of despair, Boston: Beacon Press, 1991. 
Mairead Farrell who was killed in Gibraltar, had been the commander of the women prisoners in 
Armagh Gaol during protests against the ‘criminalisation’ policy of the British government, which had 
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the Court’s judgment was extremely controversial149 and resulted in a Joint Dissenting 
Opinion by nine judges who found no violation.150  Gearty has speculated that the Court was 
prepared to accept ‘a tale of appalling professional incompetence and official stupidity’, 
rather than accuse the British government of operating a shoot-to-kill policy for this reason.151  
In a similar vein, Hampson has noted that in Özkan,152 a young girl killed by the Turkish 
security forces during an assault against a village, the Court accepted that a decision by the 
security forces ‘to open intensive fire’ on a village ‘was “absolutely necessary” for the 
purposes of protecting life’, but found a violation because Turkey had failed to take sufficient 
measures subsequently to search for and assist civilian casualties.153 
 
The European Court has long been ‘reluctant’ to label situations as ‘armed conflicts in IHL 
terms’, in order ‘to avoid unnecessary controversy – especially where the States parties do not 
themselves qualify the situation as an armed conflict.’154  In Cyprus v. Turkey, in 1976, for 
                                                 
withdrawn ‘special category status’ from imprisoned republicans in 1976, and which culminated in the 
hunger strike of 1981.  
149 See, for example, Independent, ‘Tory anger as European Court condemns Gibraltar killings’, 28 
September 1995, in which Michael Hesseltine the Deputy Prime Minister stated when asked how his 
government would respond to the judgment: ‘We shall do nothing. We will pursue our right to fight 
terrorism to protect innocent people where we have jurisdiction, and we will not be swayed or deterred 
in any way by the ludicrous decisions of the Court.’ 
150 McCann and others v. UK, Appl. No. 18984/91, 5 September 1995, Joint dissenting opinion of 
Judges Ryssdal, Bernhardt, Thór Vilhjálmsson, Gölcüklü, Palm, Pekkanen, Sir John Freeland, Baka 
and Jambrek. 
151 London Review of Books, Conor Gearty, ‘After Gibraltar’, 16 November 1995.  He notes that: ‘All 
the contradictions and inconsistencies in this sequence of events would be instantly resolved if it had 
been the British intention all along to execute the three potential bombers.  The loose ends and 
inadequate explanations that litter the official story would be transformed by the existence of such a 
plot into coherent aspects of a rational plan of action.’   
152 ECtHR: Ozkan and others v. Turkey, Appl. No. 21689/93, 6 April 2004, paras 305-8. 
153 Written statement by Françoise Hampson, ´The case-law of the European Court of Human Rights 
and the Use of Force´, in International Committee of the Red Cross, Expert Meeting: The use of force 
in armed conflicts: Interplay between the conduct of hostilities and law enforcement paradigms, 
Geneva: ICRC, 2013, p.74.  Hampson notes that: ‘The Court appears to have wanted to ensure that the 
State was held responsible for her death but was perhaps nervous of getting into a detailed analysis of 
the facts of the assault against the village. The applicant’s lawyer argued that she died as a result of the 
indiscriminate use of force. Instead the Court focused on what happened when the security forces 
entered the village. . . The security forces asked if anyone needed medical treatment but did not go 
round inspecting each individual. The little girl’s mother did not say anything, which is perhaps not 
surprising in the circumstances. Had the security forces not asked if there was a need for medical 
treatment or if they had not provided any treatment necessary, that would appropriately be a 
Convention issue. They did ask however.’ 
154 Summary of the presentation by Olga Chernishova, Head of Legal Division, Registry of the 
European Court of Human Rights,  ‘Recent Developments in the Case-Law of the European Court of 
Human Rights Related to the Issue of the Use of Force’, in ICRC Expert Meeting, 2013, p.89. 
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example, a majority of the European Commission found that since Turkey had neither 
derogated nor invoked the law of armed conflict, its detention of prisoners was unlawful 
under the Convention,155 although a minority argued that IHL may be applicable on factual 
grounds.156   
 
The Human Rights Committee has followed a similar approach.  In the Guerrero case it ruled 
that disproportionate force had been used against unarmed guerillas in Colombia who were 
ambushed by the police outside their house in Bogota and shot dead without being given an 
opportunity to surrender.157  In its Concluding Observations on Israel, in 2003, the Committee 
stated that: ‘before resorting to the use of deadly force, all measures to arrest a person 
suspected of being in the process of committing acts of terror must be exhausted.’158  In 2010 
it reiterated its concern that Israel had ‘targeted and extra-judicially executed 184 individuals 
in the Gaza Strip, resulting in the collateral unintended death of 155 additional 
individuals’.159  In both observations it stated that ‘the applicability of the regime of 
international humanitarian law during an armed conflict does not preclude the application of 
the Covenant.’160 
 
                                                 
155 Cyprus v. Turkey, Appl. No. 6780/74 & 6950/75, Report of the Commission, adopted on 10 July 
1976, paras 527-8, where it stated that ‘in any case, Art. 15 requires some formal and public act of 
derogation, such as a declaration of martial law or state of emergency, and that, where no such act has 
been proclaimed by the High Contracting Party concerned, although it was not in the circumstances 
prevented from doing so, Art. 15 cannot apply’ and para 313 where it noted that both Cyprus and 
Turkey were parties to the Third Geneva Convention and that Turkey had provided the ICRC with 
access to detainees who had been granted POW status so the Commission did not ‘find it necessary to 
examine the question of a breach of Art. 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights with regard 
to persons accorded the status of prisoners of war.’ 
156 Ibid. Dissenting Opinion of Mr. G. Sperduti, joined by Mr. S. Trechsel, paras 5 and 6.  For further 
discussion see Hampson, Françoise J. ‘The relationship between international humanitarian law and 
human rights law from the perspective of a human rights treaty body’, International Review of the Red 
Cross, Vol. 90, No. 871 September 2008, pp.549-72. 
157 Camargo and Suarez de Guerrero v. Colombia, 31 March 1982, UN Doc. CCPR/C/15/D/45/1979. 
158 Concluding Observations: Israel, 21 August 2003, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/78/ISR, para 15. 
159 Concluding Observations: Israel, 3 September 2010, UN Doc. CCPR/C/ISR/CO/3, para 10. 
160 Concluding Observations: Israel, 21 August 2003, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/78/ISR, para 11.  
Concluding Observations: Israel, 3 September 2010, UN Doc. CCPR/C/ISR/CO/3, para 5.   
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In its Concluding Observations to the Philippines in 2003 the HRC called on the State Party 
to ‘take urgent measures to ensure the protection of civilians in areas affected by military 
operations in accordance with its human rights obligations.’161  In its Concluding 
Observations to Uganda in 2004 the Committee regretted: ‘that the State Party has not taken 
sufficient steps to ensure the right to life and the right to liberty and security of persons 
affected by armed conflict in northern Uganda, in particular Internally Displaced Persons 
currently confined to camps’.162  In its Concluding Observations to the Democratic Republic 
of Congo in 2006 it restated that, ‘the provisions of the Covenant and all the obligations 
thereunder apply to the territory in its entirety’, while acknowledging that the government did 
not effectively control part of the eastern regions of the country due to the armed conflict.163  
In its Concluding Observations to Sudan in 2007 the Committee expressed concern about 
‘widespread and systematic serious human rights violations’ that were being committed 
‘particularly in the context of armed conflict’.164  In none of these cases did the Committee 
make any statement which suggested that it thought that IHL qualified or replaced in anyway 
the obligations of international human rights law. 165 
 
The inter-relationship of international human rights law and IHL  
 
The demarcation point between a state of emergency, which might justify derogation from 
some human rights obligations, and the moment at which an armed conflict can be said to 
have broken out is sometimes blurred,  making it ‘difficult to assess when consideration of 
human rights norms should end and the application of IHL norms should begin’.166  There 
                                                 
161 Concluding Observations: Philippines, 1 December 2003, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/79/PHL, para 15. 
162 Concluding Observations: Uganda, 4 May 2004, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/80/UGA, para 12. 
163 Concluding Observations: Democratic Republic of Congo, 26 April 2006, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/COD/CO/3, para 4. 
164 Concluding Observations: Sudan, 29 August 2007, UN Doc. CCPR/C/SDN/CO/3, para 9. 
165 Larsen, 2012, p.288: ‘the Committee takes IHL into consideration when making observations about 
state compliance with the Covenant only to a limited extent, if at all.’ 
166 Kenneth Watkin, ‘Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights Norms in Contemporary 
Armed Conflict’, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 98, No. 1, 2004, p.26.  For further 
discussion see Christopher Greenwood, ‘Protection of Peacekeepers: The Legal Regime’, in Duke 
Journal of Comparative & International Law, Vol. 7, 1996, pp. 199–200; Roberta Arnold & Noelle 
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will also be situations where the two paradigms overlap.167  As the ICRC has noted: ‘For 
example, in a non-international armed conflict, when a State is using force against fighters, it 
may be considered as simultaneously conducting hostilities and maintaining law and order 
(since fighters are also frequently criminals under domestic law).’168  There may also be 
situations in which civilians are present alongside fighters, for example during a riot, or 
where civilian unrest escalates into an armed conflict in which the rules regarding the use of 
lethal force will be different depending on which legal framework is considered applicable.169 
 
Many violations of international human rights law are also violations of IHL.  For example, 
‘the deliberate killing of civilians, the wanton destruction of civilian property and looting, the 
use of civilians as human shields, the destruction of infrastructure vital to civilian populations 
survival, rape and other forms of sexual violence, torture and the carrying out of 
indiscriminate attacks are violations of both sets of law.’170 However, as Lubell observes, the 
two bodies of law take an entirely different approach to the use of lethal force and also treat 
concepts such as ‘necessity’ and ‘proportionality’ very differently.171   
 
                                                 
Quénivet (eds) International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, Leiden and Boston: Martin 
Nijhof, 2008; ICRC Expert Meeting, 2013; Noam Lubell, ‘Challenges in Applying Human Rights Law 
to Armed Conflict,’ International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 87, No. 737, December 2005; Lubell, 
2010, pp.25-63 and 85 -131; Duffy, 2005, pp.151-61; Wills, 2009, pp.113-170 and 236-47; Larsen, 
2012, pp.243-96; Oberleitner, 2015, pp.131-41 and 169-83. 
167 Ibid.  See also Robert Kolb and Gloria Gaggioli, (eds), Research Handbook on Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham Glos. and Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar, 
2013; Daniel Bethlehem, Sandesh Sivakumaran, Noam Lubell, Philip Leach, and, Elizabeth 
Wilmshurst, Classification of Conflicts: The Way Forward, International Law Meeting Summary, 
Chatham House, 1 October 2012; and Françoise J. Hampson, ‘Direct participation in hostilities and the 
interoperability of the law of armed conflict and human rights law,’, International Law Studies, Vol. 
87, US Naval War College, 2011, p.192. 
168 ICRC Expert Meeting, 2013. 
169 Ibid. 
170 Increasing Respect for Civilians in Non-International Conflicts, Geneva: International Committee 
of the Red Cross, 2008. 
171 Lubell, 2010, p.7: ‘Under international humanitarian law this [the shooting of an unarmed soldier] 
would generally be considered a lawful – and indeed common – act of war’; and pp.64-6: ‘In the 
context of law enforcement, under international human rights law, the proportionality principle 
requires that the force being used should be proportionate to the sought objective (eg not to fire a lethal 
weapon to prevent someone evading a parking ticket) . . . . In the laws of armed conflict principle of 
proportionality one is required to measure the direct and concrete military advantage against the 
expected harm to civilians and civilian objects.’   See also Noam Lubell, ‘Human rights obligations in 
military occupation’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 94 No. 885 Spring 2012, pp.317-37. 
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IHL permits troops to launch a surprise attack on an enemy military base even if this involves 
‘collateral damage’ to civilians and civilian objects proportional to the military benefit, and a 
soldier may shoot an enemy soldier, so long as he is not hors de combat, even if he or she is 
unarmed and does not pose an ‘immediate threat’ at that particular point.172  Similarly, while 
international human rights law requires an effective investigation into the circumstances 
surrounding the use of lethal force, in all circumstances, IHL only requires investigations of 
potential war crimes.173  While IHL does require ‘immediate’ investigations into the death of 
prisoners and internees, it contains very little detail about the nature of the investigation 
required.174   IHL also does not contain the express provisions found in international human 
rights law for providing victims of its violations with the right to an effective 
remedy.175   Meron has noted that: 
 
                                                 
172 Additional Protocol I, Article 41 (2), A person is ‘hors de combat’ if: (a) he is in the power of an 
adverse Party;(b) he clearly expresses an intention to surrender; or (c) he has been rendered 
unconscious or is otherwise incapacitated by wounds or sickness, and therefore is incapable of 
defending himself; provided that in any of these cases he abstains from any hostile act and does not 
attempt to escape. 
173 ICRC Expert Meeting, 2013, p.55.  ‘There is no doubt, under both IHL and human rights law, that if 
there is a suspicion of a war crime, a criminal investigation must be conducted. However, not every 
civilian killed in an armed conflict raises prima facie a suspicion of criminal behaviour. On the other 
hand, even the killing of enemy fighters or combatants can be a war crime if they were hors de combat 
when killed. The key questions are then the following: when are there sufficient elements to believe 
that the use of force raises issues under criminal law? Does a credible allegation of war crime suffice? 
How many facts does the allegation have to put forth in order to be credible?’  See also Jacob Turkel, 
The Public Commission To Examine the Maritime Incident of 31 May 2010 (Turkel Commission), 
Second Report: Israel’s Mechanisms for Examining and Investigating Complaints and Claims of 
Violations of the Laws of Armed Conflict According to International Law, Government of Israel, 
February 2013, p.99.  This states that all potential war crimes require an investigation, while other 
violations required ‘some form of examination’. 
174 See Geneva Convention III, Article 121 and Geneva Convention IV, Article 131, which contain 
identical provisions requiring an immediate ‘official inquiry by the Detaining Power’ into deaths or 
serious injuries of POWs or detainees and, if this indicates guilt, the prosecution of those responsible. 
175 The right to an effective remedy can be found in ECHR, Article 13, Article 6 (access to court)  and 
Article 41(reparations); ICCPR Article 2.3; Article 14 (fair trial); ACHR, Article 1 and Article 25 
(judicial protection); African Charter, Article 7 (fair trial).  See also Human Right Committee General 
Comment No. 31 - Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, 
paras 15-17. Although IHL does not contain similar provisions, the Basic Principles and Guidelines on 
the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights 
Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, New York, 16 December 2005 refer to 
violations of both bodies of law and the Statute of the International Criminal Court, in Article 75, also 
provides for the possibility of reparations payable to victims. 
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Unlike human rights law, the law of war allows, or at least tolerates, the killing and 
wounding of innocent human beings not directly participating in an armed conflict, 
such as civilian victims of lawful collateral damage.  It also permits certain 
deprivations of personal freedom without convictions in a court of law.  It allows an 
occupying power to resort to internment and limits the appeal rights of detained 
persons.  It permits far-reaching limitations of freedoms of expression and 
assembly.176 
 
While Dennis maintains that during periods of armed conflict, IHL, as the lex specialis, 
should always be awarded primacy over international human rights law,177 others argue that 
the increasing complexity of international law is leading to greater overlap between its 
various branches.178 Prud’homme, for example, insists that the ‘coordination’ of the two 
bodies of law ‘is vital to ensure adequate protection during armed conflict’ and that IHL 
should be considered ‘as lex specialis complementa (complementary) and not derogata 
(derogatory) of human rights law.’179 This is supported by the UN Human Rights Committee, 
which, has stated that the ICCPR: 
 
applies in situations of armed conflict to which the rules of international 
humanitarian law are applicable.  While, in respect of certain Covenant rights, more 
specific rules of humanitarian law may be specially relevant for the purposes of the 
                                                 
176 Theodor Meron, ‘The Humanization of Humanitarian Law’, American Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 94, No.2, April 2000, p.240.  See also Colonel Gerald Irving Anthony Dare Draper, ‘The 
relationship between the human rights regime and the law of armed conflict’, Israeli Yearbook of 
Human Rights, Vol. 1, 1971, p.205 in which he describes ‘the law of war as a derogation from the 
normal regime of human rights.’ 
177 Michael J. Dennis, Application of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times of Armed 
Conflict and Military Occupation’, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 99, No. 1, 
January 2005, pp. 119-141 
178 Nancie Prud’homme, ‘Lex specialis: oversimplifying a more complex and multifaceted 
relationship? ’ Israel Law Review, Vol. 40, No. 2, 2007, pp. 355–95; Oberleitner, 2015, pp.83-107; and 
Hans-Joachim Heintz, ‘Convergence between human rights law and international humanitarian law’, in 
Hans-Joachim Heintz and Andrej Zwitter (eds), International Law and Humanitarian Assistance, 
Berlin: Springer, 2011. 
179 Prud’homme, 2007, p.395. 
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interpretation of Covenant rights, both spheres of law are complementary, not 
mutually exclusive.180 
 
A UN General Assembly resolution on basic principles for the protection of civilian 
populations in armed conflict, overwhelmingly adopted in 1970, specifically states that 
‘fundamental human rights, as accepted in international law and laid down in international 
instruments, continue to apply fully in situations of armed conflict.’181  There are numerous 
examples of the UN condemning violations of human rights committed in the context of 
armed conflicts.182  As previously discussed, the derogation clauses of some human rights 
treaties expressly state that they remain applicable in ‘time of war’.183   
 
The ICJ has attempted to deal with this inter-relationship in three cases.  In Legality or Threat 
of Use of Nuclear Weapons, in 1996, the Court observed that human rights protection ‘does 
not cease in times of war’, and remains applicable, subject to any derogations that States may 
make.184  However, the test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life ‘can only be decided by 
reference to the law applicable in armed conflict’, rather than human rights law, since IHL is 
the ‘applicable lex specialis’.185  It repeated much of this formulation in its The Legal 
                                                 
180 General Comment No. 3, para 1. 
181 UN General Assembly Resolution, 2675 (XXV) 9 December 1970, Adopted by 109 votes in favour, 
none against and 8 abstentions.  See also International Conference on Human Rights, Teheran, 
Resolution XXIII, 12 May 1968; and UN General Assembly Resolution, 2444 (XXIII) 19 December 
1968. 
182 For example, UN General Assembly Resolution, 52/145, 12 December 1997 (in relation to 
Afghanistan); UN Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 1992/60, 3 March 1992 (in relation to 
Iraq); UN Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 1996/73, 23 April 1996 (in relation to Sudan); 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 2000/58, 25 April 2000 (in relation to Chechnya); UN 
Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 1998/75, 22 April 1998 (in relation to Uganda); and UN 
Security Council Resolution 1019, of 9 November 1995; UN Security Council Resolution 1034 of 21 
December 1995; UN General Assembly Resolution 50/193, 22 December 1995; UN Commission on 
Human Rights, Resolution 1996/71, 23 April 1996 (all in relation to former Yugoslavia).  As is 
discussed throughout this thesis, references to human rights also now regularly appear in Security 
Council resolutions mandating POC tasks to UN missions. 
183 ECHR Article 15 refers to ‘war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation ’. 
IACHR, Article 27 refers to ‘war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens the independence 
or security of a State Party ’. ICCPR, Article 4 applies in time of a ‘public emergency which threatens 
the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed’. 
184 ICJ Reports, 8 July 1996, para. 25. 
185 Ibid. 
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Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (the Wall), 
in 2004, but stated that while both bodies of law continued to apply, ‘some rights may be 
exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; others may be exclusively matters of 
human rights law; yet others may be matters of both these branches of international law.’186 
The Court, therefore, had ‘to take into consideration both these branches of international law, 
namely human rights law and, as lex specialis, international humanitarian law.’187 In Armed 
activity on the territory of the Congo the ICJ made no reference to IHL as the lex specialis 
and simply concluded that both branches of international law ‘would have to be taken into 
consideration.’188   
 
As Hampson and Lubell have observed, the decisions of the ICJ show that the applicability of 
IHL to a particular factual situation ‘does not displace the jurisdiction of a human rights 
body’ since human rights law remains applicable in all circumstances.189  While the ICJ is 
free to find violations of both bodies of law, however, a human rights body only has the 
competence to find a violation within this legal framework.  They argue that where IHL is 
applicable, ‘a human rights body has two choices.’ It must either apply human rights law 
through the lens of IHL or it must blend the two bodies of law together, given that IHL 
contains guidance on issues such as necessary precautions when carrying out attacks on 
military targets or the rules governing aerial bombardment, which international human rights 
law is not equipped to provide.190  
 
While the European Court and UN Human Rights Committee have mainly continued to rely 
exclusively on international human rights law in making its judgments, the Inter-American 
                                                 
186 ICJ Reports, 9 July 2004, para. 106. 
187 Ibid. 
188 ICJ Reports, 19 December 2005, para 216. 
189 Hampson and Lubell, 2013, paras 16-17 
190 Hampson and Lubell, 2013, paras 26-7 They argue that in some circumstances, it would seem that a 
human rights monitoring body could only find a violation of international human rights law if there 
had been a violation of IHL.  For further discussion see ICRC Expert Meeting, 2013. 
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Commission and Court have ruled that they can use IHL as an interpretive tool in certain 
situations.191  In Neira Alegria v. Peru, the Court ruled that the authorities had acted 
disproportionately in demolishing a prison during the course of a riot, basing its decision 
solely on international human rights law, even though most of the detainees who were killed 
were members of a rebel group, involved in a non-international armed conflict.192  In Abella 
v. Argentina, however, the Commission concluded:  
 
the American Convention contains no rules that either define or distinguish civilians 
from combatants and other military targets, much less, specify when a civilian can be 
lawfully attacked or when civilian casualties are a lawful consequence of military 
operations. Therefore, the Commission must necessarily look to and apply 
definitional standards and relevant rules of humanitarian law as sources of 
authoritative guidance in its resolution of this and other kinds of claims alleging 
violations of the American Convention in combat situations.193   
 
The Commission and Court have arrived at similar conclusions in a number of other cases.194  
In Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala, it stated that although it lacked competence to declare 
                                                 
191 For discussion see: Emiliano J. Buis, ‘The Implementation of International Humanitarian Law   by 
Human Rights Courts: The Example of the Inter-American Human Rights System’, Oberleitner, 2015, 
pp.271-91; and Jean-Marie Henckaerts, ‘Concurrent Application of International Humanitarian Law 
and Human Rights Law: A Victim Perspective’, in Roberta Arnold & Noelle Quénivet (eds) 
International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, Leiden and Boston: Martin Nijhof, 2008. 
192 Inter-Am Ct HR, Neira Alegria v. Peru, 19 January 1995, para. 74: ‘Article 4(1) of the Convention 
states that ‘[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.’ . . . . . . Although it appears from 
arguments previously expressed in this judgment that those detained in the Blue Pavilion of the San 
Juan Bautista Prison were highly dangerous and, in fact armed, it is the opinion of this Court, those do 
not constitute sufficient reasons to justify the amount of force used in this and other prisons where riots 
had occurred. The incident was understood as a political confrontation between the Government and 
the real or alleged terrorists of Sendero Luminoso […], a confrontation which probably led to the 
demolition of the Pavilion and all of its consequences; among them the death of inmates who would 
have eventually surrendered, the clear negligence in the search for survivors and, later, in the recovery 
of the bodies.’   
193 Inter-Am Com HR, Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Report No. 55/97, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.9, doc. 6 
rev. P 161 (1998). 
194 Inter-Am Com HR: Arturo Ribón Avilán v. Colombia, Report No. 26/97, Case 11.142, 444, OEA 
Ser. L/V/II.98, Doc. 6 Rev. (1998); Hugo Bustíos Saavedra v. Peru, Report No. 38/97, Case 10.548, 
753, OEA Ser. L/V/II.98, Doc. 6 Rev. (1998); Lucio Parada Cea et al. v. El Salvador, Report No. 
1/99, Case 10.480, 531, OEA Ser. L/V/II.102, Doc. 6 Rev. (1999); Ignacio Ellacuria, S.J. et al. v. El 
Salvador, Report No. 136/99, Case 10.488, 608, OEA Ser. L/V/II.106, Doc. 3 Rev. (1999); Monsignor 
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that a State was responsible for the violation of a treaty over which it had no jurisdiction it 
could ‘observe that certain acts or omissions that violate human rights . . . also violate other 
international instruments for the protection of the individual, such as the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and, in particular, common Article 3.’195  In Franklin Guillermo Aisalla Molina, 
the Commission noted that international human rights law and IHL ‘share a common core of 
non-derogable rights and the mutual goal of protecting the physical integrity and dignity 
inherent in the human being’ and that they ‘may influence and reinforce each other’.196 
 
Although the other UN and regional human rights bodies have yet to develop a 
comprehensive theory concerning their relationship, there is general agreement that 
international human rights law is applicable concurrently with IHL in an armed conflict.197  In 
Hassan v. UK, in 2014, the European Court found that although the applicant’s detention by 
the British army in Iraq, in 2003, brought him within the UK’s extra-territorial jurisdiction 
the otherwise unauthorized detention of suspected combatants, was in compliance with IHL 
provisions in the context of international armed conflict.198 An inter-state case arising out of 
the conflict between Russia and Georgia in 2008, may also lead the European Court to 
address the issue as well.199  Hampson and Lubell have concluded that while there is ‘no 
general, top-down principle which can be applied to establish if an issue should be handled 
                                                 
Oscar Amulfo Romero y Galdámez v. El Salvador, Report No. 37/00, Case 10.481, 671, OEA Ser. 
L/V/II.106, Doc. 3 Rev. (1999); José Alexis Fuentes Guerrero v. Colombia, Report No. 61/99, Case 
11.519, 466, OEA Ser. L/V/II.106, Doc. 7 Rev. (1999); Riofrío Massacre (Colombia), Report No. 
62/01, Case 11.654, 758, OEA Ser. L/V/II.111, Doc. 20 Rev. (2000); Las Palmeras Case, (2000), (Ser. 
C) No. 67 [Preliminary Objection]; Case of the ‘Mapiripán Massacre’ v. Colombia (2005) Series C 
No. 134; Serrano-Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador, (2004), (ser. C) No. 118. 
195 Inter-Am CtHR: Bámaca-Velásquez v Guatemala (2000) Series C No. 70 [Merits]. 
196 Inter-Am Com HR Franklin Guillermo Aisalla Molina. (Ecuador – Colombia), Report No. 112/10 
(Admissibility), Inter-state Petition IP-02, October 21, 2010, paras 117-121. 
197 For further discussion see: Office for the High Commissioner of Human Rights, International Legal 
Protection of Human Rights in Armed Conflict, OHCHR, 2011; and UN Office for the High 
Commissioner of Human Rights, Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while 
Countering Terrorism, 28, OHCHR UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/103, 7 February 2005. 
198 Hassan v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 29750/09, Judgment (Grand Chamber), 16 September 2014. 
199  Georgia brought two inter-state cases against Russia arising out of the conflict between the two 
countries in 2008.  In the first of these, Georgia v. Russia, Appl. No 13255/07, Judgment (Grand 
Chamber) 3 July 2014, the Court found a violation arising out of the mass detention and expulsion of 
Georgian nationals by the Russian authorities in the period leading up the conflict.  The second case – 
Georgia v. Russia II, Appl. No. 38263/08, 13 was declared admissible in December 2011and referred 
to the Grand Chamber in April 2012.  For further discussion see Hampson, and Lubell, 2014. 
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one way or an-other’, the issues involving the conduct of hostilities appear to be more 
appropriate for determination through IHL, while issues involving the protection of victims 
are more likely to involve ‘a blend’ of the two bodies law.200 
 
Extra-territorial application of international human rights law 
 
For international human rights law to be of relevance to States contributing troops to UN 
peacekeeping missions with POC mandates, however, it must also be applicable 
extraterritorially.  Two countries have long-standing objections to the propositions that 
international human rights law can apply extraterritorially and remains applicable during 
armed conflicts,201 but, as Hampson notes, this position is isolated by the ‘overwhelming 
weight of international legal opinion and state practice’.202 
 
The ICESCR explicitly contains an extra-territorial obligation, requiring States to work 
together to realise its rights.203  While the text of the ICCPR appears to suggest that the rights 
would only apply to an individual who fulfilled both criteria of being within a State’s 
territory and subject to its jurisdiction,204 [emphasis added] the UN Human Rights Committee 
                                                 
200 Hampson and Lubell, 2013, para 26. 
201 For Israel’s position see Second periodic report of Israel, UN Doc. CCPR/C/ISR/2001/2, para 8. For 
the HRC’s response see UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.93, para 10; and Concluding Observations of the 
Human Rights Committee: Israel, 5 August 2003, para 11, UN Doc CCPR/CO/78/ISR (2003).  For the 
US position see HRC CCPR/C/USA/3, 28 November 2005, Annex 1, pp.109-111.  See also UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/SR. 1405, para. 20 (1995) para 20; CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1, 18.12.2006, para 10; 
CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1, Add.1, p.3; and Concluding Observations on the United States, 
CCPR/C/USA/CO/4 para 4 (2014). 
202 Hampson, 2008, p.551.  For further discussion see: Oberleitner, 2015, pp.144-65; Ralph Wilde, 
‘Legal “Black Hole”? Extraterritorial State Action and International Treaty Law on Civil and Political 
rights’, Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 26, 6 June 2005, pp.739-804; John, Cerone, Out 
of Bounds? Considering the Reach of International Human Rights Law, Center for Human Rights and 
Global Justice, New York University School of Law, Working Paper No. 5, 2006. 
203 ICESCR, Article 2. 
204 ICCPR, Article 2.1. ‘Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to 
all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.’ 
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has repeatedly stated that this interpretation is too restrictive.205   In its General Comment on 
Article 2, for example the Human Rights Committee states the wording: 
 
means that a State Party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant 
to anyone within the power or effective control of that State Party, even if not 
situated within the territory of the State Party . . . This principle also applies to those 
within the power or effective control of the forces of a State Party acting outside its 
territory, regardless of the circumstances in which such power or effective control 
was obtained, such as forces constituting a national contingent of a State Party 
assigned to an international peace-keeping or peace-enforcement operation.206   
 
There is clear agreement that States have a duty to protect people from potential violations of 
their rights by not deporting or extraditing someone to a country where he or she may suffer 
torture or threats to his or her life.207  There is broad agreement amongst the human rights 
                                                 
205 For further discussion on this debate see: Marko Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human 
Rights Treaties: Law, Principles, and Policy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011; Fons Coomans 
and Menno Kamminga, (eds), Extraterritorial application of human rights treaties, Antwerp: 
Intersentia Publishing, 2004; Lubell, 2010, pp.193-232; and Larsen, 2012, pp.177-85. 
206 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation 
Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant (Article 2) [2004] UN Doc. CCPR/C/74/CRP.4/Rev.6, para 
10.  The Committee has also described it as ‘unconscionable’ to ‘interpret the responsibility under the  
. . . Covenant as to permit a State Party to perpetrate violations of the Covenant on the territory of 
another State, which violations it could not perpetrate on its own territory’.  See also HRC Lopez 
Burgos v Uruguay, UN Doc. CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979; Celiberti de Casariego v Uruguay, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/13/D/56/1979; Montero v Uruguay, UN Doc. CCPR/C/18/D/106/1981; and Concluding 
Observations of the Human Rights Committee: United States of America, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add.50 (1995) para 19. 
207 For example: ECtHR: Soering v UK, Appl. No. 14038/88, Judgment 7 July 1989; Cruz Varas v. 
Sweden, Appl. No. 15576/89, Judgment 20 March 1991; Vilvarajah and Others v UK, Appl. Nos. 
13163/87; 13164/87; 13165/87; 13447/87; 13448/87, Judgment 30 October 1991; H.L.R. v France, 
Appl. No 24573/94, Judgment 29 April 1997; D. v UK, Appl. No 30240/96, Judgment 2 May 1997; 
Jabari v UK, 2000, Appl. No. 40035/98, Judgment 11 November; Ahmed v. Austria, Appl. No. 
25964/94, Judgment 27 November 1996; and Human Rights Committee, General Comment 2, 
Reporting guidelines (Thirteenth session, 1981), Compilation of General Comments and General 
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1 at 3 (1994) 
para 3; Human Rights Committee, General Comment 20, para 9; Haitian Centre for Human Rights et 
al v. United States,  Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 1997, Case 10675, Report No. 
51/96 OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95 Doc 7 rev. para 27; African Commission on Human and People’s Rights 
John K Modise v. Botswana, (2000) Comm. 97/93 para 91.  Such cases obviously do not involve 
extraterritorial application, since the individual concerned is located within the territory of the 
extraditing State. 
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treaty-monitoring bodies that if a State controls a foreign territory as a result of military 
occupation, all of the provisions in the human rights treaties to which it is a party are 
applicable in that territory.208  It is also widely agreed that if a State abducts or detains people 
on foreign territory then the relevant human rights treaties will be applicable.209  It is less 
clear, however, whether this extends to all other uses of force.   
 
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has held that the rights contained in 
the Charter are applicable in situations of military occupation of foreign territory.210  The ICJ 
has taken a similar approach, observing that ‘while the jurisdiction of States is primarily 
territorial, it may sometimes be exercised outside the national territory.’211  In its Advisory 
Opinion on the Wall, it also ruled that States can be bound by their human rights obligations 
in relation to activities they conduct outside their own national territory.212   
 
                                                 
208 For example: ECtHR Al-Skeini and Others v. UK, Appl. No. 55721/07, Judgment (Grand Chamber) 
7 July 2011; Andreou v. Turkey, Appl. No. 45653/99. Judgment of 27 October 2009, Solomou v. 
Turkey, Appl. No. 36832/97, Judgment of 24 June 2008; Issa and others v. Turkey Appl. No. 
31821/96, Admissibility Decision of 20 May 2000, paras 69-71; Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary 
objections), Appl. No. 15318/89, Judgment of 23 March 1995, para 62; Cyprus v. Turkey, Appl. No. 
25781/94, Judgment of 10 May 2001, paras 75-80; Ilascu and Others v. Moldova and Russia, Appl. 
No. 48787/99, Judgment of 8 July 2004, paras 314-316.  See also Inter-Am CtHR  Franklin Guillermo 
Aisalla Molina. (Ecuador – Colombia), Report No. 112/10 (admissibility), Inter-state Petition IP-02, 
October 21, 2010; and ICJ Reports 2005, paras 178-80; and ICJ Reports 2004, paras 110-1. 
209 ECtHR Al-Jedda v. UK, Appl. No. 27021/08, Judgment (Grand Chamber) 7 July 2011; Al-Saadoon 
and Mufdhi v. UK, Appl. No. 61498/08, Judgment 2 March 2010; Medvedyev and Others v. France 
Appl. No. 3394/03, Judgment (Grand Chamber) 23 March 2010; Ocalan v Turkey, Appl. 46221/99, 
Decision on Admissibility 12 May 2005; Ilich Sanchez Ramirez v. France Appl. No. 28780/95, 
Commission Decision on Admissibility, 24 June 1996; Stocké v Federal Republic of Germany, Appl. 
No. 11755/85,  Judgment 19 March 1991;  Reinette v France, Appl. No. 14009/88, Commission 
Decision on Admissibility, 2 October 1989;  Hess v UK, Appl. No. 6231/73, Commission Decision on 
Admissibility, 28 May 1975; Inter-Am Com HR, Precautionary Measures on Guantanamo Bay, Cuba 
13 March 2002; HRC Lopez Burgos v Uruguay, UN Doc. CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979. 
210 African Commission, DRC v Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Communication 227/1999, reported in 
20th Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Annex IV.  The 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights contains no explicit restriction on territorial 
applicability. 
211 ICJ Reports 2004, para 109; and ICJ Reports 2005, para 217. 
212 ICJ Reports 2004, para139.  For criticism of this decision and its implications see Dennis, 2006, pp. 
435-53. 
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The Human Rights Committee has adopted this approach with regard to Israel’s occupation 
of the Palestinian territories.213  The European Court has done so with respect to Turkey’s 
occupation of northern Cyprus,214 and Russia’s support for a breakaway state in Moldova.215  
The Inter-American Commission has done so in respect of the US occupation of Grenada and 
Panama.216 The Human Rights Committee has questioned Belgium about abuses allegedly 
committed by their armed forces during the UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia.217  The 
UN Committee against Torture has also expressed ‘grave concern over the alleged sexual 
                                                 
213 Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: Israel, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 93 
(1988); Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: Israel, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/78/ISR 
(2003) 
214 ECtHR Loizidou v. Turkey, Appl. No. 15318/89, Merits, 18 December 1996; Cyprus v. Turkey, 
Appl. No. 25781/94, Commission Report, 4 June 1999, para. 96, Merits Judgment 10 May 2001. 
215 ECtHR Catan and Others v. Republic of Moldova and Russia Appl. Nos. 43370/04, 8252/05 and 
18454/06, Judgment (Grand Chamber) 19 October 2012; Ilascu and others v Moldova and Russian 
Federation, Appl. No. 48797/99, Judgment (Grand Chamber ) 8 July 2004; Ivanţoc and Others v. 
Moldova and Russia Appl. No. 23687/05, Judgment 15 November 2011. 
216 Inter-Am Com HR, Disabled People’s International v. United States Case 9213 OEA/ser, 
L/V/II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987) (Annual Report 1986-1987); Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights Coard et al. v. United States, Report N. 109/99 - Case 10.951, (IACHR), 29 September 1999; 
Salas et al. V. United States, Report No. 31/93, Case No. 10,573, 14 October 1993.  The US disputed 
the jurisdiction of the Commission in these cases and so they were brought under the Inter-American 
Declaration of Human Rights (rather than the Convention).  The declaration has no provision for 
derogations from its provisions and contains no territorial jurisdictional clause. 
217 Summary Record of the 1707th Meeting: Belgium. 27 October 1998, UN Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1707, 
27 October 1998, paras 2 and 3.  ‘Mr. LALLAH, referring to the question raised earlier by Mr. Klein, 
said there could be no doubt that actions carried out by Belgium's agents in another country fell within 
the scope of the Covenant.  . . He understood that the two soldiers responsible for the incident in 
Somalia had been acquitted. What grounds were there for that acquittal, and what defence had been put 
forward?  There were disturbing recent reports of a string of further offences for which Belgian 
soldiers serving in Somalia had been convicted in the Belgian courts, offences that had included force-
feeding a Muslim child with pork until it vomited, tying a Somali child to a vehicle and ordering the 
vehicle to drive off, procuring and offering a teenage Somali girl as a present at a birthday party, and 
acts of public indecency. They were all the more horrifying incidents in that the soldiers concerned 
were serving under the flag of the United Nations, the organization that was author of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. In all cases the court had imposed only suspended sentences, and the 
sentences had been confirmed by the military courts.’   See also CCPR/C/79/Add.99, 19 November 
1998, para 14.  In its Concluding Observations the Committee notes that it is ‘concerned about the 
behaviour of Belgian soldiers in Somalia under the aegis of the United Nations Operation in Somalia 
(UNOSOM II), and acknowledges that the State party has recognized the applicability of the Covenant 
in this respect.’  In its Concluding Observations of the Human Rights 
Committee: Belgium. 12/08/2004, CCPR/CO/81/BEL, 12 August 2004, para 6, the Committee notes 
that: it is ‘concerned at the fact that the State party is unable to affirm, in the absence of a finding by an 
international body that it has failed to honour its obligations, that the Covenant automatically applies 
when it exercises power or effective control over a person outside its territory, regardless of the 
circumstances in which such power or effective control was obtained, such as forces constituting a 
national contingent assigned to an international peacekeeping or peace enforcement operation.’  
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exploitation and abuse of minors by military members of the Sri Lankan contingent of the 
United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)’.218  
 
The Inter-American Commission has ruled that an extraterritorial killing of four anti-Castro 
Cubans, whose plane was shot down in international air space – was considered admissible 
because it regarded the victims as being subject to Cuba’s power and control when they were 
killed.219  It has also stated that a State Party ‘may be responsible under certain circumstances 
for the acts and omissions of its agents which produce effects or are undertaken outside that 
State’s own territory.’220  In its Concluding Observations to Italy’s fifth periodic report under 
the ICCPR the Human Rights Committee welcomed ‘the State party’s position that the 
guarantees of the Covenant apply to the acts of Italian troops or police officers who are 
stationed abroad, whether in a context of peace or armed conflict.’221  Poland and Norway 
have also reported on measures taken to ensure compliance with these extra-territorial 
obligations.222  Germany has accepted the applicability of the rights contained within the 
ICCPR: ‘Wherever its police or armed forces are deployed abroad, in particular when 
participating in peace missions . . . to all persons . . . insofar as they are subject to its 
jurisdiction.’223 
 
In 2001, the Netherlands challenged a request by the Human Rights Committee to provide 
information about the fall of Srebrenica during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina,224 stating that 
it disagreed ‘with the Committee’s suggestion that the provisions of the International 
                                                 
218 Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture: Sri Lanka, 31 October–25 November 
2011, para 23. 
219 Inter-Am Com HR Armando Alejandre Jr. and Others v Cuba (known as the ‘Brothers to the 
Rescue’ case) no. 11.589, Report no. 86/99, 29 September 1999, para 23. 
220 Inter-Am Com HR Victor Saldaño v Argentina Inter-American Commission Report No. 38/99, 11 
March 1999, para 17. 
221 HRC Concluding Observations: Italy, CCPR/C/ITA/CO/5, 24 April 2006, para 3. 
222 Poland’s fifth periodic report, CCPR/CO/82/POL., 2 December 2004, para 3; and HRC Concluding 
Observations to Norway’s fifth periodic report, CCPR/C/NOR/CO/5, 25 February 2006, para 6. 
223 Germany: Follow-up response to the Concluding Observations, CCPR/CO/80/DEU/Add.1, 11 April 
2005. 
224 Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Netherlands, UN Doc. 
CCPR/CO/72/NET, para 27 (2001). 
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are applicable to the conduct of Dutch blue helmets in 
Srebrenica’, and claiming that the wording of Article 2 of the ICCPR ‘clearly states that each 
State Party undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals “within its territory and 
subject to its jurisdiction” the rights recognized in the Covenant.’ 225 The Dutch government 
claimed that:  ‘It goes without saying that the citizens of Srebrenica, vis-a-vis the 
Netherlands, do not come within the scope of that provision.’226  As previously discussed, 
however, a Dutch court subsequently ruled that the Dutch Battalion at Srebrenica had 
violated its positive obligations to some of the genocide’s victims.   
 
The European Court of Human Rights has generally adopted a similar reasoning.  In Cyprus 
v. Turkey in 1975, the European Commission first ruled that the authorized agents of a State 
are ‘bound to secure the said rights and freedoms to all persons under their actual 
responsibility, whether that authority is exercised within their own territory or abroad.’227  
This has been reaffirmed by the Court in cases such as when a group of shepherds were 
allegedly detained, tortured and killed by Turkish security forces in northern Iraq;228 a 
suspected murder and restrictions of freedom of expression in northern Cyprus;229 the killing 
of civilians by the Turkish security forces, both inside and outside the buffer zone in northern 
Cyprus;230 a fatal collision between an Italian coast guard ship and a boat of Albanian 
                                                 
225 Replies of the Government of the Netherlands to the Concerns Expressed by the Human Rights 
Committee, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/72/NET/Add.l, 29 April 2003, para 19.  It also stated that: ‘The strong 
commitment of the Netherlands to investigate and assess the deplorable events of 1995 is therefore not 
based on any obligation under the Covenant.’ 
226 Ibid. 
227 E Com HR Cyprus v. Turkey, Appl. No 6780/74 and 6950/75, Commission Admissibility decision, 
26 May 1975.  See also ECtHR Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain Appl. No. 12747/87, 
Judgment 26 June 1982. 
228 ECtHR Issa and others v. Turkey, Appl. No. 31821/96, Admissibility Decision 20 May 2000, para 
71.  The Court noted that ‘Article 1 of the Convention cannot be interpreted so as to allow a State Party 
to perpetrate violations of the Convention on the territory of another State, which it could not 
perpetrate on its own territory.’  The facts of the case were disputed with Turkey denying that the 
operation had taken place and the Court subsequently found no violation as the required standard of 
proof could not be established.  See also Issa and others v. Turkey, Appl. No. 31821/96, Judgment 16 
November 2004.  
229 ECtHR Andreas Manitaras and Others v. Turkey Appl. No. 54591/00, 3 June 2008; and Djavit An 
v. Turkey, Appl. No. 20652/92, Judgment 20 February 2003. 
230 ECtHR Andreou v. Turkey, Appl. No. 45653/99, Admissibility Decision 3 June 2008 and Judgment 
27 October. 2009; Isaak and Others  v. Turkey Appl. No. 44587/98, Admissibility Decision 28 
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migrants;231 the detention at sea of a group of Cambodian drug smugglers232 and the 
interception and forcible return of a group of Somali and Eritrean migrants.233  In another 
case the Court found a violation against Turkey after it killed seven Iranian men during a 
cross-border operation in which it bombed an area from where it claimed suspected terrorists 
had been operating.234  Indeed the Commission has gone so far as to say that the test of an 
‘exercise of authority’ should be: ‘In so far as, by their acts or omissions, they affect such 
persons or property’.235   
 
The European Court, however, took a markedly different position when it declared Bankovic 
v. Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States inadmissible because the applicants – relatives of 
five employees of a Serbian television centre who were killed by a NATO bomb during the 
Kosovo crisis – were not within the jurisdiction of the respondent States within the meaning 
of the Convention.236  The Court ruled that jurisdiction was ‘primarily territorial’237 and other 
bases were exceptional, requiring special justification in the particular circumstances of each 
case.238  It stated that the Convention is ‘a constitutional instrument of European public 
order’ and this regional context constitutes its ‘legal space’.239  It further reasoned that ‘the 
positive obligation in Article 1 to secure “the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this 
Convention” could not be ‘divided and tailored in accordance with the particular 
circumstances of the extra-territorial act in question’.240 
                                                 
September 2006 and Judgment 24 June 2008; Solomou v Turkey, Appl. No. 36832/97, Judgment 24 
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235 E Com HR Cyprus v. Turkey, Appl. Nos. 6780/74 and 6950/75, Commission Admissibility 
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236 Bankovic v. Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States, Appl. No. 52207/99, (Grand Chamber), 
Decision on Admissibility, 19 December 2001. 
237 Ibid., para 35. 
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The Bankovic decision has been widely criticized as inconsistent with the rest of the 
emerging case law, the changing nature of state practice and evolving concepts of 
responsibility in international law.241  Larsen argues that the Court’s ‘all or nothing approach’ 
to the protection of rights meant that because ‘it was clearly unrealistic to require NATO 
forces to comply with the entire range of Convention rights towards the population in 
Belgrade . . . the Court opted for a nothing at all conclusion.’242  Hannum has caustically 
observed that the Court seems to consider that ‘simply shooting suspects is apparently 
immune from scrutiny, so long as you are careful not to arrest them first’.243  Amnesty 
International has described the attack as ‘a war crime’ and notes that the Court’s decision left 
the victims with no redress.244 
 
Some of the original Bankovic applicants brought a case in the Italian domestic courts, but  
these ruled that Italy’s decision to take part in the air strikes had been a political one, so could 
not be judicially reviewed, a decision subsequently upheld by the European Court.245  The 
Court has also dismissed a case brought by Saddam Hussein, over his arrest, detention by 
US-led coalition forces, following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, finding that the applicant had 
failed to demonstrate the role and responsibility of each of the respondent States for his 
                                                 
241 See, for example, Kerem Altiparmak,  ‘Bankovic: An Obstacle to the Application of the European 
Convention for Human Rights in Iraq?’, 9 J. Conflict & Security Law, 2004, pp. 213, 223-24; 
Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘Restrictive Interpretation of Human Rights Treaties in the Recent 
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’, European Journal of International Law,  Vol. 
14, No. 3, 2003, pp.529-68; Dinah Shelton, ‘The Boundaries of Human Rights Jurisdiction in Europe’, 
Duke Jornal of Comparative and International Law, Vol. 13, 2003, pp.95-153; Hampson, 2008,  
pp.549-72; and Duffy, 2005, pp.282-289. 
242 Larsen, 2012, p.203. 
243 Hurst Hannum, ‘Remarks: Bombing for Peace: Collateral damage and human rights’, American 
Society of International Law Proceedings, 2002, pp. 96-99. 
244 Amnesty International, No justice for the victims of NATO bombings, 23 April 2009. 
245 Markovic and Others v. Italy, Appl. No. 1398/03, Judgment (Grand Chamber) 14 December 2006.  
The applicants argued that Italy's involvement in the relevant military operations had been more 
extensive than that of the other NATO members that were party to the Convention, since Italy had 
provided an important base used during the operation.  The European Court ruled that the civil action 
in the Italian courts was sufficient to create a ‘jurisdictional link’ for the purposes of the Convention, 
but found no violation of on the grounds that the domestic law had been correctly applied. 
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particular treatment.246  This reluctance by the Court to review the actions of a multinational 
organization led by a State that is not a party to the ECHR may also partly explain the Court’s 
decision in Bankovic.247  McGoldrick has argued that the Court may have felt that the positive 
obligation under Article 2, to conduct an effective investigation into the deaths was 
impractical in the circumstances of a bombing campaign  and that:  
 
A decision the other way would have raised additional institutional questions about 
the appropriateness of the European Court of Human Rights directly or indirectly 
applying aspects of international humanitarian law through the medium of ECHR 
rights, and its exercise of the review of military actions by individual states or by an 
international institution (NATO) . . . The Bankovic decision avoided these questions 
for the time being.248 
 
Grenier maintains that ‘the debate between the progressive or conservative interpretation of 
“jurisdiction” is not yet settled.’249  The Court has subsequently shown itself willing to adopt 
a far less rigid stance than that demonstrated in Bankovic.  For example, it found in Issa, in 
2004,250 Isaak, in 2006,251 and Andreou, in 2008,252 that extra-territorial killings – which had 
not been preceded by arrest – could come within the scope of the Convention.  It found in 
Ilascu and Others v. Moldova and Russia, in 2004, that ‘where a Contracting State is 
                                                 
246 Saddam Hussein v. Coalition Forces (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey, Ukraine and the United Kingdom), Appl. No. 23276/04 ,  
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prevented from exercising its authority over the whole of its territory by a constraining de 
facto situation . . . it does not thereby ceases to have jurisdiction . . . [but] such a factual 
situation reduces the scope of that jurisdiction.253  It used similar reasoning in its admissibility 
decision in Sargsyan v Azerbaijan in 2011.254  In both Issa and Ocalan 255 the Court found 
cases admissible even though they referred to events which had taken place outside the 
‘juridical space’ of the Convention.  In Jaloud v. The Netherlands in November 2014 the 
Court found a violation due to a failure to conduct an adequate investigation after Dutch 
soldiers killed a man at check-point in Iraq in 2004.256 
 
In the Al-Skeini case,257 which concerned six Iraqis killed by British occupation forces in 
2003, Bankovic was described by the English Court of Appeal and House of Lords as a 
‘watershed authority in the light of which the Strasbourg jurisprudence as a whole has to be 
re-evaluated’.258  However the Lords also stated that: ‘The problem which the House has to 
face, quite squarely, is that the judgments and decisions of the European Court do not speak 
with one voice.’ The differences were not ‘merely in emphasis’ and their seriousness 
presented ‘considerable difficulties for national courts’ in trying to follow the European 
Court’s jurisprudence.259  After reviewing the case-law, the Lords ultimately held that while 
persons detained by British forces could be considered under their ‘effective control’, the UK 
                                                 
253 Ilascu and Others v. Moldova and Russia, Appl. No. 48787/99, Judgment 8 July 2004, para 333. 
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259 Ibid., para 67. 
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was ‘not in effective control of Basrah City and the surrounding area for purposes of 
jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention at the relevant time’.260  With the exception of 
those who died while in British custody, therefore, the Court stated that the other cases did 
not fall into ‘any of the exceptions to the territorial principle so far recognised by the 
Court’.261  One of the judges stated that: 
 
In my judgment it is quite impossible to hold that the UK, although an occupying 
power for the purposes of the Hague Regulations and Geneva IV, was in effective 
control of Basrah City for the purposes of ECHR jurisprudence at the material time. 
If it had been, it would have been obliged, pursuant to the Bankovic judgment, to 
secure to everyone in Basrah City the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the ECHR. 
One only has to state that proposition to see how utterly unreal it is.262 
 
The European Court, however, ultimately found a violation in Al-Skeini v. UK.263  It stated 
that, ‘in certain circumstances, the use of force by a State’s agents operating outside its 
territory may bring the individual thereby brought under the control of the State’s authorities 
into the State’s Article 1 jurisdiction’264 and, distinguishing itself from Bankovic, stated that: 
‘In this sense, therefore, the Convention rights can be “divided and tailored”.’265  In his 
concurring opinion Judge Bonello stated that the Court’s case-law on the issue ‘has, so far, 
been bedevilled by an inability or an unwillingness to establish a coherent and axiomatic 
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regime, grounded in essential basics and even-handedly applicable across the widest 
spectrum of jurisdictional controversies’.266  He argued for a clear universal ‘functional test’ 
of whether a State had jurisdiction which would involve both negative and positive 
obligations to respect and ensure human rights and stated that: ‘If the perpetrators of an 
alleged human rights violation are within the authority and control of one of the Contracting 
Parties . . . their actions by virtue of that State’s authority, engage the jurisdiction of the 
Contracting Party.’267  
 
As Borelli has noted after ‘years of ebbs and flows’, the most recent jurisprudence of the 
Court makes clear that ‘the Convention will indeed apply to the actions of a States’ armed 
forces in situations of extraterritorial military action either where a State exercises effective 
control over a particular area, or where State agents in fact exercise control over an 
individual.’268  The question is not ‘whether the ECHR applies to extraterritorial military 
action’, but ‘how it should apply’.269  
 
From the above discussion, it can be seen that international human rights law can, in 
principle, be applied extraterritorially and concurrently with IHL.  Chapter Five will discuss 
the particular problems of holding UN peacekeeping missions to account for their human 
rights records.  The remainder of this chapter will briefly discuss the relevant provisions of 
refugee law, particularly in relation to people who are internally displaced within their own 
countries. 
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Refugee law, human rights and internal displacement 
 
The first UN Security Council resolution on POC urged the UN to ensure that its personnel 
received appropriate training in refugee law as well international human rights law and 
IHL270 and the relevance of this body of law is also sometimes specifically mentioned in 
Security Council resolutions and UN reports on POC. 271  Missions with POC mandates are 
often also mandated to provide specific protection to refugees and IDPs and to help create 
conditions ‘conducive to their return’.272   
 
Refugee law applies to people who are no longer receiving the most basic forms of protection 
from their own State and provides the foundational basis for the mandate of UNHCR; which 
was established by the UN General Assembly as a subsidiary organ under Article 22 of the 
UN Charter.273  UNHCR’s role in the coordination, supervision and progressive development 
of refugee law is stipulated in its own Statute274 as well as the Convention275 and Protocol.276  
Although it provides regular guidance on interpretation of this law and States – particularly in 
the ‘global south’ – commonly associate it with their refugee decision-making, it does not 
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possess the type of treaty oversight functions of human rights monitoring bodies.277  It does, 
however, have an extensive field presence and has played an extremely important role in 
defining the humanitarian concept of ‘protection’ in the field.   
 
The basic rights to which refugees are entitled are set out in the Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees of 1951, and the 1967 Protocol. Refugee status determination is a 
´declaratory not a constitutive process´,278 because it was the circumstances that deprived the 
individual of her or his own State´s protection rather than a decision made in the State to 
which the person fled that made that person a refugee.  However, the 1951 Convention 
accords rights at different stages of the process and some are only open to ´refugees lawfully 
staying in´ the receiving country – such as travel documents.279  One of the most fundamental 
rights is the guarantee of non-refoulement,280 which provides protection to people fleeing 
persecution and seeking asylum even if their status has not yet been definitively determined, 
and is often held to have jus cogens status.281  Protection against refoulement is also contained 
in international human rights law through both explicit treaty provisions282 and the decisions 
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of international courts and monitoring bodies.283  These have also helped to define the notion 
of ‘persecution’, which is central to the determination of refugee status, and the procedural 
rights for people deprived of their liberty or facing deportation under immigration laws.284  
 
The Refugee Convention provides that States ‘shall not impose penalties, on account of 
their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory 
where their life or freedom was threatened . . . provided they present themselves 
without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or 
presence’. 285  It shall also not restrictions to their freedom of movement ‘other than those 
which are necessary . . . until their status in the country is regularized.’286  Refugee law 
does, however, explicitly recognises the right of States to detain asylum-seekers on ‘national 
security’ grounds.287  UNHCR has issued detailed guidance on the rights of asylum seekers in 
detention.288 Such detentions would also be subject to the safeguards contained in 
international human rights law described earlier in this chapter. Indeed Chetail argues that the 
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increasing complementarity between the two bodies of law is such that ‘human rights law has 
become the primary source of refugee protection.’289   
 
Many people who have been forced to fear their homes due to fear and violence do not fit 
within the statutory definition of a refugee contained in the 1951 Convention.290  The UN has, 
therefore, often authorized UNHCR to extend assistance and international protection to other 
persons who can be determined or presumed to be without, or unable to avail themselves of, 
the protection of the government of their State of origin.291  The protracted nature of many 
conflicts and the increasing preference for ‘voluntary return’ as the most desirable long-term 
solution to refugee crises, means that creating the conditions in which refugees can return ‘in 
safety and dignity’ has also become an increasingly important part of UNHCR’s work.292   
This has led it to conduct an increasing amount of programmatic activity inside refugee 
producing countries.293    
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desirable long-term solution by the refugees themselves as well as by the international community’.   
However, repatriation must be voluntary and in conditions of safety and dignity, which is often 
impossible during protracted crises.  As States in the ‘global north’ become ever more reluctant to 
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Many complex emergencies are also marked by large-scale internal displacement and the 
conditions facing refugees and IDPs are often very similar.294  The number of IDPs has also 
grown considerably in recent decades and they now considerably outnumber refugees,295 but 
there is no dedicated UN agency to support them.296  In 1998 the UN Secretary General’s 
Representative on IDPs published a set of principles designed to provide a ‘doctrine of 
protection specifically tailored to the needs of the internally displaced,’297  The Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement have not been endorsed either by the UN General 
Assembly or Security Council, although their publication was ‘welcomed’ by UNHCR and 
the UN General Assembly.298  Some countries have, however, incorporated them into their 
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in 2011.   
296 For an overview see: UNHCR's Role in Support of an Enhanced Humanitarian Response to 
Situations of Internal Displacement. Policy Framework and Implementation Strategy, UNHCR, 4 June 
2007; UNHCR, Internally Displaced Persons: The Role of the High Commissioner for Refugees, 20 
June 2000; UNHCR, Protection Aspects of UNHCR Activities on behalf of Internally Displaced 
Persons, 4 May 1994; UN General Assembly Resolution 47/105, 16 December 1992, para 14; UN 
General Assembly Resolution 48/116, 20 December 1993, para 12; and UNGA Resolution 49/169, 23 
December 1994.  See also Simon Bagshaw and Diane Paul, Protect or Neglect? Toward a More 
Effective United Nations Approach to the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons, Washington, 
DC: The Brookings-SAIS Project on Internal Displacement and the UN Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs, November 2004; and Alexander Betts, Gil Loescher and James Milner, 
UNHCR: the politics and practice of refugee protection, second edition, Oxon and New York: 
Routledge, 2012, pp.133-7. 
297 Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, submitted pursuant to 
Commission on Human Rights resolution1997/39, Compilation and Analysis of Legal Norms, Part II: 
Legal Aspects Relating to the Protection against Arbitrary Displacement, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/1998/53/Add. 1, of 11 February 1998.  IDPs are described as ‘persons who have been forced to 
flee their homes suddenly or unexpectedly in large numbers, as a result of armed conflict, internal 
strife, systematic violations of human rights or natural or man-made disasters; and who are within the 
territory of their own country’. 
298 UNHCR, Internally Displaced Persons: The Role of the High Commissioner for Refugees, UN Doc. 
E/50/SC/INF.2, 20 June 2000.  This describes them as ‘a useful set of standards against which to 
measure the protection objectives and promote dialogue with state and non-state actors of violence’.  
See also UN General Assembly Resolution, 62/153, ‘Protection of and assistance to internally 
displaced Persons’, 6 March 2008, para 10, which welcomed ‘the fact that an increasing number of 
States, United Nations agencies and regional and non-governmental organizations are applying them as 
a standard’ and encouraged ‘all relevant actors’ to make use of them when dealing with situations of 
internal displacement, and UN General Assembly Resolution 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, 24 
October 2005, para 132, which described them as an ‘important international framework for the 
protection of internally displaced persons’.   
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domestic laws, and the ‘Kampala Convention on IDPs, adopted by the African Union in 2009 
also draws heavily on them.299 
 
While there are good arguments to be made for providing IDPs with the support of a 
dedicated UN agency, it is difficult to see what additional ‘protection’ can be provided by 
applying analogous provisions of refugee law to people who have not left their country of 
origin.300  For example, the detention of asylum-seekers, under immigration laws, is 
routine,301 and so drawing a legal parallel with IDPs in this context is unhelpful.302  It is also 
questionable whether the emphasis in refugee law on voluntary return as the preferred durable 
solution is appropriate for IDPs given the global trend towards urbanization, which is often 
exacerbated by conflicts.303  Conversely, the assertion in the Guiding Principles that the 
                                                 
299 African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in 
Africa, Kampala Convention). Adopted by the Special Summit of the Union held in Kampala on 22 
October 2009.  The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has also recognized 
that the principles as ‘a useful framework for the work of the OSCE’ and the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Council of Europe as well as its Council of Ministers urged its member states to incorporate the 
principles into their domestic laws.   
300 For a detailed discussion of the legal basis of the principles see Walter Kälin, Guiding Principles on 
Internal Displacement Annotations, The American Society of International Law and The Brookings 
Institution – University of Bern, Project on Internal Displacement Studies in Transnational Legal 
Policy No. 38, Washington, DC, 2008 for the legal sources of the principles.  For an overview of the 
arguments for and against creating a new legal instrument specifically for IDPs see:  Catherine 
Phuong, The International Protection of Internally Displaced Persons, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004, pp.39-75; Paul Schmidt, ‘The Process and Prospects for the U.N. Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement to Become Customary International Law: A Preliminary 
Assessment’, Georgetown Journal of International Law, Vol. 35, No. 3, Spring 2004, pp.483-520; 
Roberta Cohen and Francis M. Deng, Masses in flight: the global crisis of internal displacement, 
Washington DC: the Brookings Institute, pp.128-9.   
301 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and 
Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers and Alternatives to Detention, 2012, available 
at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/503489533b8.html accessed 6 November 2014. 
302 Principle 12 (2) of the Guiding Principles states that: ‘If in exceptional circumstances such 
internment or confinement is absolutely necessary, it shall not last longer than required by the 
circumstances.’ 
303 For further discussion see Scott Leckie, Handbook on Housing and Property Restitution for 
Refugees and Displaced Persons Implementing the ‘Pinheiro Principles, Geneva: UN Food and 
Agricultural Organisation, Norwegian Refugee Council, UN-Habitat, UNHCR, OHCHR, OCHA, 
March 2007.  The promotion of return to areas of origin became widespread after the Balkans wars in 
an attempt to ‘reverse the effects of ethnic cleansing’ and, although this was far less successful than its 
proponents claimed at the time, the model has since been used in other post-conflict settings.  In some 
cases the provision of assistance has been made conditional on IDPs returning to their original home 
areas or is arbitrarily withheld from some people on the grounds that they ‘economic migrants’ rather 
than ‘genuine IDPs’.  For differing views on this issues see Scott Leckie (ed), Returning home: 
housing and property restitution rights of refugees and displaced persons, Ardsley: Transnational 
Publishers, 2003; Sofie Aursnes Ingunn and Conor Foley, Property restitution in practice: The 
Norwegian Refugee Council’s experiences, Oslo: Norwegian Refugee Council, April 2005; and Sara 
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issuance of travel and identity documents, which is provided for by refugee law and IHL,304 is 
necessary to ‘give effect’ to the non-derogable ‘right to recognition as a person before the 
law’305 rather overstates their actual legal significance.306     
 
There are many places where refugees have fled from one country to another that is itself 
experiencing a ‘complex emergency’ and where the provisions relating to detention and non-
refoulement will be of obvious relevance.  As will be discussed in Chapter Seven, protection 
against refoulement is part of the legal basis for why UN missions have not expelled civilians 
who have sought sanctuary on their bases.  IDPs, however, do not constitute a separate legal 
category and, although many do have specific needs and vulnerabilities, the provisions that 
are likely to be of most relevance to the protection of their rights are contained in 
international human rights law or IHL.  In 2004, when the Secretary General appointed a new 
representative on IDPs, the words human rights were inserted into the mandate title and, in 
2010, the post became a Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced 
Persons, appointed by the Human Rights Council and serviced by OHCHR.307   
 
Conclusion 
 
                                                 
Pantuliano, (ed), Uncharted Territory: land, conflict and humanitarian action, Warwickshire: Practical 
Action Publishing, 2009. 
304 The 1951 Refugee Convention contains a number of articles relating to the right of refugees to 
receive administrative assistance (Article 25), identity papers and travel documents (Articles 27 and 
28), permission to transfer assets (Article 30) and the facilitation of naturalisation (Article 34), as well 
as legal recognition of the personal status of a refugee (Article 12).  Geneva Convention IV, Article 50 
provides that: ‘Every person is entitled to registration and a name immediately at birth, especially in 
situations of occupation’, while Article 97(6) specifies that: ‘States are specifically obliged to ensure 
that vulnerable groups such as refugees and interned civilians in occupied territories are provided with 
basic documentation. 
305 IDP Guiding Principles, Principle 20.  
306 UDHR, Article 6; CCPR, Article 16; ACHR Article 3 and African Charter, Article 5.  For further 
discussion see Kälin, 2008, pp.93-5; and  Conor Foley and Barbara McCallin, ‘The Recovery of 
Personal Documentation’, in Walter Kälin, Rhodri C. Williams, Khalid Koser and Andrew Solomon, 
Incorporating the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement into Domestic Law: Issues and 
Challenges, The Brookings Institution – University of Bern, Project on Internal Displacement Studies 
in Transnational Legal Policy, No. 38, Washington, DC, 2010, pp.337-362. 
307 For details see: OHCHR Home Page, ‘Introduction to the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the 
Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), Dr. Chaloka Beyani’, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/IDPersons/Pages/Mandate.aspx, accessed 23 April 2015.  
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This chapter set out the three main bodies of international law which, along with UN 
Charter law, may be most relevant to UN peacekeeping missions with POC mandates.  It 
also discussed the debates about the extra-territorial applicability of international human 
rights law and its concurrent applicability with IHL.  It briefly, finally, considered the 
relevant provisions of refugee law, particularly in relation to IDPs.   
 
It was argued that international human rights law has provisions related to the use of force 
and detention powers that are relevant and potentially applicable to UN missions with POC 
mandates and could provide more appropriate guidance than both IHL and refugee law on 
many occasions.  It was shown that international human rights law can apply 
extraterritorially and may be concurrently applicable with IHL in situations in which UN 
peacekeeping missions are present.  While the two bodies of law have many points in 
common, international human rights law contains some elements that IHL does not 
provide.  It is also overseen by monitoring bodies that have elaborated its provisions in 
more detail and may sometimes provide redress to those whose rights have been 
violated.The next chapter will now discuss the relationship between international human 
rights law and UN Charter law. 
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Chapter Five:  
Who guards the guards: the UN’s legal authority and obligations to protect civilians 
 
Introduction 
 
This thesis argues that the positive and negative obligations of international human rights 
law will usually provide the most appropriate legal framework and guidance within which 
UN peacekeeping missions should act when implementing Chapter VII POC mandates.  
As was discussed in the previous chapter, international human rights law can be applied 
extraterritorially and concurrently with IHL.  It contains a ‘positive obligation’ to protect 
the rights to life and physical integrity and detailed guidance and safeguards governing the 
use of lethal force and arrest and detention powers.  It also provides a ‘right of redress’ to 
people who have suffered violations. 
 
The UN Charter, however, specifies that its provisions take precedence over all other 
international treaties.  There is no mechanism to judicially review the Security Council’s 
actions and the legal immunities that cover UN missions, makes it extremely difficult to 
scrutinise their records for compliance with international human rights law.  Individual 
States may, in certain circumstances, be challenged for their own actions implementing 
Security Council resolutions.  This has led to controversy over whether these acts should 
be attributable to the implementing State or the UN.  This chapter provides an overview of 
the increasing number of problems caused by the UN’s lack of accountability, the crises of 
legitimacy that have resulted and some of the ad hoc measures with which it has 
responded.   Part III of this thesis will discuss some of the more specific issues arising in 
relation to POC in four contemporary UN peacekeeping missions. 
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The powers, principles and purposes of the UN Security Council  
 
The primary purpose of the UN is to ‘maintain international peace and security’.1  Its other 
purposes include: developing friendly relations amongst nations based on respect for the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and promoting economic, social, 
cultural and humanitarian cooperation, and respect for human rights.2 
 
The Security Council has the ‘primary responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security’ and ‘in order to ensure prompt and effective action’ the members of 
the UN ‘agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility’ it ‘acts on their 
behalf.’3  Under Article 25 of the UN Charter all members of the UN ‘agree to accept and 
carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter’4 
while Article 103 specifies that: ‘In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the 
Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any 
other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.’5   
 
Article 105 also specifies that the UN and its representatives ‘shall enjoy in the territory of 
each of its Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfilment of 
                                                 
1 UN Charter Article 1 (1). 
2 UN Charter Article 1(2). 
3 UN Charter Article 24. 
4 UN Charter, Article 25.  The ICJ noted in its Advisory Opinion on Legal consequences for States of 
the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 
(1970). Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep. 1971, para 114, that some Security Council resolutions ‘are 
couched in exhortatory rather than mandatory language and that, therefore, they do not purport to 
impose any legal duty on any State nor to affect legally any right of any State. The language of a 
resolution of the Security Council should be carefully analysed before a conclusion can be made as to 
its binding effect . . .  having regard to the terms of the resolution to be interpreted, the discussions 
leading to it, the Charter provisions invoked and, in general, all circumstances that might assist in 
determining the legal consequences of the resolution of the Security Council.’  
5 UN Charter, Article 103.  The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties recognises the absolute 
priority of Article 103 over other treaty obligations.  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
Article 30.  See also Golder v. UK, Appl. No. 4451/70, Judgment of 21 February 1975, para 29 in 
which the court said that ‘it should be guided by Articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention of 23 May 
1969 on the Law of Treaties.’ 
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its purposes’.6  It provided for the drafting of the Convention on Privileges and Immunities 
of the United Nations of 1946, which gives legal immunity to UN officials,7 
representatives of member States while participating in its activities8 and experts on 
mission to the UN in respect of words spoken or written and all acts performed by them in 
their official capacity.9  This also protects the UN’s ‘property and assets wherever located 
and by whomsoever held . . . from every form of legal process except insofar as in any 
particular case it has expressly waived its immunity.’10   
 
Under Chapter VII the Security Council may ‘determine the existence of any threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression’ and ‘make recommendations, or decide what 
measures shall be taken’ in response.11  If these measures prove insufficient the Security 
Council ‘may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or 
restore international peace and security.’12  Chapter VII contains no references to human 
rights, IHL or the protection of civilians and nor were these issues initially considered 
                                                 
6 UN Charter, Article 105.  
7 Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations 1946, Adopted by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations on 13 February 1946, United Nations — Treaty Series 1946-1947, 
Article V, Section 17 – 21. 
8 Ibid., Article IV, Section 11 – 16. 
9 Ibid., Article V, Sections 20, 22 and 23.  These privileges and immunities ‘are granted to officials in 
the interests o£ the United Nations and not for the personal benefit of the individuals themselves’ and 
the UN Secretary General ‘shall have the right and the duty to waive the immunity of any official in 
any case where, in his opinion, the immunity would impede the course of justice’.  The Secretary 
General’s own immunity can be waived by the Security Council. See also Article VII, Section 29.  The 
United Nations shall make provisions for appropriate modes of settlement of: (a) Disputes arising out 
of contracts or other disputes of a private law character to which the United Nations is a party; (b) 
Disputes involving any official of the United Nations who by reason of his official position enjoys 
immunity, if immunity has not been waived by the Secretary General’.  Disputes may also be referred 
to the ICJ, under Section 30.  
10 Ibid., Article II, Section 2 and 3.  For further discussion see, August Reinich, ‘Convention on 
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, New York, 13 February 1946, Convention on 
Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies, New York, 21 November 1947, United Nations 
Library of International Law,’ http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/cpiun-cpisa/cpiun-cpisa.html, accessed 
7 March 2013; Ola Engdahl, Protection of Personnel in Peace Operations: The Role of the ‘Safety 
Convention’ against the background of general international law, Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2007; and Dieter Fleck ‘The legal status of personnel involved in United Nations peace operations’, 
International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 95 No. 891/892 Autumn/Winter 2013, pp.613-36. 
11 UN Charter, Articles 39, 40 and 41.  
12 UN Charter, Article 42.   
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concerns of the Security Council.13  Schotten and Biehler have observed that for the first 
twenty-two years of its existence, the Security Council did not pass a single resolution on 
humanitarian or human rights aspects of armed conflict.14  This state-centred concept has 
changed considerably in recent decades and, as is discussed throughout this thesis, the 
Security Council now frequently uses its Chapter VII powers for ‘protection’ purposes. 
 
The UN Charter is often compared to a constitution as it sets out the legal powers, roles and 
inter-relationships of its constituent components, and provides the legal framework that 
governs their activities.15  It can also be seen as a ‘living’ document, which allows for 
‘constitutional development’ and the UN and its various organs have reinterpreted their own 
competencies in ways that, at times, have plainly departed from the original text.16  The 
                                                 
13 The Security Council is also the only organ of the UN which has no explicit authority to deal with 
human rights.  For discussion see Gregor Schotten and Anke Biehler, ‘The Role of the UN Security 
Council in Implementing International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law’, in Roberta Arnold 
& Noelle Quénivet (eds) International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, Leiden and Boston: 
Martinus Nijhof, 2008, p.310.  
14 Ibid. See also UN Security Council Resolution 237 of 14 June 1967, in which the Security Council 
called upon Israel and the Arab States to respect humanitarian principles ‘governing the treatment of 
prisoners of war and the protection of civilian persons in time of war contained in the Geneva 
Conventions’ during the Six Day war.  This was followed by Security Council Resolution 307 of 21 
December 1971  in which the Security Council called upon the parties to the conflict in Pakistan to 
respect the Geneva Conventions; Resolution 436 of 6 October 1978 in which the Security Council 
called upon all parties to the civil war in Lebanon to allow units of the ICRC into the area of conflict to 
evacuate the wounded and provide assistance; Resolution 446 of 22 March 1979 in which the Security 
Council directly called upon Israel to rescind its settlement policies in the West Bank and accept its 
responsibilities as an occupying power under the Fourth Geneva Convention; Resolution 540 of 31 
October 1983 condemning violations of the Geneva Conventions in the Iran-Iraq war; Resolution 582 
of 24 February 1986,  in which Iran and Iraq were condemned for the use of chemical weapons; and 
Resolution 598 of 20 July 1987, in which the Security Council called on both countries to respect the 
Geneva Conventions. 
15 For an overview of this discussion see Blaine Sloan, ‘The United Nations Charter as a Constitution’, 
Pace International Law Review, Vol. 1 Article 3, September 1989, pp.61-126.  See also: Alexander 
Orakhelashvili, ‘The Legal basis of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations’, Virginia Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 43, Winter 2003, pp.486-523; Hilaire McCoubrey,  and Nigel White, The Blue 
Helmets: Legal Regulation of United Nations Military Operations, Dartmouth: Dartmouth Pub Co, 
1996; Christopher Joyner (ed), The United Nations and International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997; Bruno Simma,  The Charter of the United Nations A Commentary Second 
Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002; Rosalind Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping 
1946-1967: Documents and Commentary, Vol. III: Africa, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980. 
16 Ibid.  See also Scott Sheeran A Constitutional Moment?: United Nations Peacekeeping in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, International Organisations Law Review, Vol. 8 Issue 1, 2011, pp.122 
and 129.  Sheeran cites, as examples, the Uniting for Peace Resolution, the creation of UN 
peacekeeping operations, the Secretary General’s good offices function, the expansion of the concept 
of peace and security, the changing status of abstentions by members of the P5 and the establishment 
of the war crimes tribunals.   
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Charter does not, however, incorporate the ‘checks and balances’ that are often associated 
with constitutional theory, and nor does it does it provide for a clear separation of powers 
within the UN.17   
 
Legal realists note that the wording of the UN Charter is so ‘open textured’ and 
‘discretionary’ as to make the powers of the Security Council practically unchallengeable.18  
Alvarez has observed that the ‘supremacy’ of the Charter over national laws, combined with 
the fact that Council decisions are generally not subject to judicial review, means that there 
are ‘few obvious legal limits to the Security Council’s powers’.19  Malanczuk argues that ‘a 
threat to peace . . . seems to be whatever the Security Council says is a threat to peace’.20  
Wood states that ‘the terms of the Charter and the established practices of the Council are 
sufficiently flexible that it is difficult to conceive of circumstances arising in practice that 
could raise serious doubts about the legality of the Council’s actions.’21  Koskenniemi 
maintains that: ‘For better or for worse, what the Council says is the law.’22   
 
The ‘principled’, or ‘aspirational’, school retorts that the framers of the UN Charter did not 
intend the Security Council to ‘act as if it were the organ of world governance and thus 
override international law and state sovereignty wherever it sees fit.’23  Milanovic points out 
                                                 
17 For further discussion see: Thomas Franck, ‘The Powers of Appreciation: Who is the ultimate 
guardian of the powers of UN legality?’ American Journal of International Law, Vol. 86, 1992, 
pp.519-23; Derek Bowett, ‘The Impact of Security Council Decisions on Dispute Settlement 
Procedures, European Journal of International Law Vol. 5, 1994, pp.89-101. 
18 For discussion see: Herbert Hart, Lionel Adolphus, The Concept of Law, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1961, p.120; and S Lamb, ‘Legal limits to UN Security Council Powers’, in Guy Goodwin-Gill 
and Stefan Talmon (eds) The Reality of International Law: essays in honour of Ian Brownlie, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999, p.361.   
19 Jose Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-Makers, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, 
p.183.   
20 Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, 7th Edition, Routledge, 
1997, pp.212 and 426.   
21 Michael Wood, ‘The UN Security Council and International Law’.  Second lecture: ‘The UN 
Security Council and International Law’, Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lectures, Lauterpacht Centre 
for International Law, University of Cambridge, 8 November 2006, para 6. 
22 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Police in the Temple. Order, Justice and the UN: A Dialectical View’, 
European Journal of International law, Vol. 6, 1995, p. 327. 
23 Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘The Acts of the Security Council: Meaning and Standards of Review’, 
Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, Vol. 11, 2007, pp.146.  See also Erika de Wet, ‘The role 
of human rights in limiting the enforcement power of the Security Council: a principled view’, in Erika 
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that the Security Council ‘is not a global sovereign’, but ‘an organ of an international 
organization and its powers are necessarily limited by that organization’s constitutive 
instrument, the Charter’.24  De Wet argues that there are circumstances where States have a 
unilateral right to refuse to implement Security Council decisions.25  Orakhelashvili maintains 
that since an ‘organ cannot be the final judge of the legality of its own acts’, the ‘residual 
power to determine the legality of the Council’s decisions rests with individual states.’26 
Shaw notes that there is an ‘ambiguous and indeterminate area’ surrounding the potential 
legality of some decisions: 
 
While there is no doubt that under the Charter system the Council’s discretion to 
determine the existence of threats to or breaches of international peace and security is 
virtually absolute . . .  and its discretion to impose measures consequent upon that 
determination . . . is undoubtedly extensive, the determination of the legality or 
illegality of particular situations is essentially the Council’s view as to the matching 
of particular facts with rules of international law.  That view, when adopted under 
Chapter VII, will bind member states, but where it is clearly wrong in law and 
remains unrectified by the Council subsequently, a challenge to the system is 
indubitably posed.27 
 
                                                 
de Wet and André Nollkaemper (eds), Review of the Security Council by Member States, Antwerp: 
Intersentia, 2003; and Erika de Wet, The Chapter VII powers of the United Nations Security Council, 
Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2004, pp.134-8.  
24 Marko Milanovic, ‘Norm Conflict in International Law: whither human rights?’, Duke Journal of 
Comparative & International Law, Vol. 20, 2009, p.94.  Milanovic states that: A decision by the 
Council which is ultra vires or contrary to the Charter would, therefore, have ‘no binding force.’ 
25 De Wet, 2004, pp.375-86. 
26 Alexander Orakhelashvili,  ‘The Impact of Peremptory Norms on the Interpretation and Application 
of United Nations Security Council Resolutions’, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 16 
No.1, 2005, pp.59−88. 
27 Malcolm Shaw, International Law, Sixth Edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 
pp.1270-1.  Shaw also notes that while the ICJ has ‘examined and analysed UN resolutions in the 
course of deciding a case or rendering an Advisory Opinion, for it to declare invalid a binding Security 
Council resolution would equally challenge the system as it operates . . . Between the striking down of 
Chapter VII decisions and the acceptance of resolutions clearly embodying propositions contrary to 
international law, an ambiguous and indeterminate area lies.’ 
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It has been argued that subjecting the Security Council’s decisions to judicial review would 
‘bind it in a legal strait-jacket’ and ‘run counter the Council’s purpose’ to take prompt and 
effective action to preserve international peace and security.28  The Security Council has, 
however, determined that such threats can include a very wide range of issues, such as 
humanitarian emergencies, the overthrow of democratically-elected leaders, extreme 
repression of civilian populations, cross border refugee flows, and measures to combat 
impunity and international terrorism.29  Matheson notes that as the Security Council has 
expanded its areas of competence this inevitably raises issues of legal accountability.30 
 
It is widely accepted that the UN is subject to norms of jus cogens and by at least some parts 
of general international law.31  It is also common ground that the Security Council acts within 
a legal framework under a constituent instrument that defines its powers and functions and 
that it is, in particular, bound by its own purposes and principles.32  The UN obviously 
depends on its members to implement its decisions, so the Security Council is constrained by 
the need to retain political legitimacy.33  Since individual States clearly do have obligations 
under international human rights law and IHL and since States cannot collectively avoid rules 
                                                 
28 Wood, 8 November 2006, paras 5-6.  See also Kathleen Renee Cronin-Furman, ‘The International 
Court of Justice and the United Nations Security Council: rethinking a complicated relationship’, 
Columbia Law Review, Vol. 106, 2006, pp. 435-53.  Cronin-Furman argues that the ICJ should accord 
primacy in the consideration of international custom to the Security Council, on the specific issue of 
self-defence against non-state actors and that:  ‘Introducing possible uncertainty into the Security 
Council’s pronouncements could hamper the Council’s ability to effectively carry out its mission of 
maintaining international peace and security.’ 
29 For further discussion see Michael Matheson, Council Unbound: the growth of UN decision-making 
on conflict and post-conflict issues after the Cold War, Washington: US Institute for Peace, 2006. 
30 Ibid. 
31 For further discussion see Rosalind Higgins,  Problems and Processes: international law and how 
we use it, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, p.181; Felice Morgenstern, Legal Problems of 
International Organizations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, p.32; Alexander 
Orakhelashvili, Collective Security, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, p.56; Alexander 
Orakhelashvili, ‘The Acts of the Security Council: Meaning and Standards of Review’, Max Planck 
Yearbook of United Nations Law, Vol. 11, 2007, pp.143-95; Sylvia Maus, ‘Human rights in 
peacekeeping missions’, Hans-Joachim Heintz and Andrej Zwitter, (eds) International Law and 
Humanitarian Assistance, Berlin: Springer, 2011, pp.103-28.  See also more generally Andrew 
Clapham, Human rights obligations of Non-State Actors, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006; 
August Reinich, ‘Securing the accountability of International Organisations’, Global Governance, 
Vol., 7, No. 2, April-June 2001; and Matheson, 2006. 
32 UN Charter Article 24.1 states that: ‘In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in 
accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.’ 
33 Wood, 8 November 2006, para 64. 
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which bind them individually34 it seems inconceivable that the UN is completely 
unconstrained by similar obligations.35 
 
The ICJ has stated that international  organizations  ‘are subjects of international law and, as 
such, are bound by any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of international 
law, under their constitutions or under international agreements to which they are parties.’36  
It has also noted that: ‘The political character of an organ cannot release it from the 
observance of the treaty provisions established by the Charter when they constitute 
limitations on its powers or criteria for its judgment. To ascertain whether an organ has 
freedom of choice for its decisions, reference must be made to the terms of its constitution.’37   
 
The ICTY has similarly observed that the Security Council is subject to ‘certain 
constitutional limitations’ and that its powers ‘cannot in any case go beyond the limits of the 
jurisdiction of the Organization at large, not to mention other specific limitations or those 
which derive from the internal division of power within the Organization.’38  As Judge 
Jennings, of the ICJ, stated in the Lockerbie case, in 1998, ‘all discretionary powers of lawful 
                                                 
34 In ECtHR Waite and Kennedy v. Germany, Appl. No. 26083/94, Judgment 18 February 1999, para 
67, the Court stated that ‘where States establish international organisations in order to pursue or 
strengthen their cooperation in certain fields of activities, and where they attribute to these 
organisations certain competences and accord them immunities, there may be implications as to the 
protection of fundamental rights. It would be incompatible with the purpose and object of the 
Convention, however, if the Contracting States were thereby absolved from their responsibility under 
the Convention in relation to the field of activity covered by such attribution.’  In Matthews v. UK 
Appl. No. 24833/94 Judgment 18 February 1999, para 32, the Court observed that ‘acts of the EC as 
such cannot be challenged before the Court because the EC is not a Contracting Party. The Convention 
does not exclude the transfer of competences to international organisations provided that Convention 
rights continue to be “secured”. Member States’ responsibility therefore continues even after such a 
transfer.’  
35 ICTY: Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, para 296; Application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and 
Montenegro), 26 February 2007, ICJ Reports 2007, Further Requests for the Indication of Provisional 
Measures, Order of 13 September 1993, Separate Opinion of Judge Lauterpacht paras 100 and 102; 
and  Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European 
Communities, Case T–315/01, Judgment of the CFI, 21 September 2005, para. 230. 
36 Advisory Opinion on the Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 Between the WHO and 
Egypt, 20 December 1980, International Court of Justice, ICJ Reports 1980, para 37. 
37 Advisory Opinion, Conditions of Admission of a State into membership of the United Nations, 28 
May 1948, International Court of Justice ICJ Reports, 1948, p.7. 
38 Prosecutor v. Tadic, October 1995, para. 28. 
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decision-making are necessarily derived from the law, and are therefore governed and 
qualified by the law . . . It is not logically possible to claim to represent the power and 
authority of the law, and at the same time, claim to be above the law.’39   
 
Reviewing the Security Council’s decisions 
 
There is no formal mechanism for reviewing decisions of the UN Security Council and, 
although, the ICJ has indirectly considered the lawfulness of these on a number of 
occasions,40  it has yet to find any unlawful.41  In Namibia the ICJ noted that: 
‘Undoubtedly, the Court does not possess powers of judicial review or appeal in respect of 
the decisions taken by the United Nations organs concerned’.42  It stated, however, that ‘in 
the exercise of its judicial function and since objections have been advanced the Court, in 
the course of its reasoning, will consider these objections before determining any legal 
consequences arising from those resolutions.’43  It found that in adopting Chapter VII 
resolutions condemning Apartheid South Africa and imposing sanctions the Security 
Council was ‘acting in the exercise of what it deemed to be its primary responsibility, the 
                                                 
39 Case concerning questions of interpretation and application of the Montreal Convention arising out 
of the Aerial incident at Lockerbie (Libya v UK) Preliminary Objections Judgment 27 February 1998, 
ICJ Reports 1998, (Judge Jennings Dissenting Opinion) p.110. 
40 Effects of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, ICJ 
Reports, 1954, para 47; Certain expenses of the United Nations (Article 17(2) of the Charter) Advisory 
Opinion, 20 July 1961, ICJ Reports 1962; Legal consequences for States of the Continued Presence of 
South Africa in Namibia notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), ICJ Reports 1971; 
and ICJ Reports 1992. 
41 For discussion see Joy Gordon, ‘The Sword of Damocles: Revisiting the Question of Whether the 
United Nations Security Council is Bound by International Law’, Chicago Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 12 No. 2, Winter 2012; August Reinich, ‘Should Judges second-Guess the UN Security 
Council? International Organizations Law Review Vol. 6, 2009, pp.257–291; Dapo Akande, ‘The ICJ 
and the Security Council: Is There Room for Judicial Control of the Decisions of the Political Organs 
of the UN?’, International & Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 46 No. 2, 1997 , pp.309-43; José 
Alvarez, ‘Judging the Security Council’, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 90, No. 1 
January 1996, pp.1-39; Erica de Wet, ‘Judicial Review as an Emerging General Principle of Law and 
Its Implications for the International Court of Justice’, Netherlands International Law Review, Vol. 47, 
Issue 2, 2000, pp.181-210. 
42 ICJ Reports 1971, para 89.  This case followed a request from the Security Council for an advisory 
opinion seeking legal advice on the consequences of its own decisions to use its Chapter VII powers in 
a series of resolutions related to Apartheid South Africa’s occupation of Namibia. 
43 Ibid. See also de Wet, 2004, pp.48 and 127.  De Wet argues that this resulted in ‘de facto review’ of 
the legality of the Security Council’s actions. 
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maintenance of peace and security’44  and that the ‘only limitations are the fundamental 
principles and purposes found in Chapter 1 of the Charter.’45   
 
In the first preliminary objections stage of the Lockerbie case, in 1992,46 the majority of 
the ICJ held that they had jurisdiction to hear a case relating to the extradition of a terrorist 
suspect, which had been brought to the Security Council by the UK and US supported by 
first a non-binding UN Security Council Resolution47 and then one issued using its Chapter 
VII powers.48  The Chapter VII resolution had been passed three days after the closing of 
oral hearings on the Libyan government’s request for provisional measures to enjoin the 
UK and US from taking action to coerce it to hand over the suspects, which it argued 
prejudiced their right to a fair trial.49  The Court declined to indicate the provisional 
measures, but it also rejected claims that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case.   
 
This decision provoked a number of dissenting opinions.50  Judge Bedjaoui questioned 
whether a bomb attack that took place three years previously could be said to be a current 
threat to peace, while Judge El-Kosheri noted that the Security Council may have violated 
                                                 
44 ICJ Reports, 1971, para 109. 
45 Ibid., para 110.  The Court went on to state in paras 128-31that South Africa’s continued occupation 
of Namibia was illegal and that its apartheid policies were ‘a flagrant violation of the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations.’  See also ICTY Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic October 
1995; ICTR Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi, Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction, Case No. 
ICTR-96-15-T, Trial Chamber 18 June 1997, point 6.  As will be discussed further in chapter six, both 
ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) subsequently used Namibia as 
authority for justifying their right to review the legality of the Security Council resolutions that created 
them. 
46 Case concerning questions of interpretation and application of the Montreal Convention arising out 
of the Aerial incident at Lockerbie (Libya v UK) Provisional Measures Order of 14 April 1992, ICJ 
Reports 1992 
47 Security Council Resolution 731 of 22 January 1992. 
48 Security Council Resolution 748 of 31 March 1992. 
49 For contrasting perspectives see de Wet, 2004, pp.2-12 and Michael Reisman, ‘The Constitutional 
Crisis in the United Nations’, Faculty Scholarship Series Paper 866, The American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 83, 1993. 
50 ICJ Reports 1992: Declaration of Vice-President Oda, Acting President; Declaration by Judge Ni; 
Joint Declaration by Judges Evensen, Tarassov, Guillaume and Aguilar Mawdsley (translation); 
Separate Opinion by Judge Lachs; Separate Opinion by Judge Shahabuddeen; Dissenting Opinion by 
Judge Bedjaoui (translation); Dissenting Opinion by Judge Weeramantry; Dissenting Opinion by Judge 
Ranjeva (translation); Dissenting Opinion by Judge Ajibola; Dissenting Opinion by Judge El-Kosheri.     
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Article 92 of the Charter by interfering with a case before the ICJ.51  Judge Weeramantry, 
however, maintained that the Security Council had sole discretion over determining what 
constituted a threat to international peace and security under its Chapter VII powers and 
the ICJ could not properly review this.52 
 
By the time the ICJ made its final decision on the Preliminary Objections a second Chapter 
VII resolution had again demanded the extradition of the suspects and further tightened the 
sanctions on Libya for refusing to hand them over.53  The ICJ again rejected the objections 
relating to jurisdiction, by 11 votes to 5, with the dissenters arguing that they were being 
asked to rule on the meaning, legality and effectiveness of the Security Council’s 
resolutions, which was beyond the Court’s powers to do.54  The dispute was finally 
resolved by the compromise of a trial in a third country and a Security Council resolution 
in August 1998 proposed the suspension of the sanctions if Libya agreed to this.55  The 
case was removed from the ICJ’s role, at the joint request of the parties in September 
2003.56 As will be discussed below, however, the human rights impact of UN imposed 
sanctions has continued to cause controversy.   
 
De Wet argues that the case shows the importance of considering human rights norms in 
limiting the Security Council’s discretionary powers.  She maintains that ‘resolutions 
authorising individual criminal prosecution as a method for restoring international peace 
                                                 
51 ICJ Reports 1992, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Bedjaoui, p.176.  Dissenting Opinion Judge El-
Kosheri p.210. 
52 ICJ Reports 1992.  Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry. 
53 Security Council Resolution 883 of 11 November 1993. 
54 ICJ Reports 1992.  Dissenting Opinion of Judges Schwebel, Oda and Jennings. 
55 Security Council Resolution 1192 of 27 August 1998. 
56 ICJ Press Release 2003/39, 10 September 2003.  See also BBC News,’ Lockerbie bomber Abdelbaset 
al-Megrahi dies in Tripoli’, 20 May 2012.  Al Megrahi, the head of security for Libyan Arab Airlines, 
director of the Centre for Strategic Studies in Tripoli, Libya, and an alleged Libyan intelligence officer 
was subsequently convicted of the Lockerbie bombing and sentenced to life imprisonment.  His co-
defendant was acquitted and the court left the question of whether he had acted on behalf of the Libyan 
government unanswered.  Al Megrahi was freed on compassionate grounds by the Scottish 
Government on 20 August 2009 following doctors reporting on 10 August 2009 that he 
had terminal prostate cancer and was expected to have around three months to live.  He died on 20 
May 2012 nearly three years after his release. 
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and security are legal only if and to the extent that they give due effect to the principles of 
independence, impartiality and even-handedness that underpin Article 1(1) of the Charter 
as well as Article 14 of the ICCPR.’57  She further states that ‘with respect to the Lockerbie 
suspects the respective resolutions totally disregard the principle of impartiality in relation 
to the two individuals whose extradition was demanded’ because the two countries 
requesting the extradition participated in the voting on the resolution.58   
 
The UN’s legal personality and liability  
 
The UN Human Rights Committee has noted that ‘there is a United Nations Charter 
obligation to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms’.59  The extent of the obligations that this imposes on the Security 
Council itself, however, remains less clear.   In the first instance it will depend upon the 
UN’s own legal personality and then on what conduct can be attributed to it and to 
member States carrying out its decisions.60  If acts or omissions which conflict with human 
rights obligations can be attributed to the Security Council and its subsidiary organs, it 
then remains to be determined whether and how the UN can itself be held to account for 
them. 61   
                                                 
57 De Wet, 2004, p.349. 
58 Ibid.  She also argues that the UK and US should not have voted on the original, Chapter VI, 
resolution since this violated Article 27 of the UN Charter. 
59 Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment no 31 (2004), para 2. 
60 For further discussion see:  Conclusions of the work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of 
International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law’, 
International Law Commission, A/CN.4/L.682 13 April 2006 Vol. II, Part Two.  See also Caitlin Bell, 
‘Reassessing Multiple Attribution: The International Law Commission and the Behrami and Saramati 
decision’, New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol. 42, 2010, pp.501-48. 
International legal personality refers to the capacity of States to enter into relationships with other 
States, through treaties and conventions, and to create legally binding rules, rights and obligations for 
themselves. 
61 James Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: 
Introduction, Text and Commentaries, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p.13.  See also 
Christopher Greenwood, ‘International Humanitarian Law and United Nations Military Operations’, in 
Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 1998, p.18; and Ralph 
Wilde, ‘Enhancing Accountability at the International level:  the Tension between International 
Organization and member state responsibility and the underlying issues at stake’, ILSA Journal of 
International and Comparative Law, Vol. 12:2, 2006. 
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It is widely accepted that the principles of state responsibility are ‘applicable by analogy, but 
with some variations, to the responsibility of international organizations’.62  The ILC drew 
heavily from its 2001 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts  
when addressing the responsibility of international organisations.63  The final Draft Articles, 
published in 2011, envisage a joint or parallel responsibility between international 
organisations and their members for both acts and omissions.64  While this was expressly 
designed to prevent States from using international organizations to circumvent the rules of 
State Responsibility,65 both sets of Articles contain a clause stating that they are ‘without 
prejudice to the Charter of the United Nations.’66 
                                                 
62 For further discussion see: International Law Association, Malcolm Shaw and Karel Wellens (Co- 
Rapporteurs), Berlin Conference (2004) Accountability of International Organizations (2004), p. 27; 
Kristen E. Boon, ‘New Directions in Responsibility: Assessing the International Law Commission’s 
Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations’, The Yale Journal of International 
Law Online, Vol. 37, Spring 2011; and Paolo Palchetti, ‘The allocation of responsibility for 
internationally wrongful acts committed in the course of multinational operations’, International 
Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 95 No. 891/892 Autumn/Winter 2013, pp.727-42. 
63 UN International Law Commission, Report on the work of its sixty-first session (4 May to 5 June and 
6 July to 7 August 2009), (A/64/10) pp. 13–183.  See also Official Records of the General Assembly, 
Fifty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/55/10), paras. 726-728 and 729 (1); International Law 
Commission, Fifty-fourth Session (29 April to 7 June and 22 July to 16 August 2002), ILC Report 
(A/57/10), paras 461-2; UN International Law Commission, Report on the work of its sixty-third 
session (26 April to 3 June and 4 July to 12 August 2011), General Assembly Official Records, Sixty-
sixth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/66/10 and Add.1); Eighth report on responsibility of 
international organizations, Giorgio Gaja, Special Rapporteur, International Law Commission, Sixty-
third session, Geneva, 26 April-3 June and 4 July-12 August 2011, A/CN.4/640, 14 March 2011.  The 
ILC first addressed the topic at its fifty-second session, in 2000, appointing Giorgio Gaja as Special 
Rapporteur and establishing a Working Group on the subject of ‘Responsibility of international 
organizations’ in 2002.  By 2011 the ILC had provisionally adopted 67 Draft Articles and 
accompanying commentaries, while the Special Rapporteur had produced eight reports surveying the 
comments made by governments and international organizations.  At its meeting in August 2011, the 
Commission decided ‘to recommend to the General Assembly:  (a) to take note of the draft articles on 
the responsibility of international organizations in a resolution and to annex them to the resolution;  (b) 
to consider, at a later stage, the elaboration of a convention on the basis of the draft articles’. 
64 Draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations, 2011, Adopted by the 
International Law Commission at its sixty-third session, in 2011, and submitted to the General 
Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report covering the work of that session, A/66/10, para. 87. 
65 Ibid., Articles 14 and 17.  See also UN Comments to the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of 
International Organisations, UN Doc. A/CN.4/637/Add.1, 17 February 2011. 
66 Ibid. Article 67; and Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
2001, Adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty-third session (2001), Article 59. For 
further discussion see José E. Alvarez, ‘Luncheon Address, Canadian Council of International Law, 
35th Annual Conference on Responsibility of Individuals, States and Organizations, International 
Organizations: Accountability or Responsibility?’, Oct. 27th , 2006.  Although generally critical of the 
ILCs work on defining the legal responsibilities of international organisations (IOs), he notes that 
‘there are a few cases suggesting IO responsibility when the Organization acts as an administrator of 
territory . . . . [and] Many now agree that at least the UN Security Council would not be violating the 
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The UN Charter specifies that: ‘The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its 
Members such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the 
fulfilment of its purposes’.67  It may also enter into ‘agreement or agreements’ with member 
States when seeking to deploy their armed forces and obtaining other assistance, and 
facilities, for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.68  In its Advisory 
Opinion on Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations of 1949 the 
ICJ was asked whether the UN had ‘the capacity to bring an international claim against the 
responsible de jure or de facto government’ which had failed to protect its most senior 
official in Palestine.69  The ICJ was clear that the UN was not the functional or legal 
equivalent of a State, ‘which possess the totality of international rights and duties recognized 
by international law’, and that the scope of the organization’s rights and duties ‘must depend 
upon its purposes and functions as specified or implied in its constituent documents and 
developed in practice.’70  It also noted that the drafters of UN’s Charter had ‘not  been  
content  to  make  the  Organization created by it merely a centre “for  harmonizing the 
actions of  nations  in the attainment  of  these  common  ends”’, but had ‘equipped that 
centre with organs’ and ‘given it special tasks’.71   
 
The Court ruled that the UN ‘is at present the supreme type of international organization and 
it could not carry out the intentions of its founders if it was devoid of international personality 
. . . It must be acknowledged that its Members, by entrusting certain functions to it, with the 
                                                 
Charter (including articles 2(4) or 2(7)) should it respond to ethnic cleansing inside a country, even 
with force.’  He also accepts that ‘states are responsible should they “circumvent” their international 
organisations by using an IO’.  
67 UN Charter, Article 104. 
68 UN Charter, Article 43. 
69 Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 11 April 1949, International 
Court of Justice, advisory opinion, ICJ Reports 1949, pp.176-7.  The UN wished to bring a 
compensation claim against Israel over the killing of Count Folke Bernadotte, its chief mediator in 
Palestine, by the so-called Stern Gang.  The UN believed that Israel, which was not a member of the 
UN at the time, had failed to prevent the murder or punish the perpetrators.   
70 Ibid., pp.178-80. 
71 Ibid., p.178. 
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attendant duties and responsibilities, have clothed it with the competence to enable those 
functions to be effectively discharged.’72  Although the Charter does not specify that the UN 
has the capacity to bring a claim for the loss suffered by its agents, the ICJ ruled that it should 
be seen as having this ‘implied power’ since otherwise it could not protect the people 
working for it.73   
 
Parlett has noted that ‘while States possess the full range of rights and duties under 
international law, with attendant capacity, other subjects of international law may have 
different rights, duties and capacities’, which can be inferred from functional necessity and 
practice and need not be expressly or directly conferred by a constituent instrument.74  It is 
now widely accepted that customary international law and the general principles of 
responsibility can apply mutatis mutandis to international organizations.75  Indeed Szaz 
argues that the proliferation of intergovernmental organizations with ‘recognized legal 
personalities’ has made these entities ‘potential sources of customary law’.76   
 
The UN itself has long accepted that the ‘international responsibility of the United Nations 
for the activities of United Nations forces is an attribute of its international legal personality 
and its capacity to bear international rights and obligations.’77  In 2004 the UN’s legal counsel 
                                                 
72 Ibid., p.179. 
73 Ibid., pp.182-4: ‘Many missions, from their very nature, involve the [UN’s] agents in unusual 
dangers to which ordinary persons are not exposed . . . Both to  ensure  the  efficient  and independent  
performance  of  these missions and to afford effective support  to its  agents,  the  Organization  must  
provide  them  with adequate  protection.’ It also noted that protection of these agents was necessary to 
ensure the ‘independent  action  of  the Organization itself’ and that it was particularly important to 
ensure that all nationals working for the UN received the same level of protection, whether they 
belonged to a powerful or a weak state. 
74 Kate Parlett, The Individual in the International Legal System, continuity and change in 
international law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p.32. 
75 Larsen, 2012, pp.99-105; Scott Sheeran and Jaqueline Bevilaqua, ‘The UN Security Council and 
International Human Rights Obligations: towards a new theory of constraints and derogations’, in Scott 
Sheeran and Nigel Rodley (eds) Routledge Handbook of International Human Rights Law, London: 
Routledge, 2013, pp.371-402.   
76 Paul Szasz, ‘General Law-Making Processes , in Christopher Joyner (ed), The United Nations and 
International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp.27-64.   
77 Secretary-General’s report, Administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of the United 
Nations peacekeeping operations, A/51/389, 1996, para. 6. 
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noted that: ‘As a subsidiary organ of the United Nations, an act of a peacekeeping force is, in 
principle, imputable to the Organization, and if committed in violation of an international 
obligation entails the international responsibility of the Organization and its liability in 
compensation.’78  In 1999 the ICJ stated that while the UN and its officials were immune 
from legal processes, this should be seen as ‘distinct from the issue of compensation for any 
damages incurred as a result of acts performed by the United Nations or by its agents acting 
in their official capacity’, while accepting that it ‘may be required to bear responsibility for 
the damage arising from such acts.’79  Compensations claims against the UN, however, ‘shall 
not be dealt with by national courts but shall be settled in accordance with the appropriate 
modes of settlement’ that the UN makes provisions for in the Convention on Privileges and 
Immunities.80  
 
From the time of its earliest missions the UN has concluded SOFAs with host nations,81 
which stipulated the specific rules for settling claims.82  The UN Model SOFA makes 
provision for the establishment of a Standing Claims Commission,83 but no such bodies have 
ever been created and peacekeeping missions have usually relied on local claims 
                                                 
78 Unpublished letter of 3 February 2004 by the United Nations Legal Counsel to the Director of the 
Codification Division.  Quoted in Report of the ILC, General Assembly Official Records, 56th session, 
Supplement No. 10 A/59/10, 2004, p.111. 
79 Difference relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a  Special Rapporteur of the Commission on 
Human Rights, Advisory opinion of 29 April 1999, ICJ Reports 1999, para 66.  See also Applicability 
of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, 
Advisory Opinion of 14 December 1989, ICJ Reports 1989. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Report of the Secretary General on the Model Status of Forces Agreement for Peacekeeping 
Operations, UN Doc. A/45/594, 9 October 1990.  See also Scott Sheeran (Research Director), UN 
Peacekeeping and The Model Status of Forces Agreement, United Nations Peacekeeping Law Reform 
Project, School of Law, University of Essex, 20011, p.2  and Scott Sheeran, (Research Director), 
Background Paper Prepared for the Experts’ Workshop, 26 August 2010, London, UK, Hosted by the 
New Zealand High Commission, United Nations Peacekeeping Law Reform Project, School of Law, 
University of Essex, 2010, p.18 for an analysis of the similarities and differences between the model 
SOFA and mission specific ones. 
82 Bruce Oswald, Helen Durham and Adrian Bates, Documents on the Law of UN Peace Operations, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp.34-8; Dieter Fleck,  ‘The legal status of personnel involved 
in United Nations peace operations’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 95 No. 891/892 
Autumn/Winter 2013, pp.613-36. 
83 Marten Zwanenburg, Accountability Of Peace Support Operations, The Hague/London/Boston: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2005, pp.89-90.  This is envisaged as a quasi-judicial body consisting of one 
representative of the UN, one of the host state and one jointly appointed chairman. 
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commissions or settled disputes informally.84  UNEF, for example, used informal negotiation 
to settle all claims and paid out compensation for accidental deaths taking into account ‘local 
levels of compensation as evidenced by the system of diyet used by the Sharia (Moslem 
religious) Courts.’85  
 
The UN did accept responsibility in cases where civilians were killed by members of UNEF 
and ONUC who had opened fire without receiving orders and who were subsequently 
prosecuted in their own countries.86  It only accepted attribution for harmful conduct by a 
member of a contingent, however, if the person was acting in an official capacity and subject 
to the organization’s effective command and control at the time it was carried out.87  One case 
is documented where the local review board rejected a claim in which a UN soldier on duty 
guarding UNEF camp, ‘accidentally killed a passer-by when using his gun to chase away 
playing children’, on the basis that the soldier acted outside the scope of lawful self-defence 
as laid down in the relevant UNEF regulations.88 
 
During the UN’s first peacekeeping mission in the Congo in the 1960s, a number of European 
nationals lodged claims for damages to person and property.  The UN responded by 
negotiating lump sum payments to their respective governments, while maintaining that it did 
not accept liability for damages which resulted ‘solely from military operations’.89  In 
response to a protest from the Soviet Union that Belgium, in particular, had no moral right to 
compensation the UN’s General Secretary stated: 
                                                 
84 United Nations Library of International Law, August Reinich, ‘Convention on Privileges and 
Immunities of the United Nations, New York, 13 February 1946, Convention on Privileges and 
Immunities of the Specialized Agencies, New York, 21 November 1947’, 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/cpiun-cpisa/cpiun-cpisa.html, accessed 7 March 2013. 
85 Report of the Secretary General, Summary of the experiences derived from the establishment and 
operation of the force, UN Doc. A/3943, 9 October 1958, para 141. 
86 Zwanenburg, 2005, p.106-7. 
87 Schmalenbach, 2006, p.36 and 38-9. 
88 Ibid.  Since he acted ultra vires, payments were made solely on moral grounds. 
89 Zwanenburg, 2005, p.88, citing an Agreement signed between the UN and the Government of 
Belgium relating to the settlement of claims filed against the United Nations in the Congo by Belgian 
nationals dated 23 February 1965. 
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It has always been the policy of the United Nations, acting through the Secretary-
General, to compensate individuals who have suffered damages for which the 
Organization was legally liable. This policy is in keeping with generally recognized 
legal principles and with the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United 
Nations . . .  it is reinforced by the principles set forth in the international conventions 
concerning the protection of the life and property of civilian population during 
hostilities as well as by considerations of equity and humanity.90  
 
In fact the UN’s practice has usually been quite restricted.  Oscar Schachter, the Director of 
the UN’s General Legal Division at the time advised that: ‘the Organization or a contributing 
State is not vicariously liable for the action of Force members not done in the performance of 
official duty and which are in the nature of private personal acts . . .  in cases where the civil 
liability of a Force member is clear and where due to repatriation or other reason ONUC has 
been unable to arrange as settlement of the matter, consideration should be given to making 
ex gratia payments to the injured party, taking into account the circumstances of the case’.91  
As Schmalenbach notes, ‘international organizations are often very generous in terms of their 
willingness to pay compensation, but they remain vague about their legal obligation to do so 
in order to avoid setting a precedent.’92   
 
In a 1986 memorandum the UN Office of Legal Affairs stated that the Organization had no 
legal or financial liability for any death injury or damage committed by ‘off-duty’ members 
                                                 
90 Letter dated 6 August 1965 addressed by the Secretary-General to the Permanent Representative of 
the Soviet Union, United Nations Juridical Yearbook, 1965, p. 41. 
91 Quoted in Kirsten Schmalenbach  ‘Third party liability of International Organisations’, in Harvey 
Langholtz, Boris Kondoch and Alan Wells (eds) International Peacekeeping, The Yearbook of 
International Peace Operations,  Hague/Boston/London: Martin Nijhoff Publishers, 2006, p.38. 
92 Schmalenbach, 2006, p.40. 
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of its peacekeeping forces,93 which clearly differs from the IHL principle that parties ‘shall be 
responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces’.94   In a review 
of the efficiency of the procedure published in 1995, it was stressed that while immunity 
could be lifted for claims relating to criminal or illegal activity this would not apply to 
‘claims based on political or policy-related grievances’.95  This principle has been restated 
since and remains the UN’s official policy.96  In 1997, in response to a growing number of 
claims for actions in respect of its operations in the 1990s in Somalia, Rwanda and the 
Balkans, the UN General Assembly also passed a resolution significantly limiting the liability 
of the UN for private law claims brought against it as a result of its peacekeeping activities.97  
This imposes strict time limits on claims;98 excludes claims arising from ‘operational 
                                                 
93 Quoted in Boris Kondoh, ‘Individual and International Responsibility’, in Terry Gill and Dieter 
Fleck (eds), The Handbook of the International Law of Military Operations, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010, p.524.  It stated that: ‘A soldier may be considered ‘off-duty’ not only when he 
is ‘on-leave’, but also when he is not acting in an official or operational capacity while either inside or 
outside the area of operations  . . .  We consider the primary factor in determining an ‘off-duty’ 
situation to be whether the member of a peacekeeping force was acting in a non-official/non-
operational capacity when the incident occurred and not whether he/she was in uniform or civilian 
attire at the time of the incident and inside or outside the area of operations.’    
94 Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: 
Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907, Article 
3.  ‘A belligerent party which violates the provisions of the said Regulations shall, if the case demands, 
be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of 
its armed forces.’  For discussion see Tom Dannenbaum, ‘Translating the Standard of Effective 
Control into a System of Effective Accountability: How Liability Should be Apportioned for 
Violations of Human Rights by Member State Troop Contingents Serving as United Nations 
Peacekeepers’, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 51, No. 1, 2010, pp.113-92; and Peter Rowe, 
‘United Nations Peacekeepers and Human Rights Violations: the Role of Military Discipline’, Harvard 
ILJ online, Vol. 51 – June 14, 2010.  Dannenbaum argues that this restrictive position is needed to take 
account of the structure of a multinational force in which the UN commander does not have 
disciplinary powers over national contingents. 
95 Review of the Efficiency of the Administrative and Financial Functioning of the United Nations: 
Procedures in place for implementation of article VIII, section 29, of the Convention on the Privileges 
and Immunities of the United Nations, adopted by the GA on 13 Feb. 1946, UN Doc. A/C.5/49/65, 24 
April 1995, [Hereinafter Efficiency Review 1995] para 23.  See also Eric De Brabandere, ‘Immunity of 
International Organizations in Post-conflict International Administrations’, International 
Organizations Law Review, Vol. 7 Issue 1, 2010, pp.79-119. 
96 For further discussion see Neils Blokker, ‘International Organisations: the Untouchables?’, 
International Organisations Law Review, Vol. 10 Issue 2, 2013, pp.259-75; Michael Wood, ‘Do 
international organisations enjoy immunity under customary international law?’, International 
Organisations Law Review, Vol. 10 Issue 2, 2013, pp.287-318.  Some believe that the immunity of the 
UN and its associated personnel is a principle of customary law.   
97 UN General Assembly Resolution, 52/247, Third party liability: temporal and fiscal limitations, UN 
Doc. A/RES/52/247, 26 June 1998. 
98 Ibid., para 8.  It excludes claims ‘submitted after six months from the time the damage, injury or loss 
was sustained, or from the time it was discovered by the claimant, and in any event after one year from 
the termination of the mandate of the peacekeeping operation.’ 
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necessity’99 and limits compensation levels.100  Compensation is also not paid when, ‘in the 
sole opinion of the Secretary-General’, the claims ‘are impossible to verify’.101 
 
The obstacles facing those from outside the Organization seeking redress were graphically 
illustrated, in February 2013, when the UN declared that a compensation claim brought on 
behalf of victims of a cholera outbreak in Haiti was ‘not receivable’ pursuant to the 
Convention on UN Privileges and Immunities.102 Nepalese troops are alleged to have brought 
the disease into Haiti in 2011 and the UN allegedly failed to screen them or ensure proper 
waste management systems in their camp.103  Haiti had not been affected by cholera for over 
50 years, but within the first 30 days of the epidemic’s outbreak, almost 2,000 deaths were 
recorded and by July 2011, it was infecting at a pace of one person every minute.104  In 2015 
the UN acknowledged the epidemic had been the ‘largest in recent world history.’105  The UN 
insists that the Haitian individuals do not hold ‘private law’ claims because the failures relate 
to policies rather than ‘criminal, illegal, or unlawful actions or activities of the mission or its 
members’.106  As Freedman has noted, however, ‘the claims are torts based on negligence, 
                                                 
99 Ibid., paras 6 and 7 state that it will not cover acts not of gross negligence or willful misconduct by 
troop contributing countries. 
100 Ibid., paras 11and 9.  Compensation for loss or damage to property arising from UN operations are 
limited to ‘the reasonable costs of repair or replacement’, and ‘medical and rehabilitation expenses, 
loss of earnings, loss of financial support, transportation expenses associated with the injury, illness or 
medical care, legal and burial expenses’.  No compensation is paid for ‘non-economic loss, such as 
pain and suffering or moral anguish, as well as punitive or moral damages’, and payments are 
generally limited to a maximum US$50,000, subject to local standards. 
101 Ibid. paras 9, 10 and 11. 
102 UN Secretary General Press Release, ‘Haiti Cholera Victims’ Compensation Claims ‘Not 
Receivable’ under Immunities and Privileges Convention, United Nations Tells Their Representatives’, 
21 February 2013. 
103For further details see, Final Report of the Independent Panel of Experts on the Cholera Outbreak in 
Haiti, Independent Panel of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dr. Alejando Cravioto, Dr. 
Claudio F. Lanata, Daniele S. Lantagne and Dr. G. Balakrish Nair, 2011, available at 
http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/haiti/UN-cholera-report-final.pdf, accessed 26 November 2014.  It 
is alleged that infected human faeces was deposited untreated in a tributary that feeds into Haiti’s main 
river. 
104 Ibid.  See also BBC News, ‘UN should take blame for Haiti Cholera’, 20 July 2012. In which Bill 
Clinton, the UN’s Special Envoy to Haiti, has publicly admitted that UN peacekeepers were the likely 
cause of the disease. 
105 UN News Centre, ‘Haiti: senior UN official says cholera outbreak needs ‘urgent attention’ 11 May 
2015. 
106 UN Secretary-General, ‘Letter to Congresswoman Maxine Waters’, 5 July 2013, available at: 
www.ijdh. org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/UNSG-Letter-to-Rep.-Maxine-Waters.pdf, accessed 26 
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gross negligence, and/or recklessness’.107  In October 2013, lawyers filed a class action in the 
US, challenges the UN’s absolute immunity.108  In March 2014 the US filed a ‘statement of 
interest’ supporting the UN’s absolute immunity.109 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, on the two occasions that UN missions were given executive 
powers over territories the lack of mechanisms to scrutinise their human rights records 
effectively seriously undermined their legitimacy.  The Haiti cholera case is likely to cause 
similar reputational damage.  As will be discussed below, the UN has tried to create ad hoc 
mechanisms to address some of its own short-comings and improve its accountability.  Courts 
and monitoring bodies have also attempted to define whether acts authorized by the Security 
Council under its Chapter VII powers should be attributable to the implementing States or to 
the UN itself. 
 
Attribution for conduct and norm conflicts 
 
The drafters of the UN Charter originally envisaged an extremely comprehensive system of 
collective security with considerable land, sea and air forces permanently at the Security 
Council’s disposal, under Article 47 of the Charter,110 but with the onset of the cold war its 
work soon became paralyzed by the vetoes of its permanent members.111  No Article 47 
                                                 
November 2014. See also Efficiency Review 1995, para 23 which states that the UN will not address 
‘claims based on political or policy-related grievances’. 
107 Rosa Freedman, ‘UN Immunity or Impunity? A Human Rights Based Challenge’, European 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2014, pp.239–254. 
108 D Georges v. United Nations et al, US (2013); Jean-Robert et al v United Nations, US (2014); 
LaVenture et al v. United Nations, US (2014). 
109 Letter from the US Department of Justice, 7 March 2014, available at: 
http://personal.crocodoc.com/J4lRXpi, accessed 4 December 2014. 
110 UN Charter, Article 47.  
111 Colonel D.W. Bowett, United Nations Forces: A legal study, New York: Frederick A Praeger, 
1964, p.15.  In the initial discussions the Soviet Union contemplated a force of ‘about 12 ground 
divisions (say 125,000 men) 600 bombers, 300 fighters, 5-6 cruisers, 24 destroyers and 12 submarines.  
The United States wanted 20 ground divisions (say 300,00 men), 1,250 bombers, 2,250 fighters, 3 
battleships, 6 aircraft carriers, 15 cruisers, 84 destroyers and frigates and 90 submarines.’  See also 
Christopher Greenwood, ‘The United Nations and Guarantor of International Peace and Security: past 
present and future – a United Kingdom view’, in Christian Tomuschat, (ed), The United Nations at age 
Fifty, The Hague/London/Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1995, pp.54-75. 
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agreements were ever concluded and the meetings of the Military Staff Committee became an 
empty formality.112  Calls for the creation of a UN standing military force have resurfaced 
periodically, but rapid deployment of properly equipped troops has been a recurring problem 
in UN peacekeeping missions.113  This has left the Security Council with no choice but to rely 
on member States willing to act on its behalf.114  Although it is widely accepted that the 
Security Council can delegate this power to States,115 controversies have arisen about whether 
they are permissively ‘authorized’ or ‘obliged’ by a Security Council resolution to take 
certain actions.116   
 
In 2007, the European Court of Human Rights declared inadmissible Behrami and Behrami v. 
France and Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway,117 which respectively focussed on 
‘negative’ and ‘positive’ obligations under the Convention.118  The first was brought by the 
                                                 
112 Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams, Understanding Peacekeeping, Second Edition, Polity Press, 2011, 
pp.81-91; Christine Gray, Use of Force in International Law, Third Edition, Oxford: Oxford, 
University Press, 2008, pp.255-264; Bowett, 1964, p.18.  See also Adam Roberts, ‘Proposals for UN 
Standing Forces: history, tasks and obstacles’, in Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh and 
Dominik Zaum (eds), The United Nations Security Council and War, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008, pp.99-130.   
113 Ibid.  In September 1948, for example, 11 days after the assassination of its most senior official in 
Palestine, which gave rise to the Reparations case, the Secretary General proposed, under Articles 97 
and 98 of the Charter the establishment of a UN Guard, to protect its field staff, supply lines and 
neutralised areas, along with a UN Legion of 50,000 soldiers and a Volunteer Reserve Force.  Similar 
proposals have since made periodically, but never implemented. 
114 Bruno Simma The Charter of the United Nations A Commentary Second Edition, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002, p.729.   
115 See, for example, Rosalind Higgins, Problems and Processes: international law and how we use it, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, p.266; and Dan Sarooshi The United Nations and the 
Development of Collective Security, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, p.153; Natalino Ronzitti, 
‘Lessons of International Law from NATO’s Armed Intervention Against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia’, The International Spectator Vol. XXXIV, No. 3, July - September 1999. 
116 Report of the ILC, General Assembly Official Records, 56th session, Supplement No. 10 A/59/10 
(2004), p.110.  This notes in its Commentary on the Draft Articles that states often place their military 
contingents at the disposal of the UN for peacekeeping operations while retaining disciplinary powers 
and criminal jurisdiction over their members of the national contingent and that problems can arise in 
such situations when trying to attribute responsibility for specific conduct.  See also: Niels Blokker, ‘Is 
the Authorization Authorized? Powers and Practice of the UN Security Council to Authorize Use of 
Force by Coalitions of the Able and Willing’, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 11, No. 3, 
2000, pp.541-568; Simma, 2002, p.729; and Larsen, 2012, pp.62-4. 
117 Behrami and Behrami v. France (Appl. No. 71412/01) 31 May 2007 (Grand Chamber) Decision on 
Admissibility and Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway (Appl. No. 78166/01), (Grand Chamber) 
Decision on Admissibility, 2 May 2007.   The two cases were joined together for the purposes of the 
admissibility decision. 
118 For discussion see P. Bodeau-Livinec, G. P. Buzzini and S. Villalpando, ‘Agim Behrami & Bekir 
Behrami v. France; Ruzhdi Saramati v. France, Germany & Norway. Joined App. Nos. 71412/01 & 
78166/01’American Journal of International Law, Vol. 102, 2008. 
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father of a boy killed, in March 2000, by an exploding shell, dropped by NATO during its air 
campaign over Kosovo the previous year, which it was alleged that French KFOR soldiers 
had subsequently failed to mark or clear.  The second was brought by an alleged Albanian 
militia leader who was detained in administrative KFOR military custody for several months 
in 2001 and 2002 without effective access to a court.119   
 
The Court recalled Bankovic in ruling that ‘jurisdictional competence is primarily territorial’ 
and noted that ‘the impugned acts and omission of KFOR and UNMIK cannot be attributed 
to the respondent States and, moreover, did not take place on the territory of those States or 
by virtue of a decision of their authorities.’120  It stated that the central question in the present 
case, however, was ‘whether this Court is competent to examine under the Convention those 
States’ contribution to the civil and security presences which did exercise the relevant control 
of Kosovo.’121  It noted that UNMIK ‘was a subsidiary organ of the UN created under 
Chapter VII of the Charter’ and so its actions were ‘in principle, attributable to the UN’.122  It 
further noted that KFOR had been created by the same UN Security Council resolution, 
which had delegated responsibility for security in Kosovo to it and required its leadership to 
report to the Security Council on its progress.123  The Court recognised that neither the 
Security Council nor UNMIK exercised any ‘effective control’ or ‘operational command’ 
over KFOR.124  Nevertheless, this ‘ultimate authority and control’ was sufficient for the 
Court’s assessment of attribution.125  It cited the ICJ’s ruling that ‘the UN has a legal 
personality separate from that of its member states’ and noted that it is ‘not a Contracting 
Party to the [European] Convention’.126  According to the Court: 
                                                 
119 Ibid, 
120 Behrami and Behrami v. France (Appl. No. 71412/01) 31 May 2007 (Grand Chamber) Decision on 
Admissibility and Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway (Appl. No. 78166/01), (Grand Chamber) 
Decision on Admissibility, 2 May 2007, para 152. 
121 Ibid., para 71. 
122 Ibid., para 143.   
123 Ibid., para 134. 
124 Ibid., para 141. 
125 Ibid., para 133. 
126 Ibid., para 144. 
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it is evident from the Preamble, Articles 1, 2 and 24 as well as Chapter VII of the 
Charter that the primary objective of the UN is the maintenance of international 
peace and security. While it is equally clear that ensuring respect for human rights 
represents an important contribution to achieving international peace (see the 
Preamble to the Convention), the fact remains that the UNSC has primary 
responsibility, as well as extensive means under Chapter VII, to fulfil this objective, 
notably through the use of coercive measures . . . operations established by UNSC 
Resolutions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter are fundamental to the mission of 
the UN to secure international peace and security and since they rely for their 
effectiveness on support from member states, the Convention cannot be interpreted in 
a manner which would subject the acts and omissions of Contracting Parties which 
are covered by UNSC Resolutions . . .  to the scrutiny of the Court.127 
 
The Court has similarly ruled that it has no jurisdiction to hear a number of other cases where 
alleged violations of Convention rights were attributable to subsidiary organs of the UN 
established in the former Yugoslavia.128  Dutch district courts also initially relied on Behrami 
and Saramati in ruling that they lacked jurisdiction to hear two other similar cases relating to 
the Srebrenica genocide.129    
 
                                                 
127 Ibid., paras 148-9. 
128 Kasumaj v. Greece, Appl. No. 6974/05 Decision on Admissibility, 5 July 2007; Gajić v. Germany, 
Appl. No. 31446/02 Decision on Admissibility, 28 August 2007; Berić and others v. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Appl. Nos. 36357/04; 36360/04; 38346/04; 41705/04; 45190/04; 45578/04; 45579/04; 
45580/04; 91/05; 97/05; 100/05; 101/05; 1121/05; 1123/05; 1125/05; 1129/05; 1132/05; 1133/05; 
1169/05; 1172/05; 1175/05; 1177/05; 1180/05; 1185/05; 20793/05; 25496/05, Decision on 
Admissibility, 16 October 2007.    
129 Judgment in the case of Mustafić, Court of Appeal in the Hague, Civil Law Section, Case number: 
200.020.173/01, Case-/cause-list number District Court: 265618/ HA ZA 06-1672, Ruling of 5 July 
2011; and Judgment in the case of Nuhanović, Court of Appeal in the Hague, Civil Law Section, Case 
number: 200.020.174/01 Case-/cause-list number District Court : 265618/ HA ZA 06-1672 Ruling of 5 
July 2011.  Hasan Nuhanović had been a translator for the Dutch Battalion in Srebrenica at the time of 
the genocide.  Rizo Mustafić, was a UN electrician.   Mustafić was ordered to leave the base by the UN 
soldiers of Dutch Battalion.  The soldiers did evacuate Mustafić but refused to take his father and 
brother, both of whom were subsequently killed in the genocide.   
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The decision to attribute KFOR’s conduct to the UN, even though the force was not under 
UNMIK’s effective control, was, however, controversial, particularly since the NATO forces 
that had initially launched military action in Kosovo without UN authorization were 
essentially ‘blue hatted’ by the Security Council and remained under NATO’s operational 
command.130  Larson argues that it is difficult to reconcile this decision with UN practice on 
responsibility for unlawful conduct in peace operations, and with the Court’s own 
jurisprudence concerning attribution of conduct to the State.131  Milanović and Papić maintain 
that ‘the Court’s analysis is entirely at odds with the established rules of responsibility in 
international law and is equally dubious as a matter of policy.’132  Bell notes that the ‘Court’s 
implication that international law allows for only single attribution of internationally 
wrongful acts’ is in sharp conflict with the ILC’s approach which ‘allow for the possibility of 
multiple attribution of conduct and the assignment of plural responsibility to several involved 
entities’.133  The ILC Special Rapporteur on the responsibility of international organisations 
stated that the judgment was inconsistent with the Commission’s own work.134  The UN 
                                                 
130 CNN News, ‘Russian troops block NATO forces at Pristina checkpoint’, 13 June 1999; and Mike 
Jackson, Soldier, London: Transworld Publishers, 2007, pp. 216–254.  It was originally agreed that 
KFOR would consist of both NATO and Russian forces and Russia assumed that it would be given its 
own sector of the province.  NATO, however, refused to grant Russia this in case it led to the 
province’s partition as the Serbian dominated area around Mitrovica in northern Kosovo was firmly 
opposed to independence.  This led to a serious incident in June 1999 when both forces advanced on 
Pristina airport.  A small Russian column reached the airport but was blockaded by advancing NATO 
forces and eventually withdrew.  Although Russian forces were subsequently authorised to operate in 
Kosovo, independently of NATO, their presence was widely considered to be token. 
131 See Kjetil Mujezinovic Larsen, Attribution of Conduct in Peace Operations: The ‘Ultimate 
Authority and Control’ Test, 19 The European Journal of International Law Vol. 19 No. 3, 2008, 
pp.509-31; and Larsen, 2012, pp.129-36. 
132 M. Milanović and T. Papić, ‘As Bad As It Gets: The European Court of Human Rights’ Behrami 
and Saramati Decision and General International Law’, International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, Vol. 58, 2009. 
133 C. A. Bell, ‘Reassessing multiple attribution: the International Law Commission and the Behrami 
and Saramati decision’, New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol. 42, 2010, 
pp.503 and 508. 
134  Seventh report on responsibility of international organizations, Giorgio Gaja, Special Rapporteur, 
International Law Commission, International Law Commission, Sixty-first session, Geneva, 4 May-5 
June and 6 July-7 August 2009, A/CN.4/610, 27 March 2009, paras 26 and 30. The report stated that: 
‘had the Court applied the criterion of effective control set out by the Commission, it would have 
reached the different conclusion that the conduct of national contingents allocated to KFOR had to be 
attributed either to the sending State or to NATO . . .  it would be difficult to accept, simply on the 
strength of the judgment in Behrami and Saramati, the criterion there applied as a potentially universal 
rule . . .  the approach taken by the European Court of Human Rights is unconvincing . . . It is therefore 
not surprising that in his report of June 2008 on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in 
Kosovo, the United Nations Secretary-General distanced himself from [it]’.  For further discussion see 
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Office for Legal Affairs has also noted that ‘the court disregarded the test of “effective 
control” which for over six decades has guided the United Nations and member states in 
matters of attribution’.135    
 
The assumption that national contingents retain liability for the officially authorised conduct 
of their troops has long been considered part of the legal basis of peacekeeping.136  The 
decision also appears directly to contradict part of the Court’s reasoning in Bankovic, where it 
deemed it significant that no State has made derogation pursuant to Article 15 of the 
Convention when participating in military missions authorized by the Security Council, since 
this would not be necessary if such actions were attributable to the UN.137 Milanovic has 
suggested that ‘the very obviousness of the flaws in the Court’s decision’ were due to its 
reluctance to address the norm conflict between States’ human rights obligations under the 
European Convention and the pre-emptive effect of Article 103 of the UN Charter.138 It did 
not want to accept that ‘fifteen states sitting in the Security Council could whisk away this 
                                                 
Eighth report on responsibility of international organizations, Giorgio Gaja, Special Rapporteur, 
International Law Commission, International Law Commission, Sixty-third session, Geneva, 26 April-
3 June and 4 July-12 August 2011, A/CN.4/640, 14 March 2011, paras 32 -35; and Draft articles on 
the responsibility of international organizations, with commentaries, 2011, Adopted by the 
International Law Commission at its sixty-third session, in 2011, and submitted to the General 
Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report covering the  work of that session (A/66/10).  See also 
Christopher Leck, ‘International Responsibility in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: command 
and control arrangements and the attribution of conduct’, Melbourne Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 10, Issue 1, May 2009, p.346.   
135 Comments and observations of the Office of Legal Affairs on the draft Articles on Responsibility of 
International Organizations, adopted by the International Law Commission on first reading in 2009, 
February 2011.  Cited in Larsen, 2012, p.145. 
136 Attorney-General v. Nissan, 11 February 1969, as reported in 1969 All England Law Reports, Vol. 
1, p. 62.  Cited in United Nations, Juridical yearbook, 1969, The Lords stated that: ‘The functions of 
the United Nations Force as a whole are international. But its individual component forces have their 
own national duty and discipline and remain in their own national service.’  See also Bici and another 
v. Ministry of Defence [2004] All ER (D) 137 (Apr), [2004] EWHC 786 (QB) in which a British court 
ruled that British soldiers who shot at a car in Kosovo in 1999, killing two people and injuring another, 
could not claim ‘combat immunity’ to cover their actions.   
137 Bankovic v. Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States, Appl. No. 52207/99, (Grand Chamber), 
Decision on Admissibility, 19 December 2001, para 38: ‘Although there have been a number of 
military missions involving Contracting States acting extra-territorially since their ratification of the 
Convention (inter alia, in the Gulf, in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the FRY), no State has indicated 
a belief that its extra-territorial actions involved an exercise of jurisdiction within the meaning of 
Article 1 of the Convention by making a derogation.’ 
138 Marko Milanovic, ‘Norm Conflict in International Law: whither human rights?’, Duke Journal of 
Comparative & International Law, Vol. 20, 2009, p.86. [emphasis in original]    
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“constitutional instrument” on the basis of Article 103’ but nor did it want to ‘openly defy the 
Council or interfere with the Chapter VII system and peacekeeping operations in Kosovo.’139 
 
The case of Al-Jedda,140 an Iraqi with dual British citizenship who was detained without trial 
in Baghdad for several years, raised some similar issues.141  The British government accepted 
that the applicant’s detention in a British facility brought him within the extra-territorial 
jurisdiction of the European Convention, in the light of Al-Skeini,142 but argued that his 
detention was authorized by the Chapter VII Security Council resolutions, which set out the 
mandate of the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq.143  In 2006, one year before the Behrami and 
Saramati decision, the English Court of Appeal dismissed his complaint, holding that:  
 
if the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, considers that the exigencies posed 
by a threat to the peace must override, for the duration of the emergency the 
requirements of a human rights convention (seemingly other than jus cogens, from 
which no derogation is possible), the UN Charter has given it the power to so provide 
. . . There is no need for a member state to derogate from the obligations contained in 
a human rights convention by which it is bound in so far as a binding Security 
Council resolution overrides those obligations.144   
 
The Court also stated that the Security Council has ‘the primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, and one of the purposes of the United 
Nations, by which it is bound to act, is to take effective collective measures for the prevention 
                                                 
139 Ibid. 
140 Al-Jedda v. Secretary of State for Defence, Court of Appeal [2006] EWCA Civ 327, 29 March 
2006.   
141 Hilal Abdul-Razzaq Ali Al-Jedda, an Iraqi national, who had also been granted British citizenship, 
was arrested in Baghdad in 10 October 2004 and detained without trial in a detention centre run by 
British forces in Basra until 30 December 2007. 
142 ECtHR Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom , Appl. No. 55721/07,  Judgment (Grand 
Chamber) 7 July 2011.    
143 Security Council Resolutions 1511, of 16 October 2003 and 1546 of 8 June 2004. 
144 Al-Jedda v. Secretary of State for Defence, Court of Appeal [2006] EWCA Civ 327, 29 March 
2006, para 71. 
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and removal of threats to peace.’ 145  It noted that the UN Charter contained references to 
human rights, but that these were ‘clearly an agenda for future action rather than a statement 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms in itself.’146   
 
In the light of the Behrami and Saramati decision, the British government argued in the 
House of Lords, that the detention of the applicant was attributable to the UN and thus 
outside the scope of the Convention.147  A majority rejected the legal analogy between the 
UN missions in Kosovo and Iraq, on the grounds that the resolution authorizing UNMIK’s 
establishment predated KFOR’s deployment, while when the coalition troops had first 
entered Iraq they had done so without a UN mandate.148  They nevertheless ruled that at the 
time of the applicant’s detention the detaining troops were acting under a UN Security 
Council authorization and that Article 103, therefore, trumped the UK’s obligations under the 
European Convention.149 
 
The European Court of Human Rights ultimately found a violation in the case, in July 
2011.150  The Court noted that the language of the Security Council resolutions did not 
indicate that it ‘intended to place Member States within the Multi-National Force under an 
obligation to use measures of indefinite internment without charge and without judicial 
guarantees, in breach of their undertakings under international human rights instruments 
including the Convention’.151  In fact the reference to internment was not even contained in 
the Security Council resolution, although it was mentioned in an annexe from the US 
Secretary of State attached to it, and the UN mission had also repeatedly expressed its 
                                                 
145 Ibid., para 50.   
146 Ibid. 
147 See R. (on the application of Al-Jedda) (FC) (Appellant) v Secretary of State for Defence 
(Respondent) [2007] UKHL 58, 12 December 2007).  
148 Ibid., See Lord Bingham’s opinion, paras 18-25, which was supported by Baroness Hale and Lord 
Carswell, although Lord Rodger of Earlsferry dissented on this point arguing that both forces were 
operating under UN mandates at the time that the incidents took place. 
149 Ibid.   
150 Al-Jedda v. the United Kingdom Appl. No. 27021/08, Judgment (Grand Chamber) 7 July 2011. 
151 Ibid., paras 105-6.   
257 
 
 
concern at the large number of people who were being detained without trial.152  The Court 
also appeared to give considerably more weight to the human rights obligations contained in 
the UN Charter:  
 
As well as the purpose of maintaining international peace and security . . .  the United 
Nations was established to ‘achieve international cooperation in . . . promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms’. Article 24(2) of 
the Charter requires the Security Council, in discharging its duties . . .  to ‘act in 
accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations’. Against this 
background, the Court considers that, in interpreting its resolutions, there must be a 
presumption that the Security Council does not intend to impose any obligation on 
Member States to breach fundamental principles of human rights . . .  it is to be 
expected that clear and explicit language would be used were the Security Council to 
intend States to take particular measures which would conflict with their obligations 
under international human rights law.153 
 
Use of force and detention powers 
 
As previously discussed in Chapter Two, where UN missions assumed executive powers, in 
Kosovo and East Timor, there were complaints about their use of force and detention powers, 
and some earlier missions faced similar controversies.  Given that UN peacekeeping missions 
with POC mandates are both permitted and ‘legally required’ to ‘use force, including deadly 
force’ to fulfil their mandates, the lack of legal accountability in how they do so is 
troubling.154  Detentions by contemporary UN missions with POC mandates are, in fact, quite 
                                                 
152 Ibid. 
153 Ibid., para 102. 
154 See, for example, Amnesty International, Haiti: allegations of excessive use of force during 
demonstrations must be thoroughly investigated, 15 December 2014, highlighting a case in which a 
peacekeeper in Haiti was shown on video shooting several times at demonstrators after some of them 
had thrown rocks at UN troops.  MINUSTAH responded by promptly issuing a statement 
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rare.  The OIOS Protection Evaluation 2014 has noted, only three missions have ever fired 
shots with lethal intent.155  As will be discussed in the next two chapters, however, lack of 
clarity about the circumstances in which missions can use lethal force or detain people, is one 
of the reasons why they are so reluctant to use force for protective purposes. 
 
Very broad concepts relating to how the mission will use its Chapter VII authority are usually 
contained in the Secretary General’s report on its establishment.156  The SOFA or status of 
mission agreement (SOMA) between the UN and the state hosting the peacekeeping 
operation, tend to avoid any explicit reference to the use of force, in deference to State 
sovereignty.157  More detailed guidance will, however, be contained in standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) issued by the UN force commander and reflected in the mission’s RoE.  
These generally include what types of weapons are permissible and what level of command 
has responsibility for taking decisions.158  Simplified versions of RoE may be issued to 
individual soldiers for everyday reference, usually in the form of a laminated card.159  UN 
DPKO’s current guidance specifies that: ‘ROEs must always be compliant with human rights 
and international humanitarian law, which are superior sources’, but without clarifying which 
will be the applicable legal framework.160   
 
                                                 
‘acknowledging the allegations of excessive use of force and informing that an investigation had been 
immediately opened ‘to establish the facts.’  
155 OIOS Protection Evaluation 2014, para 25. 
156 For further discussion see Findlay, 2002, p.13-4; Ray Murphy, UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon, 
Somalia and Kosovo: Operational and Legal Issues, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 
pp.153-74; and Max Kelly, Protecting Civilians, Proposed Principles for Military Operations, 
Washington DC: Stimson Center, May 2010. 
157 Report of the Secretary General on the Model Status of Forces Agreement for Peacekeeping 
Operations, UN Doc. A/45/594, 9 October 1990.  For further discussion see Sheeran, 20011; Sheeran, 
2010; and Bruce Oswald, Helen Durham and Adrian Bates, Documents on the Law of UN Peace 
Operations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp.34-8. 
158 Findlay, 2002, p.14.  He notes that: ‘The SOPs typically include guidelines on the manner in which 
weapons are to be used, for example, in regard to the use of warning shots, the controlling of fire, 
prohibitions on the use of automatic weapons and/or high explosives, and the action to be taken after 
firing.’  
159 Ibid.  These may be known as orders for opening fire (OFOF). 
160 United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual Volume I, Department of Peacekeeping Operations/ 
Department of Field Support, August 2012, p.50.  
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The guidance on interpreting the RoEs matters considerably.  In Haiti, for example, the RoE 
of the US-led multinational force, that entered the country in September 1994, with a Chapter 
VII UN Security Council mandate,161 was initially interpreted as leaving law enforcement to 
the notorious Haitian armed forces.162  A public outcry followed television pictures of US 
troops standing by while Haitian soldiers beat peaceful pro-democracy protesters, one of 
whom subsequently died.163  The interpretation of the RoE, but not the rules themselves, was 
then changed to permit troops to use force to prevent the loss of human life.164  As discussed 
in Chapter Two, during the 1990s Commanders in the field often interpreted their rules of 
engagement quite differently, with some expanding the notion of self-defence to permit them 
to defend UN civilian agencies and personnel from attack, while others took a more 
restrictive interpretation.165   
 
One of the criticisms of the Report of the Independent Inquiry on Rwanda, published in 1999, 
was of ‘confusion over the rules of engagement’ between the field and headquarters.166  It 
recommended steps to ensure greater clarity for future missions, as well as their formal 
approval by UN headquarters.167  In 1998 a working group was established to produce a draft 
                                                 
161 Security Council Resolution 944 of 29 September 1994.  See also Security Council Resolutions 933 
of 30 June 1994, 917, of 6 May 1994, 905 of 23 March 1994, 841 of 16 June 1993, 861 of 27 August 
1993, 862 of 31 August 1993, 867 of 23 September 1993, 873 of 13 October 1993, and 875 of 16 
October 1993. 
162 For sharply contrasting views of the UN’s record in Haiti see Peter Hallward,  Damming the flood: 
Haiti and the politics of containment, London: Verso, 2010; and David Malone and Sebastian von 
Einsiedel, ‘Haiti’, in Berdal, Mats and Economides, Spyros (Eds), United Nations interventionism 
1991 – 2004, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.   
163 For discussion of the confusion surrounding the evolving mandates of the UN-mandated forces in 
Haiti see Colin Granderson, ‘Military-Humanitarian Ambiguities in Haiti’, in Jonathan Moore (ed) 
Hard Choices, moral dilemmas in humanitarian intervention, Maryland and Oxford: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 1998. 
164 Chesterman, Simon, The use of force in UN peace operations, External study for the Department of 
Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, New York: DPKO, 2003, p.15.  He notes that the US also reinforced 
the 21,000 strong mission with an additional 1,000 soldiers.  
165 Findlay, 2002, p.15; and Dallaire, 2003, pp.12, 229 and 233.  See also Terry D. Gill, Dieter Fleck 
(eds), The Handbook of the International Law of Military Operations, Second Edition, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015.  While these differences may be partly due to the situations confronting 
missions, the interpretation of the use of force in self-defence can also differ in various legal systems, 
so some contingents might be more inclined towards certain approaches. 
166 Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide 
in Rwanda, S/1999/1257, 16 December 1999, p.35. 
167 Ibid., p.53.  
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of model set of RoEs for future missions and training purposes.168  In December 2001, 
however, the Secretary General announced that the document, now known as the Guidelines 
for the Development of Rules of Engagement for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,
 
would remain a ‘work in progress’.169  
 
The draft RoE contain five sets of rules: Use of Force, Use of Weapon Systems, Authority to 
carry Weapons, Authority to Detain, Search and Disarm and Reaction to Civil Action/Unrest 
with a list that provides various options from which a selection will be made to suit each 
specific mission.170  Individual mission RoE include one or more general permissions for the 
use of force selected from the numbered options on the UN Master List. These are then 
adapted for each operation, based on the authorizing resolutions.171  As discussed in Chapter 
Three, following the publication of the Brahimi Report, these rules were amended to 
authorise the use of force ‘up to, and including deadly force, to defend any civilian person 
who is in need of protection against a hostile act or hostile intent, when competent local 
authorities are not in a position to render immediate assistance’.172 As also discussed, 
however, most existing guidance on the interpretation of the RoE appears to be based on the 
assumption that the use of force will be implemented within an IHL legal framework and 
                                                 
168 Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special 
Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN Doc 
A/AC.121/43, 21 February 1999. 
169 Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations 
and the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Report of the Secretary-General), UN Doc 
A/56/732 (21 December 2001), para 70.   
170 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, ‘United Nations Master List of Numbered ROE,’ 
Guidelines for the Development of ROE for UNPKO, Provisional Sample ROE, Attachment 1 to 
FGS/0220.001, United Nations, April 2002. 
171 United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual Volume I, Department of Peacekeeping Operations/ 
Department of Field Support, August 2012, p.50. The mission RoEs are formulated by the DPKO 
Military Advisor’s office and the UN Office of Legal Affairs.  The UN Under-Secretary-General for 
Peacekeeping Operations approves them and provides them to the mission’s Force Commander, who 
can request changes to the RoEs.  The rules for the use of force, as formulated by the force 
commander, may be issued in written form to troops in the field.  RoEs are ‘directions to operational 
commanders, which delineate the parameters within which force may be used by the military 
component of the peace keeping operation while executing its mandated tasks. 
172 United Nations Master List of Numbered ROE, Guidelines for the Development of ROE for 
UNPKO, Provisional Sample ROE, Attachment 1 to FGS/0220.001, United Nations, April 2002, Rule 
1.8.  
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peacekeeping soldiers receive little training or guidance on the positive and negative 
obligations surrounding the use of lethal force contained in international human rights law.173   
 
The draft RoE provide broad authorization for the detention of people who ‘commit a hostile 
act or demonstrate hostile intent’.174  DPKO published an interim standard operating 
procedure to provide guidance on detention policy to peacekeeping operations in 2011 and 
this has been used as the basis for mission-specific guidance as well.175  The policy states that 
missions are authorised to detain people where ‘mandated by the Security Council or General 
Assembly and in compliance with Mission-specific military rules of engagement’, SOFAs 
and SOMAs, ‘police directives on the use of force’, and ‘applicable international human 
rights, humanitarian and refugee law, norms and standards.’176   Any person detained by UN 
personnel shall be released or handed over to national law enforcement officials of host state 
or other national authorities ‘as soon as possible’, which is understood to mean: 
 
                                                 
173 Interviews conducted with senior UN civilian and military staff in DRC, South Sudan and Côte 
d’Ivoire in June and July 2012.  This comment is also based on hundreds of conversations with 
peacekeeping soldiers during pre-deployment training seminars and workshops in Brazil, Uruguay, 
Washington, Stockholm, Brindisi and Entebbe between 2010 and 2015. 
174 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, ‘United Nations Master List of Numbered ROE,’ 
Guidelines for the Development of ROE for UNPKO, Provisional Sample ROE, Attachment 1 to 
FGS/0220.001, United Nations, April 2002.  Rule 4. Authority to detain, search and disarm.  Rule No. 
4.1 Detention of individuals or groups who commit a hostile act or demonstrate a hostile intent against 
oneself, one’s unit or United Nations personnel is authorized; Rule No. 4.24 Detention of individuals 
or groups who commit a hostile act or demonstrate a hostile intent against other international personnel 
is authorized; Rule No. 4.35 Detention of individuals or groups who commit a hostile act or 
demonstrate hostile intent against installations and areas or goods designated by the Head of the 
Mission in consultation with the Force Commander, is authorized; Rule No. 4.4 Searching, including 
of detained person(s), for weapons, ammunition and explosives is authorized; Rule No. 4.5 Disarming 
individuals, when so directed by the Force Commander, is authorised. 
175 Detention in United Nations Peace Operations Interim Standard Operating Procedures 2010, UN 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department for Field Support, 2010.  See also Detention in 
United Nations Peace Operations Interim Standard Operating Procedures, UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations/Department for Field Support, 25 January 2011 and Standing Operating 
Procedures on Internment by the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department for Field Support, 2103. 
176 Detention in United Nations Peace Operations Interim Standard Operating Procedures, 25 January 
2011. This notes that the rules ‘provide internal operational guidance for the handling of persons and 
do not address issues of criminal procedures, which are governed by the laws of the respective host 
State.’ 
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Within 48 hours, the detained person should be either released or handed over to the 
national authorities. Detainees may be held for an additional 24 hours if on transit 
and in the process of handover to the national authorities. Custody beyond 72 hours 
may only be undertaken on a written request from and for temporary detention on 
behalf of the national authorities, in discharge of a mandate to assist national law 
enforcement agencies to this effect, or when the HOM [Head of Mission] considers 
detention reasonable and appropriate to discharge the mandate in relation to the 
specific case. [emphasis added] . . . In case of substantial grounds indicating real risk 
to detained persons from national authorities of torture, ill-treatment, persecution, 
subjection to death penalty or arbitrary deprivation of life; the UN shall not handover 
but rather release the detainee. 177  
 
Detained persons have ‘the right to know the reason for detention, designate a family member 
and or other representative person to be notified of the detention, to make complaint on 
condition or treatment during the detention, to make claim/compensation for bodily 
injury/damage to property arising from detention and to receive an inventory of items taken 
and have them returned under certain conditions.’178 They should also be informed of their 
legal rights and given a medical examination.  They have no right to legal representation, 
however, and can be questioned in the absence of a lawyer.179  A ‘Detained Persons Register’ 
shall be maintained on initial details of detention and updated to reflect any material change 
of circumstances.180  Detainees should be held in specified cells, in appropriate conditions, to 
which both the mission’s human rights components and the ICRC ‘shall be granted 
                                                 
177 United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual Volume II, Department of Peacekeeping Operations/ 
Department of Field Support, August 2012, p.142.  
178 Ibid., p.138. 
179 Ibid., p.140. 
180 Ibid., p.139. 
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unconditional access . . . and be notified of and have access to documents relating to 
detentions, releases, transfers and handover of detainees.’181  
 
As will be discussed in the next two chapters this policy is problematic, in practice, for UN 
peacekeeping missions with POC mandates.  UN missions do not have the authority to 
establish a criminal justice system independent of the government of the State in which they 
are operating, but the national systems are often incapable of meeting the minimum standards 
required under international human rights law of protecting people against torture and other 
forms of ill-treatment.  The requirement to handover or release detainees, therefore, makes 
many missions reluctant to detain at all.  As will be discussed in Chapter Six, when rebel 
forces were advancing on Goma, in eastern DRC, in 2012, some senior MONUSCO officials 
expressed uncertainty as to whether their RoE permitted the use of force to engage with or 
detain rebel fighters unless they were actually threatening civilians at the time.182  As will be 
discussed in Chapter Seven UNMISS reluctantly began to detain people within its PoC sites 
in 2014, using the authority provided under its SOFA to maintain safety and security within 
its premises, but this raises serious issues in the absence of an effective procedure to review 
the legality of extended detentions. 183   
 
In October 2012 a group of States adopted a set of Principles and Guidelines under the 
‘Copenhagen Process on the handling of detainees in international military operations’.184  
The Principles are to apply to military operations, such as those conducted by coalition forces 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as UN peacekeeping operations where the use of force is 
                                                 
181 Ibid., pp.143-4.  ‘Each COB and the Battalion HQ will have detention cells as per mission SOPs. 
These cells will be provided with sleeping arrange.  Food, water, recreation facilities and toilet 
facilities will be provided. Religious scriptures should be accessible to the detainees.’ 
182 This view was expressed to the author of this thesis by several senior MONUSCO officials 
including a Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG) during interviews 
conducted in Goma and Kinshasa in June 2012.  
183 Ralph Mamiya, ‘Legal Challenges for UN Peacekeepers Protecting Civilians in South Sudan’, 
American Society of International Law, Vol. 8, Issue 26, December 2014. 
184 Website of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://um.dk/da/nyheder-fra-
udenrigsministeriet/newsdisplaypage/?newsID=8FDF325A-AEFA- 
473B-A62B-FCC630EE0A64 (accessed 22 October 2012), accessed 28 April 2014. 
264 
 
 
authorized.185  They are intended to address the ‘legal uncertainties’ surrounding detentions in 
such situations, including defining:  
 
What is the legal basis for detention in international military operations?  Which 
regime of treatment and conditions of detention applies to the detainees? What legal 
standards and procedures apply to transfers between States in a military coalition and 
the host State or internally between coalition partners? What exactly do we mean 
when we talk about ‘detention’? And not the least, do the answers to all these 
questions change when the situation in which the military operation takes place 
changes from an international to a non-international armed conflict or to a situation 
of no conflict?186  
 
The Principles are not legally binding.  They recognize that: ‘States have differing views as to 
when and under what circumstances a “restriction on liberty” amounts to detention’187 as  
well as divisions on the extraterritorial application of human law and its relationship with 
IHL.188 The Principles were ‘welcomed’ by seventeen of the participating States, although 
                                                 
185 Blog of European Journal of International Law, Jacques Hartman, ‘ The Copenhagen Process: 
Principles and Guidelines’, 3 November 2012, http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-copenhagen-process-
principles-and-guidelines/, accessed 14 April 2014.  See also Bruce Oswald, ‘IHL and IHRL: The 
Interplay as Regards Detainees’, United States Institute of Peace, Handout, 2013. 
186 Thomas Winkler, Acting Legal Adviser, Danish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, ‘The Copenhagen 
Process on the Handling of Detainees in International Military Operations, XXXIst Round Table on 
Current Issues of International Humanitarian Law International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights and 
Peace Operations,  Theme III: Working Group 2: Peace operations and detention,5 September 2008. 
187 Ibid., para XIII.  Chairman’s Commentary, para 1.4. ‘States have differing views as to when and 
under what circumstances a ‘restriction on liberty’ amounts to detention. Either detention or restriction 
of liberty may be considered to occur in such places as roadblocks, check points, or when searching 
houses or property. A person who has been made subject to restriction of liberty may not necessarily 
be considered to have been detained. Although the person may have his liberty restricted the 
procedural protections referred to in Principles 7 through 15 may not be applicable to that individual. 
Operational uncertainties may make it difficult to distinguish a restriction of liberty from a deprivation 
of liberty.’  
188 Ibid. See Commentary to Principles 1, 4, 5, 12 and 15. For discussion see Blog of European Journal 
of International Law, Jacques Hartman, ‘ ‘The Copenhagen Process: Principles and Guidelines’, 3 
November 2012, http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-copenhagen-process-principles-and-guidelines/, accessed 
14 April 2014 
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two expressed concerns about whether they fully reflected the provisions contained in 
international human rights law.189   
 
Amnesty International, however warned that the Principles could significantly weaken 
existing protections, stating that they ‘pander to existing poor practices’ and were ‘ripe for 
exploitation’ by those seeking to evade their obligations under IHL and international human 
rights law’.190  Amongst its specific concerns were that they ‘do not acknowledge the 
absolute prohibition of enforced disappearance and other forms of secret detention under 
international law’ and would allow the detaining authorities ‘not to inform family members 
of the fate and whereabouts of a detainee’ for undefined periods of time.191  They also ‘appear 
to endorse indefinite administrative detention on security grounds’ without providing 
safeguards such the right to challenge the lawfulness of detention before a court.’192   Finally, 
they ‘do not recognise that all complaints of torture and ill-treatment ‘must be investigated by 
independent and impartial authorities, that victims of such abuses have the right to an 
effective remedy, and that those responsible for such abuses must be brought to justice.’193  It 
further noted that: 
 
the Principles could be appended to future resolutions of the UN Security Council 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which could indirectly give them binding legal 
                                                 
189 3rd Copenhagen Conference on the Handling of Detainees in International Military Operations, 
Copenhagen, 18 - 19 October 2012, Minutes of the Meeting, http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-
site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomacy/Official%20minutes_CP%20ny.pdf, accessed 14 April 2014.  
The Principles were welcomed by delegates from Argentina, Australia, Canada, China, Denmark, 
France, Finland, Germany, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, Turkey, 
Uganda, United Kingdom, and the United States of America. The Swedish and Russian delegations 
had concerns about the Principles reflecting IHRL appropriately and made statements to that effect.  
The term ‘welcomed’ is taken to mean that the participants agreed that the Principles accurately reflect 
the decisions that occurred during the Process, are a useful outline for global approach to detention; 
and are not legally binding. 
190 Amnesty International, Outcome of Copenhagen Process on detainees in international military 
operations undermines respect for human rights, 23 October 2012 AI index: IOR 50/003/2012. 
191 Ibid. 
192 Ibid. 
193 Ibid. 
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effect. States have already tried to argue in the past that their obligations under 
human rights treaties can be overridden or displaced by Chapter VII resolutions.194 
 
As discussed in Chapter Four, under international human rights law, the right to liberty is 
potentially derogable, but protections against torture and ill-treatment are non-derogable and 
the right to challenge the lawfulness of a detention may be non-derogable as well.195  The 
right to life is also non-derogable but IHL and international human rights law treat the use of 
force very differently and so the legality of particular actions or inactions may depend upon a 
determination of the applicable legal framework. 
 
As discussed in this chapter, however, while national and international courts refuse even to 
consider complaints over alleged violations by UN peacekeeping missions – unless they can 
attribute responsibility for the actions to a State or States rather than the UN itself – ensuring 
compliance with these standards remains problematic.  The OIOS Protection Evaluation 2014 
found a general lack of understanding concerning the legal obligation of missions to use force 
for protective purposes196 and noted that some troops had expressed concerns that they could 
face prosecution by the ICC for excessive use of force.197  While some of the current failures 
of missions to provide effective protection to civilians, in line with their mandates, points to 
the need for clearer legal guidance, it could also reflect risk-aversion due to the fact that there 
are no meaningful mechanisms by which peacekeepers can be held to account by those that 
                                                 
194 Ibid. 
195 European Court of Human Rights, Aksoy v. Turkey, Appl. No. 21987/93, Judgment 18 December 
1996; Inter-American Court on Human Rights, Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2), 
25(1) and 7(6) American Convention on Human Rights) (1987) Advisory Opinion OC-8/87, Series A, 
No. 8.   See also ECtHR: Lawless v. Ireland, Appl. No. 332/57, Judgment 1 July 1961; ECtHR: Ireland 
v UK, Appl. No. 5310/71, Judgment 18 January 1978  Brogan and others v.UK, Appl. No. 11209/84, 
Judgment 29 November 1988; and Brannigan and MacBride v. UK Appl. No. 14553-4/89, Judgment 
24 May 1993.   
196 OIOS Protection Evaluation 2014, para 40  
197 Ibid., para 50. 
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they are supposed to be protecting.  One interviewee told the evaluation that: ‘There are 
penalties for action, but no penalties for inaction’.198   
 
The final two sections of this chapter will discuss two areas where the current lack of 
accountability and mechanisms for reviewing UN actions and inactions has led to increasing 
crises of legitimacy for the Organisation: UN sanctions and sexual exploitation by UN 
peacekeepers.  In both cases the UN has developed – or is in the process of developing – ad 
hoc mechanisms to address the most egregious violations, which both provide potential 
models that could be adapted for POC purposes, but also show the need to address the 
problem of ‘who guards the guards’ in a more systematic way.   
 
Sanctions, travel bans and asset seizures 
 
From the start of the 1990s the Security Council began to make increasing use of its 
Chapter VII powers to impose arms embargos and economic sanctions.199  An embargo 
was imposed against Iraq, in August 1990, following its invasion of Kuwait,200 against 
Yugoslavia, in September 1991, as it descended into civil war201 and against Haiti, in June 
1993, following a military coup. 202  Although the intention of these measures was to put 
                                                 
198 Ibid.  ‘Also apparent is a fear of penalties in the event of allegations of excessive use of force. Court 
martial, repatriation, loss of financial benefits or even prosecution by the International Criminal Court 
were among consequences reportedly feared by troops in a confidential survey conducted by the 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support in 2013, despite training that 
emphasizes the breadth of their authority. Risk aversion results. One interviewee stated, “There are 
penalties for action, but no penalties for inaction”.  
199 For more details see: Marcos Tourinho, ‘Becoming World Police? The Implications of Individual 
UN Targeted Sanctions’, International Affairs, 2015, forthcoming (on file with author); Michael 
Bothe, ‘Security Council’s Targeted Sanctions against Presumed Terrorists the Need to Comply with 
Human Rights Standards’, Journal of International Criminal Justice Vol. 6, Issue 3, 2008, pp.541-55; 
David Cortright, George A. Lopez, and Linda Gerber-Stellingwerf, ‘The Sanctions Era: Themes and 
Trends in UN Security Council Sanctions Since 1990,’ in Lowe, Roberts, Welsh, and Zaum, 2008, pp. 
205–225; and De Wett, 2004, pp.217-50.  The use of sanctions is provided in for in Article 41 whereby 
the Security Council may impose ‘complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, 
sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic 
relations.’  Sanctions were first used against Southern Rhodesia in 1965 and a mandatory arms 
embargo was imposed on South Africa in 1977. 
200 Security Council Resolution 661 of 6 August 1990. 
201 Security Council Resolution 713 of 25 September 1991. 
202 Security Council Resolution 841 of 16 June 1993. 
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pressure on the countries’ rulers, increasing concerns about their devastating impact on the 
people of the countries concerned led some to argue that the UN may be committing grave 
violations of economic, social and cultural rights.203   In Haiti for example, the rate of 
malnutrition for children under five appears to have almost doubled during the three years 
in which the sanctions were in place204 while sanctions against Iraq may have contributed 
to the death of up to half a million children under the age of five over an eight year 
period.205  
 
In response to criticisms, the UN began to devise ‘smarter’ individual sanctions, which have 
been used against rebel groups in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Angola as well as to target 
regime leaders in Haiti, Libya, Iran and North Korea.206  In 1999 the Security Council 
established the Al Qaeda Taliban (AQT) Sanctions Committee207 and this has become 
particularly active since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.208  In 2000 there were 
                                                 
203 See for example:  Mary Ellen O’Connell, ‘Debating the Law of Sanctions’, European Journal of 
International Law, Volume 13, Issue , 2002, pp.63-79; Matthew Craven, ‘Humanitarianism and the 
quest for smarter sanctions’, European Journal of International Law, Volume 13, Issue 1, 2002, pp.43-
61; Anna Segall, ‘Economic sanctions: legal and policy constraints’, International Review of the Red 
Cross, 32, 1999; Roger Normand, ‘A human rights assessment of sanctions: the case of Iraq, 1990-7’, 
in Willem van Genugten and Gerard de Groots (eds) United Nations Sanctions: Effectiveness and 
Effects, especially in the field of human rights.  A multi-disciplinary approach, Antwerpen: Intersetia, 
1999; Michael Brzoska, ‘From Dumb to Smart? Recent Reforms of UN Sanctions’, Global 
Governance, Vol. 9 No. 4, October-December 2003, pp.519–535. 
204 UNICEF, State of the World’s Children in 1996, UNICEF, 1997, panel 4.  
205 UNICEF Newsline ‘Iraq surveys show 'humanitarian emergency’, August 12 1998.  UNICEF 
Executive Director Carol Bellamy said that: ‘if the substantial reduction in child mortality throughout 
Iraq during the 1980s had continued through the 1990s, there would have been half a million fewer 
deaths of children under-five in the country as a whole during the eight-year period 1991 to 1998.  
206 Biersteker, Thomas J. and Eckert, Sue E., Strengthening Targeted Sanctions Through Fair and 
Clear Procedures, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, 2006; and Tourinho, 
2015.  The UN has imposed targeted sanctions in 63 cases since the start of the 1990s, three quarters of 
which have been imposed on individuals. 
207 Security Council Resolution 1267 of 15 October 1999.  This strongly condemned the continuing use 
of Afghan territory by the Taliban, for the sheltering and training of terrorists and planning of terrorist 
acts.  It froze the funds and other financial resources of the Taliban and established a Sanctions 
Committee. 
208 See also Security Council Resolutions 1333 adopted on 19 December 2000; Resolution 1363 
adopted on 30 July 2001; Resolution 1373, adopted on 28 September 2001; and Resolution 1390 
adopted on 16 January 2002.  Resolution 1333 extended the application of the sanctions provided for 
under Resolution 1267 to any individuals or entities identified by the Sanctions Committee as being 
associated with al-Qaeda or Osama bin Laden. The resolution further required a list to be maintained 
for the implementation of the UN sanctions.  In Resolution 1363 the Security Council decided to set up 
a mechanism to monitor the measures imposed ‘the Monitoring Group’, while Resolution 1373 
decided that States should take a further series of measures to combat international terrorism and 
ensure effective border controls in this connection.  In Resolution 1390 the Security Council decided to 
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only seven entities or individuals listed by the AQT Committee while by 2003 another 397 
had been added.209 As Gehring and Dörfler have noted the initial listing process was 
‘virtually unconstrained’, occurred ‘in the absence of reliable decision criteria’ and partially 
reversed the burden of proof.210  There was no clear procedure within the original mechanism 
for listed individuals to seek a review of their case, or to be de-listed, so many of those 
affected challenged the decisions through the courts.211   
 
In 2005 the European Court of Human Rights had found no violation in the case of 
Bosphorus Airways v. Ireland concerning the seizure of an aircraft leased by Yugoslav 
Airlines in pursuant of the sanctions regime authorised by the Security Council in relation to 
the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.212  In September 2008, however, the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) ruled, in Kadi v. Council of European Union, that an order freezing of assets of 
someone identified as an alleged Al Qaeda member by the AQT Sanctions Committee had 
failed to respect fundamental rights because it did not provide a right to challenge a freezing 
                                                 
impose a ban on entry and transit for individuals and entities concerned by the international sanctions, 
to regularly update the list of persons concerned by the sanctions, to promulgate expeditiously such 
guidelines and criteria as might be necessary to facilitate the implementation of the sanctions and to 
make any information it considered relevant, including the list of persons concerned, publicly 
available. 
209 David Cortright, Patterns of Implementation: Do Listing Practices Impede Compliance with UN 
Sanctions? A Critical Assessment, Policy Brief No. SSRP 0912-01, Sanctions and Security Research 
Program; Fourth Freedom Foundation, Goshen; Kroc Institute of International Peace Studies, 
University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, 2009. 
210 Thomas Gehring and Thomas Dörfler, ‘Division of Labor and Rule-based Decisionmaking Within 
the UN Security Council: The Al-Qaeda/Taliban Sanctions Regime, Global Governance, No. 19, 2013, 
pp.567–587.  Proposals for listings were circulated by the Committee chairperson and adopted unless a 
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order.213  A court of first instance had held that it had no jurisdiction to inquire into the 
lawfulness of a Chapter VII Security Council resolution, because the obligations it imposed 
on members of the EU prevailed over fundamental rights as protected by the Community 
legal order.214  On appeal, however, the ECJ held that it was competent to review the 
lawfulness of the Regulation because EU law formed a distinct internal legal order.215   
 
By holding EU law to be separate branch of law to general international law, the ECJ avoided 
addressing the pre-emptive nature of Article 103 of the UN Charter.216  This appears, 
however, to present a direct confrontation between the two systems.217  Even supporters of 
the judgment acknowledge that it creates conflicting obligations for EU member states.218  De 
Burca has argued that the ECJ decision risks fragmenting the international legal system 
because the Court was in effect stating that ‘no international treaty could affect the autonomy 
of the EC legal system, and that even if the Charter were to be ranked as part of EC law it 
                                                 
213 Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council of the European Union 
and Commission of the European Communities (joined cases) C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Judgment 
of 3 September 2008. 
214 Kadi v Council of European Union, Case T-315/01, 21 September 2005, paras 213-226. See also, 
Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council of the European Union and 
Commission of the European Communities, Case T–306/01, Judgment of the Court of First Instance, 
21 September 2005. 
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National Classification’, Amsterdam Centre for European Law and Governance Working Paper Series 
2012 – 02, University of Amsterdam, May 2012. 
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Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 51, No. 1, Winter 2010, pp.1-49.  See also Opinion of 
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would be ranked below the normative level of the EC treaties themselves and lower than the 
general principles of EC law’.219   
 
Individual sanctions are increasingly being used by the Security Council for POC purposes 
and the ECJ has also annulled measures implemented in accordance with a POC Security 
Council resolution, on Côte d’Ivoire.220  The wife of Côte d’Ivoire’s President and a 
prominent business associate of him were accused of obstructing the ‘peace and 
reconciliation process’ by publicly ‘inciting hatred and violence and through participation in 
disinformation campaigns in connection with the 2010 presidential election’.221  The Court 
ruled that these reasons ‘failed to provide the actual and specific reasons of why the Council, 
who enjoys a wide margin of discretion, considered it necessary to apply restrictive 
measures’ and the ‘absence of a single concrete element’ that would justify them.222  As will 
be discussed further in Chapter Seven, sanctions have also been used for POC purposes in 
relation to the conflicts in Darfur and South Sudan. 
 
In October 2008, the UN Human Right Committee found in the case of Nabil Sayadi and 
Patricia Vinck v. Belgium,223 that a travel ban against the complainants by the AQT Sanctions 
Committee was disproportionate and constituted a violation of their right to freedom of 
movement.224  The majority of the Committee avoided addressing the potential norm conflict 
by finding a violation on the basis that even though Belgium was not competent to remove 
their names from either the UN or EU lists, it was responsible for placing their names there 
                                                 
219 De Burca, 2010, pp.5 and 27. [emphasis in original] 
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(Fifth Chamber) of 16 September 2011. 
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222 Ibid.  For further discussion see Council of Europe, Committee of Legal Advisers on Public 
International Law (CAHDI) UN Sanctions and Respect for Human Rights, March 2012. 
223 Sayadi and Vinck v. Belgium, CCPR/C/94/D/1472/2006, Communication No. 1472/2006, Views 
adopted on 22 October 2008. 
224 ICCPR, Article 12. 
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originally.225  In his concurring opinion, one Committee member, Nigel Rodley, took a step 
towards considering the Security Council’s own human rights obligations. 
 
Rodley stated that he had initially dissented on admissibility because he had ‘presumed that 
there was indeed a conflict between the State party’s obligations under the Covenant’ and the 
UN Charter.226   On ‘further reflection’, however, he had ‘come to the view that the 
Committee could itself take at least a prima facie view as to the existence or otherwise of a 
conflict’.227  He stated that the wording of the UN Charter strongly suggests that there should 
be a ‘presumption that the Security Council did not intend that actions taken pursuant to its 
resolutions should violate human rights’, which would apply to jus cogens and non-derogable 
rights and that ‘even in respect of rights that may be derogated from during a public 
emergency, any departures would be conditioned by the principles of necessity and 
proportionality.’228 He then listed a set of ‘presumptions’ which, ‘should be applied in 
interpreting the resolutions for the purposes of establishing whether there is indeed a conflict’ 
between the two sets of obligations.229  He concluded that while it is not an issue for the 
Committee he ‘would venture to suggest that these criteria would also be helpful to those 
called upon to assess the legal validity of a Security Council resolution.’230  
                                                 
225 The two complainants, who were Belgian nationals, had been placed on the lists appended to that 
resolution in January 2003, on the basis of information which had been provided to the Security 
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investigation and the State party’s delisting requests showed that the restrictions were not necessary to 
protect national security or public order.  In the Committee’s opinion, although the State party itself 
was not competent to remove the names from the list, it had the duty to do all it could to obtain that 
deletion as soon as possible, to provide the complainants with compensation, to make public the 
requests for delisting, and to ensure that similar violations did not occur in the future. 
226 Sayadi and Vinck v. Belgium, 22 October 2008, Appendix A, Individual opinions on the 
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228Ibid., Appendix B, Individual opinion of Committee member Sir Nigel Rodley (concurring).   
229 Ibid.  These were that the Security Council did not intend to violate human rights; it did not intend 
to violate ‘peremptory norm of international (human rights) law (jus cogens)’, it did not intend to 
violate non-derogable rights (which are not jus cogens) in times of grave public emergency; and that it 
did intend to abide by the principles of necessity and proportionality should it require derogations.   
230 Ibid.  Similar arguments have been put forward by Milanovic, 2009; and Alexander Orakhelashvili, 
‘The Impact of Peremptory Norms on the Interpretation and Application of United Nations Security 
Council Resolutions’, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 16 No.1, 2005, pp.59−88. 
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In September 2012 the European Court of Human Rights found, in the case of Nada v. 
Switzerland, 231 that a ban on entering or transiting through Switzerland, imposed on the 
applicant as a result of the addition of his name to the AQT Sanctions Committee list, had 
breached his right to private and family life.232  The Court referred to the ‘presumption’ in 
favour of human rights set out in Al-Jedda, but ruled that in this case the presumption had 
been ‘rebutted’ because the UN Security Council resolutions in question contained ‘clear and 
explicit language, imposing an obligation to take measures capable of breaching human 
rights’.233  It nevertheless found a violation because Switzerland ‘should have persuaded the 
Court that it had taken – or at least had attempted to take – all possible measures to adapt the 
sanctions regime to the applicant’s individual situation.’234  It then concluded:  
 
That finding dispenses the Court from determining the question, raised by the 
respondent and intervening Governments, of the hierarchy between the obligations of 
the States Parties to the Convention under that instrument, on the one hand, and those 
arising from the United Nations Charter, on the other.235   
 
Some courts have also found that domestic laws implementing the listing procedures have 
violated their own constitutional protections of human rights.236  In the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome Document the General Assembly had called upon the Security Council, ‘to ensure 
that fair and clear procedures exist for placing individuals and entities on sanctions lists and 
for removing them, as well as for granting humanitarian exemptions’.237  The Security 
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Council has responded to these criticisms with a series of resolutions towards ensuring fairer 
and clearer procedures.’238  In 2009, an Office of the Ombudsperson was established, which 
can help individuals to obtain a de-listing.239  A delisting proposal is now automatically 
adopted after sixty days unless the AQT Sanctions Committee decides by consensus to 
uphold the listing or unless a member State takes the matter to the Security Council.240  
Although it falls short of providing a formal judicial review of the Committee’s decisions,241 
the authority ceded to the Ombudsperson has been described as ‘unprecedented and 
extraordinary’.242   
 
Sexual exploitation and UN accountability 
 
At the same time the UN has faced a separate crisis due to a growing number of reports 
documenting the involvement of peacekeeping personnel in sexual exploitation and abuse.243  
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Catherine Lutz, and General Paban J. Thapa, Expert Mission to Evaluate Risks to SEA Prevention 
Efforts in MINUSTAH, UNMIL, MONUSCO and UNMISS, 3 November 2013 ; OIOS Inspection and 
Evaluation Division, Evaluation Report, Evaluation of the Enforcement and Remedial Assistance 
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In February 2002 UNHCR and Save the Children published a report detailing sexual violence 
and exploitation carried out by UN peacekeepers against children in refugee camps in 
Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone.244  In May 2003 the General Assembly adopted Resolution 
57/306,245 which led to a Secretary General’s Bulletin on ‘Special measures for protection 
from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse’ that October.246  The following year, in response 
to further scandals, the UN published ‘A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual 
Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations’ (the Zeid Report) whose 
findings were endorsed by the General Assembly in March 2005.247   
 
The Zeid Report noted that there was ‘extensive mosaic of provisions’ dealing with sexual 
exploitation and abuse that had been drafted at various times and with varying degrees of 
legal force.248  The rules applied differently to different categories of personnel and the 
situation was particularly unclear in relation to the military because the rules could only be 
made binding ‘with the agreement of and action by the troop-contributing country (TCCs) 
concerned’.249  It recommended that TCCs hold more on-site courts martial and adopt formal 
memoranda of understanding so that cases could be forwarded to the competent national or 
military authorities.250  The existing model memorandum should also be amended to specify 
that disciplinary action will be taken against personnel found to have violated the standards 
set out in the 2003 bulletin’251  TCCs should also report on the outcome of cases within their 
jurisdiction’ and the General Assembly should make compliance with this procedure ‘an 
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251 Ibid., paras 24 and 70-1. 
276 
 
 
essential condition for acceptance of an offer from a troop-contributing country.  Similar 
provisions should be included in the model memorandum of understanding and be referred to 
in Security Council resolutions.’252 
 
The report noted two fundamental obstacles to ensuring full legal accountability.  First of all, 
that the UN sometimes operated ‘in areas where there was no functioning legal system or 
where the legal system was so devastated by conflict that it no longer satisfied minimum 
international human rights standards. In such cases it would not be in the interests of the 
United Nations to waive immunity because its Charter requires it to uphold, promote and 
respect human rights.’253 [emphasis added]  Secondly, that the UN could not ‘obligate a 
troop-contributing country to prosecute’ since this decision ‘is an act of sovereignty’.254  One 
solution it suggested could be the development of an international convention that would 
subject UN personnel to the jurisdiction of States.  Alternatively, ‘to try to get agreement 
with the host State when negotiating the status-of-forces agreement for the United Nations to 
provide assistance to the host State to ensure that criminal proceedings against United 
Nations personnel satisfied international human rights standards.’255 It stated that: 
 
The founders of the United Nations did not intend that the privileges and immunities 
of [its] officials . . . should constitute a shield from national criminal prosecution for 
crimes committed in a State hosting a United Nations operation. However, the 
absence of a functioning judicial system in some peacekeeping locations means that 
it is not feasible to waive immunity in those jurisdictions. As a result, the prosecution 
of staff or experts on mission for crimes committed in such a State depends on 
whether the State of nationality of the suspect has conferred extraterritorial 
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jurisdiction on its courts to take such action and whether it can, in the circumstances 
of the case, effectively take such action. 256 
 
Partly in response to the Zeid Report, in November 2005 the UN established a Conduct and 
Discipline Team in DPKO, which became the Conduct and Discipline Unit, two years later, 
located in the Department of Field Support.257  This is one of several investigatory and 
adjudicative bodies within the UN,258 and overlap and duplication between them often 
hinders effective investigations of complaints.   
 
In December 2015 the UN published a Report of an Independent Review on Sexual 
Exploitation and Abuse by International Peacekeeping Forces in the Central African 
Republic. 259  This detailed the negligence of the mission (MINUSCA) in responding to these 
allegations and was highly critical of both the mission leadership and the head of its human 
rights component, both of whom were found to have committed abuses of authority.260  The 
report had been commissioned that June and as a result of its preliminary findings, in August 
2015, MINUSCA’s head of mission, Babca Gaye, resigned from his post.261  The report noted 
that ‘the manner in which UN agencies responded to the Allegations was seriously flawed’ 
with information being ‘passed from desk to desk, inbox to inbox, across multiple UN 
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260 Ibid. 
261 BBC News, ‘UN’s CAR Envoy Gaye sacked over peacekeeper abuse claims’, 12 August 2015. 
278 
 
 
offices, with no one willing to take responsibility to address the serious human rights 
violations.’262 
 
The report was also critical of the leadership of OHCHR, and other senior headquarters staff, 
for appearing to spend more time trying discipline a senior official who helped bring the 
allegations to light, rather than investigating them and bringing the perpetrators to justice.263  
It nevertheless recommended the setting up of a Coordination Unit in OHCHR to oversee and 
coordinate responses to conflict related sexual violence, including: ‘monitoring, reporting and 
follow up on allegations of sexual abuse; analyzing data with a view to tracking trends and 
practices for the purpose of improving prevention and accountability; and following up on the 
implementation of the Panel’s recommendations.’264   
 
In February 2016 the UN appointed a special coordinator to work exclusively on the problem 
of sexual exploitation by peacekeepers.265  In March the Security Council voted to give the 
Secretary General the right to repatriate entire units if their home countries fail to prosecute 
alleged perpetrators of sexual misconduct within six months.266  In April 2016 it was reported 
that soldiers in the mission from France, Gabon, and Burundi had sexually abused at least 
108 women and children in a single province between 2013 and 2015.267 It was also reported 
that 25 new and separate allegations had been lodged in the first three months of 2016.268 
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In his response to the High-level Panel on Peace Operations, published in September 2015, 
the Secretary General promised that ‘by the end of 2015 immediate response teams would be 
set up to gather and preserve evidence within 72 hours of receipt of an allegation’ of sexual 
exploitation or abuse, that investigations ‘must be concluded within six months’ and that 
strong sanctions would be imposed ‘against those who commit acts of misconduct and those 
who fail to take action against them, including mission leadership and command 
authorities’.269  Missions had also ‘been instructed to put in place, by the second quarter of 
2016, a framework to provide community-based mechanisms where people can more readily 
come forward to raise complaints’ regarding UN personnel and an ‘adequately resourced 
victim assistance programme’ was being created.270 
 
A full discussion of the UN’s efforts to address the issue of sexual abuse in its peacekeeping 
operations goes beyond the scope of this thesis. 271  The fact that the UN is attempting to 
address it through its disciplinary structures is significant, although MINUSCA’s and 
OHCHR’s experiences show that considerable flaws remain in the current system, and what 
has been described as a ‘pervasive culture of impunity in an organisation where whistle-
blowers are given minimal protection from reprisals’272  As will be discussed in the next two 
chapters, however, there have been repeated cases of UN peacekeeping personnel with POC 
mandates simply refusing to provide protection or to fully investigate alleged violations of 
IHL and international human rights law without any disciplinary action being taken against 
them.   
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The OIOS Protection Evaluation 2014 stated that it was not aware of a single case in which 
the failure of a UN unit to execute an order of the Force Commander ‘had been conveyed to 
the Security Council’ or even included in a mission report because: ‘Mission military officers 
reportedly preferred to keep “harmonious relations” with contingents rather than report 
matters up the line.’273  In its response DPKO, ‘strongly’ rejected a recommendation that such 
cases should be brought to the Council’s attention arguing that there were ‘existing processes 
in place to address issues related to command and control, conduct and discipline, and a host 
of related issues’.274  This suggests either that existing UN guidance about the use of force for 
protective purposes is not clear enough or that the UN is not ensuring that senior mission staff 
members are fully held to account when they fail to protect civilians.  
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter has discussed the relationship between international human rights law and UN 
Charter law and, in particular, the increasing problems resulting from the lack of an effective 
mechanism for reviewing actions authorised by the Security Council acting under its Chapter 
VII powers.  These have become increasingly acute as the Council has made more frequent 
and wide-ranging use of these powers in ways that clearly impact on individual human rights.  
National and international courts have increasingly been prepared to scrutinize acts 
authorized by the UN Security Council for compliance with international human rights law 
but only so long, as these can be attributed to member States, rather than the UN itself.  
Recent decisions by ECJ that the EU’s ‘distinct internal legal order’ enables it to override 
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decisions by the UN Security Council exercising its Chapter VII powers creates a clear 
potential dilemma for EU members supporting the UN in its efforts to protect civilians.  
Challenging the records of individual States in implementing Security Council resolutions 
risks increasing the fragmentation of international law and may make some States more 
reluctant to commit their soldiers, police to UN peacekeeping missions.   
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the situations in which the Security Council exercises 
its powers under Chapter VII may be analogous with situations in which States may need to 
derogate from some of their human rights obligations.275  Although the UN Charter makes no 
provision for the Security Council to derogate, the provisions of Article 103, which states that 
the ‘obligations’ of member States under Charter, shall ‘prevail’ over their obligations under 
any other international agreement, rests on similar principles.276  If this were to be accepted, 
Rodley’s reasoning in Sayadi and Vinck v. Belgium could be used as a basis for determining 
whether acts authorised by the Security Council – such as targeted sanctions, travel bans or 
asset seizures and the use of force and arrest and detention procedures – are justifiable within 
the framework provided by international human rights law.277     
 
In the absence of true effective legal accountability, the UN has sought to develop 
mechanisms to address its own short comings, such as setting up the Ombudsperson for the 
AQT Sanctions Committee implementing recommendations from the Zeid Report and 
making greater use of its own internal disciplinary procedures.  Its Secretariat also regularly 
                                                 
275 Scott Sheeran and Catherine Bevilacqua, ‘The UN Security Council and international human rights 
obligations: towards a theory of constraints and derogations’, in Scott Sheeran and Nigel Rodley (eds) 
Routledge Handbook of International Human Rights Law, London: Routledge, 2013, pp.371-402.  
They note that the Security Council acting under Chapter VII has a narrower mandate, being only 
concerned with international peace and security, while the circumstance in which states can derogate 
include natural disasters, and that the Council has far more limited powers and responsibilities than a 
sovereign state. See also Michael Wood, ‘The UN Security Council and International Law’.  Second 
lecture: ‘The UN Security Council and International Law’, Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lectures, 
Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, University of Cambridge, 8 November 2006, para 29. 
276 Ibid. 
277 See Sayadi and Vinck v. Belgium, 22 October 2008, Appendix B, Individual opinion of Committee 
member Sir Nigel Rodley (concurring)  
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carries out its own reviews and ‘lessons learned’ exercises, from the field, which have 
arguably become an important process by which the Organization ensures that it remains 
within the constraints of international law.278  Such solutions, however, are ad hoc and partial.  
If mechanisms are not developed to ensure that the UN system as a whole can deal with this 
issue in an equitable and transparent manner this risks weakening the legitimacy of the UN 
itself and further discrediting the whole concept of peacekeeping. 
  
                                                 
278 See Sheeran , 2011, for a general discussion of this issue in relation to the UN Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo 
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PART THREE: PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS MANDATES IN FOUR 
CONTEMPORARY CASE-STUDY MISSIONS 
 
 Chapter 6 
Peacekeeping or war-fighting: the UN missions in the Democratic Republic and Côte 
d’Ivoire 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter will discuss the UN peacekeeping missions to the DRC and Côte d’Ivoire.  
These have been marked by controversy both for failing to provide sufficient protection to 
civilians in many cases, but also because it is sometimes claimed that they may have become 
parties to the conflicts they were sent to try to help to resolve.   
 
POC developed in both missions in a largely reactive process.  The UN mission to the DRC 
gradually adopted a more robust posture with the formation of better equipped and more pro-
active Brigades, a process that culminated in the creation of the Force Intervention Brigade in 
2013.1  This mission has faced two particular controversies with wider implications for the 
future of peacekeeping: first of all, what are the UN’s legal responsibilities when the national 
forces that it is supporting are responsible for grave violations of international human rights 
law and IHL, and secondly, what are the legal consequences of a mission moving from 
peacekeeping to war-fighting? 
 
The UN mission to Côte d’Ivoire will be discussed more briefly.  This also initially saw itself 
as a ‘traditional’ peacekeeping mission.  In 2011, however, its interpretation of its ‘protection 
                                                 
1 Security Council Resolution 2098 of 28 March 2013.  See also UN Security Council Resolutions 
2211 of 26 March 2015, 2198 of 29 January 2015, 2147 of 24 December 2013, and 2136 of 30 January 
2014.  
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responsibilities’ led it to launch military action that helped to bring down the country’s 
incumbent President, who was subsequently taken into the custody of the ICC.  The UN 
denied that this regime-change intervention had led to it becoming a party to the conflict and 
this chapter contextualises the action.  The Security Council also made its first use of targeted 
sanctions on those accused of inciting violence against civilians in Côte d’Ivoire in 
November 2004 and these were again used in the 2011 crisis. 
 
There are strong grounds for considering that the UN mission in the DRC did, as a matter of 
fact, become a party to the conflict and so lost its legal protection and becomes bound by 
IHL.  This should, however, be considered an aberration rather than a model for other 
missions.  It is both possible and practical for missions to implement their POC mandates 
within the legal framework provided by international human rights law, rather than the more 
aggressive operations that would make IHL applicable.  Conversely, the experience of the 
UN mission in the DRC shows the importance of applying the positive obligations of 
international human rights law to peacekeeping operations.  Missions should also consider 
themselves bound to monitor, investigate and report on violations of international human 
rights law and IHL and may not lawfully support organizations and individuals who have 
committed grave violations of these bodies of law.   
 
A. Democratic Republic of the Congo  
 
The United Nations Organization Mission in the Congo (MONUC) was established in August 
1999 as a small, unarmed observer force to monitor a cease-fire signed between the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), one rebel group and five regional States in Lusaka, 
Zambia.2  The Lusaka Accord officially brought an end to the second Congo war, which is 
                                                 
2 Security Council Resolution 1258 of 6 August 1999.  The Lusaka Accord called for the deployment 
of a UN peacekeeping operation, the withdrawal of foreign troops, and the launching of an ‘Inter-
Congolese Dialogue’ to form a transitional government leading to elections.  It was signed by the 
DRC, Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Uganda, and the Movement pour la Liberation du Congo 
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sometimes referred to as the ‘African world war’ because it involved nine African nations 
and some twenty armed groups.3  It was also one of the world’s deadliest recent conflicts, 
killing up to six million people. 4 
 
President Mobutu’s autocratic rule from 1965 faced increasing challenges by the early 1990s 
as economic decay and political repression mounted.5  Following the 1994 genocide in 
Rwanda, some two million Rwandese Hutus — including elements that had taken part in the 
genocide — fled to the neighbouring Kivu regions of eastern Congo.  Hutu Power militias 
began to launch cross-border attacks from the refugee camps and IDP camps inside Rwanda.6  
In mid-1996, the new Rwandan government sponsored a rebellion to overthrow Mobutu, who 
had close ties with the previous regime.  Laurent Kabila, aided by Rwanda and Uganda, 
                                                 
(MLC) rebel group. The Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) rebel group refused to 
sign. 
3 See, for example, The Economist, ‘Special Report from the Congo: Africa’s Great War’, 4 July 2002, 
putting the total death toll at 3 million; and BBC News Africa, ‘Democratic Republic of Congo Profile, 
14 September 2014, 12 years later, putting the total death toll at 6 million. 
4 See Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: results from a nationwide survey, New York: 
International Rescue Committee and Burnet Institute, 2003;  Mortality in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo: results from a nationwide survey conducted April-July 2004, New York: International Rescue 
Committee and Burnet Institute, 2004; Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: results from a 
nationwide survey, New York: International Rescue Committee and Burnet Institute, 2005; Mortality 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo: an ongoing crisis, New York: International Rescue Committee 
and Burnet Institute, 2007.  A total of six surveys were carried out by IRC between 2000 and 2007.  
See IRC Homepage, ‘Congo Crisis’, www.rescue.org, accessed 29 December 2014.  The most recent 
survey, in 2007, estimated the total death toll at 5.4 million people.  The vast majority of deaths have 
been from conditions of malaria, diarrhoea, pneumonia and malnutrition.  According to these surveys, 
only about two percent of the deaths resulted directly from violence.   
5 For a general overview of the conflicts see: Michael Deibert, The Democratic Republic of Congo, 
between hope and despair, London: Zed Books, 2013; Gérard Prunier, Africa’s World War, the 
Rwandan genocide and the making of a continental catastrophe, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009; Martin, Meredith, The State of Africa, a history of fifty years of independence, Johannesburg and 
Cape Town: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2006, pp.525-44; Thomas Weiss and, Cindy Collins 
Humanitarian challenges and intervention, Second Edition, Boulder: Westview Press, 2000, pp.100-
10; International Crisis Group, Scramble for the Congo.  Anatomy of an Ugly War,   Africa Report, 
Brussels: ICG, 2000.  
6 For further discussion of the international community’s response to these events see: Alex De Waal, 
Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa, London: James Currey, 1997, pp. 
204-13; Samantha Power, Chasing the Flame, Sergio Vieira de Mello and the fight to save the world, 
London: Penguin Books, 2008, p.191-222;  and Ian Martin, ‘Hard choices after genocide’ in Jonathan 
Moore, (ed) Hard Choices, moral dilemmas in humanitarian intervention, Maryland and Oxford: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 1998, pp.157-77.  See more generally.  Fiona Terry, Condemned to repeat? The 
paradox of humanitarian action, Ithaca: Cornell University, Press, 2002; Sadako Ogato, The turbulent 
decade: confronting the refugee crises of the 1990s, New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2005.  The 
support which UNHCR and a large number of humanitarian agencies initially gave to the ‘killers in the 
camps’ and then subsequently rapidly withdrew from remains a deeply controversial episode.   
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marched across the country to take the capital city Kinshasa in 1997 and forcibly closed many 
refugee camps as well.7  Relations between President Kabila and his foreign backers 
deteriorated, however, and, in July 1998, nationwide fighting erupted as fresh Rwandan and 
Ugandan troops entered the country.  The creation of a newly-formed group, the 
Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD), was announced and Rwandan troops 
prepared to march on Kinshasa in its support.8  Angolan, Zimbabwean, and Namibian troops 
intervened on behalf of President Kabila, while the Hutu Power groups and Mai-Mai ‘self-
defence’ militias also rallied to his support.  The Rwandans and the RCD withdrew to eastern 
DRC, while a new group, the Movement pour la Liberation du Congo (MLC), sponsored by 
Uganda, took control of the north east.  Kabila was assassinated, in January 2001 and 
succeeded by his son Joseph.9   
 
Widespread fighting continued after the signing of the Lusaka Accord.10   In January 2000 
one of the UN mission’s first reports warned that its forces ‘would not have the capacity to 
protect the civilian population from armed attack’.11  The following month the Security 
Council increased the mission’s strength and gave it a POC mandate12 using language similar 
to that agreed for UNAMSIL the previous October.13  In the discussions on the Security 
                                                 
7 Human Rights Watch, Casualties of War: Civilians, Rule of Law, and Democratic Freedoms, New 
York: HRW, February 1999; and Human Rights Watch, Eastern Congo Ravaged: Killing Civilians 
and Silencing Protest, New York: HRW, May 2000.   
8 Ibid.  See also Human Rights Watch Uganda in Eastern DRC: Fuelling Political And Ethnic Strife, 
New York: HRW, March 2001; Reluctant Recruits: Children and Adults Forcibly Recruited for 
Military Service in North Kivu, New York: HRW, May 2001; and Human Rights Watch, The War 
within the War: Sexual Violence Against Women and Girls in Eastern Congo, New York: HRW, June 
2002. 
9 International Crisis Group, The Kivus: the forgotten crucible of the Congo conflict, Brussels: ICG, 
Africa Report N°56, 24 January 2003; International Crisis Group, Storm clouds over Sun City: the 
urgent need to recast the Congolese peace process, Brussels: ICG, 2002; International Crisis Group, 
The Inter-Congolese Dialogue: political negotiation or game of bluff, Brussels: ICG, 2001. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, S/2000/30 of 17 January 2000, para. 67. 
12 UN Security Council Resolution 1291 of 24 February 2000, para. 4.  This increased the mission 
strength to 5,370 armed troops, including 500 UN military observers (UNMOs), protected by four 
reinforced infantry battalions, and ‘appropriate civilian support staff including in the areas of human 
rights, humanitarian affairs, public information, child protection, political affairs, medical support and 
administrative support.’ 
13 Ibid., para. 8 ‘Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, . . . MONUC may take 
the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its infantry battalions and as it deems it within its 
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Council, however, the US, UK, Netherlands and Canada, expressed far greater concern about 
taking on POC tasks, although strong support for the POC mandate came countries in the 
‘global south’ such as Gambia, Namibia and Argentina.14    
 
The general understanding of the language adopted was that POC was not a main part of the 
mandate but would be needed under certain circumstances.15  A mission report in early 2001 
emphasized that UN forces could guard UN facilities but that they would ‘not be able to 
extract’ UN personnel, ‘or accompany humanitarian convoys’, nor ‘extend protection to the 
local population’.16  A new concept of operations (CONOPS) in October 2001 focused on 
monitoring and investigating ceasefire violations and encouraging disarmament, 
demobilization, repatriation, resettlement, and reintegration (DDRRR).17  The resolution did 
refer to the situation in the DRC as continuing to pose a threat to international peace and 
security in the region, but it was not adopted under Chapter VII and did not feature any POC 
language.18  Mission reports also contained no specific references to POC either as a planning 
objective or military task and an underlying assumption seems to have been that the best 
protection of civilians would come from the overall success of the mission. 19    
                                                 
capabilities, to protect United Nations and co-located [Joint Military Commission] personnel, facilities, 
installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, and protect 
civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.’ 
14 Security Council, Meetings of16 December 1999, S/PV.4083; and of 24 February 2000, S/PV.4104.  
Concern was expressed about the ‘complexity of the conflict’, the ‘dangerous security environment’, 
‘excessive expectations being placed on MONUC’, and it having ‘inadequate resources to fulfil its 
mandate.’  
15 For discussion see Séverine Autesserre, The trouble with the Congo: local violence and the failure of 
international peacebuilding, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.   
16 Sixth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2001/128 of 12 February 2001, para. 77.  UN Security Council 
Resolution 1341 of 22 February 2001 actually reduced the number of troops deployed to guard UN 
military observers.   
17 Ninth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2001/970 of 16 October 2001. By October 2001, MONUC had 
deployed 2,408 military personnel, including 540 staff officers/UN Military Observers (UNMOs) and 
1,868 troops.  UN Security Council Resolution 1376 of 9 November 2001, para 10 approved the new 
CONOPS and force structure.   
18 Ibid. 
19 For an overview see: Tenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2002/169, 15 February 2002; Twelfth Report of 
the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, S/2002/1180 of 18 October 2002, S/2002/169, 15 February 2002; Thirteenth Report of the 
Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the 
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In May 2002, however, the Rwandan-backed RCD-Goma militia troops in Kisangani 
massacred over 100 civilians in the process of suppressing a mutiny by some of their local 
commanders.20  MONUC had around 1,000 troops in the vicinity,21 but decided not to send 
patrols to deter the abuses as they were occurring.22  The mission did protect a handful of 
people, who had sought shelter near to its base and stepped up patrolling in the following 
days, but otherwise remained passive during what Human Rights Watch (HRW) described as 
a ‘wave of killings, rapes and looting’.23   
 
Attacks on civilians continued across eastern DRC throughout 2002, but a mission report in 
June insisted that, ‘MONUC troops . . . are not equipped, trained or configured to intervene 
rapidly to assist those in need of protection’,24 while a special report of September contained 
                                                 
Congo, S/2003/211, 21 February 2003.  These note that talks sponsored by South Africa led to the 
government and one rebel group signing up to a power sharing agreement on 19 April 2002.  The Sun 
City Agreement was a framework for providing the Congo with a unified, multipartite government and 
democratic elections.  On 30 July 2002 Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo signed a peace 
deal known as the Pretoria Accord, which provided for the withdrawal of the estimated 20,000 
Rwandan soldiers in the Congo and the rounding up of the ex-Rwandan soldiers and the Hutu Power 
militias in the country.  By the end of 2002, all Angolan, Namibian, and Zimbabwean troops had 
withdrawn from the country. 
20 Eleventh Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2002/621 of 5 June 2002, para 7 – 13.  See also Briefing by High 
Commissioner for Human Rights to the Security Council Report on the 14-15 May Events in Kisangani 
- Democratic Republic of the Congo, no date. According to the UN Special Rapporteur on 
Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions, Asma Jahangir, 103 civilians and 60 policemen and 
military personnel were summarily executed, while an additional 20 unidentified bodies were found in 
the Tshopo River.   
21 Victoria Holt and Glyn Taylor, Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operation, 
OCHA/DPKO, United Nations, 2009, pp.248-9.  The UN Force consisted of approximately 650 
Moroccan and 550 Uruguayan soldiers and a couple of dozen military observers, but they were not 
configured as infantry units.  These witnessed the arrival of RCD-Goma reinforcements observed 
gunfire in the city, and received word of violence from numerous sources, including from an 
international aid worker.  The Deputy Force Commander repeatedly attempted to meet with RCD-
Goma officials in Kisangani but was rebuffed until after the mutiny had been put down. 
22 Human Rights Watch, War crimes in Kisangani: the response of Rwandan-backed rebels to the May 
2002 mutiny, New York: HRW, August 2002.  See also Joshua Marks, ‘The Pitfalls of Action and 
Inaction: Civilian Protection in MONUC’s Peacekeeping Operations’, African Security Review, Vol. 
16, No. 3. 2007; Victoria Holt and Tobias Berkman, The Impossible Mandate? Military Preparedness, 
the Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace Operations, The Stimson Center, 2006, pp.160-1; and 
Clifford Bernath and Anne Edgerton, MONUC: Flawed Mandate Limits Success, Washington, DC: 
Refugees International, 2003. 
23 Human Rights Watch, August 2002. 
24 Eleventh Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2002/621 of 5 June 2002, para 71. 
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no reference to POC.25  The following month’s report, however, warned that human rights 
violations had ‘far surpassed the worst expectations’, that their ‘number and scale . . . is 
growing rapidly’ and that ‘the situation demands greater protection of civilians under 
imminent threat of physical violence.’26 
 
Rwandan troops officially withdrew from the DRC in October 2002, while Ugandan troops 
withdrew in May 2003.27  The latter withdrawal created a security vacuum in Bunia, which 
led to a series of massacres.28  Over 600 civilians were killed and around 2,000 sought refuge 
at the MONUC base.29  Two UN military observers were also killed in a nearby village.30  A 
subsequent report by DPKO concluded that the troops stationed there did what they could 
within the constraints of their capabilities and mandate.31  An internal report by MONUC’s 
first Force Commander stated more bluntly that:  
 
Faced with the band of killers who were sowing death and devastation in town, [the 
contingent] refused to react by opening fire after proper challenge and in accordance 
with the mandate to protect the population and in accordance with quite unambiguous 
                                                 
25 Special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2002/1005, 10 September 2002.  
26 Twelfth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2002/1180 of 18 October 2002, para 49. 
27 The Security Council had repeatedly called for all foreign forces to leave the DRC.  See, for 
example, Security Council resolution 1341of 22 February 2001.  However, the UN had also warned 
about a precipitous withdrawal leading to exactly the type of violence that did occur.  See Seventh 
report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo  (S/2001/373), 17 April 2001, paras 28 – 31 and paras 98 – 102 and 118.   
28 International Crisis Group, Africa Briefing, Pulling Back from the Brink in the Congo, Brussels: 
ICG, 7 July 2004; International Crisis Group, Africa Briefing, Back to the brink in the Congo, Brussels: 
ICG, 17 December 2004. 
29 Ibid.  See also Letter Dated 16 July 2004 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of 
the Security Council, S/2004/573 of 16 July 2004.   
30 Ibid. 
31 Operation Artemis: The Lessons of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force. New York: Best 
Practices Unit, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, October 2004, p.7.  The report asserts that the 
contingent of 712 troops was only prepared for static guard duty and that the tasks specified in the 
formal request to the troop-contributing country to redeploy that contingent to Bunia were largely 
limited guard duties with no mention of protection of civilians.  The contingent’s officers maintained 
that MONUC’s mandate was authorized under Chapter VI and therefore force could not be used except 
in self-defence.  The report concluded that: ‘It was clear from the start that there was little more [the 
contingent] could do than provide security to MONUC and other international staff as well as the local 
civilians who sought refuge at the headquarters and at the airport base.’ 
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rules of engagement. Instead, they persisted in only firing into the air, declaring that 
they could only act under Chapter VII and engage in combat with prior authority of 
[their parliament].32 
 
The UN authorized the deployment of an Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF), 
under European Union auspices in response.33  The IEMF was well-armed and provided with 
air support, although it was only authorized to operate within Bunia, and massacres continued 
outside the town.34  It enforced a ‘weapons-free zone’ in Bunia and responded aggressively to 
provocations by the militia groups.35  Thousands of IDPs were able to return home from June 
to August 2003.36  Responsibility for the security of the region was handed back to MONUC 
in September 2003, which gradually also began to patrol more remote villages. 37    
 
The Ituri and Kivus Brigades 
 
The UN responded to the perceived success of the IEMF operation by organizing an Ituri 
Brigade with heavy armaments, and combat helicopters as well as increasing MONUC’s 
overall troop ceiling.38  In one encounter, a truck full of militia fighters attempted to drive 
                                                 
32 End of Tour Report, 31 December 2003, pp. 8-10, cited in Holt and Taylor, 2009, pp.251-2. 
33 Security Council Resolution 1484, of 30 May 2003.  See also Resolution 1489, of 26 June 2003; 
Resolution 1493, of 28 July 2003; Resolution 1501, of 26 August 2003.  See also Alpha Sow, 
‘Achievements of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force and Future Scenarios’, in Mark Malan 
and Joao Gomes Porto (eds), Challenges of Peace Implementation: The UN Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2004; and DPKO, October 2004. 
34 International Crisis Group, Congo Crisis: Military Intervention in Ituri, Brussels: ICG, Africa 
Report N°64, 13 June 2003. 
35 Ibid. In one skirmish the IEMF killed 20 militiamen. The IEMF also cut off some weapons 
shipments into Bunia by monitoring secondary and field airstrips, and running vehicle patrols.   
36 For further details see Kees Homan, ‘Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo.’ In 
European Communities Commission. European Commission: Faster and More United? The Debate 
about Europe’s Crisis Response Capacity. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities. 2007. 
37 Fifteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. S/2004/251 of 25 March 2004, paras 23-5. 
38 UN Security Council Resolution 1493, of 28 July 2003.  This raised the overall troop level to 10,800 
and specified that 4,800 of these would comprise the Ituri Brigade.  It also gave MONUC the mandate 
to provide assistance for the reform of the security forces, the re-establishment of a State based on the 
rule of law and the preparation and holding of elections, while reaffirming the POC mandate under 
Chapter VII.  See also Resolution 1501, of 26 August 2003.   
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into Bunia, and was fired upon by a MONUC surveillance helicopter; killing three militia 
members.39  MONUC forces raided the political headquarters of the Ugandan-backed Union 
des Patriotes Conglais (UPC) seizing weapons and arresting a number of top officials.40  It 
also accelerated the deployment of its forces outside of Bunia in response to a massacre 
perpetrated by the UPC and in early November these intervened to prevent a clash with a 
rival militia.41  When MONUC began foot patrols across the Congo River it reportedly 
received a heroes’ welcome and its soldiers were showered with leaves and rice as they 
passed through the crowds.42 
 
The situation in Ituri became the subject of considerable international legal attention after the 
ICC announced that it would mount its first ever investigation there in 2003 and it was also a 
major focus of the ICJ case between the DRC and Uganda.43  MONUC considerably 
increased its civilian staff carrying out monitoring and reporting of violations, which, 
paradoxically, may have emphasized the mission’s weaknesses since comparable atrocities 
were also taking place in areas where it had fewer resources.44  MONUC’s more aggressive 
stance also provoked a reaction from the rebel groups.  Between December 2003 and March 
                                                 
39 Victoria Holt and Tobias Berkman, The Impossible Mandate? Military Preparedness, the 
Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace Operations, The Stimson Center, 2006, p.163. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Holt and Taylor, 2009, p.256. 
42 Holt and Berkman, 2006, p.164. 
43 International Criminal Court, Press Release, ‘Communications Received by the Office of the 
Prosecutor, 16 July 2003.  ‘The Office of the Prosecutor has selected the situation in Ituri, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, as the most urgent situation to be followed’. See also DRC v Uganda, ICJ Report, 
2005, paras 176 and 178-9 and 209-10, which focussed on the situation in Ituri.  See also Human 
Rights Watch, Ituri: Covered in Blood. Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northeastern DR Congo, New 
York: HRW, July 2003. 
44 Autesserre, 2010, p.209-14.  She notes that MONUC was to devote far more resources to Ituri than 
any other district and its civilian head of office ranked senior to equivalent posts.  In order to justify 
this use of resources, she claims that the mission highlighted atrocities taking place.  One example she 
cites was a press conference where it broadcast a videotaped interview with a woman who had been 
horribly tortured by a militia force and then made to watch as they chopped up, grilled and ate her 
children. 
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2004 there were 20 attacks on its soldiers in Ituri alone.45  This doubled to 40 attacks between 
September and December 2004.46 
 
A Kivus Brigade was also formed to carry out high visibility patrols.47  Security in North and 
South Kivu deteriorated in late 2003 and early 2004, however, with clashes between RCD-
Goma and the Congolese national army around Bukava. 48  The rebels subsequently seized 
first Kavumu airport and then Bukava itself in June 2004, after it had been abandoned by 
government forces.49  The Uruguayan Battalion commander responsible for the airport’s 
protection reportedly disobeyed a direct order to defend it and MONUC’s political leadership 
subsequently overruled their military colleagues – who wanted to defend the town – for fear 
of derailing the wider mission strategy.50  On entering Bukava, the rebel militias instigated 
heavy looting and widespread violence, killing an estimated 100 and displacing tens of 
thousands of people.51   
 
                                                 
45 Fifteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. S/2004/251 of 25 March 2004, para 25. 
46 Sixteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2004/1034 of 31 December 2004, para 11. 
47 Fifteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2004/251 of 25 March 2004, paras 23-5.  See also International 
Crisis Group, Maintaining Momentum in the Congo: The Ituri Problem, Brussels: ICG, 26 August 
2004.  While the patrols appear to have improved civilian safety, critics argued that people remained at 
risk when they withdrew from an area. 
48 Third special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2004/650, 16 August 2004, paras 34-46 for the UN’s account of 
events. 
49 International Crisis Group, The Congo’s Transition is Failing: Crisis in the Kivus. Africa Report No. 
91, Brussels: ICG, 30 March 2005.  MONUC forces briefly cantoned one rebel group and halted the 
advance of another, while the Kivus Brigade temporarily halted anther rebel advance outside Bukava, 
but the Congolese armed forces used this respite to abandon the city and retreat south to Walungu, 
which they pillaged.   
50 Holt and Taylor, 2009, pp.257-8. 
51 Ibid.  The UN gives lower figures, although these are likely to be incomplete.  See Third special 
report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, S/2004/650, 16 August 2004, para 42.  The figure of 100 deaths is supported by 
Médecins sans Frontières. International Activity Report 2003/04: Democratic Republic of Congo, 
2004, pp.24-5, where it also reports that it was forced to evacuate its own staff from Bunia.   
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The combined impact of the Bunia and Bukava crises seriously damaged MONUC’s 
reputation and there were violent demonstrations against it in many parts of the country.52  
International aid agencies also condemned the UN’s inability to protect their staff and ensure 
the delivery of relief supplies.53  A special mission report acknowledged that the events 
‘represented the most serious challenge to date’ in its transition strategy and complained 
about the gap between the expectations created by the mandate and its capacity to fulfil 
them.54  The mission’s reputation suffered further due to revelations of sexual exploitation by 
UN peacekeepers and civilian personnel at an IDP camp in Bunia.55  In October 2004, the 
Security Council approved a modest increase in MONUC’s size, and a new mandate, which 
gave greater emphasis to POC tasks listing them as second in priority only to deterring 
violence that might threaten the political process.56 
 
Almost 5,500 MONUC combat-capable troops were re-deployed to the Kivus and Ituri 
between October 2004 and February 2005 and undertook a number of military operations to 
‘enhance security’, including by disarming and arresting militia members.57  In February 
                                                 
52 Third special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2004/650, 16 August 2004, para 38.  UN premises were attacked 
in Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, Kalemie, Mbandaka, Kisangani, Beni and Kindu, resulting in the destruction 
of over $1 million worth of equipment and property, while three protesters were killed by MONUC 
troops in Kinshasa.  Other humanitarian agencies were also looted and damaged, resulting in the 
suspension of humanitarian programmes in food security, health care, water and education for some 
3.3 million people. UN personnel were harassed, physically attacked and their private residences 
looted. 
53 MSF, 2005 where it reports that two staff members were kidnapped while travelling north of Bunia 
and that it has been forced to close all of its projects outside the town as a result.  It was also forced to 
close its programmes in North Kivu due to the security situation.   
54 Third Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. S/2004/650 of 16 August 2004, para 2 and paras 79-102. The 
report called for MONUC’s strength to be increased from 10,800 to 23,000 personnel, the creation of 
brigade-sized forces in both North and South Kivu, a new Brigade for Katanga and the Kasai 
provinces, an eastern division headquarters to direct military operations in the Kivus and Ituri, and a 
‘joint mission analysis cell’ to improve information analysis. 
55Ibid., para 32.    
56 UN Security Council Resolution 1565 of 1 October 2004.  This raised the force ceiling to 16,700, 
allowing for the creation of the north and south Kivu Brigades, but did not approve the creation of 
Brigades for Katanga and Kasais.   
57 Sixteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2004/1034 of 31 December 2004; and Seventeenth Report of the 
Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo. S/2005/167 of 15 March 2005, para 15.  ‘These operations were concentrated in the areas in 
and around Fataki, Soba (3 kilometres north of Kafé), Mahagi and Djebu. With a view to protecting the 
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2005 an ambush by a militia group killed nine Bangladeshi soldiers on a routine patrol to 
protect an IDP camp.58  MONUC troops responded with an operation that killed 50 - 60 
militia members.59   A subsequent UN Security Council resolution extended MONUC’s 
mandate and stated that it was ‘authorized to use all necessary means, within its capabilities 
and in the areas where its armed units are deployed, to deter any attempt at the use of force to 
threaten the political process and to ensure the protection of civilians under imminent threat 
of physical violence . . . in accordance with its mandate, MONUC may use cordon and search 
tactics to prevent attacks on civilians and disrupt the military capability of illegal armed 
groups’.60   
 
MONUC adopted a new CONOPS in April 2005, which set out the envisaged approach in 
more detail.61  A succession of mission reports over the next few years showed that POC was 
now being treated as a civil-military objective to be achieved through the neutralization of 
Congolese militias and ‘foreign armed groups’.62  Mission reports stressed, however, that 
                                                 
civilian population threatened by militia members after the murder of a prominent businessman, on 24 
February MONUC conducted a cordon-and-search operation at Ariwara and disarmed 116 militia 
soldiers, collecting some 118 weapons and ammunition. Also on 24 February, MONUC arrested 30 
militia members and confiscated weapons in the village of Datule (about 20 kilometres from Tchomia 
and 8 kilometres from Kafé).’   
58 Seventeenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. S/2005/167 of 15 March 2005, para 16.  This states that:  ‘The 
ambush may have been in response to the increasing pressure that MONUC had exerted on militia 
groups over the previous weeks, notably the 24 February arrest of numerous militia members in its 
Datule stronghold. It may also have been designed to discourage another militia group, which was in 
Bunia as part of its efforts to ensure the extension of State administration to the area. The ambush also 
took place immediately after a meeting of the Tripartite Commission in Kampala, at which MONUC 
briefed the participants on its robust approach to the maintenance of peace in Ituri.’ 
59 Ibid., para 19. 
60  Security Council Resolution 1592 of 30 March 2005, para 7. 
61 Divisional Commander’s Initial Campaign Plan for Operations in DRC East. 4 April 2005 and 
Military Concept of Operations for MONUC, 2005, Annex C. 
62 See: Eighteenth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2005/506, 2 August 2005; Nineteenth report of the Secretary-
General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
S/2005/603, 26 September 2005; Twentieth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2005/832, 28 December 2005; 
Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraphs 10 and 14 of Security Council resolution 
1649 (2005), S/2006/310, 22 May 2006; Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed 
conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2006/389, 13 June 2006; Twenty-first report of the 
Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, S/2006/390, 13 June 2006; Report of the Security Council mission on the electoral process in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 10-12 June 2006, S/2006/434, 22 June 2006; Twenty-second 
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although ‘some Congolese and Member States continue to call on MONUC to forcibly 
disarm the foreign armed groups’ this was not MONUC’s responsibility.63   The CONOPS 
also stated that: ‘While MONUC can use force to protect civilians, and, in this connection, 
will do so against the foreign armed groups, the very nature of peacekeeping prohibits 
peacekeepers from engaging in targeted warfare.’64     
 
The mission’s strategic objectives were once again reviewed and a report in March 2007 
stated that the focus of the mission should now be the protection of civilians and the 
extension of the authority of Congolese government throughout the country.65  MONUC’s 
strength was again increased, to just over 17,000 troops, and the wording of the mandate 
suggested that POC be a top priority.66  ‘Protection of Civilians’ began to appear as a specific 
section in mission reports from April 2008 onwards.  MONUC troops took direct action 
against rebel militia groups in North Kivu in August and September 2007.67  In November 
                                                 
report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, S/2006/759, 21 September 2006; Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to 
paragraph 8 of resolution 1698 (2006) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2007/68, 
8 February 2007; Twenty-third report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2007/156, 20 March 2007; Report of the 
Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
S/2007/391, 28 June 2007; Twenty-fourth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2007/671, 14 November 2007; 
Twenty-fifth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2008/218, 2 April 2008. 
63 Sixteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2004/1034 of 31 December 2004, para 34. 
64 Military Concept of Operations for MONUC, 2005, Annex C, p. 14.  On file with author. 
65 Special Report of the Secretary-General on Elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
S/2005/320 of 26 May 2005; and Report of the Security Council mission on the electoral process in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, 10-12 June 2006, S/2006/434, 22 June 2006.  See also UN 
Security Council Resolution 1671 of 25 April 2006.  See also Twenty-third Report of the Secretary-
General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
S/2007/156 of 20 March 2007. 
66 Security Council Resolution 1756 of 15 May 2007, para 2.  ‘Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter 
of the United Nations . . . Decides that MONUC will have the mandate, within the limits of its 
capabilities and in its areas of deployment, to assist the Government of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo in establishing a stable security environment in the country, and, to that end, to: Protection of 
civilians, humanitarian personnel and United Nations personnel and facilities (a) Ensure the 
protection of civilians, including humanitarian personnel, under imminent threat of physical violence.’  
This was confirmed in December by Security Council resolution 1794 of 21 December 2007, para 5.  
‘The protection of civilians must be given priority in decisions about the use of available capacity and 
resources’. 
67 Twenty-fourth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2007/671, 14 November 2007, paras 12-8.  In December 2006, 
Laurent Nkunda, who had previously been a leading member of the RCD (Goma) formed a new 
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2008, however, they failed to prevent a massacre of more than 150 people in the town of 
Kiwanja.68   
 
Operation Kimia II and Human Rights Due Diligence 
 
Despite a peace agreement between the government and a number of militia groups in 
January 2008, the year was marked by fresh crises, which continued into 2009.69  Between 
July and November 2008 MONUC supported the Congolese armed forces in a major 
operation against one militia group, which retaliated by attacking civilians and looting 
villages.70  In September MONUC and the Congolese army launched another offensive, this 
time against the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), which had infiltrated from neighbouring 
Uganda.71   
                                                 
militia, the Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP).  His forces suffered heavy losses in 
clashes with a MONUC battalion and he subsequently entered agreed to merge his militia with the 
national army.  On 27 August 2007 major fighting broke out in North Kivu when Nkunda’s forces 
attacked the Congolese armed forces. In September, MONUC forces halted Nkunda’s advance on Sake 
when Congolese army positions crumbled.  Mai-Mai began fighting Nkunda as well, creating new 
humanitarian crises. A subsequent investigation revealed 12 mass graves containing 21 victims near 
Sake, an area that had been held by Nkunda’s forces. In late October, MONUC and the Congolese 
army launched an operation to neutralize a Mai-Mai group that resulted in their surrender. 
68 Fourth Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. S/2008/728 of 21 November 2008, paras 10-11.  See also Human 
Rights Watch, Killings in Kiwanja: The UN’s Inability to Protect Civilians, New York: HRW, 
December 2008.  This claimed that there were well armed and equipped MONUC troops within 1 km 
of where the killings took place.  They sent a patrol roughly two hours after the CNDP had regained 
control of Kiwanja and begun summarily executing civilians. Although the patrol found bodies in the 
streets, ‘No further action was taken by MONUC to stop the killings or to enhance protection for 
civilians in the town. 
69 For an overview see: Twenty-fifth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2008/218, 2 April 2008; Twenty-
sixth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo. S/2008/433 of 3 July 2008; Twenty-seventh Report of the Secretary-General on 
the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. S/2009/160 of 27 
March 2009.  In January 2008, the government signed a peace accord in Goma  with over 20 
Congolese armed groups (including the CNDP), under which they agreed on the need for an immediate 
cessation of hostilities, the disengagement of troops, return of displaced people, Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), improved adherence to human rights standards, and the 
creation of UN buffer zones. However, in late August 2008, intense fighting began again between the 
CNDP and the Congolese army in the southern part of North Kivu Province. Hundreds of people were 
killed, and by late October 2008, the CNDP had advanced to within a few miles of Goma before 
declaring a unilateral cease-fire.   
70 For an overview of operations in the Kivus see Julie Reynaert, MONUC/MONUSCO and Civilian 
Protection in the Kivus, International Peace Information Service, February 2011. 
71 For background on the LRA see Tim Allen, Trial Justice: the International Criminal Court and the 
Lord’s Resistance Army, London: Zed books, 2006; and Andre Le Sage, Countering the Lord’s 
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In December 2008 the Congolese government signed an agreement with Rwanda for a joint 
operation against the Hutu Power militia – Forces Democratiques de Liberation du Rwanda 
(FDLR).72  The government also signed peace deals with the Congrès National pour la 
Défense du Peuple (CNDP) and other smaller armed groups in the Kivus, who were granted 
amnesties and integrated into the Congolese armed forces.73  The CNDP’s then Chief of Staff, 
Bosco Ntaganda, announced that he had replaced Laurent Nkunda as leader of the group on 5 
January 2009.  Nkunda fled into Rwanda, two days later, where he was taken into custody.74   
Ntaganda had been indicted by the ICC for alleged crimes committed in Ituri in 2002 and 
2003 and this indictment was unsealed in April 2008.75  No effort was made to arrest him, 
however, and he assumed the rank of General in the Congolese armed forces.76 
 
Around 4,000 Rwandan troops crossed into the DRC, in January 2009, for a month long 
combined operation with the newly integrated Congolese armed forces.77  The FDLR 
retaliated with massacres of the civilian population that killed 201 people, including 90 in a 
single village.78  The LRA also launched a series of attacks between 24 December 2008 and 
                                                 
Resistance Army in Central Africa, Washington DC: Center for Strategic Research, the Institute for 
National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, July 2011. The LRA is a rebel group formed 
in Uganda in 1987 and renowned for its use of indiscriminate violence, and abduction of children to 
serve as soldiers, sex slaves, and porters.  It received substantial support from the Sudanese 
government in retaliation for Ugandan support for the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army. It now also 
operates in the DRC and South Sudan.  
72 Twenty-seventh Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. S/2009/160 of 27 March 2009, paras 2-3.  See also Security 
Council Resolution 1856 of 22 December 2008, renewing the mission mandate. 
73 Ibid., paras 4-7.  
74 Ibid. 
75 Human Rights Watch, ‘ICC: Congolese Warlord to go to trial’, New York: HRW, 9 June 2014; 
Human Rights Watch, DR Congo: Arrest Bosco Ntaganda for ICC trial, New York: HRW, 13 April 
2012; Human Rights Watch, ‘You will be punished’: Attacks on civilians in Eastern Congo New York: 
HRW, December 2009. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Deibert, 2013, pp.149-51. 
78 Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Hutu Militia Rampages Across North Kivu, IWPR, AR No. 
212. 11 May 2009; Human Rights Watch, DR Congo: Brutal Rapes by Rebels and Army, HRW, 8 
April 2009. 
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17 January 2009, in which they killed almost a thousand people and abducted 160 children.79  
In February 2009 it was reported that MONUC’s previous Force Commander had resigned 
from office because he believed that the plan adopted the previous October to provide 
protection for civilians was ‘divorced from reality’. 80   
 
In May and July 2009 the Congolese armed forces, again with MONUC support, launched a 
military operation against the FDLR, known as Kimia II.81  MONUC assisted the operation 
through ‘planning’ and ‘logistical support, including tactical helicopter lift, medical 
evacuation, fuel and rations.’82  The mission ‘also provided fire support to FARDC 
[Congolese armed forces] operations when deemed essential by MONUC commanders.’83  
The mission report of this operation claimed that it had pushed the bulk of the FDLR away 
from population centres and mining sites and resulting in the repatriation of large groups of 
FDLR members and their dependents to Rwanda. However, it acknowledged that:   
 
Despite the enhanced and innovative measures taken by MONUC to protect civilians, 
the operations also took a heavy toll on civilians, who were displaced and subjected 
to reprisal attacks by retreating armed groups. Furthermore, the actions of 
undisciplined and recently integrated FARDC elements seeking to settle old ethnic 
scores resulted in serious violations of international humanitarian law, including 
killings of civilians. 
 
                                                 
79 Human Rights Watch, The Christmas Massacres: LRA Attacks on Civilians in Northern Congo, New 
York: HRW, February 2009.  This states that the fatalities included at least 815 Congolese civilians 
and 50 Sudanese civilians. 
80 El País ‘El informe del militar español que dirigió lãs tropas de la ONU en Congo’, 8 February 
2009.  He warned that the limited operational capacity of the force and its lack of flexibility and 
mobility meant it could only protect the population in major towns and cities, and along key roads. 
Elsewhere, the mission could only protect itself.  He concluded that it was better to resign and draw 
attention to what he regarded as dangerous mission creep. 
81 For an overview see: Thirtieth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2009/623, 4 December 2009.   
82 Ibid., para 5. 
83 Ibid. 
299 
 
 
 A HRW report estimated that more than 1,400 civilians had been killed in North and South 
Kivu between January and September 2009.84   Half the victims were killed by the FDLR and 
half by the Congolese and Rwandan armed forces and allied militia.85  It also claimed that 
7,500 women had been raped and 900,000 people forced from their homes during the course 
of the operation.86  The MONUC mission report acknowledged that: ‘international non-
governmental organizations reported alleged or confirmed massacres and gross human rights 
violations committed by elements of FARDC against civilian populations . . . some 
components of the United Nations system called for an immediate end to Kimia II and for the 
withdrawal of MONUC support for FARDC.’87 
 
In October 2009 the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions described the results 
of the operation as ‘a disaster’.88  He said that in many areas the Congolese armed forces 
‘posed the greatest direct risk to security’ and noted that ‘the Security Council’s mandate has 
transformed MONUC into a party to the conflict in the Kivus.’89  In the same month the UN’s 
Legal Counsel issued an internal memorandum, which stated that if the mission had reason to 
believe that the Congolese armed forces were committing violations of IHL, international 
human rights law or refugee law:  
 
MONUC may not lawfully continue to support that operation, but must cease its 
participation in it completely . . . MONUC may not lawfully provide logistic or 
‘service’ support to any FARDC operation if it has reason to believe that the FARDC 
units involved are violating any of those bodies of law . . . This follows directly from 
                                                 
84 Human Rights Watch, ‘You will be punished’: Attacks on civilians in Eastern Congo New York: 
HRW, December 2009. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Thirtieth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2009/623, 4 December 2009, para 9. 
88 Press statement by Professor Philip Alston, UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial executions. 
Mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 5–15 October 2009, 15 October 2009, OHCHR 
website, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/executions/docs/PressStatement_SumEx_DRC.pdf, 
accessed 19 November 2013. 
89 Ibid.  
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the Organization’s obligations under customary international law and from the 
Charter to uphold, promote and encourage respect for human rights, international 
humanitarian law and refugee law.90   
 
The legal advice was endorsed by the UN Secretary General’s Policy Committee, in June 
2009.91  This prompted MONUC officials to develop what was to become known as a 
‘conditionality policy, whereby it suspended all military aid to units of the Congolese armed 
forces implicated in human rights violations.92  The Security Council endorsed this policy and 
further called on the Secretary General to ‘establish an appropriate mechanism to regularly 
assess’ its implementation.93  In late 2010 the UN Policy Committee decided that the policy 
should apply globally and system-wide, and launched an internal inter-agency process led by 
DPKO and OHCHR, which was to result in the adoption of the Human Rights Due Diligence 
Policy on UN support to non-UN security forces (HRDDP) in July 2011.94  This was publicly 
endorsed by the Security Council in March 2013.95 
 
The HRDDP requires UN missions to carry out early risk assessments when considering 
whether to give support to or undertake joint operations with national forces and to ‘take fully 
into account the need to protect civilians and mitigate risk to civilians, including, in 
particular, women, children and displaced persons and civilian objects’.96  Missions are 
                                                 
90 Conﬁdential note, leaked by the New York Times, from the UN Ofﬁce of Legal Affairs to Mr. Le 
Roy, Head of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 1 April 2009, para.10.  
91 For a more detailed description see Jeremie Labbe and Arthur Boutellis ‘Peace operations by proxy: 
implications for humanitarian action of UN peacekeeping partnerships with non-UN security forces’, 
International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 95 No. 891/892 Autumn/Winter 2013, pp.539-59; and 
Helmut Philipp Aust, ‘The UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy: An Effective Mechanism against 
Complicity of Peacekeeping Forces?’, Journal of Conflict and Security Law, Oxford University Press, 
June 24, 2014. 
92Thirtieth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2009/623, 4 December 2009, para 2.   
93 Security Council Resolution 1906 of 23 December 2009, para 23. 
94 UN Secretary General, Decision No. 2011/18, 13 July 2011. 
95 Human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces, 
UN Doc. A/67/775–S/2013/110, 5 March 2013 [Hereinafter HRDDP 2013]. 
96See, for example, Security Council Resolution 2100 of 25 April 2013 (on the UN mission in Mali), 
para. 26. MINUSMA take fully into account the need to protect civilians and mitigate risk to civilians, 
including, in particular, women, children and displaced persons and civilian objects in the performance 
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required to monitor the compliance of these forces with IHL and international human rights 
law and actively intervene to draw attention to violations while ensuring that its own forces 
lead by example.97   
 
Protection strategies and ‘innovative measures’  
 
In January 2010 MONUC and UNHCR published its first mission-wide strategy for the 
protection of civilians.98 ‘Protection’ was defined as:  
 
all activities aimed at ensuring the safety and physical integrity of civilian 
populations, particularly children, women, and other vulnerable groups, including 
IDPs; preventing the perpetration of war crimes and other deliberated acts of violence 
against civilians; securing humanitarian access; and ensuring full respect for the 
rights of the individual, in accordance with relevant national and international bodies 
of law, i.e. human rights law and international humanitarian law.99 
 
The strategy stressed that: ‘MONUC does not have the operational capacity to position troops 
in every locality . . . and must maintain its ability to intervene decisively through a balance 
between concentration of forces to keep strategic and tactical reserves, and extensive 
deployments in priority areas to protect civilians at risk.’100  It further recognized ‘the primary 
responsibility of the State to protect its own citizens’ and that ‘sustainable protection’ could 
                                                 
of its mandate . . . where undertaken jointly with the Malian Defence and Security Forces, in strict 
compliance with the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy. 
97 HRDDP 2013, para 2.   
98 UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) & UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees, ‘UN System-Wide Strategy for the Protection of Civilians in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo’, January 2010 [Hereinafter MONUC Protection Strategy 2010].  
See also Kyoko Ono, Actions Taken by MONUC to Implement the Security Council Mandate on 
Protection of Civilians, UN DPKO, Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, June 2008; and Lessons 
Learned Note on the Protection of Civilians, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2010; and 
MONUC Protection Strategy Narrative – Draft 8, March 31 2009 – MONUC ODSRSG (all on file 
with author). 
99 Ibid., para 15. 
100 Ibid., para 12. 
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only be achieved ‘through the restoration of a functional justice system and civilian 
administration’.101  The strategy incorporated ‘the various humanitarian, security and human 
rights dimensions of protection in DRC’102 and took into account ‘the need to reconcile and 
integrate MONUC’s mandate to protect civilians with its mandate to support the operations 
of FARDC integrated brigades’, conditional on the latter’s ‘behaviour and respect of IHL and 
human rights law’103 
 
The Congolese army and MONUC conducted another joint operation in January 2010, but 
MONUC claimed to have been more selective in its targets and mission reports stressed that 
there had been more focus on holding re-captured territory and developing State institutions 
in them.104  The mission also announced a number of initiatives to increase outreach to local 
communities, gather more information about potential threats and the development of a 
database to identify ‘must-protect’ areas.105 Subsequent reports detailed the increased use of 
Joint Protection Teams (JPTs) Community Liaison Advisers (CLAs), Community Alert 
Mechanisms (CANs) and the formation of Mobile Operating Bases (MOBs).106   
 
Taken together these measures indicate both a far more proactive interpretation of the 
mission’s POC mandate, but also a different way of thinking about how to fulfil it.107  The 
                                                 
101 Ibid.,para. 13.  
102 Ibid., para 2. 
103 Ibid., para 21. 
104 Thirty-first report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2010/164, of 30 March 2010, para 2. 
105 Ibid., para 70. 
106 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2010/512, of 8 October 2010; Report of the Secretary-General 
on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
S/2011/20, of 17 January 2011.  See also MONUC, Protection in Practice, Practical Protection 
Handbook for Peacekeepers, MONUC/Protection Cluster, no date; MONUC, Meeting the Protection 
Challenge: an overview of MONUC initiatives on the protection of civilians, MONUC, no date. 
107 The following descriptions and observation are based on the author’s own time spent in Eastern 
DRC in June and July of 2012 as well as interviews conducted with senior MONUSCO civilian and 
military personnel to research the development of scenario-based training exercises on POC 
commissioned by UN DPKO.  For further details see MONUSCO POC pre-deployment training 
package, which was drafted by the author of this thesis.  Available at UN Peacekeeping Resource Hub, 
http://research.un.org/en/peacekeeping-community, accessed 23 April 2015  
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JPTs are small mixed teams of military, police and civilian personnel that visit high risk areas 
to carry out ‘protection assessments’.108 The presence of civil affairs staff as well as human 
rights, child rights and women’s rights officers, alongside military and police personnel is 
intended to ensure that there are skilled investigators able to conduct interviews with local 
people, alert to signs of human rights violations and the particular vulnerabilities of particular 
groups of people. The protection assessment reports contain recommendations to the Mission 
about troop deployments.109  The CLAs are tasked with outreach activities to facilitate 
communication between MONUSCO troops, local communities, the authorities and 
humanitarian partners.110  The CANs have been established by distributing mobile telephones 
to focal points in villages surrounding UN bases to alert the CLAs or troop commanders in 
case of imminent threat to the security of villagers.111 MOBs are small military units that can 
be deployed in the field for several weeks at a time to help secure an area and support the 
work of a JPT.112   
 
In mid-2010 MONUC was transformed into MONUSCO, with a reference to ‘stabilization’ 
added to the mission’s title intended to ‘reflect the new phase reached in the country’.113  The 
Security Council urged the mission to build on ‘best practices and extend useful protection 
                                                 
108 Ibid.   
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid.  The CLAs are primarily deployed to support the protection activities of MONUSCO’s Force 
at the Company or Platoon level. They are national staff members, although not drawn from the 
particular community in which they work.  They help the UN troops to build trust and gain access to 
local networks and a deeper understanding of the local context, which is particularly important given 
six month troop rotations. CLAs also respond to a longer term objective of building national capacity 
on POC. 
111 Ibid.  A CAN Committee is in charge of adapting the model as required, reviewing and suggesting 
alternate technology based options, or liaising with partners on any potential extension of the phone 
network in priority areas. The project aims to cover most priority areas benefitting from mobile 
network coverage. Some MONUSCO military bases, not covered by telephone networks, have 
distributed high frequency radios to facilitate communication. 
112 Ibid. An MOB will typically consist of one around 20 soldiers, accompanied by medical and 
logistical support and a Community Liaison Assistant (CLA).  They will equipped with two or three 
light machine guns, a 60 mm mortar, an RPG-7, a sniper rifle and 20 sub-machine guns or rifles as 
well as binoculars, a GPS, night vision goggles, a cell-phone, Sat-phone and wireless radio set.  MOBs 
can be deployed by road or air and located 15-20 kms away from the radius of permanent bases.   
113 MONUSCO website, background 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monusco/background.shtml, accessed 19 November 
2013.  See also Security Council Resolution 1925, of 28 May 2010, para 1. 
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measures, such as the Joint Protection Teams, Community Liaison Interpreters, Joint 
Investigation Teams, Surveillance Centres and Women’s Protection Advisers’.114  Subsequent 
resolutions have encouraged the further use of such ‘innovative measures implemented by 
MONUSCO in the protection of civilians’ and stated that POC is the mission’s priority.115  A 
Security Council Resolution in 2012 also expressed concern at ‘the promotion within the 
Congolese security forces of well-known individuals responsible for serious human rights 
violations and abuses’ and called for the prosecution of those responsible for acts of violence 
against civilians.116 
 
Although attacks on civilians and human rights violations continued with regularity,117 
mission reports became more optimistic from 2011.118   The capture and defections of 
significant FDLR commanders, coupled with the arrests of key leaders in Europe, reduced its 
active membership to a small rump.119  An increasing number of Mai Mai militia and rebel 
                                                 
114 Security Council Resolution 1925, of 28 May 2010, para 12 (f).   
115 UN Security Council Resolution 2053, Adopted on 27 June 2012, para 1: ‘reaffirms that the 
protection of civilians must be given priority in decisions about the use of available capacity and 
resources and encourages further the use of innovative measures implemented by MONUSCO in the 
protection of civilians’.  See also Protection of Civilians: Implementing Guidelines for Military 
Components of United Nations Peacekeeping Missions, Department of Peacekeeping Operations / 
Department of Field Support, February 2015, pp.14-5 which cites these measures as examples of good 
practice. 
116 Ibid., Preamble and para 12.  
117 See, for example, Office for the High Commissioner of Human Rights/ MONUSCO, Final report of 
the fact-finding missions of the United Nations joint human rights office into the mass rapes and other 
human rights violations committed by a coalition of armed groups Along the Kibua-Mpofi axis in 
Walikale territory, North Kivu, from 30 July to 2 August 2010, July 2011. 
118For an overview see: Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization 
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2011/298, of 12 May 2011; Report 
of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, S/2011/656, of 24 October 2011; Report of the Secretary-General on the 
United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
S/2012/65, of 26 January 2012; Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization 
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2012/355, of 23 May 2012; Report 
of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, S/2012/838, of 14 November 2012; Report of the Secretary-General on the 
United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
S/2013/96, of 15 February 2013; Special report of the Secretary-General on the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo and the Great Lakes Region, S/2013/119, of 27 February 2013; Report of the Secretary-
General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, S/2013/388, of 28 June 2013; Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2013/581, of 30 
September 2013. 
119 Ibid. 
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groups also reportedly opted for negotiated surrender and integration into the Congolese 
armed forces.120 
 
The Force Intervention Brigade 
 
In April 2012, however, a new armed rebel group, comprised principally of former CNDP 
militia and led by Ntaganda, emerged known as the M23.121  Its leaders claimed that the 
government had failed to respect the terms of this peace agreement, signed on 23 March 2009 
and was failing to take sufficient measures against the FDLR.122  Ntanganda had integrated 
his militia into the Congolese armed forced, in return for an amnesty, and these had been 
identified as amongst the worst perpetrators of human rights and IHL violations during the 
Kimia II operation.123  Pressure by the ICC for Ntaganda’s arrest may have helped to spark 
the rebellion, or it may have been due to an order to re-deploy their forces from an area where 
they are believed to have controlled several illegal mining and logging operations.124  A UN 
appointed investigative panel found considerable evidence to show that elements within the 
Rwandan government and armed forces had provided direct support to the rebellion.125   
 
On 20 November 2012 the rebels briefly seized control of Goma after it was abandoned by 
government troops. 126  It has been alleged that the UN Force Commander ignored orders 
from senior civilian UN officials to defend the town, called his own country’s defence 
                                                 
120 Ibid. 
121 Jason Stearns, From CNDP to M23: The evolution of an armed movement in eastern Congo, 
Stockholm and Nairobi: Rift Valley Institute/Usalama Project, 2012, p. 44. 
122 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2012/355, of 23 May 2012, paras 17-9.   
123 Human Rights Watch, ‘DR Congo: Arrest Bosco Ntaganda for ICC trial, New York: HRW, 13 
April 2012, for a detailed profile of the grave crimes he committed as a militia leader supported by 
Rwanda and Uganda and then as a General in the Congolese armed forces.   
124 For discussion see Stearns, 2012. 
125 Letter dated 12 November 2012 from the Chair of the  Security Council Committee established 
pursuant to  resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to 
the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/2012/843, 15 November 2012.   
126 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2013/96, of 15 February 2013.   
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ministry to ask what he should do and was told not to resist.127  During the rebel advance 
some senior officials expressed uncertainty as to whether their RoE permitted the use of force 
to engage with or detain rebel fighters.128  On 2 December 2012, the M23 withdrew from the 
city following strong diplomatic pressure on Rwanda from other countries in the region.129   
 
In March 2013, after consultations with various regional bodies,130 the UN Security Council 
authorized a Force Intervention Brigade to undertake military operations against armed 
groups in the DRC.131  In announcing its formation the UN stated that the Security Council 
had ‘approved the creation of its first-ever “offensive” combat force, intended to carry out 
targeted operations to “neutralize and disarm” the notorious 23 March Movement (M23), as 
                                                 
127 Guardian, ‘What's the point of peacekeepers when they don't keep the peace?, 17 September 2015. 
128 This view was expressed to the author of this thesis by several senior MONUSCO officials 
including a Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG) during interviews 
conducted in Goma and Kinshasa in June 2012.   
129 African Union, Press Release, ‘The African Union strongly condemns the armed offensive launched 
by the M23 in the province of North Kivu, in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo’, 
19 November 2012 ; and ‘Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of the Member States of 
the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) on the Security Situation in Eastern 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)’, 5th Ordinary Summit of the Heads of State and Government, 
Kampala, Uganda, 24 November 2012. The ICGLR includes 12 countries in the region and has 
become a key mechanism for inclusive diplomacy. 
130 For further discussion see Carina Lamont and Emma Skeppström, The United Nations at War in the 
DRC? Legal Aspects of the Intervention Brigade, Stockholm: Swedish Ministry of Defence, December 
2103; Patrick Cammaert and Fiona Blyth, The UN Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, New York: International Peace Institute, Issue Brief, July 2013; and Bruce ‘Ozzie’ Oswald, 
The Security Council and the Intervention Brigade: Some Legal Issues, American Society of 
International Law, Insights, Vol. 17, Issue 15, 6 June 2013.  The ICGLR had previously, largely at 
Rwanda’s behest, called for the AU and UN to work together to establish ‘a neutral International Force 
to eradicate M23, FDLR and all other Negative Forces in the Eastern DRC’.  The M23 rebellion gave 
added impetus to this demand, although the question of which countries troops should comprise its 
membership was controversial.    
131 UN Security Council Resolution 2098, 28 March 2013, para 12(b). ‘Neutralizing armed groups 
through the Intervention Brigade: In support of the authorities of the DRC, on the basis of information 
collation and analysis, and taking full account of the need to protect civilians and mitigate risk before, 
during and after any military operation, carry out targeted offensive operations through the 
Intervention Brigade referred to in paragraph 9 and paragraph 10 above, either unilaterally or jointly 
with the FARDC, in a robust, highly mobile and versatile manner and in strict compliance with 
international law, including international humanitarian law and with the human rights due diligence 
policy on UN-support to non-UN forces (HRDDP), to prevent the expansion of all armed groups, 
neutralize these groups, and to disarm them in order to contribute to the objective of reducing the threat 
posed by armed groups on state authority and civilian security in eastern DRC and to make space for 
stabilization activities’.  See also Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Peace, 
Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region, 
S/2013/569, 24 September 2013. 
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well as other Congolese rebels and foreign armed groups’.132  In the same month, following a 
split within the rebel group, Ntaganda surrendered himself to the US Embassy in Rwanda and 
was taken into custody by the ICC.133   
 
The M23 rebellion ended in November 2013 following heavy fighting in which the 
Intervention Brigade provided direct support to the Congolese armed forces, using artillery 
and attack helicopters,134 as well as taking defensive action to protect civilians in the area.135  
Around 6,000 rebels surrendered to MONUSCO and government forces, most of whom were 
placed in DDR programmes.136  MONUSCO claims that the defeat of this rebellion had also 
led to overtures from ‘several armed groups in North Kivu . . . seeking to either surrender or 
negotiate’.137  Nevertheless, it noted almost 10,000 security related incidents, threatening 
civilians, within the terms of the mission’s mandate, in October and November 2013,138 
including scores of killings, rapes and abductions, some of which were carried out by 
members of the Congolese armed forces.139  OHCHR also accused ‘components of the 
                                                 
132 ‘UN News, ‘United Nations, “‘Intervention Brigade’ Authorized as Security Council Grants 
Mandate Renewal for United Nations Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo’, 28 March 2013, 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc10964.doc.htm, accessed 5 May 2015. 
133 The Economist, ´Bosco Ntaganda: a surprising surrender´, 19 March 2013. 
134 Reuters, ‘U.N. helicopters strike rebel posts in Congo’, 18 November 2012. 
135 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2013/757, 17 December 2013, paras 17-20 and 37-40. The M23 
announced an end to its rebellion on 5 November and the government confirmed the rebellion had been 
defeated the following day.  According to the report: ‘Between 1 October and 30 November, 
MONUSCO provided logistical support to the Congolese armed forces throughout the country . . . . . 
The Intervention Brigade participated in the Congolese-led operations against the M23 from 26 
October to 4 November. In support of these operations, MONUSCO units and sub-units, totaling 1,280 
troops, together with 902 troops from the North Kivu brigade, redeployed to Munigi, Rwindi and 
Kiwanja to ensure protection of civilians in the area. MONUSCO support included combat operations 
by ground troops from the Intervention Brigade and attack helicopters, artillery and mortar fire, as well 
as logistics support.’ 
136 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2014/450, 30 June 2014, para 88. 
137 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the 
Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, S/2013/757, 17 December 2013, para 22.   
138 Ibid., para 36.  ‘In October and November, the United Nations protection cluster recorded 9,515 
incidents in North Kivu, South Kivu and Orientale provinces, where six joint protection teams were 
deployed to assess the situation and identify protection needs. During October and November, 
MONUSCO received 504 protection alerts, 359 of them in North Kivu, through community alert 
networks. In response, MONUSCO deployed quick reaction forces and sent investigative patrols or, 
where appropriate, referred the alerts to national security forces.’  
139 Ibid., paras 47-53. 
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Congolese armed forces’ of torture, mistreating M23 detainees, killing civilians looting and 
burning villages and carrying out mass rapes and other sexual violence.140  Attacks on 
civilians have continued and the UN continues to face criticism for failing to prevent them.141 
 
In March 2014, the Security Council extended MONUSCO’s mandate by another year and 
included the Intervention Brigade within it, ‘on an exceptional basis and without creating a 
precedent or any prejudice’.142  The word ‘imminent’ was also removed from its POC 
mandate.143 Mission reports during 2015 detail continuing efforts to strengthen national 
capacity, ‘neutralize’ rebel groups and provide protection to vulnerable civilians and aid 
workers, although both the human rights and security situation remain precarious at best.144  
Seven million people required humanitarian assistance to meet their basic needs in the DRC, 
in 2015 and MONUSCO struggles to provide protection to the most vulnerable.145  With the 
                                                 
140 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and MONUSCO, Report of the 
United Nations Joint Human Rights Office on Human Rights Violations Perpetrated by Soldiers of the 
Congolese Armed Forces and Combatants of the M23 in Goma and Sake, North Kivu Province, and in 
and around Minova, South Kivu Province, from 15 November to 2 December 2012, May 13, 2013, pp. 
9–10. 
141 Human Rights Watch, DR Congo: Army, UN Failed To Stop Massacre, 3 July 2014.  This reported 
that despite being alerted to a massacre in Mutarule on June 6, 2014, while killings were underway, the 
commander of a nearby MONUSCO contingent stated that he had been told by his national superiors 
to merely clarify the situation and gather more information rather than directly intervene.  See also UN 
News Centre, ‘DR Congo: UN boosts force in east after gruesome massacre of civilians’, 16 December 
2013.  In December 2013 UN troops found the bodies of 21 civilians who had been brutally 
slaughtered by unknown attackers.  The victims were killed with machetes or knives, and the youngest 
among the dead was only a few months old while three girls are reported to have been raped before 
being beheaded. 
142 UN Security Council Resolution 2147, of 28 March 2014 and 2211 of 26 March 2015.  This gave 
an authorized troop ceiling of 19,815 military personnel, 760 military observers and staff officers, 391 
police personnel and 1,050 formed police units.  See also Security Council Resolutions 2198 (2015), 
2147 (2014), 2136 (2014) and 2211 (2015).  The overall troop ceiling level has been maintained 
although in 2015 the number of deployed troops was reduced by 2,000.   
143 Ibid., para 4 (a) (i): ‘Ensure, within its area of operations, effective protection of civilians under 
threat of physical violence, including through active patrolling, paying particular attention to civilians 
gathered in displaced and refugee camps, humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders, in the 
context of violence emerging from any of the parties engaged in the conflict, and mitigate the risk to 
civilians before, during and after any military operation.’ 
144 See Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2015/486, 26 June 2015; and Report of the Secretary-
General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo  S/2015/172, 10 March 2015. 
145 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo  S/2015/172, 10 March 2015., para 22.  ‘More than 50 local 
protection committees in five provinces received around 270 early warning alerts. MONUSCO 
responded in 21 per cent of the cases; 46 per cent of the alerts were conveyed to the national security 
forces and 14 per cent to local civilian authorities. In the remaining 19 per cent of cases, the alerts 
309 
 
 
M23 rebellion defeated the Intervention Brigade has turned its attention to other armed 
groups.146  Some have praised its robust mandate,147 while others have warned that by 
becoming a party to the conflict it has set a dangerous precedent.148  The implications of this 
will be discussed further in the final section of this chapter.   
 
B. Côte d’Ivoire 
 
The United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) was first authorized by the Security 
Council in April 2004149 and the mandate has since been renewed annually.150  It replaced the 
UN Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (MINUCI), a small political mission, mandated to facilitate the 
                                                 
proved either false or were received after the incident. In approximately 40 per cent of cases, violations 
against civilians were prevented.’  See also Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2015/486, 26 June 
2015, para 44. ‘The Mission continued to support the establishment and operation of 56 community 
alert networks and 80 local protection committees in conflict affected areas in eastern Democratic 
Republic of the Congo. The networks and the committees helped to protect civilians from risks through 
enhanced cooperation with local security services, local authorities, civil society and local 
communities. The Mission responded, alone or in support of FARDC, the national police or local 
authorities, to 118 protection alerts of the 188 received from local community alert networks, 
effectively deterring the perceived threat or leading to the arrest of the perpetrators. In 70 cases it 
proved impossible to respond owing to the inaccessibility of the location, late receipt of the alert or 
imprecise information.’  See also see Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo submitted pursuant to 
paragraph 39 of Security Council resolution 2147 (2014), S/2014/957, 30 December 2014. 
146 UN News, ‘Secretary-General Appoints Lieutenant General Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz of 
Brazil Force Commander for UN Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo’, 17 May 2013, 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sga1407.doc.htm, accessed 5 May 2016. 
147 Evaluation of the implementation and results of protection of civilians mandates in United Nations 
peacekeeping operations Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services, UN Doc A/68/787, 7 
March 2014, para 28. 
148 Sheeran, Scott, and Case Stephanie, The Intervention Brigade: Legal Issues for the UN in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, New York: International Peace Institute, November 2014.  See 
also , Jeremie Labbe and Arthur Boutellis, ‘Peace operations by proxy: implications for humanitarian 
action of UN peacekeeping partnerships with non-UN security forces’, International Review of the Red 
Cross, Volume 95 Number 891/892 Autumn/Winter 2013, pp.539-60. 
149 Security Council Resolution 1528, of 4 April 2004. 
150 See UN Security Council Resolutions 1594 of 4 April 2005; 1609 of 24 June 2005; 1643 of 15 
December 2005;  1652 of 24 January 2006; 1657 of 6 February 2006; 1726 of 15 December 2006; 
1739 of 10 January 2007; 1763 of 29 June 2007; 1765 of 16 July 2007; 1826 of 29 July 2008; 1880 of 
30 July 2009; 1911 of 28 January 2010; 1924 of 27 May 2010; 1933 of 30 June 2010; 1962 of 20 
December 2010; 1981 of 13 May 2011; 2000 of 27 July 2011; 2062  of 26 July 2012; 2112 of 30 July 
2013; 2162 of 25 June 2014; and 2226 of 26 June 2015.  In April 2012 UNOCI comprised 10,954 
uniformed personnel including: 9,404 troops; 200 military observers; 1,350 police (including formed 
units); 400 international civilian personnel; 758 local staff; and 290 United Nations Volunteers.  Its 
strength of September 2013 was 9,994 total uniformed personnel including: 8,492 troops; 187 military 
observers; 1,315 police (including formed units); 409 international civilian personnel; 772 local staff; 
and 153 United Nations Volunteers.   
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implementation of peace agreement signed the previous year.151  UNOCI reached peak 
strength of over 10,000 uniformed personnel in April 2012, but began downsizing in March 
2013, as security conditions improved.152    
 
Although the UNOCI mission was authorized under Chapter VII and had a POC mandate, 
there was little specific reference to these tasks in the Security Council debate, in February 
2004, that led to its adoption and a statement from the Secretary General immediately after 
this made no reference to it.153  POC has also never been included as a specific section in 
mission reports.154  These show that the mission initially saw its role in ‘traditional’ 
peacekeeping terms: it deployed along a specified ceasefire line, in support of a formal peace 
agreement to reduce the likelihood of renewed fighting between two well-defined 
belligerents.155   
                                                 
151Security Council Resolution 1514 of 13 November 2003.  See also Security Council Resolution 
1479, of 13 May 2003; Security Council Resolution 1464 of 4 February 2003; Security Council 
Resolution 1527 of 4 February 2004; and Security Council Resolution 1528 of 27 February 2004.  
MINUCI was established as part of a French-brokered agreement as an observer mission that worked 
alongside 4,000 French troops and 1,500 troops deployed by the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) in January 2003. 
152 What’s in Blue, ‘Operation in Côte d’Ivoire mandate renewal’, 24 June 2015. 
http://www.whatsinblue.org/2015/06/un-operation-in-cote-divoire-mandate-renewal-1.php, accessed 
30 June 2015.  An operative paragraph on the force structure of the mission refers to UNOCI’s 
‘possible termination’ following the October 2015 elections, security conditions permitting and so long 
as the government has the capacity to assume UNOCI’s security responsibilities. The term ‘possible 
termination’ is again repeated in the penultimate paragraph of the draft, requesting that the Secretary-
General report to the Council by 31 March 2016, with recommendations on the mission’s drawdown. 
Some elected members, proposed that this phrase not be repeated.  However, the P3 and Russia 
supported reiterating this phrase, with some arguing that it is important to signal the eventual departure 
of the mission. 
153 UN Security Council, 4918th meeting, S/PV.4918 of 27 February 2004; and UN Security Council 
Press Release, ‘Security Council establishes Peacekeeping Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, unanimously 
adopting resolution 1528 (2004)’, 27 February 2004.  The latter quoted Annan as stating that: ‘A 
strengthened United Nations presence in Côte d’Ivoire will make it easier for the Government of 
National Reconciliation to implement the [disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration] 
programme. It will also facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance and the restoration of State 
authority throughout the country, contribute to the promotion of human rights and the re-establishment 
of the rule of law and help the country prepare for the holding of fair and transparent general elections 
in 2005’. 
154 The issue is generally dealt with under the headings of human rights, security and sexual violence 
as well as reports on mission activities, particularly by its military component, and under headings 
related to the safety of mission personnel. 
155 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire submitted pursuant 
to Security Council resolution 1514 (2003) of 13 November 2003, S/2004/3, 6 January 2004; 
Addendum One, S/2004/3/Add.2, 9 February 2004; Addendum Two, S/2004/3/Add.2, 23 February 
2004; First report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, 
S/2004/443, 2 June 2004; Second report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in 
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Côte d’Ivoire’s first President, Félix Houphouet-Boigny, had ruled an autocratic one-party 
State from independence in the 1960s until his death in 1992 when he was succeeded by 
Henri Konan Bédié.156  After decades of stability Côte d’Ivoire’s economy faltered in the 
early 1990s, leading to widespread social protests.157  Houphouet-Boigny had appointed a 
technocratic Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara, who came from the north of the country and 
his father was rumoured to have been born in Burkina Faso.158  This made him a target of 
resentment as President Bédié, emphasized the concept of Ivoirité and overtly stirred up 
xenophobia against Muslim northerners and migrant workers, who by then composed over a 
quarter of the Ivoirian population.159  Bédié also jailed several hundred opposition supporters 
and purged the army.160  A coup took place in 1999, but Laurent Gbagbo, a former political 
prisoner who also campaigned on a xenophobic platform, was elected President the following 
year.161 
                                                 
Côte d’Ivoire, S/2004/697, 27 August 2004; Third progress report of the Secretary-General on the 
United Nations operation in Côte d’Ivoire, S/2004/962, 9 December 2004; Fourth progress report of 
the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, S/2005/186, 18 March 2005; 
Fifth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, 
S/2005/398, June 2005. 
156 For an historical overview see: Martin, Meredith, The State of Africa, a history of fifty years of 
independence, Johannesburg and Cape Town: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2006, pp. 285-9 and 678-9; 
Robert Mundt, ‘Côte d’Ivoire: Continuity and Change in a Semi-Democracy’, in John F. Clark and 
David Gardinier, Political Reform in Francophone Africa, Boulder: Westview Press, 1997; and David 
Lea and Annamarie Rowe, A Political Chronology of Africa, London: Taylor & Francis, 2005, pp.123-
30.  
157 International Crisis Group, Côte d’Ivoire: Continuing the Recovery, Africa Briefing N°83,  
Brussels: ICG, 16 December 2011; International Crisis Group, Africa Report N°176, A Critical Period 
for Ensuring Stability in Côte d’Ivoire, Brussels: ICG, 1 August 2011; Human Rights Watch, Turning 
Rhetoric into Reality: Accountability for Serious International Crimes in Côte d’Ivoire,  New York: 
HRW, April 2013; United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the 
Commission of Inquiry into the Events Related to the March in Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire), 13 May 2004. 
158 Ibid.  Ouattara is an economist who had previously worked for the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). 
159 For discussion see Alfred Babo, ‘The crisis of public policies in Côte d'Ivoire: Land law and the 
nationality trap in Tabou’s rural communities’, Africa, Vol. 83, Special Issue 01, February 2013, 
pp.100-119 and Human Rights Watch, The New Racism: the Political Manipulation of Ethnicity in 
Côte d'Ivoire,  New York: HRW, August 2001.  Many of the migrants were from neighbouring 
countries drawn to Cote d’Ivoire during its economic boom years.  Tensions between immigrants and 
the indigenous population were particularly pronounced in the west of the country where disputes over 
land rights were common.   
160 Meredith, 2006, pp. 678-9; Mundt,1997; and Lea and Rowe, 2005, pp.123-30.  
161 Ibid. On 19 September 2002, an army mutiny turned into a full-scale revolt when government 
buildings and military and security facilities were simultaneously attacked in Abidjan, Bouake, and 
Korhogo. The government crushed the revolt in Abidjan, although the attacks resulted in the deaths of 
Minister of Interior Emile Boga Doudou and several high-ranking military officers. General Guéï was 
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Civil war broke out in September 2002 with a rebel group, the Mouvement patriotique de 
Côte d'Ivoire (MPCI), seizing control of most of the northern half of the country. 162  French 
troops already garrisoned in the country were deployed to establish a de facto buffer zone 
preventing their further advance and, in mid-October 2002, the two sides signed a ceasefire 
under French supervision.  Further rebellions broke out in the west of the country, in late 
November 2002, with the emergence of two new rebel groups, all of which subsequently 
fused into the Forces Nouvelles.163   
 
A ceasefire and power sharing government was agreed in January 2003,164 but the conflict 
restarted in November 2004. 165 Government forces bombed rebel bases and one strike hit a 
French military installation.166  France retaliated by destroying most of the small Ivoirian air 
force and violent riots against the French broke out in Abidjan.167  On 15 November the 
                                                 
also killed under still-unclear circumstances. Ouattara took refuge in the French embassy when his 
home was attacked.  President Gbagbo stated that some of the rebels were hiding in the shanty towns 
where foreign migrant workers lived and Gendarmes and vigilantes bulldozed and burned homes, 
attacking residents and displacing some 12,000 people. 
162 International Crisis Group, Africa Report N°72, Côte d’Ivoire: the War Is Not Yet Over, Brussels: 
ICG, 28 November 2003; and Human Rights Watch, Trapped Between Two Wars: Violence against 
Civilians in Western Côte d’Ivoire, New York: HRW, August 2003. The Ivoirian Popular Movement 
for the Great West (MPIGO) and the Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP) were previously unknown 
rebel groups with ties to Charles Taylor and the Liberian government, and composed in significant part 
by veterans of Liberian and Sierra Leonean rebel groups, such as the RUF. 
163 Ibid. 
164 For details see Nicholas Cook, Côte d’Ivoire Post-Gbagbo: Crisis Recovery, Washington DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 20 April 2011.  The Linas-Marcoussis Agreement signed in January 
2003.  The parties agreed to work together on modifying national identity, eligibility for citizenship, 
and land tenure laws.  The LMA also stipulated a UN Monitoring Committee to report on 
implementation of the accord.  The LMA was followed by the Accra II Agreement organized by 
ECOWAS and signed in March 2003, the Accra III Agreement organized by ECOWAS and the UN 
Secretary-General and signed in July 2004; and the Pretoria Agreement, organized by the African 
Union and signed in April 2005. The main provisions of all these agreements were basically similar.   
165 Second report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, 
S/2004/697, 27 August 2004; Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in 
Côte d’Ivoire submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1514 (2003) of 13 November 2003, 
S/2004/3 of 6 January 2004; First report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in 
Côte d’Ivoire, S/2004/443 of 2 June 2004; Second report of the Secretary-General on the United 
Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, S/2004/697 of 27 August 2004.  See also International Crisis 
Group, Africa Report N°82, Côte d’Ivoire: No Peace in Sight, Brussels: ICG, 12 July 2004 
166 UN Security Council Press Release, ‘Attack on French forces in Côte d’Ivoire, fatal air strikes by 
national armed forces condemned by Security Council’, 6 November 2004. 
167 Third progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Côte d’Ivoire, 
S/2004/962, 9 December 2004. 
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Security Council issued an arms embargo on Côte d’Ivoire and gave its leaders one month to 
get the peace process back on track or face a travel ban and an asset freeze.168  For the first 
time in UN history, the resolution cited violence against civilians as one of the criterion for 
the sanctions regime.169  On the same day the UN Special Rapporteur on the Prevention of 
Genocide warned that violence was being incited in Côte d’Ivoire, through hate speech.170 
Further diplomatic efforts led to follow up agreements, laying out frameworks for 
disarmament and elections.171  Gbagbo’s presidential mandate expired on 30 October 2005, 
but was extended for a year, and a new Prime Minister was selected, according to a plan 
worked out by the AU and endorsed by the Security Council.172  State security, pro-
government militia and rebel forces all carried out violations against civilians.173  UNOCI 
responded by conducting ‘robust and continued joint patrolling’ with the national armed 
forces, but warned of its ‘limited capacity’ and reported an ‘eightfold increase in the number 
of cases of UNOCI movements being obstructed by government forces’.174  
 
                                                 
168 Security Council Resolution 1572 of 15 November 2004. 
169 International Crisis Group, Africa Report N°90, Côte d’Ivoire: the Worst May Be Yet To Come, 
Brussels: ICG, 24 March 2005. 
170 UN News Centre, ‘Special UN Adviser on Genocide warns of ethnic hate message in Côte d’Ivoire, 
15 November 2004.  He also noted that this is a crime listed in the statute of the International Criminal 
Court to which Côte d’Ivoire is a party. 
171 International Crisis Group, Africa Briefing N°33, Côte d’Ivoire: Halfway Measures Will Not 
Suffice, Brussels: ICG, 12 October 2005. 
172 UN Security Council Resolution 1633 of 21 October 2005, paras 3 and 5 ‘Reaffirms  . . .  its 
decision on the fact that President Gbagbo shall remain Head of State from 31 October 2005 for a 
period not exceeding 12 months, and demands that all the parties signatories to the Linas-Marcoussis, 
Accra III and Pretoria Agreements, as well as all the Ivorian parties concerned, implement it fully and 
without delay; . . . . a new Prime Minister acceptable to all the Ivorian parties signatories to the Linas-
Marcoussis Agreement shall be appointed by 31 October 2005.’ 
173 For an overview of 2005 see: Report of the Secretary-General on inter-mission cooperation and 
possible cross-border operations between the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, the United 
Nations Mission in Liberia and the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, S/2005/135, 2 March 
2005; Fourth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte 
d’Ivoire, S/2005/186, 18 March 2005; Fifth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United 
Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, S/2005/398/Add.1, 17 June 2005; Seventh progress report of the 
Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, S/2006/2, 3 January 2006; 
Human Rights Watch, Côte d’Ivoire: the human rights cost of the political impasse, New York: HRW, 
December 2005.  See also Relief web, ‘UN report links Ivory Coast massacre to Liberian mercenaries’, 
7 July 2005.  This describes an incident, in June 2005, in which a village was attacked in the west of 
the country and 41 villagers were shot, hacked to death, or burned in their homes in a three-hour-long 
attack that occurred within 200 metres of a national army checkpoint. 
174 Sixth Progress Report of the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, September 26, 2005, 
S/2005/604, paras 15-23. 
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In January 2006, militias loyal to President Gbagbo mounted violent protests against UNOCI 
and the Prime Minister.175  Security forces transported the militias involved to different 
locations around Abidjan.176  Bangladeshi UNOCI troops shot five protesters who stormed a 
UN compound.177  Presidential elections were again postponed and, in November 2006, the 
Security Council extended the Prime Minister’s mandate for an additional 12 months and 
enhanced his powers, against Gbagbo’s objections.178  In December 2005 HRW called on 
UNOCI to ensure that its ‘forces can provide protection to all civilians whose security is at 
risk because of communal tension or threats from abusive armed forces.’179  There seems to 
have been less clarity within the mission, however, about what POC involved, as mission 
reports contained few specific references to how UNOCI was implementing this part of its 
mandate.180  An internal paper published by OCHA in May 2006, stressed that POC was 
‘limited’ to the specific language of the mandate, which should be interpreted narrowly, while 
defining ‘protection’ in the humanitarian ‘rights-based’ advocacy terms discussed in Chapter 
                                                 
175 International Crisis Group, Africa Briefing N°40, Côte d’Ivoire: Stepping up the Pressure, Brussels: 
ICG, 7 September 2006; International Crisis Group, Africa Report N°109, Côte d’Ivoire: Peace as an 
Option, Brussels: ICG,17 May 2006.  
176 Human Rights Watch, “Because they have guns … I’m left with nothing”: The Price of Continuing 
Impunity in Côte d’Ivoire, New York: HRW, May 25, 2006. 
177 New York Times, ‘UN forces exchange fire with Ivory Coast protesters’, 18 January 2006. 
178 UN Security Council Resolution 1721 of 1 November 2006.   
179 Human Rights Watch, Côte d’Ivoire: the human rights cost of the political impasse, New York: 
HRW, December 2005, conclusions and recommendations.  See also: Human Rights Watch, “My 
Heart Is Cut”: Sexual Violence by Rebels and Pro-Government Forces in Côte d’Ivoire, New York: 
HRW, August 2007; Human Rights Watch, “The Best School,” Student Violence, Impunity, and the 
Crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, New York: HRW, May 21, 2008; Amnesty International, Côte d’Ivoire: 
Women and Girls Forgotten Victims of Conflict, 15 March 2007.   
180 For an overview of the mission’s activities see: Twelfth progress report of the Secretary-General on 
the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, S/2007/133, 8 March 2007; Report of the Secretary-
General on cross-border issues in West Africa, S/2007/143, 13 March 2007; Thirteenth progress 
report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, S/2007/275, of 14 
May 2007; Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Côte d’Ivoire, 
S/2007/515,  of 30 August 2007; Fourteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United 
Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, S/2007/593, of 1 October 2007. 
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Three.181  UNOCI’s Force Commander also noted that POC was not considered a priority and 
other tasks took precedence.182   
 
Operation ‘Protect the Civilian Population’ 
 
After repeated postponements, presidential elections finally took place, on 31 October 2010, 
with Ouattara and Gbagbo emerging as leading candidates in the first round.183  A run-off 
took place between them on 28 November.184  Ouattara was declared the winner by the 
electoral commission and the result was certified by the UN, the AU and ECOWAS, but 
Gbagbo refused to cede power.185  ECOWAS and the AU suspended Côte d’Ivoire from its 
                                                 
181 Roundtable background paper, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2006.  OCHA 
had established a ‘Protection Network’ in 2005, which included: prominent international NGOs, 
mandated UN protection agencies, UNOCI’s Human Rights Division, advisers from the Child 
Protection and Gender units, observers from the ICRC.  The Network’s objectives included collection 
of ‘protection information’, and the provision of analysis ‘on which early warning action, advocacy 
and denunciation could be based.  The network included network included two subgroups, the Child 
Protection Forum as of March 2006 and the IDP Protection Cluster as of April 2006.  The OCHA 
paper advocated ‘an approach to protection in which ‘human rights, media and rule of law play a more 
proactive role’.  However, no details are given about how the physical protection of civilians is to be 
achieved. 
182 Report of the Roundtable on the Implementation of the Protection Mandate of the UN Peacekeeping 
Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 24 May 2006.   
183 See Fifteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte 
d’Ivoire, S/2008/1, of 2 January 2008; Sixteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the 
United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, S/2008/250, of 15 April 2008;Seventeenth progress report 
of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, S/2008/451, of 10 July 
2008; Eighteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte 
d’Ivoire, S/2008/645, of 13 October 2008; Nineteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the 
United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, S/2009/21, of 8 January 2009; Twentieth progress report of 
the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, S/2009/196, of 13 April 
2009; Twenty-first progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte 
d’Ivoire, S/2009/344, of 7 July 2009; Twenty-second progress report of the Secretary-General on the 
United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, S/2009/495, of 29 September 2009; Twenty-third progress 
report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, S/2010/15, of 7 
January 2010; Twenty-fourth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte 
d’Ivoire of 20 May 2010; Progress report on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, 
S/2010/537, of 18 October 2010. 
184 Twenty-sixth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte 
d'Ivoire, S/2010/600, of 23 November 2010, para 11 stated: ‘The campaign was conducted in a 
generally peaceful and free atmosphere.  However, tensions between opposing camps, in particular 
between FPI and RDR supporters, were apparent; there were isolated minor clashes . . . and electoral 
campaign posters were destroyed in some areas.’ 
185 For a complete list of UN statements See UNOCI website ‘Post-election crisis’, ‘Key UN 
statements’, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unoci/elections.shtml, accessed November 
2013. 
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decision-making bodies186 and UNOCI’s military component was reinforced in December 
and January.187  Forces Nouvelles seized control of most of the country, but Gbagbo remained 
entrenched in Abidjan.188  HRW has claimed that at least 3,000 people were killed during the 
resulting crisis.189 
 
On 16 December forces loyal to Gbagbo killed more than 50 people and maimed a further 
200 in Abidjan.190  On 17 March mortars fired by forces loyal to Gbagbo into a market area in 
the Abobo district of the city killed 25 civilians.191  On 30 March 2011, the Security Council 
adopted a resolution imposing targeted sanctions against Gbagbo, his wife and three of his 
associates and reinforcing the authorisation for UNOCI to use force to protect civilians.192  
UNOCI’s own staff and buildings came under attack from pro-Gbagbo forces193 and, on 4 
April, the Secretary General announced that he had instructed UNOCI to take the necessary 
measures to prevent the use of heavy weapons against the civilian population. 194  On 5 April 
UNOCI launched operation ‘Protect the Civilian Population’ and UN attack helicopters were 
subsequently used on several occasions to destroy Gbagbo’s heavy weapons.195  On 11 April 
                                                 
186 Ibid. 
187 UN Security Council Resolution 1951 of 24 November 2010; 1962 of 20 December 2010; 1967 of 
19 January 2011; and 1968 of 16 February 2011. 
188 International Crisis Group, Africa Report N°171, Côte d’Ivoire: Is War the Only Option?, Brussels: 
ICG, 3 March 2011. 
189 Human Rights Watch, Turning Rhetoric into Reality: Accountability for Serious International 
Crimes in Côte d’Ivoire, New York: HRW, April 2013; and Human Rights Watch, “They Killed Them 
Like It Was Nothing”: The Need for Justice for Côte d’Ivoire’s Post-Election Crimes, New York: 
HRW, October 2011. 
190 Human Rights Watch, “They Killed Them Like It Was Nothing”: The Need for Justice for Côte 
d’Ivoire’s Post-Election Crimes, New York: HRW, October 2011. 
191 Ibid., see also Twenty-seventh progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, S/2011/211, 30 March 2011. 
192 Security Council Resolution 1975 of 30 March 2011. 
193 UN News Centre, ‘Côte d’Ivoire: UN condemns firing at helicopter and killing of civilian’, 29 
March 2011;  UNOCI Press Releases: ‘UNOCI headquarters continues to come under fire from 
Gbagbo’s special forces’, 3 April 2011; ‘New attack on UNOCI patrol’, 2 April 2011; ‘UNOCI repels 
attack by Gbagbo's special forces’, 2 April 2011, ‘UNOCI helicopter was shot at in Abidjan’, 1 April 
2011; ‘UNOCI civilian staff killed by stray bullet’, 1 April 2011; ‘Gbagbo special forces fire on 
UNOCI Headquarters’, 1 April 2011. 
194 Secretary-General statement, expressing concern over violence in Côte d’Ivoire, informing that the 
United Nations has undertaken military operation to prevent heavy weapons use against civilians, 
Office of the Secretary General 4 April 2011. 
195 See UNOCI Press Releases ‘UNOCI calls on Gbagbo's special forces to lay down their arms’, 5 
April 2011;  
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Gbagbo, who had been hiding in the basement of the presidential palace, was captured by 
forces loyal to Ouattara and brought into custody.196  He was subsequently transferred to The 
Hague to stand trial at the ICC on charges of crimes against humanity.197   
 
Ouattara was inaugurated as Côte d’Ivoire’s new President on 21 May 2011.198  UNOCI’s 
mission has since been extended with a POC mandate,199 to ‘support the new Ivorian 
government’.200 POC issues no longer appear to be a particular concern for the mission and 
are usually dealt with in a single paragraph.201  A number of leaders of the former regime 
have since been convicted of serious crimes and human rights violations in both the Abidjan 
criminal and military courts, receiving sentences of up to 20 years.202  Mission reports do not 
show concerns about the fairness of the trials although it has been noted that there were 
‘continued perceptions of victor’s justice’, due to the fact that most prosecutions have been 
brought exclusively against supporters of former President Gbagbo.203  In May 2015 it was 
reported that 321 of the 659 people detained in connection with the crisis remained in 
detention while most of the others had been released on bail.204   
 
At the height of the violence during this crisis the UN Secretary General issued a statement 
                                                 
‘UNOCI launches Operation “Protect the Civilian Population”’, 5 April 2011; ‘UNOCI transports 
passengers blocked in Abidjan; 5 April 2011; ‘Pro-Gbagbo forces ready to end combat ‘, 5 April 2011; 
‘UN Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights visits Côte d’Ivoire’, 4 April 2011. 
196 New York Times, ‘Leader’s Arrest in Ivory Coast Ends Standoff’, 11 April 2011. 
197 Guardian, ‘Laurent Gbagbo appears at The Hague to face trial’, 6 December 2011. 
198 UN News Centre, ‘Côte d'Ivoire: UN chief attends inauguration of President Alassane Ouattara’, 21 
May 2011 
199 UN Security Council Resolutions 1981 of 13 May 2011; 2000 of 27 July 2011; 2062 of 26 July 
2012; 2101 of 25 April 2013; 2112 of 30 July 2013.  
200 See UNOCI Homepage website, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unoci/background.shtml, accessed 27 November 2013. 
201 Thirty-sixth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte 
d'Ivoire, S/2015/320, 7 May 2015, para 16.  See also Thirty-fifth progress report of the Secretary-
General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire S/2014/892, 12 December 2014; and Thirty-
fourth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, S/2014/342, 
15 May 2014. 
202 Thirty-sixth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte 
d'Ivoire, S/2015/320, 7 May 2015, para 15-6. 
203 Ibid. 
204 Ibid., para 3. 
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insisting that the UN had not become a party to the conflict and was using force purely in 
self-defence and pursuant to its mandate to protect civilians.205  It also stressed that ‘those 
who commit serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights laws . . . will 
be held accountable.’206  There have been no allegations made that UN forces violated IHL or 
international human rights law, nor any attempt to bring proceedings against the UN for its 
actions or inactions during the crisis.  As mentioned in Chapter Five, however, Gbagbo’s 
wife and one of his close associates have been successful in challenging the freezing of their 
assets by the EU Court in 2011.207  The new government of Côte d’Ivoire has also unfrozen 
bank accounts of a number of supporters of former President Gbagbo as part of its efforts to 
promote reconciliation.208  
 
In November 2012 a group of nearly a thousand armed men attacked an IDP camp, Nahibly, 
near Duékoué, killing at least seven people, wounding dozens and causing 5,000 people to 
flee.209  The attack came a few weeks after an ambush in western Cote d’Ivoire that killed 
seven UN peacekeeping soldiers, the mission’s first fatalities.210  In his report on the incident 
                                                 
205 Secretary-General statement, expressing concern over violence in Côte d’Ivoire, informing that the 
United Nations has undertaken military operation to prevent heavy weapons use against civilians, 
Office of the Secretary General 4 April 2011.  
206 Ibid. 
207 Bamba v. Council,  Case T-86/11, Judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber, Extended 
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8 June 2011; and   Morokro v. Council, Case T-316/11 Judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) 
of 16 September 2011. 
208 Thirty-sixth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte 
d'Ivoire, S/2015/320, 7 May 2015, para 3 
209 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre Côte d’Ivoire: IDPs rebuilding lives amid a delicate 
peace, Geneva: IDMC, 28 November 2012; and UNHCR News, ‘UNHCR disturbed by attacks on IDP 
camp in Côte d'Ivoire’, Briefing Notes, 24 July 2012.  These note that UN troops and police had earlier 
turned back a small group of dozos (a fraternity of traditional hunters often employed to provide 
security in Ivorian villages). About an hour later the camp was stormed by the much larger group.  The 
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village, but it also clearly took place within a wider overall context of alleged militia activity and tense 
inter-communal relations between supporters and opponents of the previous President. 
210 The details here are based on a briefing given to the author at UNOCI headquarters in Abidjan, June 
2012 and interview by the author with the chief of police and several local officials in Duékoué, June 
2012.  The attack took place on 8 June 2012 and coincided with the opening proceedings against 
Gbagbo by the International Criminal Court in The Hague.  The militia group which carried out the 
attack on UNOCI had crossed the border from Liberia was believed to have been loyal to the former 
President Gbagbo.  The local authorities in Cote d’Ivoire allege that many militia members are based 
in refugee camps there managed by UNHCR and also warned that IDP camps in western Cote d’Ivoire 
contained similar militia groups. 
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the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, Chaloka 
Beyani, urged an investigation as to why the attack had not been prevented ‘despite the 
presence of government officials and UNOCI elements’ nearby.211  He told an earlier press 
conference that UNOCI troops had told him that the ‘rules of engagement of UN 
peacekeeping forces do not allow them to open fire if civilians are attacking other 
civilians.’212  This claim does not appear in the Special Rapporteur’s official report, and the 
UN explicitly denied it, 213 but it seems reasonable to assume that the statement reflects these 
troops own understanding of their RoE.214  
 
C. Peacekeeping or war fighting? 
 
While the UN denied that its ‘Protect the Civilian Population’ operation in Côte d’Ivoire had 
made UNOCI a party to the armed conflict, it seems to accept that the actions of the Force 
Intervention Brigade may have done so in the DRC.  In May 2013 Patricia O’Brien, the UN 
Under Secretary General for Legal Affairs, stated that: ‘By virtue of the tasks foreseen for the 
Intervention Brigade, it would appear that MONUSCO may end up becoming a party to 
armed hostilities in the DRC, thus triggering the application of international humanitarian 
law.215  Lieutenant General Babacar Gaye, when he was the UN Military Adviser for 
                                                 
211 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of  internally displaced persons, Chaloka 
Beyani , A/HRC/23/44/Add.1, 24 May 2013, para 12.  He recommended ‘there should be a special 
focus on lessons learned in relation to policing and protection practices within such camps, and the 
capacity and mandate of United Nations military contingents in such circumstances (namely, when 
providing the protection of an IDP camp from an attack by civilians). 
212 Inner-City News, ‘UN Peacekeepers Inaction on IDP Killings in Cote d'Ivoire Due to DPKO 
Rules?’, 23 October 2012.  He stated: ‘I asked the peacekeepers why they didn’t act. They said that 
they have to take a balance, whether acting would cause more harm. They felt more would have been 
killed if they had acted with force. . . . they would have been overrun. The commander to make sure 
preserve lives of men to continue to provide protection [sic] . . . . [and the] rules of engagement of UN 
peacekeeping forces do not allow them open fire civilians if civilians are attacking other civilians. 
213 Ibid. ‘At the following day's noon briefing the UN spokesman read out a statement denying what 
the Special Rapporteur had said about UN Peacekeeping's rules of engagement.’   
214 Interview by the author in the field at Duékoué and at UNOCI’s headquarter in Abidjan with senior 
UNOCI civilian officials and military officers, June 2012.  Interviewees repeatedly stated that they 
considered themselves bound by IHL and that this ‘protected civilians’ unless these had become a 
party to an armed conflict. 
215 Patricia O’Brien, statement by the under-secretary-general for Legal Affairs and UN legal counsel 
delivered to the International Law Commission, Geneva, May 23, 2013, p.18 available at 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/65/Statement%20byTheLegal%20Counsel.pdf, accessed 6 January 
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Peacekeeping Operations similarly noted that: ‘When we are asked to provide the Congolese 
army with support in disarming armed groups, some consider that we become parties to the 
conﬂict. But at some stage, it becomes necessary to be a party to the conﬂict in order to 
resolve it.’216  In October 2014 Lieutenant General Dos Santos Cruz, MONUSCO’s Force 
Commander, made a forthright defence of this position stating that:  
 
The United Nations should not wait for armed groups to come and terrorize 
communities; it should not give them freedom of movement . . . Conceptually, troops 
remain mindful of the United Nations principles of peacekeeping, namely, the 
consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defence 
and defence of the mandate. Those principles may not always apply against armed 
criminal groups in contemporary missions. Their application could be reviewed and 
adjusted to contemporary threats and to the context of violence that innocent civilians 
and peacekeeping personnel face in conflict areas  . . . The assumption that military 
action may create collateral damage should not prevent us from taking the necessary 
action. On the contrary, there are many examples that prove that action against armed 
groups brings huge benefits to the population.217 
 
Sheeran and Case, however, have warned that the formation of the Intervention Brigade 
‘reflects UN forces moving toward a more traditional war-fighting, rather than peacekeeping, 
posture’, with significant implications for the legal protection and obligations of 
peacekeepers.218  O’Brien has noted that MONUSCO could lose its protected status under the 
                                                 
2015; and UN Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) representative Mona Ali Khalil, panel discussion, 
“Humanitarian Law, Peacekeeping/Intervention Forces and Troop-Contributing Countries: Issues and 
Challenges,” Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization (AALCO), United Nations, New York, 
August 21, 2013; and Mona Ali Khalil, ‘Peace Forces at War’ panel discussion at the annual general 
meeting of the American Society of International Law, 7-12 April 2014. 
216‘Interview with Lieutenant General Babacar Gaye United Nations Military Adviser for 
Peacekeeping Operations’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 95 Number 891/892 
Autumn/Winter 2013, p.490. 
217 UN Security Council debate on UN Peacekeeping Operations, S/PV.727, 9 October 2014, pp.2-3.  
218 Scott Sheeran and Stephanie Case, The Intervention Brigade: Legal Issues for the UN in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, New York: International Peace Institute, November 2014.  See 
321 
 
 
Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel and would face  
‘practical challenges’ if ‘required to detain large numbers of fighters’ as part of its efforts to 
‘neutralize’ the threats that they pose to civilians.219  The loss of legal protection appears to 
have also been implicitly recognised by the Security Council when, in condemning the killing 
of a MONUSCO peacekeeping soldier in August 2013,  it noted that ‘intentionally directing 
attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a peacekeeping 
mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to 
the protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed 
conflict, constitutes a crime under international law.’220 [emphasis added]   
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, the High Level Panel report of 2015 argued that UN 
peacekeeping missions are not suited to engage in military counter-terrorism operations, due 
to their composition and character, and urged the Security Council to exercise ‘extreme 
caution’ before giving missions such mandates’. 221  By contrast the OIOS Protection 
Evaluation 2014 welcomed the formation of the Intervention Brigade and the inclusion of the 
words ‘targeted offensive operations’ in the mandate, which it stated marks ‘a decisive 
change from the past’ in relation to the use of force.222  France’s representative on the 
                                                 
also Jeremie Labbe and Arthur Boutellis, ‘Peace operations by proxy: implications for humanitarian 
action of UN peacekeeping partnerships with non-UN security forces’, International Review of the Red 
Cross, Vol. 95 No. 891/892 Autumn/Winter 2013, pp.539-60. 
219 Patricia O’Brien, statement by the under-secretary-general for Legal Affairs and UN legal counsel 
delivered to the International Law Commission, Geneva, May 23, 2013, p.18 available at 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/65/Statement%20byTheLegal%20Counsel.pdf, accessed 6 January 
2015; and UN Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) representative Mona Ali Khalil, panel discussion, 
“Humanitarian Law, Peacekeeping/Intervention Forces and Troop-Contributing Countries: Issues and 
Challenges,” Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization (AALCO), United Nations, New York, 
August 21, 2013. 
220 UN News Centre, ‘Security Council Press Statement on Democratic Republic of Congo’, 29 August 
2013. 
221 Report of the High Level Panel on Peace Operations, 2015, para 116-9. 
222 Evaluation of the implementation and results of protection of civilians mandates in United Nations 
peacekeeping operations Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services, UN Doc A/68/787, 7 
March 2014, para 28 
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Security Council also commented that the idea of the Intervention Brigade had been tested 
‘and it works’, so ‘could be a model when necessary for the future.’223   
 
For humanitarians this revives long-standing concerns about attempts to integrate the delivery 
of humanitarian assistance into counter-insurgency operations.224  Ashley states that the 
‘establishment of the brigade was met with outcry from many aid agencies and human rights 
groups over concerns that it would ultimately result in greater harm to civilians and questions 
around accountability.’225  Mackintosh has observed that as MONUSCO increasingly 
appeared to be becoming a party to the conflict, humanitarian NGOs in the DRC ‘started to 
paint their cars different colours: yellow, pink, anything’ to distinguish themselves from UN 
vehicles.226   
 
In March 2013 three consortia representing over 3000 humanitarian NGOs expressed their 
dismay at a UN Security Council Resolution 2093,227 which integrated all UN functions 
under one UN umbrella in Somalia, warning that this could seriously compromise their 
humanitarian neutrality. 228  Others have noted that, on purely pragmatic grounds, the UN 
should not relinquish ‘any pretence of neutrality or impartiality’, when it ‘lacks the requisite 
resources and structures to play a comprehensive or clearly strategic stabilisation role’.229  
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Assistance, Berlin: Springer, 2011, p.46. 
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implications for humanitarian action’, in Disasters, Vol. 34, Supplement 3, October 2010, p. 290.  For 
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Sloan argues that peacekeeping missions are ‘fundamentally ill-suited to the enforcement-
type tasks being asked of them’ as they are almost always under-funded, under-equipped and 
reliant on troops who are under-trained.230 
 
There has been considerable less controversy about the ‘innovative measures’ developed as 
part of MONUC’s protection strategy, described above.  Indeed they have been welcomed by 
humanitarian agencies and are often implemented in consultation with Protection Working 
Groups.231  These deployments are essentially based on gathering information, improving 
early warning mechanisms, and supporting the development of local protection plans and 
coordination structures.232  Deploying forces with the aim of ‘protecting civilians’ rather than 
‘defeating the enemy’ draws on some contemporary counter-insurgency theory,233 but also on 
the type of robust community policing strategies used in developing and middle income 
countries where communities have come under the control of heavily-armed criminal 
gangs.234  Policing in such situations, where levels of violence are often far higher than many 
                                                 
further discussion see James Sloan, The Militarisation of Peacekeeping in the Twenty-First Century, 
Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011. 
230 James Sloan, The Militarisation of Peacekeeping in the Twenty-First Century, Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2011. 
231 Interviews conducted with a variety of humanitarian agency protection staff in DRC and in other 
missions between 2010 and 2015.  The author of this thesis also regularly participated in Protection 
Working Groups in Liberia where similar practices also occurred. 
232 Interview conducted by the author of this thesis in Eastern DRC with senior MONUSCO civilian 
and military personnel in June and July of 2012.   
233 See, for example, David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: fighting small wars in the midst of a 
big one, London: Hurst & Co., 2009, which reflects on his experiences designing the ‘surge’ in Iraq in 
2007 and subsequent similar operations in Afghanistan.  See also Nathan Hodge,  Armed 
humanitarians: the rise of the nation builders, London: Bloomsbury, 2011; Philip Wilkinson, The 
Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations, Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 3-50, Second 
Edition, Shrivenham: Ministry of Defence, 2004; Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic, Eliot M. 
Goldberg (eds), Policing The New World Disorder: Peace Operations And Public Security, 
Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1998; Oliver Ramsbotham, Hugh Miall, Tom 
Woodhouse, The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Post War Peace 
Operations, Abingdon: Routledge, 2009; Beth Cole and Emily Hsu (lead writers), Guiding Principles 
for Stabilization and Reconstruction, Washington: United States Institute for Peace, 2009; OECD-
DAC Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility: Policy Guidance, DAC 
Guidelines and Reference Series, Paris: OECD, 2011.   
234 For a description of such operations currently being conducted in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro see 
Conor Foley, Pelo telefone: rumours, truths and myths on the pacification of the favelas of Rio de 
Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro: Humanitarian Action in Situations Other than War, Pontifícia Universidade 
Católica do Rio de Janeiro, March 2014.  Around 40,000 people have been shot dead in Rio de Janeiro 
in the last decade and the gangs until recently physically controlled most of the favelas barricading the 
entrances and deploying openly armed guards to patrol them.  For further discussion on urban violence 
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officially recognized conflict zones,235  is nevertheless conducted within a law and order 
paradigm, in which the use of force is regulated by international human rights law rather than 
IHL.236 As discussed in Chapter Four, international human rights monitoring bodies have 
required States to comply with both the positive and negative provisions protecting the right 
to life and freedom from torture, even ‘in difficult security conditions, including in a context 
of armed conflict’.237    
 
The Intervention Brigade was created ‘on an exceptional basis and without creating a 
precedent or any prejudice’238 and some argue that ‘UN peacekeepers remain unlikely to 
engage in offensive military operations and peace enforcement.’ 239  As Patrick Cammaert, a 
previous MONUC Force Commander, has pointed out that the mission was ‘already 
authorised to conduct offensive operations under its Chapter VII mandate (and it did), where 
the rules of engagement authorise the use of force beyond self-defence.’240  Indeed some 
argue that the UN has been a party to the conflict in the DRC since the formation of the Ituri 
and Kivus Brigades in 2003 or Operation Kimia II in 2009.241   
                                                 
in Brazil see Luke Dowdney, Neither War nor Peace. International comparisons of children and youth 
in organised armed violence, Rio de Janeiro: Viva Rio, 2005; and Luke Dowdney, Children of the 
drug trade, Rio de Janeiro: Viva Rio, 2003; Teresa Caldeira,  City of Walls: crime, segregation and 
citizenship in Sao Paulo, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000; Sarah Hautzinger, Violence in 
the City of Women: police and batterers in Bahia, Brazil, Berkley: University of California Press, 
2007; Janice Perlman, Favela: four decades of living on the edge in Rio de Janeiro, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010 
235 For a broader discussion of the problems of policing in situations of extreme urban violence see: 
Mark Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples, 
Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007; Alice Hills, Policing in post-conflict societies, London: Zed books, 
2009; Robert Muggah and Kevin Savage, ‘Urban Violence and Humanitarian Action: Engaging the 
Fragile City,’ Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, 2012; and Elena Lucchi, Humanitarian 
interventions in situations of urban violence, ALNAP Lessons Paper. London: ALNAP/ODI.   
236 Ibid. 
237 ECtHR: Al-Skeini and Others v. UK, Appl. No. 55721/07, Judgment (Grand Chamber) 7 July 2011, 
para 164.   See also Kaya v. Turkey, Appl. No. 22729/93, Judgment 19 February 1998, para 9.   
238 Security Council Resolution 2147, of 28 March 2014.  This gave an authorized troop ceiling of 
19,815 military personnel, 760 military observers and staff officers, 391 police personnel and 1,050 
formed police units. 
239 Jeremie Labbe and Arthur Boutellis ‘Peace operations by proxy: implications for humanitarian 
action of UN peacekeeping partnerships with non-UN security forces’, International Review of the Red 
Cross, Vol. 95 Number 891/892 Autumn/Winter 2013, p.543. 
240 Patrick Cammaert and Fiona Blyth, The UN Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, International Peace Institute, Issue Brief, July 2013. 
241 For discussion see Tristan Ferraro, ‘The applicability and application of international humanitarian 
law to multinational forces’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 95 Number 891/892 
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POC is listed as a separate task from ‘neutralizing armed groups’ in MONUSCO mission 
reports and the emphasis in POC activities is strongly on community liaison and working 
with the Congolese police force.242  Mission reports in 2014 and 2015 do not show that it is 
taking a more aggressive stance, partly because the security situation itself is easing as an 
increasing number of rebels surrender to government forces.243  In December 2014 the UN 
revised its POC strategy ‘with the aim of better coordinating activities between MONUSCO 
and the United Nations country team and supporting the Government’s efforts to fulfil its 
obligations with regard to the protection of civilians.’244 A mission report also stressed ‘the 
need to remove the distinction between the Force Intervention Brigade’ and other 
MONUSCO forces as while ‘it may be impractical for all contingents to be authorized to 
conduct targeted offensive operations to neutralize armed groups’ they all had ‘full 
responsibility to protect civilians and full authority to take all necessary measures for that 
purpose.’245    
 
                                                 
Autumn/Winter 2013, pp.561-612.  See also UN Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
‘Press statement by Professor Philip Alston, UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial executions.  
Mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 5–15 October 2009’, 15 October 2009. 
Mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 5–15 October 2009, 15 October 2009, OHCHR 
website, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/executions/docs/PressStatement_SumEx_DRC.pdf, 
accessed 19 November 2013. 
242 See, for example, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2014/698, 25 September 2014, paras 50-4; Report 
of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, S/2014/956, 30 December 2014, paras 32-3; Report of the Secretary-General 
on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
S/2014/956, 10 March 2015, paras 40-4. 
243 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2014/157, 5 March 2014; Report of the Secretary-General on the 
United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
S/2014/450, 30 June 2014; Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Peace, 
Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region, 
S/2014/697, 24 September 2014; Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization 
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2014/698, 25 September 2014. 
244 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2014/956, 10 March 2015, para 41. 
245 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo submitted pursuant to paragraph 39 of Security Council resolution 
2147 (2014), S/2014/957, 30 December 2014, para 30. 
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In April 2013 the Security Council authorised a UN Multidimensional Integrated 
Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) with ‘robust rules of engagement’ to implement a 
POC mandate as well as the ‘extension of State authority’. 246  It also authorized French 
forces operating alongside the mission to intervene to support it when needed.247   In April 
2014 the Security Council authorized the deployment of the Multidimensional Integrated 
Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA).248  The protection of 
civilians is described as the mission’s ‘utmost priority’ with other initial tasks included as 
‘support for the transition process; facilitating humanitarian assistance; promotion and 
protection of human rights; support for justice and the rule of law; and disarmament, 
demobilization, reintegration and repatriation processes.’249  French forces are also mandated 
to provide the mission with operational support, ‘within the limits of their capacities and 
areas of deployment’ and the mission is also requested to ‘coordinate its operations with 
those of the African Union’.250  UN and AU forces are similarly involved in proactive combat 
operations with Islamist rebels in Somalia.251  In July 2015 the UN stabilization mission in 
Haiti (MINUSTAH) deployed a ‘departmental brigade for operations and intervention’ in one 
the most violent neighbourhoods in Port-au-Prince, the capital city.252   
                                                 
246 Security Council Resolution 2100 of 25 April 2013. 
247 Ibid., para 18.  ‘Authorises French troops, within the limits of their capacities and areas of 
deployment, to use all necessary means, from the commencement of the activities of MINUSMA until 
the end of MINUSMA’s mandate as authorised in this resolution, to intervene in support of elements 
of MINUSMA when under imminent and serious threat upon request of the Secretary-General.’ 
248 Security Council Resolution 2149 of 10 April 2014. 
249 Ibid. para 30, 31 and 32.  See also UN Peacekeeping Homepage, MINUSCA, ‘United Nations 
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusca/, accessed 5 May 2015. 
250 Ibid. 
251Security Council Resolutions 2111 of 24 July 2013 and 2093 of 6 March 2013.  See also Letter 
dated 14 October 2013 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, 
S/2013/606, 14 October 2013.  Foreign Policy, ‘UN Declares war on Al-Shabab’, 16 October 2013.  
See also Ashley Deeks, ‘How Does the UN Define ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’?’ 
Lawfare(blog), October 21, 2013, available at www.lawfareblog.com/2013/10/how-does-the-un-
define-direct-participation-in-hostilities/ accessed 5 May 2015. 
252 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, S/2015/667, 
31 August 2015, paras 19-20.  ‘The brigade, consisting of 225 officers from the twenty-fifth police 
promotion, was deployed for its first major operation on 11 July in the area of La Saline, Port-au-
Prince . . . A military operation, launched in December 2014 and completed in May 2015, eliminated a 
gang-controlled “buffer zone” between two communities in the Simon Pelé neighbourhood in Delmas 
(West). As at 1 July, the military component had put in place its new rapid reaction force posture with 
countrywide reach. There has been no requirement to date for its deployment.’  
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Labbe and Boutellis argue that ‘this reﬂects a more general trend towards these so-called 
“parallel” deployments of UN and (robust) national or regional non-UN forces –such as from 
the EU – from the DRC to Chad and Côte d’Ivoire.’253 They note that UN forces now find 
themselves operating in contexts where they both receive and give support to non-UN forces 
– both national and international – who are actively engaged in offensive military 
operations.254   
 
As discussed in Part II of this thesis, it is generally accepted that States are under an 
obligation to respect and ensure respect for the provisions of international human rights law 
to anyone within their power or effective control, even if not situated within their territory, so 
long as the action or inaction can be attributed to the State and not the UN.255  The EU also 
explicitly accepts both international human rights law’s extraterritorial application and that it 
may be concurrently applicable with IHL.256  The UN’s HRDDP means that it is required to 
monitor non-UN forces for compliance with international human rights law and actively 
intervene to draw attention to violations, while ensuring that its own forces lead by 
example.257  This could lead to situations where a UN peacekeeping mission was operating 
alongside national and regional forces, who were both required to abide by international 
human rights law, without accepting that its own forces had similar legally-binding and 
judicially reviewable obligations.   
 
Where the UN becomes a party to a conflict, it is accepted that it loses its legal protection and 
becomes bound by IHL.  But if force is merely being used pursuant to a POC mandate, it 
                                                 
253 Jeremie Labbe and Arthur Boutellis ‘Peace operations by proxy: implications for humanitarian 
action of UN peacekeeping partnerships with non-UN security forces’, International Review of the Red 
Cross, Volume 95 Number 891/892 Autumn/Winter 2013, p.543. 
254 Ibid. 
255 Al-Skeini and Others v. UK, Appl. No. 55721/07, Judgment (Grand Chamber) 7 July 2011.    
256 Frederik Naert ‘Observance of international humanitarian law by forces under the command of the 
European Union’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 95 No. 891/892 Autumn/Winter 2013, 
pp.637-43. 
257 Human Rights Due Diligence Policy 2013, para 2.   
328 
 
 
seems that this could be regulated by the provisions of international human rights law.  The 
stipulations contained within this framework on the use of force and the treatment of people 
deprived of their liberty appear compatible with the type of ‘innovative measures’ that have 
been developed by the UN mission in the DRC, and also with the defensive use of force that 
occurred during operation protect civilians in Côte d’Ivoire.  There does not, therefore, 
appear to be any practical reason why the UN could not stipulate that these provisions are 
applicable in the majority of its operations, unless and until IHL becomes applicable.  The 
bigger obstacle may be the concerns, discussed in Chapter Five, about the nature and extent 
of the UN’s human rights obligations and how it can be held accountable for these.  This will 
be discussed further in the following chapter and the conclusions of this thesis.
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Chapter 7 
Acting with moral courage? The UN missions to Darfur and South Sudan 
 
Introduction 
 
There are currently three UN peacekeeping missions in the territory of the former Sudan: the 
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), the African 
Union/United Nations Hybrid mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and the United Nations Interim 
Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), all of which developed out of the previous UN Mission 
in Sudan (UNMIS), created in 2005.1  At the time of writing, South Sudan is experiencing a 
widespread ongoing conflict, which has killed tens of thousands.2  The conflict in Darfur has 
been ongoing since 2003 and has resulted in over 300,000 deaths, both from direct violence 
and conflict-related causes.3  
 
The OIOS Protection Evaluation 2014 was particularly critical of UNAMID and UNMISS, 
which it described as ‘frequently weak’ and ‘less than effective’.4  UNAMID has also been 
criticized for manipulating its own reports to cover up egregious violations of IHL and 
international human rights law by the Sudanese armed forces’5 and even providing transport 
                                                 
1 UNMIS was created by UN Security Council Resolution 1590 of 24 March 2005. See also Resolution 
1547 of 11 June 2004 which created the UN Advance Mission to Sudan.   
2 The Council of Foreign Relations, Global Conflict Tracker, puts the death toll between December 
2013 and April 2016 at around 50,000.  http://www.cfr.org/global/global-conflict-
tracker/p32137#!/conflict/civil-war-in-south-sudan, accessed 27 April 2016.  See also Statement by the 
President of the Security Council, S/PRST/2014/26, 15 December 2014, which stated that tens of 
thousands had been killed. 
3 The Lancet, ‘Patterns of mortality rates in Darfur conflict’, September 2010.  This estimated with 95 
per cent confidence that the excess number of deaths is between 178,258 and 461,520 (with a mean of 
298,271), with 80 per cent of these deaths due to disease. The number 300,000 is usually used by the 
UN and aid agencies, although supporters and opponents of intervention often claim much lower or 
higher figures.  
4 OIOS Protection Evaluation 2014, paras 45 and 70.   
5 Foreign Policy, Why is the U.N. soft-pedalling its criticism of Sudan?, 4 August 2011; Foreign 
Policy, Report, ‘They just stood watching’ 7 April 2014; Foreign Policy, ‘See no evil speak no evil: 
UN covers up Sudan´s bad behaviour in Darfur’, 21 November 2014; Guardian, ‘Don’t abandon 
Darfur, UN whistleblower says’, 19 January 2015; International Crisis Group, The Chaos in Darfur, 
Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°110, 22 April 2015; Human Rights Watch, Men with no mercy: rapid 
support forces attacks against civilians in Darfur, New York: HRW, 9 September 2015.   
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for a senior government official under indictment by the ICC.6  The missions have, however, 
sheltered hundreds of thousands of civilians on their bases many of whom would otherwise 
almost certainly been killed.7  They have also been operating in conditions where host State 
consent has been grudging at best and where senior government officials are accused of 
responsibility for serious violations against civilians.  
 
This chapter contextualizes those developments.  It will be shown that, as a matter of policy, 
if not law, the UN accepts responsibility for protecting the lives of people who have sought 
shelter in its own bases, which provides a contrast to the actions and inactions of UN 
peacekeeping soldiers in Rwanda and Srebrenica.8  Where additional guidance may be 
helpful is in delineating the extent of its obligations towards them.  When it adopted its 
Human Rights Up Front Policy, in 2013, the UN declared that it would ‘take a principled 
stance’ and ‘act with moral courage’ in making ‘human rights and the protection of civilians’ 
a ‘system-wide core responsibility’9  Its missions in Sudan show that there remains a 
considerable gap in this regard between policy and practice. 
 
A. Sudan (UNMIS)  
 
UNMIS was originally envisioned as an observer and verification force,10 building on the 
work of a political mission established to monitor and assist implementation of the 
                                                 
6 Amnesty International, UN aids Sudanese official wanted for war crimes, 13 January 2011. 
7 Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan, S/2014/821, 18 November 2014; and Report of the 
Secretary-General on UNAMID, S/2013/607, of 14 October 2013, paras 14-6. 
8 Lessons Learned Note on Civilians Seeking Protection at UN Compounds, Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support, 2014. 
9 Human Rights Up Front, http://www.un.org/sg/rightsupfront/, accessed 30 July 2015.   
10 For background papers on the establishment of the mission see Report of the Secretary-General on 
the Sudan pursuant to paragraphs 6, 13 and 16 of Security Council resolution 1556 (2004), paragraph 
15 of resolution 1564 (2004) and paragraph 17 of resolution 1574 (2004), S/2005/10, 7 January 2005; 
Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan pursuant to paragraphs 6, 13 and 16 of Security Council 
resolution 1556 (2004), paragraph 15 of Security Council resolution 1564 (2004) and paragraph 17 of 
Security Council resolution 1574 (2004), S/2005/68, 4 February 2005; Report of the Secretary-General 
on the Sudan pursuant to paragraphs 6, 13 and 16 of Security Council resolution 1556 (2004), 
paragraph 15 of Security Council resolution 1564 (2004) and paragraph 17 of Security Council 
resolution 1574 (2004), S/2005/140, 4 March 2005; Monthly report of the Secretary-General on 
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Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).11  This brought an end to the second Sudanese civil 
war in January 2005, 12 after a conflict that is estimated to have killed around two-and-a-half 
million people and displaced between four and five million from their homes.13   
 
The Secretary General’s report, in January 2005, that proposed UNMIS’s creation, contained 
two references to POC.14  Under the heading ‘Security aspects’, it stated that the mission 
would ‘take action to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence within the 
capability of United Nations formed military units.’15  There was no further elaboration 
provided on this task, although the report contained a detailed outline of how the military 
component would execute its observation and verification role.16  The second reference was 
in a stand-alone section on ‘Protection’, which  referred to the ‘protection provisions’ of IHL 
                                                 
Darfur, S/2005/240, 12 April 2005; Monthly report of the Secretary-General on Darfur, S/2005/378, 9 
June 2005.  
11 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sudan and the 
Sudan People’s Liberation/Sudan People’s Liberation Army, 
https://unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/UNMIS/Documents/General/cpa-en.pdf, accessed 10 October 
2015.  The CPA was signed by the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Army/Movement (SPLA/M) and led to the formation of an Autonomous Government of South Sudan.  
The CPA also provided for a referendum, which was held on schedule in January 2011, with almost 99 
per cent of participants voting for independence. 
12 For an overview of the conflict see: Robert Collins, A History of Modern Sudan, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008; Douglas H. Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars, 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press/ The International Africa Institute, 2003; Andrew S. Natsios, 
Sudan, South Sudan, and Darfur: What Everyone Needs to Know, Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2012; Francis M. Deng, Sudan at the Brink: Self-Determination and National Unity, 
New York: Fordham University Press and the Institute for International Humanitarian Affairs, 2010;  
Jok Madut Jok, War and slavery in Sudan, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001; and 
Jok Madut Jok, Sudan: Race, Religion, and Violence, London: Oneworld Publications 2007.  See also 
David Keen, Complex emergencies, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008, pp.109-16; and Alex De Waal, 
Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa, London: James Currey, 1997, 
pp.86-105. 
13 Ibid.  The modern states of South Sudan and Sudan were part of Egypt under the Muhammad Ali 
Dynasty, later being governed as an Anglo-Egyptian condominium until Sudanese independence was 
achieved in 1956.  Most of the people of southern Sudan are Christian, black Africans and they 
resented being governed by the predominantly Muslim, Arab north.  Revolts against the latter’s rule 
led to two civil wars, the first of which lasted from 1955 – 1972, while second ran from 1983 and 
ended with the CPA of January 2005. The Sudanese government relied heavily on the recruitment of 
proxy forces in Southern Sudan, and the north–south border areas.  Control over the militia groups was 
weak and they carried out a large number of violations of human rights and IHL.  The SPLA also 
suffered a number of splits within its own ranks, actively encouraged by the government of Sudan.   
14 Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan, S/2005/57 of 31 January 2005, para 28.  Mandate 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., paras 45-52.  Military Component.  POC is mentioned in para 46 (f) but with no elaboration. 
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and Security Council resolutions,17 and called on the mission to develop a Sudan-wide 
protection strategy.18  It asserted protection to be the primary responsibility of the national 
authorities and contained no reference to the potential role of international peacekeeping 
soldiers.19   
 
Five days before this report was released, however, the UN also published the findings of the 
International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur.20  This had been established in September 
200421 ‘to investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human 
rights law’ and determine also whether these amounted to acts of genocide.22  It confirmed 
widespread violations and recommended that the Security Council refer the situation to the 
ICC for further investigation.23  The Security Council resolution that led to the establishment 
of UNMIS referred to both reports in its preamble.24 The referral to the ICC was seen as 
particularly significant given the suspicion with which the Court was viewed by some of its 
                                                 
17 Ibid. paras 74-6.  The two Security Council Resolutions referenced are 1265 of 17 September 1999 
and 1296 of 19 April 2000. 
18 Ibid., para 75.  ‘The mission would develop a Sudan-wide protection strategy and work plan 
focusing on the protection of returning populations, host communities and those wishing to remain in 
situations of displacement until a durable solution can be found; civilians in armed conflict, including 
in Darfur and other areas where conflict may continue or erupt; and women, children and vulnerable 
groups of persons.’ 
19 Ibid., para 76. 
20 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-
General, Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004, Geneva, 25 January 
2005. 
21 UN Security Council Resolution 1564, 18 September 2004.  This resolution also threatened Sudan 
with sanctions if it did not ‘comply with its obligations to protect civilians in Darfur’. 
22 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-
General, Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004, Geneva, 25 January 
2005 [Hereinafter Darfur Inquiry 2005], p.1. 
23 Ibid., p.5.  The Security Council agreed to do this by Resolution 1593, of 31 March 2005, which was 
adopted with 11 votes in favour and four abstentions: China, the US, Brazil and Algeria.   
24 UN Security Council Resolution 1590 of 24 March 2005, preamble: ‘Taking note of the Secretary-
General’s reports of 31 January 2005 (S/2005/57), 4 February 2005 (S/2005/68), and 4 March 2005 
(S/2005/140) as well as the report of 25 January 2005 of the International Commission of Inquiry’. 
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permanent members25 and its supporters hailed this as a significant victory in establishing its 
legitimacy.26 
 
Discussion of atrocities in Darfur also dominated the subsequent press briefing.  In the 
presence of Sudan’s representative, the UN Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping 
Operations stressed that ‘the present state of affairs in Darfur was unacceptable’ and that 
‘impunity must end’.27  He also said that:  
 
It must be made clear to those responsible that they would be held 
accountable.  There was a clear recommendation from the International Commission 
of Inquiry on Darfur that the Security Council immediately refer the situation to the 
International Criminal Court, and sanctions must also be kept on the table.28   
 
Against this background, the Council rejected the Secretary General’s recommendation to 
establish UNMIS solely under Chapter VI, specifying that its POC tasks would have a 
Chapter VII mandate.29  POC language appeared in subsequent mission documents, but with 
                                                 
25 See UN Security Council Press Release, ‘Security Council refers situation in Darfur, Sudan, to 
Prosecutor of International Criminal Court’, 31 March 2005.  The US abstained on the resolution 
because although it ‘continued to fundamentally object to the view that the Court should be able to 
exercise jurisdiction over the nationals, including government officials, of States not party to the Rome 
Statute’ it nevertheless supported the establishment of ‘an accountability mechanism for the 
perpetrators of crimes and atrocities in Darfur’.  Russia supported the resolution stating that ‘the 
struggle against impunity was one of the elements of long-term stability in Darfur.  All those 
responsible for grave crimes must be punished, as pointed out in the report of the Commission of 
Inquiry.’ 
26 Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Homepage, ‘A Universal Court with Global Support, 
UN and the ICC Security Council, Res. 1593’, http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=res1593, accessed 20 
October 2015. 
27 See Security Council Meeting, Press Release, SC/8343, 24 March 2005.   
28 Ibid. 
29 UN Security Council Resolution 1590 of 24 March 2005, para 16: ‘Acting under Chapter VII of the 
Charter of the United Nations, (i) Decides that UNMIS is authorized to take the necessary action, in 
the areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to protect United Nations 
personnel, facilities, installations, and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of 
United Nations personnel, humanitarian workers, joint assessment mechanism and assessment and 
evaluation commission personnel, and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of 
Sudan, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence’. 
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little further elaboration or guidance.30  Most of the UNMIS mission reports included a 
section entitled ‘Protection of Civilians’ and UNMIS was the first mission to create a POC 
Office.31  It is clear, however, that the mission saw this in terms of humanitarian ‘rights-
based’ protection, as the following example of a POC activity makes clear: 
 
In coordination with the Protection Working Group in Darfur, the human rights and 
civil affairs sections have undertaken joint missions with AMIS [AU Mission in 
Sudan], the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, IOM [International 
Organization for Migration] and other humanitarian actors to villages and towns 
across Darfur to promote protection of civilians in their own villages. During the 
missions, civilians were made aware of their rights, and were advised on how to 
approach humanitarian organizations for support and help on how to follow up their 
cases with the local authorities. The teams also held discussions with local religious 
and tribal leaders to enlist their support for the protection of civilians, and raised with 
local authorities issues related to extortion and protection money paid by civilians to 
armed militia.32   
 
The limitations of this approach became apparent early in UNMIS’s operations.  In 2006, for 
example, following a series of attacks on civilians by the LRA,33 the Security Council urged 
UNMIS ‘to make full use of its current mandate and capabilities’ to protect civilians against 
                                                 
30 Sudan Unified Mission Plan, United Nations Mission in Sudan, 2005; Guidelines for Troop 
Contributing Countries Deploying Military Units to the United Nations Mission in Sudan, New York: 
DPKO Force Generation Service, May 2005, pp. 30–31; and Rules of Engagement (ROE) for the 
Military Component of the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), 29 April 2005, on file with the 
author. 
31 Victoria Holt and Glyn Taylor, Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operation, 
OCHA/DPKO, United Nations, 2009, p.319 ‘Thus, at the outset POC had two distinct meanings in the 
context of UNMIS: physical protection by the military component as a deemphasized element of their 
activities and, far more prominently, the coordination of UNCT activities by the POC Office.’ 
32 For example, Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan, S/2005/579, 12 September 2005, para 
53.  See also Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan, S/2005/821 of 21 December 2005, paras 
55-7. 
33 For an overview of the LRA’s activities in Sudan see Mareike Schomerus, The Lord’s Resistance 
Army in Sudan: A History and Overview, Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of 
International Studies, 2007. 
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human rights violations and attacks.34  The mission responded that its troops were too thinly 
spread to provide such protection and were ‘only configured for a Chapter VI operation’.35  It 
also noted that the CPA ‘expressly states that the parties to the Agreement would assume full 
responsibility for dealing with foreign armed groups’.36  A similar tension over interpretation 
of the POC mandate was visible in subsequent reports,37culminating in a crisis in Abyei, in 
May 2008, in which a disputed town was burnt to the ground with the displacement of 30,000 
people.38  The US Special Envoy to Sudan openly criticized UNMIS for failing to take more 
robust action while its head of mission responded he had ‘neither the capacity nor the 
mandate’ to do so.39   
 
The following month, the President of the Security Council issued a statement calling on 
UNMIS ‘within its mandate’ and in accordance with this resolution ‘to robustly deploy, as 
appropriate, peacekeeping personnel in and around Abyei to help reduce tensions and prevent 
escalation of conflict in support of implementation of the CPA.’40  The mission report of 
October 2008 stated that: ‘UNMIS is engaging all components of the Mission in the 
development of a comprehensive strategy for the protection of civilians’.41  It also, however, 
urged the Security Council to:  
 
consider holding a thorough debate on provisions related to the protection of civilians 
. . . taking into consideration the public expectations such mandate provisions 
                                                 
34 UN Security Council Resolution 1663 of 24 March 2006, para. 7. 
35 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Resolutions 1653 (2006) and 1663 (2006), S/2006/478 
of 29 June 2006, paras 19-21. 
36 Ibid. 
37 See Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan, S/2006/728 of 12 September 2006; Report of the 
Secretary-General on the Sudan, S/2008/267 of 22 April 2008;  UNMIS Force Commander, End-of-
Assignment Report, UNMIS, 6 April 2008, p. 16. 
38 International Crisis Group, Sudan’s Southern Kordofan Problem: The Next Darfur?, Brussels: ICG, 
21 October 2008. 
39 Sudan Tribune, ‘UN rejects US charge about south Sudan’, 18 June 2008.  See also UN Security 
Council Resolution, 1812 of 30 April 2008, para 6.  This had ‘urged UNMIS to consult with the 
parties, and to deploy, as appropriate, personnel to the Abyei region, including areas of Kordofan’. 
40 Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/2008/24 of 24 June 2008. 
41 Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan, S/2008/662, of 20 October 2008, para 58. 
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generate. Clear guidelines need to be developed that can be translated into realistic 
rules of engagement for peacekeepers equipped with the requisite capacity.42 
 
In July 2009 the mission report stated that: ‘Given the rising tensions related to seasonal 
migration in the Abyei region, UNMIS conducted two training workshops . . . on issues of 
protection of civilians and that of children’. 43  The report also stated that: ‘UNMIS 
movements north of the Road Map Area remain restricted, thus denying the Mission any 
situational awareness with regard to deployment of forces by both sides just outside the Road 
Map Area.’44  A POC Fact Sheet published in the same month described the mission’s 
objectives and achievements purely in terms of humanitarian monitoring and advocacy with 
no reference, whatsoever, to how UNMIS could provide physical protection.45   
 
The section on POC was omitted entirely from the October report,46 but in January 2010 it 
was reported that: ‘UNMIS is currently developing a mission-wide protection strategy 
adapted to its mandate and its complex operating environment.’47  The report of April 2010 
contained a far more detailed account of the mission’s POC activities and strategy, stating 
this was based on ‘a three-tier approach’ which included providing immediate physical 
security, securing the delivery of humanitarian assistance and deterrence of violence.48  It 
further stated that: ‘One of the key ways in which this protection strategy is translated into 
                                                 
42 Ibid., para 80. 
43 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sudan, S/2009/357, 14 July 2009, 
para 67. 
44 Ibid., para 14. 
45 The Role of UNMIS Protection, UNMIS Protection of Civilians Section, 9 July 2009.  It described its 
role as: ‘working with all protection actors such as UN actors that have protection mandates, including 
UNHCR, UNICEF, and UNMIS Human Rights, as well as INGOs, ICRC and Community Based 
Organizations. POC works closely with humanitarian actors to identify and address protection 
concerns that impact people in Sudan. We work together with these humanitarian actors to develop a 
coordinated work plan for Sudan that outlines protection priorities, actions/programs and those 
responsible for them.’   
46 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Sudan, S/2009/545, 21 
October 2009. 
47 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Sudan, S/2010/31, 19 January 
2010, para 70. 
48 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Sudan, S/2010/168, 5 April 
2010, paras 63-9. 
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UNMIS operations is through increased patrolling and extended UNMIS presence in remote 
potential hotspots in Southern Sudan.’49   
 
This set the tone for the mission’s subsequent reports with POC emerging as a substantive 
and mainstream mission activity.50  One reason for this greater clarity may have been that 
UNMIS began to focus increasingly on South Sudan as separate missions were formed to 
deal with the then more challenging situations in Abyei and Darfur.51  Protection task forces 
were established in each state of South Sudan in November 2010 and these worked closely 
with the Southern Sudan protection cluster, ‘to identify threats to populations and determine 
interventions.’52  
 
The final report before the mission’s closure, in mid-2011, included recommendations that a 
new mission could play ‘to facilitate peace consolidation in the new State of South Sudan.’53  
                                                 
49 Ibid., paras 66-7.  ‘In response to major conflicts, including the mid-January clashes between Dinka 
and Nuer which resulted in 50 reported deaths and at least 11,000 persons displaced, both local 
authorities and UNMIS have increased interventions and patrols . . In January 2010, the UNMIS 
military component initiated pre-emptive patrolling in 13 areas in Southern Sudan where potential 
inter-communal violence had been identified, in order to provide a deterrent presence. In February 
2010, UNMIS operations were extended across the Nile in Upper Nile State, including long range 
patrols into the Shilluk Kingdom and remote areas near the north-south border. UNMIS pre-emption 
measures recently led to the prevention of an outbreak of violence, following a long range patrol to 
Gemmaiza, Central Equatoria State. In addition, a Joint Monitoring Team’s rapid response to reports 
of clashes in Abiemnom helped to de-escalate tensions in the area.’ 
50 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Sudan, S/2010/388, 19 July 
2010; Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Sudan, S/2010/528, 14 
October 2010; Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Sudan, 
S/2010/681, 31 December 2010. 
51 The Security Council subsequently passed Security Council Resolution 1828 of 31 July 2008 for the 
hybrid mission to Darfur (UNAMID) and Resolution 1990 of 27 June 2011, creating a separate 
mission for Abyei (UNISFA).  UNAMID will be discussed in more detail below.  The UNISFA 
mandate was renewed by resolutions 2024 of 14 December 2011; Resolution 2032 of 22 December 
2011.  See also Presidential Statements of 6 March 2012 and 12 April 2012; and S/PRST/2012/19 of 
31 August 2012.  For more details on UNISFA see UNISFA Homepage, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unisfa/, accessed 18 June 2015.  UNISFA was also given 
a Chapter VII mandate, tasked with monitoring the flashpoint border between north and south and 
facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid, and authorized to use force in protecting civilians and 
humanitarian workers in Abyei.  
52 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Sudan, S/2011/239, 12 April 
2011, paras 62 and 64. The Protection Cluster was co-chaired by the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC).  Several former 
UNMIS staff members interviewed by this author between 2011 and 2015 have commented that some 
of the POC structures created worked better on paper than in reality, but they at least reflected a 
growing sense of the importance given to the issue within the mission. 
53 Special report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan, S/2011/314, 17 May 2011, para 2. 
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It proposed that POC would be ‘one of the core activities of the mission and the country 
team’54 and recommended that the mission should be provided with Chapter VII 
authorization.55  It also stated that the protection of civilians was ‘first and foremost the 
sovereign responsibility of the Government’ and that most of the mission’s POC activities 
would be capacity-building and providing ‘advice’ to the new police and army on ‘the 
general conduct of operations in accordance with international humanitarian law and human 
rights law’.56  UN troops would also be ‘deployed to areas at high risk to deter conflict’ and 
that the use of force would be authorized only ‘as a last resort to protect civilians in imminent 
threat of physical danger’ within the mission’s area of deployment and capability’.57   
 
UNMISS’s experiences of attempting to put these strategies into practice in South Sudan will 
be discussed below, following an account of how the UN attempted to deal with the human 
rights and humanitarian crisis in Darfur. 
 
B. Darfur 
 
The current conflict in Darfur is often dated as beginning in February 2003 when two loosely 
allied rebel groups took up arms against the government of Sudan.58  This responded with an 
                                                 
54 Ibid., para 44. 
55 Ibid., para 41(r) ‘To provide, within capabilities, physical protection to civilians under imminent 
threat of physical danger, including through the use of force as a last resort when Government security 
services are unable to provide such security.’ 
56 Ibid., para 44. 
57 Ibid., paras 45 and 46. 
58 For an overview see: Julie Flint and Alex De Waal, Darfur: a short history of a long war, London: 
Zed books, 2005; Gérard Prunier,  Darfur: A 21st Century Genocide, Third Edition, Ithaca NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2008; Richard Cockett, Sudan: Darfur and the Failure of an African State, 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010; International Crisis Group Darfur’s New Security Reality, 
Africa Report No 134, Brussels: ICG, 26 November 2007; International Crisis Group, ‘Darfur: The 
Failure To Protect’, Africa Report N°. 89, Nairobi/ Brussels: ICG, 2005; International Crisis Group, 
‘Getting the UN into Darfur’, Africa Briefing N°. 43, Nairobi /Brussels: ICG, 2006; Sara Pantuliano, 
Understanding Conflict in the Sudan: An Overview. Washington DC: The World Bank Group 2004; 
Sara Pantuliano, Strategic Priorities and Key Challenges to Address Conflict and its Consequences in 
Darfur. London: DFID, 2005.  Darfur was incorporated into Sudan by Anglo-Egyptian forces in 1916, 
having previously existed as an independent Sultanate for several hundred years. It is a complex mix of 
more than 36 ethnic groups, of which the Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit are the most significant.  
Tensions have existed for generations, between the nomadic herders, often identified as Arabs, and 
sedentary farmers, often identified as indigenous, over access to water and grazing land.  Ethnicity is 
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aerial bombardment campaign against communities suspected of sympathizing with the 
rebels and supporting ground attacks by an Arab militia, pejoratively nicknamed the 
Janjaweed.59  Government and Janjaweed forces are accused of committing numerous 
violations, including mass killing, looting and systematic rape of the non-Arab population, as 
they burned and destroyed hundreds of villages throughout the region.60    
 
The AU initially led the international efforts to resolve the crisis and, in July 2004, it 
dispatched 60 military observers and 310 protection troops in Darfur to monitor and observe 
a ‘humanitarian ceasefire’ agreed that April.61  The AU mission in Sudan (AMIS) was 
subsequently expanded in October 2004, bringing it to a total of 3,320 personnel.62  In June 
2004 the UN also established a small political mission to assist the mediation efforts.63  In 
May 2006 the AU brokered the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) between the government of 
Sudan and one rebel faction inside the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), which was to be 
                                                 
not in itself clear-cut, given the long history of racial mixing between ‘indigenous’ peoples and the 
‘Arabs’, who are distinguished by cultural-linguistic attachment as much as race.  Armed raids on rich 
agricultural areas and skirmishes with rival groups of Arab nomadic herders were historically common 
occurrences in Darfur and have become more so as global warming has increased desertification in the 
region.  These were generally resolved through traditional methods of conflict resolution, which began 
to break down in the 1980s and 1990s as Darfur became a theatre in a wider set of conflicts, between 
the government of Sudan and the rebels of South Sudan; between rival forces in neighbouring Chad; as 
a staging ground during the conflict between Chad and Libya; and between different factions within 
Sudan’s own National Islamic Front. Arms were channelled into Darfur, and proxy militias backed, by 
different power-brokers, making these localized struggles increasingly deadly.  The settled farmers did 
not traditionally have the same degree of military organization as the nomadic groups, but, as drought-
stricken livestock herders encroached, they became increasingly associated with the rebellion, fighting 
to retain what they saw as ‘their’ land.     
59 Ibid.  The term ‘Janjaweed’ was used for the first time in 1989 to denote groups of Arab camel 
herders engaged in militia fighting. 
60 Darfur Inquiry 2005.  See also: Amnesty International, Sudan: Immediate Steps To Protect Civilians 
and Internally Displaced Persons in Darfur, public statement, London: Amnesty International, 29 
August 2003; Amnesty International, Crying Out for Safety, London: Amnesty International; 5 October 
2006; Human Rights Watch, Darfur in Flames. Atrocities in Western Sudan, 2 April 2004; Human 
Rights Watch, Darfur: Arrest War Criminals, not Aid Workers, press release, 31 May 2005; Human 
Rights Watch, Targeting the Fur: Mass Killings in Darfur, 21 January 2005; Human Rights Watch, 
Darfur: Aid Workers Under Threat, press release, 5 April 2005; Lee Feinstein, Darfur and Beyond: 
What is Needed to Prevent Mass Atrocities, Council Special Report No. 22, New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations Press, 2007.  
61 For details see UNMIS, United Nations Mission in Sudan, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmis/background.shtml, accessed 1 October 2015. 
62 Ibid.  This included 2,341 military personnel, 815 civilian police and complementary civilian 
personnel. 
63 Security Council Resolution 1547 of 11 June 2004. 
340 
 
 
overseen by AMIS.64  Other groups refused to sign, however, and continued fighting.65  
AMIS was attacked a number of times and several of its members killed.66  It was also widely 
criticized for its weakness and failure to protect civilians.67   
 
International outcry about the violations in Darfur had led to the formation of a large 
advocacy movement, particularly in the US, calling for ‘humanitarian intervention’ from 
2004 onwards.68  The Darfur crisis also coincided both with the aftermath of the invasion of 
Iraq in 2003 and the debates that led to a reference to a ‘responsibility to protect’ being 
incorporated into the UN General Assembly World Summit Outcome Document in 2005.69  
The US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, officially accused the Sudanese government of 
genocide in 200470 and this description was codified into US law by the Darfur Peace and 
Accountability Act in 2006.71  Both US President George Bush and British Prime Minister 
Blair also made a number of comments which implied they might take unilateral military 
action to protect civilians if the Security Council did not approve the deployment of a strong 
peacekeeping mission.72  The Sudanese government responded that supporters of intervention 
                                                 
64 Darfur Peace Agreement, 5 May 2006, Article 25 ‘Strengthening the ceasefire monitoring and 
verification mechanisms’, http://www.un.org/zh/focus/southernsudan/pdf/dpa.pdf, accessed 1 October 
2015. 
65 For an overview of these negotiations see London Review of Books, Alex de Waal, ‘I will not sign’, 
30 November 2006.  The SLA/MM faction led by Minni Minnawi signed the agreement while the 
faction led by Abdel Wahid Mohammed Ahmed El-Nur (SLA-AW) refused to agree to its terms.  De 
Waal, who was closely involved in the talks, believes that the vast international pressure to get an 
agreement led to the imposition of ‘diplomatic deadlines’, and that a better agreement could have been 
negotiated, if the participants had been given more time.   
66 For a brief description of these problems see, for example: The Washington Post, ‘African Union 
Force Low on Money, Supplies and Morale’, May 13, 2007; and Nick Grongo, ‘Darfur: The 
International Community's Failure to Protect’, Journal of African Affairs, Oxford Journals, Vol. 
105, Issue 421, October 2006, pp.621-31.   
67 Ibid. 
68 For contrasting views see: Mamdani, Mahmood, Saviours and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the 
War on Terror, London: Verso, 2009; and Don Cheadle and John Prendergast, Not On Our Watch: 
The Mission to End Genocide in Darfur and Beyond, New York: Hyperion, 2007. 
69 Summit Outcome Document, General Assembly Resolution 60/1, of A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005. 
70 BBC News, ‘Powell declares genocide in Sudan’, 9 September 2004. 
71 Darfur Peace and Accountability Act, 2006, H.R. 3127/S. 1462.  This was signed into law by 
President Bush in October 2006.  Its main provisions are to: impose travel bans and asset freezes on 
individuals determined by the President to be complicit in atrocities in Darfur; authorize US assistance 
to strengthen and expand AMIS; impose sanctions; and urge the administration to deny the government 
of Sudan access to oil revenues.  
72 For contrasting views, for and against western military intervention, see Mahmood, 2009, pp.48-71; 
Alex Bellamy, ‘Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian 
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were vastly exaggerating the casualty figures to make the case for another unilateral western 
military invasion.73 
 
In August 2006 the Security Council passed a resolution extending the mandate of UNMIS 
into Darfur and ‘requesting’ that Sudan accept this mission’s deployment.74  The resolution 
contained an oblique reference to R2P’s adoption in the Summit Outcome Document’ in its 
preamble – the first and only such reference the Security Council has ever made when 
mandating a peacekeeping mission.75  In urging Sudan to accept the deployment the US 
Ambassador, John Bolton, referred to the situation in Darfur as an ongoing genocide and 
demanded Sudan’s cooperation.76  In a slightly more conciliatory presentation, the UK 
representative stated that the resolution had been drafted:  
 
to be as acceptable to the Sudan as possible.  There was, for example, no reference to 
the International Criminal Court in the text.  Although the resolution contained 
Chapter VII elements, it was not under Chapter VII in its entirety.  The resolution 
                                                 
Intervention after Iraq’, Ethics & International Affairs Vol. 19, Issue 2, pp.31–54, September 2005; 
and Conor Foley, The Thin Blue Line: how humanitarianism went to war, London: Verso, 2010, pp. 8-
13.  The view that the US and British governments were using deadlock at the Security Council as an 
excuse to issue bellicose statements without having to follow them through was bolstered by a number 
of apparently contradictory briefings issued at the time.  For example, in the Guardian, ‘Blair wants 
no-fly zone enforced over Darfur’, 28 March 2007, it was reported that the British Prime Minister was 
considering a plan to bomb the Sudanese air force although the Ministry of Defence issued a statement 
on the same day stating that: ‘There are absolutely no plans for any UK military action at all in Sudan 
or the Darfur region of Sudan.’ 
73 See for example, Islamweb English, ‘Al-Bashir rejects Darfur genocide’, 29 November 2006.  Al 
Bashir said there was no humanitarian crisis in Darfur and accused Western countries of inflating 
statistics to justify a military intervention.  He is quoted as saying: ‘The figure of 200,000 dead is false 
and the number of dead is not even 9,000. All the figures have been falsified and the child mortality 
rate in Darfur does not exceed that in Khartoum’. 
http://www.islamweb.net/emainpage/articles/137023/newguest.php, accessed 22 June 2015. 
74 UN Security Council Resolution 1706 of 31 August 2006, adopted by 12 votes in favour with none 
against and three abstentions.   
75 Ibid., preamble: ‘Recalling its previous resolutions 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security, 1502 
(2003) on the protection of humanitarian and United Nations personnel, 1612 (2005) on children and 
armed conflict, and 1674 (2006) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, which reaffirms inter 
alia the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 United Nations World Summit outcome 
document’. 
76 UN Security Council Media Release, SC/8821, 31 August 2006.  Bolton stated that: ‘It was 
imperative to act to stop the violence in Darfur. Every day of delay only extended the genocide.  He 
expected full cooperation and support of the Government of the Sudan for the new United Nations 
force.  Failure to cooperate would undermine the Peace Agreement.’ 
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also stated that the Council remained committed to the sovereignty and independence 
of the Sudan.77   
 
Eleven days later, in a presentation before the Security Council, Sudan rejected both the 
resolution and the way in which it had been drafted, saying that it was based on ‘flawed 
speculation’ about the situation in Darfur.78  Russia and China indicated that they would veto 
a deployment without host state consent and the resolution was withdrawn.79  This marked 
the first time in history that a UN peacekeeping mission has been authorized but subsequently 
failed to deploy.80  In its absence, the mandate of AMIS was extended for another year and, in 
July 2007, following intensive negotiations a new AU/UN hybrid operation in Darfur 
(UNAMID) was authorised,81 with a mandate, which has since been renewed annually.82 
 
The trade-offs required to get agreement led to some watering down of the text, and a 
commitment to a ‘mostly African character’ when selecting mission personnel and troop 
contributing countries.83   Nevertheless, POC was listed as a top priority for the mission and 
the US representative on the Security Council emphasized that:  
 
the Council is entrusting UNAMID, its force commander and its personnel with 
carrying out its mandate using the full range of its authorities. UNAMID has the 
                                                 
77 Ibid. 
78 UN Security Council, 5520th meeting, 11 September 2006, S/PV.5520.   See also UN News: 
Secretary-General tells Security Council ‘it is time to act’ in Darfur, as Council meets in wake of 
renewed fighting, 11 September 2006. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Foreign Policy, ‘Ten Worst Security Council Resolutions Ever’, 21 March 2010. 
81 UN Security Council Resolution 1769 of 31 July 2007.  It consists of 19,555 troops and 19 Formed 
Police Units (FPUs), although it was slow to reach full strength.  
82 UN Security Council Resolutions 1828 of 31 July 2008; 1881 of 30 July 2009; 1935 of 30 July 
2010; 2003 of 29 July 2011; 2063 of 31 July 2012; 2113, of 30 July 2013; 2173 of 27 August 2014, 
and Resolution 2233 of 29 July 2015. 
83 Holt and Taylor, 2009, p.343.  They note that references to sanctions were dropped from the text and 
that a proposed ‘authorization to collect and seize arms’ became the less robust task of ‘monitoring 
arms that are present in Darfur in violation of peace agreements’. 
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authority under Chapter VII to use force to prevent armed attacks, to protect 
civilians.84   
 
A Secretary General’s Planning Directive of March 2006 identified POC and supporting the 
DPA as the mission’s two strategic objectives,85 which was reflected in the language of the 
mandate.86  This effectively aligned the UN with the Sudanese government and the one rebel 
faction that signed the agreement, against those rebel groups who did not accept its terms.87  
There was considerable discussion of the POC mandate during the mission planning process 
and humanitarian actors initially lobbied for a ‘strengthening’ of the mandate, urging that the 
stipulation ‘from imminent harm’ be removed from the formulation, ‘in order to reflect a 
wider conception of protection of civilians’.88   
 
In February 2009 UNAMID’s first mission directive defined protection as: ‘All activities 
aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter 
and spirit of the relevant bodies of law (i.e. international humanitarian law; human rights law; 
refugee law)’.89  It also outlined three types of POC: preventive protection, immediate 
response protection, and follow-up protection90 as well as identifying the military and civilian 
                                                 
84 UN Security Council Meeting of 31 July 2007, S/PV.5727.  
85 Darfur: Draft Framework Plan for a Possible Transition to a United Nations Operation, 2 June 
2006.  See also Report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union 
Commission on the Hybrid Operation in Darfur, S/2007/307/Rev.1 of 5 June 2007;  Report of the 
Secretary-General on Darfur, proposing the establishment on UNAMID, S/2007/462, of 27 July 2007; 
and Report of the Secretary-General on the deployment of UNAMID, S/2007/517, of 30 August 2007. 
86 UN Security Council Resolution 1769 of 31 July 2007, para 15: ‘Acting under Chapter VII of the 
Charter of the United Nations: (a) decides that UNAMID is authorized to take the necessary action, in 
the areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities in order to: (i) protect its 
personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, and to ensure the security and freedom of movement 
of its own personnel and humanitarian workers, (ii) support early and effective implementation of the 
Darfur Peace Agreement, prevent the disruption of its implementation and armed attacks, and protect 
civilians, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Sudan.’ 
87 Opposition to the DPA had also sparked new waves of violence between various rebel factions.  See, 
for example, The UN Secretary-General’s Monthly Report on Darfur, S/2006/764, of 26 September 
2006, which reported that SLA-Minawi elements had attacked villages in North Darfur in July, killing 
at least 100 civilians and displacing 20,000 people from their homes. 
88 Holt and Taylor, 2009, p.348. 
89 UNAMID, Mission Directive No. 1, Mission Directive on the Protection of Civilians in Darfur. 23 
February 2009. 
90 Ibid.  Long-term protection is explicitly excluded as the document states that it: ‘deals exclusively 
with required immediate response to protect civilians under imminent threat, in order to bridge the gap 
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‘protection actors’ within the mission.91  It then listed a series of ‘most frequent grave 
violations against civilians in Darfur’, and alongside each ‘immediate protection’ category 
identified the responsibility of each ‘protection actor’.92  Holt and Taylor have noted that this 
approach was ‘problematic’ and ‘not a substitute for a coherent strategy.’ 93 
 
It prescribes mechanistic responses to incidents without the guidance needed to 
enable on-site military or police commanders to make context-sensitive judgements 
regarding the most appropriate action. In some cases, such as the response to 
offensive over flights, it does not account for the known limits of mission capacity 
(UNAMID has no air defence system). In others, such as violence between two or 
more parties, it fails to adequately acknowledge the political and security 
consequences that could result from the mission’s use of force to protect civilians 
against a belligerent, especially the Sudanese Armed Forces.94  
 
Security conditions actually worsened after UNAMID assumed authority at the end of 2007, 
with almost daily attacks on civilians and aid workers during 2008.95  The mission did take 
some actions such as providing escorts to people collecting firewood, and guarding the 
delivery of humanitarian assistance, as well as investigating ceasefire violations and 
                                                 
between standard rules and regulations of [UNAMID military and police] and the identified need for 
explicit guidance on how to respond in the event of a specific protection incident.’ 
91 Ibid.  These were: ‘the military, police, Humanitarian Recovery Development and Liaison Section, 
child protection, human rights, and Civil Affairs components, along with UNHCR, UNICEF, UNDP, 
OCHA, and WFP.’   
92 Ibid. 
93 Holt and Taylor, 2009, p.183.   
94 Ibid.  They further state that: ‘This is not to suggest that UNAMID should never take such action, 
but rather that this approach is unlikely to engender a change in the mission’s response to POC 
incidents in the absence of a realistic assessment of the context in which the ‘directed actions’ are to 
take place.’ 
95 See Report of the Secretary-General on the deployment of UNAMID, S/2008/98, of 14 February 
2008; Report of the Secretary-General on the deployment of UNAMID, S/2008/249, of 14 April 2008; 
Report of the Secretary-General on the deployment of UNAMID, S/2008/304, of 9 May 2008; Report 
of the Secretary-General on the deployment of UNAMID, S/2008/400, of 17 June 2008; Report of the 
Secretary-General on the deployment of UNAMID, S/2008/558, of 18 August 2008; Report of the 
Secretary-General on the deployment of UNAMID, S/2008/659, of 17 October 2008; Report of the 
Secretary-General on the Deployment of the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in 
Darfur, S/2008/781 of 12 December 2008. 
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supporting local conflict mediation.96  However, it was slow to reach its authorized strength 
due to a combination of obstructionism by the Sudanese government and a reluctance of 
troop contributing countries to supply it with air assets.97  By June 2009 the mission was still 
only 68 per cent of its authorized strength and none of the eight attack helicopters and 18 
military utility helicopters had been deployed.98  UNAMID has also been the target of serious 
attacks by rebel groups opposed to the DPA.99  By June 2015 it had suffered 212 fatal 
casualties,100 the highest of any contemporary peacekeeping mission.101   
 
Host state consent to the mission’s deployment has been grudging at best and its work has 
been hindered by a variety of bureaucratic manoeuvres.102  The stipulation of the mission’s 
‘mainly African character’ has been used to block deployments of personnel and equipment 
from non-African states.103  Lengthy customs and import regulations have also been used to 
hinder deployments and the Sudanese government has sometimes refused to allocate land for 
                                                 
96 Presentation by Force Commander, General Martin Agwai, Darfur and the Battle for Khartoum, 
Situation Report, ISS (Institute for Security Studies), Pretoria: ISS, 4 September 2008.  See also Report 
of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in the Sudan, S/2009/84, of 10 February 
2009. 
97 See: Report of the Secretary-General on the deployment of UNAMID, S/2009/83, of 10 
February2009; Report of the Secretary-General on the deployment of UNAMID, S/2009/201, of 14 
April 2009; Report of the Secretary-General on the deployment of UNAMID, S/2009/297, of 9 June 
2009.     
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid.  For example, in June 2008 an unidentified militia attacked a UNAMID police and military 
patrol, killing seven peacekeepers and wounding over 20.  The previous month the JEM had mounted 
an attack on Khartoum, the capital of Sudan.  In July 2008 the security level of the mission was raised 
to Phase IV, which requires it to prioritize the use of mission resources to protect the mission itself.   
100 UN Peacekeeping Home page, Fatalities, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/fatalities/documents/stats_3.pdf, accessed 22 June 2015. 
101 Ibid.  The total number of fatalities suffered by UNIFIL is higher (307 by November 2014), but the 
mission has been in existence for much longer.  The first UN mission to the Congo – UNOC – also 
suffered a higher number of fatalities (249). 
102 Report of the Secretary-General on UNAMID, S/2012/771, of 16 October 2012, para 63.  One 
example of official harassment is where it is noted that UNAMID’s sole contracted food rations 
provider had been told that it ‘must cease operations and leave the country within 48 hours owing to 
alleged irregularities in its import notices. The government finally granted interim extensions of this 
deadline, month by month.   
103 For further discussion of the see: Sara Pantuliano and Sorcha O’Callaghan, ‘The protection crisis’: 
a review of field-based strategies for humanitarian protection in Darfur, London: Overseas 
Development Institute Humanitarian Policy Group discussion paper, December 2006; and Helen 
Young, Abdal Monim Osman, Yacob Aklilu, Rebecca Dale, Babiker Bali and Abdal Jabber Fuddle, 
Darfur: livelihoods under siege, Medford MA: Feinstein International Famine Centre, Tufts 
University, 2005; Larry Minear, ‘Lessons Learned: The Darfur Experience’ in ALNAP Review of 
Humanitarian Action in 2004. London: ALNAP, 2005, pp.74–122. 
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UNAMID bases.104  It has also frequently refused to give approval for flights, while insisting 
on its right to block UNAMID’s communications and deny it access to particular locations on 
‘security grounds’.105     
 
The mission’s deployment also coincided with the ICC investigation following the Security 
Council referral in March 2005.106  The Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, declared that it 
would: ‘form part of a collective effort, complementing African Union and other initiatives to 
end the violence in Darfur and to promote justice. Traditional African mechanisms can be an 
important tool to complement these efforts and achieve local reconciliation.’107  In April 2007 
the ICC issued arrest warrants for the first two suspects: Ahmad Muhammad Harun, a 
Sudanese government minister,108 and Ali Kushayb, an alleged Janjaweed leader.109  Harun 
was charged with having recruited, armed and funded the Janjaweed, and incited them to 
conducting a reign of terror against civilians between August 2003 and February 2004.110  
Kushayb was charged with 504 assassinations and 20 rapes, which resulted in the forced 
displacement of 41,000 people.111   
                                                 
104 Ibid. 
105 BBC News, ‘Darfur peace force set to fail’, 19 December 2007. 
106 International Criminal Court, Darfur, Sudan, ICC 02/05, Investigation, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200205/Pages/situation
%20icc-0205.aspx, accessed 20 October 2015. 
107 International Criminal Court, Press Release, ‘The Prosecutor of the ICC opens investigation in 
Darfur’, 6 June 2005.  
108 International Criminal Court, Case Information Sheet, Situation in Darfur, Sudan The Prosecutor v. 
Ahmad Muhammad Harun (“Ahmad Harun”) and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd–Al-Rahman (“Ali 
Kushayb”) ICC-02/05-01/07, ICC-PIDS-CIS-SUD-001-004/15_Eng Updated: 25 March 2015.  
‘Ahmad Harun served from 2003 to 2005 as Minister of the State for the Interior of the Government of 
Sudan and allegedly in charge of the management of the “Darfur Security Desk” thereby coordinating 
the different bodies of the government involved in the counter-insurgency, including the Police, the 
Armed Forces, the National Security and Intelligence Service and the Janjaweed militia. . .  it is 
alleged that in his public speeches Ahmad Harun not only demonstrated that he knew that the 
Janjaweed militia were attacking civilians and pillaging towns and villages, but also personally 
encouraged the commission of such illegal acts.’ 
109 Situation in Darfur, In the Case of the Prosecutor v. Ahmad Mohammad Harun (Ahmad Harun) 
and Ali Mahummad Ali Abd-al-Rahman (Ali Kushayb), ICC Pre Trial Chamber I, ICC-02/05-01/07, 27 
April 2007. 
110 Ibid.  See also Warrant of Arrest issued for Ahmad Harun, ICC Pre Trial Chamber I, ICC-02/05-
01/07-2, 27 April 2007; and Warrant of Arrest issued for Ali Kushayb, ICC Pre Trial Chamber I, ICC-
02/05-01/07-3, 27 April 2007. Between them they were charged with 51 counts of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. 
111 Ibid.  International Criminal Court Prosecutor opening remarks The Hague, 27 February 2007. ‘In 
one of the attacks in the Kodoom area in August 2003, Ali KUSHAYB was seen issuing instructions to 
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Kushayb was allegedly twice taken into custody by the Sudanese authorities in 2007 and 
2008, but released both times.112  According to HRW he was subsequently appointed to a 
senior position in the Central Reserve Police and was seen participating in a militia attack 
against civilians in central Darfur in April 2013.113  In 2009 Harun, was appointed Governor 
of South Kordofan, which borders South Sudan and has also been the scenes of protracted 
conflict and allegations of widespread violations by State forces.114  In early 2012, al-
Jazeera broadcast a video of him telling government troops fighting rebels there to take no 
prisoners.115 
 
On 14 July 2008, the ICC Prosecutor submitted an application for the issuance of a warrant of 
arrest for the Sudanese president al Bashir on charges of war crimes, crimes against humanity 
and genocide.116  Some observers, however, have questioned both the substance and the 
timing of the charges.  Rony Baumann, a former President of MSF, for example, has noted 
that the Prosecutor’s case was that the genocide had been committed in two consecutive 
stages: the first, through direct violence, during the during the first eighteen months of the 
conflict and then a second ‘camp’ stage where ‘the extermination process continued.’ 117  He 
notes that: 
                                                 
the Militia/Janjaweed. Civilians were being fired upon as they fled. His forces pillaged and burned 
homes and shops. The attack . . . resulted in the destruction of most of the town and the death of more 
than 100 civilians, including 30 children. . . Ali KUSHAYB personally inspected a group of naked 
women before they were raped by men in military uniform. A witness said she and the other women 
were tied to trees and repeatedly raped. The evidence shows that Ali KUSHAYB personally 
participated in a number of summary executions.’ 
112 New York Times, ‘Sudan Arrests Militia Chief Facing Trial’, 13 October 2008. 
113 Human Rights Watch, Sudan: ICC suspect at scene of fresh crimes, 3 June 2013. 
114 Sudan Tribune, ‘Profile of Ahmad Harun’, June 2015.  See also International Crisis Group, Sudan: 
Defining the North-South Border, Africa Briefing N°75, Brussels: ICG, 2 Sep 2010; International 
Crisis Group, Sudan’s Southern Kordofan Problem: The Next Darfur?, Brussels: ICG, 21 October 
2008. 
115 Al Jazeera English ‘Inside Sudan - Southern Kordofan: Unfinished Business’, 8 April 2012.  He is 
seen joking with the soldiers and saying ‘don’t bring them back alive. We have no space for them.’ 
116 ICC, Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC Pre Trial Chamber I, ICC-02/05-01/09-1, 
4 March 2009.  See also Guardian, ‘Darfur genocide charges for Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir’, 
14 July 2008.  
117 Rony Brauman, Darfur: the International Criminal Court is wrong, MSF, 2010. 
348 
 
 
 
Yet in these camps, located near Darfur’s major cities as well as army garrisons, the 
largest emergency relief operation since the Second World War was set up. Tens of 
thousands of people were saved from probable death and over two million received 
essential aid. Health indicators are much better there than elsewhere in the country . . 
. Yet the ICC speaks of ‘living conditions that will lead to physical destruction’ – a 
sort of Auschwitz of the desert . . . The ICC’s accusation is not only inept, but also an 
insult to humanitarian, foreign and Sudanese workers, who retrospectively become 
unknowing accomplices to genocide.118 
 
The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber initially rejected the genocide charge, in March 2009, while 
approving the others, but it was restored to the indictment by the Appeals Chamber in 
February 2010.119  A second arrest warrant was then issued by the Court in July 2010.120  
News of the first indictment was leaked from Moreno Ocampo’s office on the same day that 
an industrial tribunal had ruled that he had wrongfully dismissed a staff member who had 
alleged sexual misconduct against him.121 This has also helped al Bashir to portray the 
charges against him as opportunist and politically motivated.122  
 
                                                 
118 Ibid. 
119 For a chronology of the case to date see International Criminal Court, Case Information Sheet 
Situation in Darfur, Sudan The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir ICC-02/05-01/09 ICC-
PIDS-CIS-SUD-02-004/15_Eng Updated: 26 March 2015. 
120 UN News Centre, ‘Darfur: ICC charges Sudanese President with genocide’, 12 July 2010.   
121 For discussion see World Affairs, Julie Flint and Alex de Waal, ‘Closed case: a prosecutor without 
borders’, Spring 2009.  The news that Ocampo intended to charge al-Bashir with genocide was first 
leaked to the Washington Post on 11 July 2008, the day after an industrial tribunal at the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) had ruled that he had wrongfully dismissed his public information adviser, 
sacked after complaining that Moreno-Ocampo had ‘committed serious misconduct … by committing 
the crime of rape, or sexual assault, or sexual coercion, or sexual abuse’ against a South African 
journalist. The alleged victim did not make a complaint against Moreno-Ocampo and so no further 
action was taken, but the ILO panel did rule that he had abused his authority in sacking the staff 
member for making an internal complaint. 
122 See, for example, New York Times, ‘Court Issues Arrest Warrant for Sudan’s Leader’, 4 March 
2009, which reported that: ‘Within minutes of the court’s announcement, thousands of people gathered 
in central Khartoum, the Sudanese capital, denouncing the decision and waving national flags and 
posters of Mr. Bashir’s face.’  See also BBC News, ‘Profile of Sudan’s Omar al Bashir’, 12 June 2015 
and Human Rights Watch, UN Members opposed Al Bashir’s visit, 18 September 2013. 
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The Sudanese authorities responded to the first arrest warrant against al Bashir by expelling 
thirteen international aid organizations from the country, accusing them of ‘spying’ for the 
Court.123  The government has also strictly limited access of both the remaining aid groups 
and UN agencies to the region, arguing that they ‘could be collaborating with the court’.124  
One aid worker noted that ‘protection’ had been ‘another casualty of the expulsions’ as it 
‘was now rarely if ever referred to in program strategies and had been stripped from any UN 
and NGO information materials or websites’.125 
 
Mission reports since 2009 emphasize that UNAMID has focused much of its efforts on 
political engagement in the hope of achieving a durable peace settlement.126  At one point 
there were around 30 rebel groups in Darfur and their distinction from government forces 
increasingly blurred.127  Government-supported Arab militias sometimes allied with rebel 
groups, while these often struck bargains with the government.128 There have been a series of 
ceasefires agreed, although most have fallen apart, sometimes just days after being signed.129   
                                                 
123 Wall Street Journal, ‘Darfur Aid Agencies Leave After Expulsion by Sudan’, 9 March 2009.   See 
also Guardian, Conor Foley, ‘Darfur: a disaster for justice’, 20 April 2009. 
124 Tajeldin Abdalla Adam, Katy Glassborow, Simon Jennings and Assadig Mustafa Zakaria Musa, 
Special Report: International Failures Prolong Darfur’s Misery, The Hague: International Institute for 
War and Peace Reporting, April 2011, p.7. 
125 Helen Young, ‘Diminishing returns, the challenges facing humanitarian action in Darfur’, in 
Antonio Donini (ed), The golden fleece, manipulation and independence in humanitarian action, 
Sterling, Virginia: Stylus Publishing/Kumarian Press, 2012, pp.89-109. 
126 For an overview of events between 2009 and 2011 see Report of the Secretary-General on the 
deployment of UNAMID, S/2009/83, of 10 February2009; Report of the Secretary-General on the 
deployment of UNAMID, S/2009/201, of 14 April 2009; Report of the Secretary-General on the 
deployment of UNAMID, S/2009/297, of 9 June 2009; Report of the Secretary-General on the 
deployment of UNAMID, S/2009/352, of 13 July 2009; Report of the Secretary-General on elections in 
Sudan, S/2009/391, of 28 July 2009; Report of the Secretary-General on UNAMID, S/2009/592, of 16 
November 2009; Report of the Secretary-General on UNAMID, S/2010/50, of 29 January 2010; Report 
of the Secretary-General on UNAMID, S/2010/213, of 28 April 2010; Report of the Secretary-General 
on UNAMID, S/2010/382, of 14 July 2010; Report of the Secretary-General on UNAMID, 
S/2010/543, of 18 October 2010; Report of the Secretary-General on UNAMID, S/2011/22, of 18 
January 2011; Report of the Secretary-General on UNAMID, S/2011/244, of 14 April 2011. 
127 For an overview of the shifting nature of the alliances and conflicts see International Crisis Group, 
The Chaos in Darfur, Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°110, 22 April 2015. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Ibid.  Between 2008 and 2010, violent deaths in Darfur were dominated by intra-Arab fighting, 
notably between abbala (camel-herding) and baggara (cattle-herding) groups in South Darfur. In 
October 2010, Minni Minawi, withdrew from the DPA and returned to rebellion.  This triggered new 
fighting between the government and rebels, starting in December of that year.  It also led to a 
resumption of violence against Zaghawa civilians, with which the SLA/MM was identified.  The 
Sudanese air force carried out aerial bombardments on areas controlled by the rebels, and communities 
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In January 2011 UNAMID transported Governor Harun to Abyei in one of its helicopters for 
a meeting to try to reconcile an inter-tribal conflict.130  Amnesty International expressed 
‘outrage’ that the mission had helped a fugitive from international justice and pointed out that 
the UN and the ICC are legally bound to cooperate closely together.131  A spokesperson for 
the UN Secretary General stated that: 
 
the UN Mission is mandated to provide good offices to the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) parties in their efforts to resolve their differences through dialogue 
and negotiations . . . clashes in Abyei were ongoing and threatening to escalate to 
wider war. Governor Harun was critical to bring the Misseriya leaders in Southern 
Kordofan to peace meeting in Abyei to stop further clashes and killings.132 
 
In July 2011 a new agreement, the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD), was signed 
between the government of Sudan and the Liberation and Justice Movement, (LJM) an 
umbrella organization of ten rebel groups.133  This coincided with improved relations between 
                                                 
suspected of sympathizing with them, and also recruited for a militia group, the Popular Defence 
Forces (PDF), which reportedly carried out widespread human rights violations.  Although formally 
under the control of the military, the PDF operate semi-autonomously, like the Janjaweed, often 
pursuing its own agendas and vendettas, related to land and local political dominance. Previously 
marginalized groups—including the Bergid, Berti, and Tunjur— were armed and deployed in the PDF 
against Zaghawa communities, though often in response to attacks by Zaghawa militias.  This 
generated significant ethnically directed violence between January and July 2011.  
130 Reuters, ‘U.N. flew indicted war criminal to Sudan meeting’, 11 January 2011. 
131 Amnesty International, UN aids Sudanese official wanted for war crimes, 13 January 2011. 
132 UN Office of the Spokesperson for the Secretary General, ‘Highlights of the Noon Briefing, by 
Martin Nesirky, Spokesperson for Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon’, Tuesday, 11 January 2011. 
133 Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Darfur political process, 
S/2011/252, of 15 April 2011; Report of the Secretary-General on UNAMID, S/2011/422, of 8 July 
2011.  The JEM had by then withdrawn from the negotiations and the SLA-AW and SLA/MM also did 
not participate.  Some critics have noted that many of the LJM’s leading members had been living 
abroad for many years at the time of the negotiations and have questioned how representative they are 
of people on the ground.  In November 2011, the JEM, SLA-AW and SLA/MM, together with SPLM-
N, formed a new political and military alliance, the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF), which is 
pledged to fight for the overthrow of Sudan’s government.   
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Sudan and its neighbours,134 which led to a decline in violence in West Darfur.135  A Darfur 
Regional Authority was established, in accordance with the power-sharing provisions of the 
DDPD.136  It was also agreed, in principle, to establish a National Human Rights Commission 
and a Prosecutor for a Special Court for Darfur, with jurisdiction for crimes committed since 
2003.137  The number of clashes both between rebel groups and government forces as well as 
inter-tribal conflicts declined in 2011 and 2012 and mission reports noted some progress by a 
Sudanese government appointed Special Prosecutor for Darfur in bringing charges against 
militia members accused of serious crimes.138 
 
The security situation deteriorated again in 2013, however, and well over half a million 
people were displaced from their homes in the next two years.139  Tens of thousands of 
civilians sought protection by sheltering around UNAMID bases and by April 2014 the 
mission reported that it was providing direct physical protection to 60,000 IDPs.140  Special 
                                                 
134 Ibid.  See also International Crisis Group, April 2015.  Improved relations with Chad was a direct 
consequence of the DDPD.  Relations with Libya also improved due the downfall of the Gaddafi 
regime, in 2011, which had previously backed the rebels.  The JEM, which had been the strongest 
Darfur rebel movement militarily for a number of years was particularly weakened by the loss of 
support from Chad and Libya, and a series of internal splits following the death of its leader Khalil 
Ibrahim in December 2011.    
135 See, for example, Report of the Secretary-General on UNAMID, S/2013/607 of 14 October 2013, 
paras 46-9.  UNAMID reported 87 incidents of human rights violations involving 189 victims between 
1 July and 27 September 2013 compared to 126 incidents, involving 557 victims in the previous three 
months.  Violations included abductions, armed attacks and physical assaults as well as 24 incidents of 
sexual and gender-based violence involving 31 victims, 23 of whom suffered rapes. 
136 Report of the Secretary-General on UNAMID, S/2011/643, of 12 October 2011; Report of the 
Secretary-General on UNAMID, S/2011/814, of 30 December 2011; Report of the Secretary-General 
on UNAMID, S/2012/231, of 17 April 2012; Report of the Secretary-General on UNAMID, 
S/2012/548, of 16 July 2012. 
137 Ibid. 
138 Report of the Secretary-General on UNAMID, S/2013/225, of 10 April 2013, para 5. 
139 Report of the Secretary-General on UNAMID, S/2013/420, of 12 July 2013, para 13.  See also 
Report of the Secretary-General on UNAMID, S/2013/22, of 15 January 2013; Report of the Secretary-
General on UNAMID, S/2013/607, of 14 October 2013, para 14-17.  See also Report of the Secretary-
General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, S/2015/141, of 26 
February 2015, para 3; Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid 
Operation in Darfur, S/2015/378, of 26 May 2015, para 2; and Sudan, Darfur Profile, UN Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, May 2015.  
140 Report of the Secretary-General on UNAMID, S/2013/607, of 14 October 2013, para 14-17; Report 
of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, 
S/2014/279, of 15 April 2014, para 39.  See also Report of the Secretary-General on the African 
Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, S/2015/378, of 26 May 2015, paras 39-42; and 
Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, 
S/2015/141, of 26 February 2015, paras 46-52. 
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Reports on the mission published in 2014 and 2015 concluded that UNAMID was 
‘contributing’ to the protection of civilians through its ‘various types of patrols, static security 
and the promotion of community policing, particularly in camps for internally displaced 
persons’ as well as through support for local community mediation and facilitating the 
delivery of humanitarian assistance,141 but that the mission should adopt a more robust 
posture when faced with restrictions of movement to crisis-affected areas.142  One report 
stated that mission personnel ‘too easily turn back rather than assertively insisting on 
proceeding.’143  It proposed revised benchmarks for the mission based on more effective 
protection of civilians and suggested that if it could not demonstrate greater progress on this 
than the Security Council needed to take ‘hard decisions’ about its future.144 
 
The International Crisis Group (ICG) has also claimed that the mission remains ‘too 
deferential’ to the Sudanese government, has ‘frequently failed to intervene and protect 
civilians’ and ‘systematically presented a narrative of an improving situation divorced from 
reality’.145  In September 2015, HRW published a report detailing abuses carried out by the 
Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which had been created in mid-2013 by the Sudanese 
Intelligence Services.146  It noted that the RSF had led two counterinsurgency campaigns. in 
2014 and 2015, during which ‘its forces repeatedly attacked villages, burned and looted 
homes’ as well as ‘beating, raping and executing villagers.’147  The report noted that the RSF 
‘received support in the air and on the ground from the Sudanese armed forces and other 
government-backed militia groups, including a variety of proxy militias.’148  The 
                                                 
141 Special report of the Secretary-General on the review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid 
Operation in Darfur, S/2014/138, 25 February 2014, para 13; and Special report of the Secretary-
General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, S/2015/163, of 13 March 
2015. 
142 Special Report, 2014, para 14. 
143 Ibid., para 27. 
144 Ibid., para 51. 
145 International Crisis Group, The Chaos in Darfur, Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°110, 22 April 
2015. 
146 Human Rights Watch, Men with no mercy: rapid support forces attacks against civilians in Darfur, 
New York: HRW, 9 September 2015.  
147 Ibid. 
148 Ibid. 
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overwhelming majority of the abuses reported to it were committed by RSF or other 
government forces in villages and towns where rebels were reportedly never present or had 
left prior to the attacks. Some RSF attacks even occurred in towns or villages that were 
entirely under government control.149   
 
HRW noted that UNAMID reports had ‘failed to release any detailed documentation about 
abuses against civilians during either of the RSF-led counterinsurgency campaigns’ and that 
while several mission reports had referred to attacks by the RSF causing civilian 
displacement, there had been ‘no indication of magnitude of the other serious abuses, such as 
sexual violence, extrajudicial killings, and burning of villages.’150 OCHA also reported that 
there were up to 100,000 IDPs trapped in areas where the fighting was heaviest that 
humanitarian agencies were unable to reach due to government restrictions.151  In March 2016 
the UN reported that at least 138,000 people had been freshly displaced by violence since the 
start of the year.152 
 
In December 2014 the new ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, had informed the Security 
Council that she had ‘no choice but to hibernate investigative activities in Darfur’ to ‘shift 
resources to other urgent cases’.153  She told the Security Council that:  
 
It is becoming increasingly difficult for me to appear before you to update you when 
all I am doing is repeating the same things I have said over and over again . . . Not 
only does the situation in Darfur continue to deteriorate, the brutality with which 
crimes are being committed has become more pronounced. Women and girls 
                                                 
149 Ibid. 
150 Ibid. 
151 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Sudan, Darfur Profile, UN OCHA, May 
2015. 
152 UN News Centre, ‘Daily Press Briefing by the Office of the Spokesperson for the Secretary-
General’, 6 April 2016. 
153 Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, ‘Statement to the United Nations Security Council 
on the Situation in Darfur, pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005)’, 12 December 2014. 
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continue to bear the brunt of sustained attacks on innocent civilians. But this Council 
is yet to be spurred into action.154  
 
The announcement was hailed as a triumph over ‘colonialist courts’ by al Bashir.155  The 
Ugandan president, Yoweri Museveni, also took the opportunity to call on African countries 
to withdraw from the ICC, saying that it had become a ‘tool to target’ the continent.156  The 
same month saw the collapse of another ICC trial against an African head of State, when the 
ICC formally withdrew charges against Uhuru Kenyatta who had been indicted in 2012 for 
his alleged role in a wave of violence during election in Kenya in 2007.157  In October 2013 
an extraordinary AU General Assembly passed a resolution stating that sitting heads of State 
‘shall not appear before any international court during their term of office.’158  In November 
2013 the AU narrowly failed to persuade the Security Council to defer ICC proceeding 
against Kenyatta and his Deputy President159 and in February 2014 it  called on its members 
to ‘speak with one voice’ against criminal proceedings by the ICC against sitting 
presidents.160   
 
                                                 
154 Ibid. 
155 Guardian, ‘Omar al-Bashir celebrates ICC decision to halt Darfur investigation’, 14 December 
2014. 
156 Ibid.  See also The Telegraph, ‘International Criminal Court is ‘hunting' Africans’’, 27 May 2013; 
and Washington Post, ‘Is the International Criminal Court really targeting black men?’, 17 June 2005. 
157 ICC, Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura and Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, ICC Pre-Trial Chamber 
II, ICC-01/09-02/11, 23 January 2012; and ICC, Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Notice of 
withdrawal of the charges against Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/115 December 2014.  See 
also Abdullahi Boru Halakhe, “R2P in Practice”: Ethnic Violence, Elections and Atrocity Prevention 
in Kenya, New York: Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect Occasional Paper Series No. 4, 
December 2013; and BBC News, ‘ICC drops Uhuru Kenyatta charges for Kenya ethnic violence’, 5 
December 2014.  Over 1,000 people were killed during this campaign, which at one point threatened to 
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evidence against him following alleged intimidation. 
158 BBC News, ‘African Union urges ICC to defer Uhuru Kenyatta case’, 12 October 2013. 
159 UN News Centre, Security Council Resolution Seeking Deferral of Kenyan Leaders’ Trial Fails to 
Win Adoption, with 7 Voting in Favour, 8 Abstaining’, 15 November 2013.  The vote was seven in 
favour with none against and eight abstentions so it fell short of the nine votes that would have been 
needed for it to pass. 
160 Al Jazeera, ‘African Union urges united stand against ICC’, 1 February 2014.  See also BBC News, 
‘South Africa may leave ICC over Bashir arrest row’, 25 June 2015. 
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In June 2014 the ICC Prosecutor expressed her concern that UNAMID’s reports ‘had been 
subject to manipulation, with the intentional effect of covering up crimes committed against 
civilians and peacekeepers, in particular those committed by the forces of the Government of 
the Sudan’.161  In July 2014 the UN Secretary General announced a review into the 
allegations.162  The review claimed not to have found any evidence of intentional cover-ups 
but stated the mission did not always provide its own headquarters with full reports on the 
circumstances surrounding incidents and was ‘dysfunctional and deeply divided’ about what 
to publicly report.163  It also noted that initial reports from the field identifying attackers as 
suspected government or pro-government forces were often changed at some point in the 
official reporting chain to ‘unidentified assailants’.164  Secretary General Ban Ki-moon said 
that ‘the lapses in the reporting standards’ were ‘very troubling.’165   
 
A few weeks after this statement UNAMID issued a press release stating that it had been 
granted access to a village in north Darfur ‘following media reports of an alleged mass rape 
incident perpetrated against 200 women and girls in the area’.166  Its team had ‘spent several 
hours touring the village’, interviewing a residents and community leaders and a local 
military commander.  These ‘reiterated to UNAMID that they coexist peacefully with local 
military authorities in the area’ and found no evidence to substantiate the allegations.167  The 
release failed to mention the presence of government officials observing and filming the 
interviews or reports that villagers had been warned by the military not to cooperate with the 
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investigation.168  The Security Council subsequently issued a separate statement calling on 
the Sudanese government to allow UNAMID ‘full and unrestricted freedom of movement 
without delay throughout Darfur.’169  In November Sudan sent a letter to the Council stating 
that UNAMID would not be permitted to visit the area again.170  On 25 December 2014 the 
Sudanese government announced the expulsion of the two most senior UN officials in the 
country.171 Al Bashir stated in the same month that the mission should wrap up its operations 
as it had ‘become . . . a security burden on the Sudanese army.’172  
 
In June 2015 ICC Prosecutor Bensouda again briefed the Security Council, this time stating 
that her ‘determination to bring independent and impartial justice to the people of Sudan 
remains unshaken’, but acknowledging that there had been no substantive progress in the 
cases.173  The only positive development she could highlight was that President al Bashir had 
been forced to make a ‘rapid departure’ from South Africa during a recent state visit after the 
Southern Africa Litigations Centre (SALC) brought a successful action against him in the 
country’s High Court.174  Although the Prosecutor described this as ‘a shining precedent that 
must be emulated in other States’,175 it is noticeable how even strong supporters of the ICC 
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174 Ibid.  paras 14-9.  
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have urged a rethink its prosecution strategy.176 Nicole Fritz, for example, executive director 
of the SALC had earlier urged a suspension of the Kenya prosecution arguing that:  
 
Courts cannot be more strident than the political consensus supporting their 
establishment allows   . . . The ICC is the product of a brief interregnum — a decade 
strung between the end of one totalising narrative of international relations, the Cold 
War, and the beginning of another, the war on terror.  The potential for international 
co-operation and co-ordination that seemed possible in the 1990s has been broken 
down in the decades since and the ICC needs to be mindful of this.177 
 
The Security Council also renewed UNAMID’s mandate for a further year, in June 2015, 
with mandated tasks and a force structure that was essentially unchanged.178  The text 
detailed the deteriorating security and humanitarian situation and highlighted the escalation of 
violence that undermined the security of civilians.179  UNAMID’s benchmarks were also 
attached as an annex, along with relevant indicators for each one.180  Disagreement within the 
Council in the run-up to the mission’s renewal centred on those, mainly western, countries 
who wanted to link discussion of the mission’s exit strategy to clear progress on these 
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benchmarked goals and the African Council members, supported by Russia, who wanted 
faster progress on the exit strategy.181  
 
One observer has described UNAMID as ‘a slow burning disaster’, that was established in a 
‘politically panicked response to public pressure’ and that the ‘frank reality is no one believes 
that the mission is working but no one dares pull it out because they fear the moment it goes 
there will be an even greater spike in violence.’182 Malloch Brown, a former UN Deputy 
Secretary General also admitted at around the time of the mission’s deployment that: ‘No one 
is up for deploying a military force in the heart of Africa.  People do not want to do it and it 
has never been a realistic option so there has always been an element of empty threat 
there.’183  De Waal similarly noted early on in the crisis: ‘The knock-down argument against 
humanitarian invasion is that it won’t work. The idea of foreign troops fighting their way into 
Darfur and disarming the Janjaweed militia by force is sheer fantasy.’184   
 
A UN mission with a Chapter VII POC mandate can be considered as falling somewhere 
between invasion and inaction, but, as this chapter has shown, its exact location along this 
spectrum is less clear.  UNAMID has suffered from the polarized and controversial context in 
which the Security Council established it and in which the ICC conducted its investigation.  
The decision to charge a sitting President with genocide and the way in which it was done 
appears to reflect particularly badly on the former ICC Prosecutor.  The failures within the 
UN system as a whole during this crisis are also in many ways as serious as some of the 
disasters of the 1990s, discussed in Chapter Two, and suggest a failure to learn the lessons 
from the mass killings in Sri Lanka in 2009.  As Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has noted: 
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UNAMID is clearly not the only mission faced with the challenge of maintaining the 
consent and goodwill of the host Government, while fulfilling its obligation to report 
accurately and candidly, including on acts of violence committed against civilians or 
its own personnel . . . Ensuring that the United Nations speaks out consistently 
against abuses and identifies the perpetrators is a key goal of my Human Rights Up 
Front initiative. I therefore intend to ensure that all missions are provided with 
additional guidance on the fulfilment of their reporting obligations, particularly with 
regard to human rights and the protection of civilians.185 
 
The next section of this chapter will briefly discuss the experiences of the UN mission to 
South Sudan before analysing what positive obligations international human rights law could 
place on a UN mission and the relevance of this legal framework for POC mandates. 
 
C. South Sudan 
 
South Sudan came into existence in July 2011 after its people had voted overwhelmingly for 
independence the previous January.186  UNMISS was created in the same month by the 
Security Council acting under its Chapter VII powers. 187  The mission’s mandate has been 
renewed annually188 and its tasks include to:  
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consolidate peace and security, and to help establish the conditions for development . 
. . with a view to strengthening the capacity of the Government of the Republic of 
South Sudan to govern effectively and democratically and establish good relations 
with its neighbours . . . [and] Deterring violence including through proactive 
deployment and patrols in areas at high risk of conflict, within its capabilities and in 
its areas of deployment, protecting civilians under imminent threat of physical 
violence, in particular when the Government of the Republic of South Sudan is not 
providing such security.189   
 
In June 2012 the government of South Sudan tried to convince the Security Council that it 
would be ‘inappropriate’ to renew the mandate under Chapter VII as it had taken 
responsibility for the safety and security of its own citizens.190  This was rejected, but 
benchmarks for progress were agreed so that the mission could exit ‘once the Government 
has established effective State authority, held elections in accordance with the Constitution, 
and sufficiently developed the capacity of its rule of law and security institutions to a level 
where they can effectively maintain public order and protect the civilian population.’191  POC 
has featured in all of UNMISS’s mission reports, although the initial focus was on 
maximizing information flow, provision of good offices and urging the government to deploy 
                                                 
189 UN Security Council Resolution 1996 of 8 July 2011, para 3.   
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additional security forces when necessary.192  The mission saw its task as mainly to advocate 
for such protection and develop early warning mechanisms to identify threats.193   
 
The transition to independence had already been fraught.194  In May 2011 the Sudanese 
armed forces, again, occupied the disputed town of Abyei.195  Over 140,000 people fled from 
fighting between the forces of Sudan and South Sudan in South Kordofan state, in June and 
July 2011.196  There have also been aerial bombardments and incursions within South Sudan 
from Sudan, including through proxy armed groups.197  In March 2012 South Sudan accused 
Sudan of bombing two of its oil wells and responded by seizing the Heglig oil fields.198  It 
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subsequently withdrew from these under international pressure, but, in December 2012 and 
January 2013 South Sudan again complained to the Security Council about alleged aerial 
bombing by its northern neighbour.199 
 
Clashes between government troops and rebel militia, some of whom were sponsored by 
Sudan, had led to repeated violations of international human rights law and IHL by both sides 
in 2011 and 2012.200  UNMISS suffered a series of attacks by rebel groups in 2012 and 
2013,201 as well as ongoing harassment, threats, physical assaults and attempts to seize its 
property by government soldiers and police.202  In December 2012 government troops shot 
down an UNMISS helicopter, after apparently mistaking it for a Sudanese military one.203  
Tensions had also been mounting in Jonglei state as part of an ongoing cycle of inter-ethnic 
and militia-based violence that dates back to a split within the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation 
Movement (SPLM) and its army (SPLA) in 1991.204  A series of skirmishes and attacks on 
villages throughout 2011 left hundreds dead.205   Thousands of civilians sought refuge in 
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UNMISS military compounds in Jonglei state and UNMISS redeployed almost all of its 
forces, leaving the bare minimum, to cover the rest of the country that December.206  A cycle 
of revenge attacks continued, through 2013 with government police and soldiers taking part 
in some of these.207 
 
Against this background, simmering divisions within the leadership of the now ruling SPLM 
erupted into a full-scale conflict in December 2013.  President Salva Kiir Mayardit claimed to 
have foiled a coup attempt while his opponents accused him of launching a dictatorial 
purge.208  Around 10,000 people died in the first few months of the conflict and a million 
were displaced from their homes.209  By December 2014 Security Council referred to the 
civilian death toll as being in the ‘tens of thousands’ and the displacement total at two 
million.210  The SPLA quickly fractured and both sides committed widespread massacres 
often on ethnic grounds, as the ICG noted: 
 
Although the dispute within the SPLM that led to the conflict was primarily political, 
ethnic targeting, communal mobilisation and spiralling violence quickly led to 
appalling levels of brutality against civilians, including deliberate killings inside 
churches and hospitals. Dinka elements of the Presidential Guard and other security 
organs engaged in systematic violence against Nuer in Juba in the early days. Armed 
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actors, including the Nuer White Army, responded by targeting Dinka and other 
civilians.211   
 
As the fighting spread civilians sought protection on UNMISS bases.  By the end of 2014 it 
was estimated that there were 100,000 sheltering in them.212  By May 2015 this had swelled 
to around 118,000 people and by August 2015 there were an estimated 200,000 in what were 
to become known as PoC sites.213  Civilians had sought shelter on UNMISS bases before this 
crisis and the mission had developed guidelines for managing such situations.214  These stated 
that on-site protection should be a last resort and temporary solution, outlined the roles and 
responsibilities of actors involved, including coordination with humanitarian agencies, and 
required each UNMISS base to develop contingency plans within existing budgets.215  The 
outbreak of civil war caught UNMISS by surprise and the scale of the influx overwhelmed 
it.216  Nevertheless, as the ICG noted: 
 
Within hours of the outbreak of conflict, civilians began arriving at UNMISS bases 
seeking protection. The speed with which the fighting spread required immediate   
action and UNMISS senior leadership took the risky but right decision to open its 
gates . . . Mission staff are not humanitarians and did not have access to humanitarian 
supplies, such as tents, food and materials to build latrines, leading to dire conditions 
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in some of the bases. Acknowledging the logistical and political difficulties, there is 
no question UNMISS’ action saved – and continues to save – many thousands of 
civilian lives.217 
 
UNMISS bases came under attack in several places, particularly in Jonglei state.218  Two 
peacekeeping soldiers and a civilian aid worker were killed in one UNMISS base, some bases 
were hit in cross-fire and UNMISS helicopters were deliberately shot at on some 
occasions.219  In April 2014 the UNMISS base in Bor was stormed by an armed group who 
attacked the IDPs inside with axes, handguns and automatic weapons.220  According to the 
ICG, UNMISS troops and a police unit initially fled further into the base and it was left to the 
unarmed staff of an NGO to ward off the attackers, although the soldiers did eventually open 
fire and the attack was beaten off after 48 IDPs and three attackers had been killed.221 
UNMISS evacuated two of its bases in response to the attacks and the Ugandan armed forces, 
which had intervened in the conflict on the government’s side, began to provide protection by 
patrolling the outer perimeter of some other bases.222   
 
Towns changed hands frequently during the initial months of the conflict, leading to different 
groups seeking UNMISS’s protection.223  Many of these had previously played an active role 
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in the conflict, but UNMISS consciously defined ‘civilians’ in adherence to IHL rules as 
including armed actors who had laid down their weapons.224  As the mission’s senior POC 
advisor noted:  
 
A significant proportion of the people seeking refuge were former combatants. By 
relinquishing their weapons and uniforms they became civilians and eligible for 
protection. However, there was always the risk of these individuals rejoining the 
fighting, and UNMISS was criticised by both sides in the conflict for harbouring 
potential adversaries. A clear ‘no arms on UN premises’ policy was implemented. 
While screening was conducted by UN police at entry and exit points to ensure that 
weapons did not enter the PoC sites, this was not fool-proof and some weapons were 
brought in.225 
 
Both sides continued to accuse UNMISS of sheltering ‘criminals’ and ‘enemies’ who were 
legitimate targets for attack.226  Over the course of 2014 the mission developed guidance on 
preserving the civilian character of its protection sites and stated that it would not admit 
additional individuals onto its premises where there was no ‘current fighting or threat of 
violence in the area’.227 Although UNMISS has been wary of allowing its ‘PoC sites’ to turn 
into de facto IDP camps, land was acquired next to bases where people can be accommodated 
on a more sustainable basis.228  Even humanitarian agencies such as MSF, which is 
particularly wary of compromising its independence and neutrality by integrating into UN 
structures, decided to provide direct support to IDPs in the UN bases.229  One MSF worker 
described the conditions in the PoC sites as ‘horrifying and an affront to human dignity,’ 
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saying that most of the camp was ‘knee-deep in sewage, thousands of people cannot lay down 
and therefore sleep standing up with their infants in their arms.’230 
 
UNMISS reconfigured its forces in response to the crisis, concentrating on defending its 
bases as well as those sheltering in them.231  It also suspended capacity-building support for 
the South Sudanese government or security sector, in line with the HRDDP, in light of 
reports that both the government and the opposition were deliberately committing violence 
against civilians.232  Its mission report in November 2014 stated that it had resumed proactive 
patrolling to ‘expand its reach beyond UNMISS premises’.233  It also reported that it was 
establishing a number of ‘forward operating bases’ in order to ‘ensure proactive engagement 
with vulnerable communities’.234  Some humanitarian agencies had strongly urged this 
redeployment, warning that focussing attention and assistance on the PoC sites risked 
neglecting the far larger number of IDPs who were sheltering elsewhere and often in worse 
conditions.235  By April 2015, UNMISS reported that over two million people were displaced 
from their homes, over 1.5 million people inside South Sudan and more than 500,000 to 
neighbouring countries.236   
 
In June 2015 the mission reported that: ‘South Sudanese armed forces may have committed 
widespread human rights abuses, including the alleged raping and immolation of women and 
girls’ and ‘killing civilians, looting and destroying villages and displacing over 100,000 
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people.’237  UNICEF also reported that boys had ‘been castrated and left to bleed to death,’ 
and that ‘children were bound together before having their throats slit, and while ‘others had 
been thrown into burning buildings.’238  The South Sudanese authorities dismissed any 
allegations of wrongdoing and stated that they would welcome an investigation into them.239  
UNMISS responded that its human rights officers had been routinely denied access to 
locations of interest by the SPLA.240   
 
In March 2015 the Security Council created a UN South Sudan Sanctions Committee panel of 
experts.241  This claims that it has ‘conducted its work with the greatest transparency possible 
while maintaining, when requested or when significant safety concerns exist, the 
confidentiality of its sources.’242  It has also ‘given relevant parties the opportunity, where 
appropriate and possible, to review and respond to, within a specific period, any information 
in its report citing those parties.’243  According to the committee guidelines, designations can 
come into force if none of its members object to them over a five-day period, which suggests 
that lessons have been learned from the controversies of the AQT Sanctions Committee.244 
 
In July 2015 this Committee recommended the imposition of travel bans and assets freezes on 
six South Sudanese officials – three in the government and three in the opposition – as a 
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means of pressurizing them into reaching a political settlement to bring the conflict to an 
end.245  These were not the key decision-makers on either side and the decision not to initially 
target more senior figures partly reflected divisions within the Security Council about the 
effectiveness of sanctions.246  It was also hoped that the decision could pressurize more senior 
figures by signalling the Security Council’s intent to target them in the future.247  In August 
2015 both sides were persuaded to sign a peace agreement, which was welcomed by a 
Security Council Presidential statement.248  The agreement has, however, broken down 
repeatedly and by April 2016 there were still regular reports of continuing clashes.249   
 
In its November 2014 report the mission noted that: ‘UNMISS also continued separating 
suspects with regard to security-related incidents in holding facilities until their referral to 
community-led informal mitigation and dispute resolution mechanisms.’ 250  In February 2015 
it was reported that the distribution of humanitarian assistance within the protection sites was 
proceeding effectively, ‘with a few exceptions’, but that there had been ‘violent attempts by 
internally displaced youth to block humanitarian assistance to specific ethnic groups’.251  The 
WFP had been forced to temporarily suspend food distribution at one site after humanitarian 
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workers were assaulted.252   A number of sexual assaults were also carried out near to 
UNMISS’s protection sites, often perpetrated by government soldiers.253  In April 2015 it was 
reported that: 
 
Inter-communal tensions, community leadership struggles, youth gang violence and 
threats against humanitarian service providers and UNMISS staff continue to pose 
serious challenges in many of the UNMISS protection sites. During the reporting 
period, a total of 410 security incidents were reported, including incidents of murder, 
theft, assault, domestic violence and public disorder . . . Of particular concern is 
sexual, gender-based and domestic violence, including the exploitation of young girls 
and women, by male internally displaced persons.254 
 
The mission reported that it had responded by ‘streamlining referral pathways with 
humanitarian protection partners to provide efficient emergency response services to victims 
of sexual, gender-based and domestic violence’ as well as implementing ‘conflict 
transformation trainings and peace dialogues’ at certain sites.255  It also ‘continued to 
administer four holding facilities for the temporary isolation of internally displaced persons 
suspected of having committed serious crimes, at the UNMISS protection sites in Juba, 
Bentiu, Malakal and Bor.’256  Initially detainees were held in makeshift detention areas, such 
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as containers, which an UNMISS spokesperson admitted fell far below international 
standards.257  In May 2014 UNMISS began to erect ‘holding facilities’ and set up a fenced-in 
area with air-conditioned trailers, but according to a report by the Stimson Center, UN staff 
initially believed that they could not use force to keep detainees inside and so some simply 
walked out.258  The legal implications of this detention policy will be discussed further below. 
 
In February 2015 the mission stated that: ‘Since the establishment of the holding facilities in 
May 2014, a total of 856 offenders have been temporarily detained. Most of the offenses are 
being handled under community-led informal mitigation and dispute resolution mechanisms. 
In isolated instances, offenders were expelled from the protection sites.’259  By April 2015 
there were a total of 63 ‘suspects’ being held in these facilities, but UNMISS had ‘yet to 
agree with the government on a framework for the transfer of detainees to national 
authorities.’260  Some detainees had been released ‘and their cases handled under community-
led informal mitigation and dispute resolution mechanisms’.261  The report also stated that 
‘nine offenders representing a significant threat to UNMISS staff and their communities were 
expelled from the protection site, after a detailed human rights risk assessment confirming 
they were not under threat of violence outside the site.’262  HRW, however, claims that at 
least two civilians were handed over to authorities without a proper assessment of the ‘very 
real risks to these individuals’.263 
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A Security Council resolution in May 2014 gave UNMISS a new mandate, focussing on its 
POC tasks and eliminating the mission’s peace-building and state-building functions.264  The 
mission mandate continues to be extended on a bi-monthly basis.265 
 
D. The ‘positive obligations’ of UN missions 
 
Both UNAMID and UNMISS can claim credit for protecting the lives of hundreds of 
thousands of civilians who sought shelter on their bases.  Indeed one of the strongest 
arguments that can be made for the continuation of both missions is the fear of genocide or 
mass killings of these civilians were this support to be precipitately withdrawn.   
 
As discussed in Chapter Five, both domestic and international courts have ruled that they lack 
jurisdiction to hear challenges on the ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ obligations of UN 
peacekeeping missions under international human rights law.  In the two cases taken against 
the Dutch and Belgian governments for their failure to protect lives during the genocides in 
Rwanda and Srebrenica, the courts were careful to distinguish between the responsibility that 
could be attributed to these States and that of the UN.266  As also discussed, however, it is 
widely accepted that the UN is subject to norms of jus cogens and that it has obligations 
under customary international law and from the Charter to uphold, promote and encourage 
respect for human rights.267   
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Sheeran has noted that it simply ‘could not be that the United Nations, in carrying out its 
peacekeeping activities, was permitted to torture and arbitrarily execute civilians’.268  
Alongside this ‘negative obligation’ the discussion in these two chapters has shown that the 
UN probably now accepts that it has a ‘positive obligation’ to take reasonable measures, 
within its capabilities, to protect the lives of civilians sheltering on its mission bases, at least 
as a matter of policy if not law.  This is implicit in the UN’s most recent policy guidance on 
POC issued in April 2015.269  It has also been explicitly codified in guidance sent to all 
missions with POC mandates.270   
 
In the absence of legal accountability, the nature and extent of its missions’ broader 
obligations under international human rights law are more difficult to define.  The final 
section of this chapter, therefore, discusses what negative and positive obligations of 
international human rights law might potentially be applicable to UN peacekeeping missions 
and could be used as guidance by the UN Secretariat. 
 
The ICJ has noted that the UN is not the functional or legal equivalent of a State and so the 
scope of its rights and duties, and those of its subordinate bodies, must depend upon their 
purposes, functions and practices.271  It is clearly beyond the scope and powers of a 
peacekeeping mission to secure for everyone in its area of deployment all the rights and 
freedoms guaranteed by the entire corpus of international human rights law.  This thesis has 
argued that the obligations of a POC mandate could be deemed more narrowly as a positive 
obligation to protect people from threats to their rights to life and physical integrity, while 
respecting – that is not infringing – these rights in the process.  If POC is defined in this way, 
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though, should the ‘protection’ just be from physical violence or also from arbitrary 
deprivations of the right to liberty or violations of basic economic, cultural such as the right 
to food, heath, and adequate shelter?  Maus, for example, has argued that ‘the delivery of 
humanitarian aid can easily also be considered to fall under the human rights mandate of 
most peace missions’ and such protection ‘cannot and must not be reduced to protection 
against violence and oppression, against death or torture.’272 
 
Hundreds of thousands of IDPs in POC sites in South Sudan are currently living in 
appallingly squalid and life-threatening conditions.  Outside of the UN’s bases, millions of 
people in South Sudan and Darfur live in fear of massacres, torture and rape and are denied 
access to life-saving humanitarian aid.  After visiting some of the POC sites in South Sudan, 
the Executive Director of MSF Canada noted that living conditions were ‘abysmal, with 
water and food in continuing short supply, and most people confined to low-lying areas, 
which have become swamps of infestation and disease.’ He warned that people in the camps 
‘suffer from violence, malnutrition and cholera’ with ‘wires and barricades designed to keep 
violence out, the people inside’.273  UNMISS, he concluded, had accepted a new ‘definition 
of protection’, which ‘appears to apply in only the most narrow sense’.274   
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, the right of humanitarian access is firmly established in both 
IHL and international human rights law and POC mandates explicitly require UN missions to 
protect humanitarian aid workers delivering such assistance.  Given that the majority of 
deaths in many conflicts where the UN is present are from conflict-related hunger and 
disease, rather than direct violence, the applicability of economic, social and cultural rights 
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obligations in such situations is of obvious relevance.275  The provision of humanitarian 
assistance itself, however, is not a POC task and there are both principled and practical 
reasons for maintaining a distinction between POC and humanitarian ‘rights-based’ 
protection.  The obligation to deliver humanitarian assistance falls firstly on the affected 
State276 and if this is unable to provide life-saving assistance it is obliged to allow access to 
humanitarian agencies, who have the right to offer this without it being construed as an 
unfriendly act.277  While the ICESCR contains an explicit extra-territorial obligation, this is a 
progressive one.278  There does not appear to be any obligation on the UN itself to secure a 
broader range of economic, social and cultural rights and nor would this be a practical or 
realistic requirement.   
 
There is, however, a strong case for ensuring that the listing and de-listing procedure 
associated with the UN’s use of sanctions for POC purposes is made human rights-compliant 
.  Sanctions have been imposed on leading figures within the Sudanese government in 
relation to atrocities committed in Darfur and while Sudan’s President remains a fugitive 
from international justice, it is unlikely that these will be eased.  Sanctions have also been 
introduced, on an extremely limited basis, against some political leaders in South Sudan and 
as discussed above, the UN has taken steps to ensure greater transparency in the drawing up 
of its current sanctions.  At the time of writing this thesis there have been no challenges to the 
procedural fairness or legality of either set of sanctions before international courts or tribunals 
although these could arise in the future.   
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UNMISS is also currently detaining people with no access to a court and in conditions which 
do not fully meet the international human rights standards discussed in Chapter Four.  The 
mission decided that the detainees had committed offences under South Sudan law and that 
this was the applicable legal framework under which they should be tried and punished.279  It 
also decided, however, that there was ‘little hope that criminals of the “wrong” ethnicity 
would get fair treatment in South Sudan’s courts and prisons’.280  It was, therefore, prohibited 
by its own detention policy – and the prohibition of refoulement contained in refugee law,281 
IHL,282 and international human rights law283 – from handing them over.284  
 
The mission reportedly considered whether it could rely on the provisions of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention, requiring the occupying power to ‘maintain the orderly government of 
the territory’ and ensure ‘the effective administration of justice’.285  It decided, however, that 
‘while relations between UNMISS and the Government of South Sudan no doubt reached a 
nadir during this period’, the legal authority of the mission still rested on host state consent.286  
It chose instead to utilize ‘the narrow authority provided under its SOFA to maintain safety 
and security within its premises’ as the legal basis for its detention policy.287 
 
The detainees in the PoC sites clearly are under the ‘effective control’ of the UN and the 
UN’s detention policy, as discussed in Chapter Five, is designed to be human rights-
compliant.  Yet with no access to a court or effective forms of redress if the detainees’ rights 
are violated, it suffers from an obvious basic lack of accountability.  As also discussed, the 
circumstances in which the Security Council exercises its powers under Chapter VII may be 
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analogous with situations in which States may need to derogate from some of their human 
rights obligations.  This may be permissible under international human rights law, so long as 
the derogation satisfied requirements that the situation constitutes a genuine public 
emergency and that the measures taken were strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situation.288  While the right to liberty is potentially derogable, the rights of detained people 
to protection against torture and other forms of ill-treatment as well as to challenge the legal 
basis their detention constitute a non-derogable core.289  UNMISS, therefore, needs to create 
a detention review procedure, based on international human rights law to become compliant 
with obligations that it appears already to accept as a matter of policy. 
 
Neither UNAMID nor UNMISS have become a party to their respective conflicts, so it 
appears that if they do use force in self-defence, or defence of their POC mandate, the 
provisions of international human rights law – as discussed in Chapter Four – would be more 
applicable than IHL.  Again, however, there is no way of legally reviewing this and balancing 
the ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ obligations governing the use of lethal force.  Indeed there 
appear to be many cases where missions arguably should have used force to protect civilians 
but failed to do so.  As discussed in Chapter Three existing guidance appears to be that 
missions should interpret their authority to use force through the legal framework provided 
by IHL, but, in doing so must also ‘reflect and uphold the principles of UN peacekeeping, 
namely, consent of the host government and the main parties to the conflict, impartiality, and 
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the non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate’.290  In practice this is 
often a recipe for confusion and inertia. 
 
Both IHL and international human rights law contain requirements to ‘ensure respect’ for 
their provisions, which includes through carrying out effective investigations of violations.291  
Military commanders are obliged, under IHL, to exert their influence to stop violations by 
third parties through, for example, investigating violations and prosecuting perpetrators.292  
International human rights law has set down more detailed principles regarding official 
investigations into allegations of torture and the use of lethal force and has stated that 
deficiencies in these could themselves constitute a violation of these rights.293  These 
obligations continue to apply ‘in difficult security conditions, including in a context of armed 
conflict’.294   Even when a killing has been carried out by a private individual there is a duty 
on the State ‘to use the means at its disposal to carry out a serious investigation of violations 
committed within its jurisdiction, to identify those responsible, to impose the appropriate 
punishment and to ensure the victim adequate compensation.’295   
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These obligations are primarily intended to apply to States regulating the conduct of their 
own security forces and it is not suggested that they impose a legal obligation on UN 
peacekeeping missions to investigate every alleged violation of IHL or international human 
rights law in the territories to which they have been deployed.  Missions are, however, legally 
obliged to cooperate with the ICC through, for example, facilitating investigations by the ICC 
prosecutor296 and it is difficult to see how UNAMID’s actions and inactions have been 
compatible with this requirement.  The UN already deploys human rights officers on its 
missions with POC mandates and their mandated tasks include monitoring for violations.  
The international legal standards of what constitutes an effective investigation could usefully 
be included in the guidance that the UN produces on the POC responsibilities of missions and 
be backed up with disciplinary procedures when these are breached.   
 
As was discussed in Chapter Five, the UN has also pledged to put in place community-based 
mechanisms as part of a framework to provide where people can more readily come forward 
to raise complaints’ about sexual abuse and exploitation by UN peacekeepers.297 It is also 
noteworthy that the Secretary General specifically referred to Human Rights Up Front in 
response to criticisms of UNAMID, when promising to provide ‘additional guidance’ to all 
missions ‘on the fulfilment of their reporting obligations, particularly with regard to human 
rights and the protection of civilians.’ 298  UNMIS and UNAMID have operated in a highly 
politicized environment that had a particularly negative impact on their performance and 
better legal guidance is no substitute for greater political will.  They do, however, highlight 
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why the UN needs to make greater efforts to ensure its mission make ‘human rights and the 
protection of civilians’ a ‘system-wide core responsibility’299   
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Conclusions 
 
In March 2013 two Congolese human rights NGOs released a statement in response to the 
formation of the Intervention Brigade calling on MONUSCO to strengthen its existing 
mechanisms to protect human rights in the country.1  The statement insisted that POC should 
remain a priority for the mission and stated that if the UN ‘truly believes that such an 
intervention brigade is the best hope of reducing the threat posed by armed groups in Eastern 
DRC, MONUSCO’s mandate must also include provisions to mitigate against the increased 
risks that communities will face.’2  The mission should improve its communication with the 
civilian population, ‘which has been insufficient and ineffective up until now’ and 
‘collaborate with communities at risk to gain their trust and identify their needs’.3  It should 
also ‘continue monitoring and reporting on the human rights situation in the DRC, and to 
support national and international efforts for the fight against impunity, including those of the 
International Criminal Court, to bring to justice perpetrators of serious human rights abuses 
and violations of international humanitarian law.’4 
 
These demands fall a long way short of full legal accountability under international human 
rights law and the right of alleged victims to an effective remedy.  As discussed throughout 
this thesis, however, a variety of ad hoc mechanisms already exist or are currently being 
developed to provide some form of redress to those who believe that the UN has violated 
their rights.  What is missing is clear overall guidance – perhaps in the form of a Secretary 
General’s Bulletin – indicating how the UN believes international human rights law applies 
to its peacekeeping operations and setting out the obligations that this entails.  Monitoring 
                                                 
1 FIDH News Release ‘DRC: An intervention brigade within MONUSCO would require further human 
rights protection mechanisms’, 27 March 2013 https://www.fidh.org/International-Federation-for-
Human-Rights/Africa/democratic-republic-of-congo/DRC-An-intervention-brigade-within-
MONUSCO-would-require-further-human-13106, accessed 27 April 2015. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
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mechanisms also need to be established which could receive individual complaints and issue 
advisory opinions on the compliance of missions with these obligations.  Disciplinary action 
should be taken against senior mission or headquarters staff who fail to fulfil their mandated 
obligations to protect civilians.   
 
In his dissenting opinion in Namibia, Judge Fitzmaurice observed that: ‘It was to keep the 
peace, not to change the world order, that the Security Council was set up’.5  As discussed in 
this thesis, however, the Security Council is increasingly using its Chapter VII powers to 
determine that ‘threats to international peace and security’ can include a far wider range of 
issues than was ever originally envisaged by the drafters of the UN Charter.  As its 
responsibilities have increased the lack of effective accountability mechanisms over the 
Council’s decision-making has become increasingly problematic.  
 
Part I of this thesis traced the evolving relationship between POC and peacekeeping to show 
how the concept has been increasingly integrated into the mandated tasks of many UN 
peacekeeping missions.  As the Secretary General’s 2009 report on POC noted, a decade 
previously ‘members of the Security Council questioned whether situations of internal armed 
conflict constituted a threat to international peace and security’, but that this was now ‘firmly 
recognized’ by all Security Council members.6  It would, therefore, seem that there is now 
sufficient opinio juris and state practice for POC to be considered as an emerging norm in 
international law.   
 
These mandates have proved challenging to implement, partly because of a lack of agreement 
within the UN system as a whole about what is actually meant by the term ‘protection’.  
                                                 
5 Legal consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia notwithstanding 
Security Council Resolution 276 (1970). Advisory Opinion, Dissenting Opinion, Sir Gerald 
Fitzmaurice, ICJ Reports (1971) 294. 
6 Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians in Armed 
Conflict, 29 May 2009, S/2009/277, para3. 
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Some missions, at least initially, interpreted their POC mandates in humanitarian ‘rights-
based’ terms and were extremely reluctant to use force for POC purposes or to fully 
investigate and report on egregious violations of international human rights and IHL lest this 
led to loss of state consent for the mission’s deployment.  Broader divisions within the 
Security Council over the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) and ‘humanitarian interventions’, 
may also have weakened the political support provided to some missions in implementing 
their POC mandates.   
 
Another difficulty in operationalizing POC mandates is a lack of clarity about the legal 
framework governing the use of force by uniformed peacekeeping personnel, which was 
discussed in more detail in Part II of this thesis.  The UN Secretary General’s Bulletin on the 
applicability of IHL in 1999 was issued two months before the Security Council gave its first 
POC mandate to a mission.7  Much of the guidance produced by DPKO seems to be based on 
the assumption that the use of force for POC purposes will be regulated by IHL provisions, 
but that these should be applied consistently with the ‘core principles’ of neutrality, consent 
and minimum use of force.8  This has led to ‘considerable confusion’ about how and when 
force can and should be used for protective purposes.9  For example, General Gaye, DPKO’s 
former Military Adviser for Peacekeeping Operations, and former head of the UN mission to 
the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), while arguing, in 2013, that it ‘may be necessary’ 
for the UN to ‘become a party to the conflict’ in the DRC stated in the same interview that: 
 
                                                 
7 Secretary General’s Bulletin, Observance by UN Forces of International Humanitarian Law, 
ST/SGB/1999/13, 6 August 1999; and Security Council Resolution 1270 of 22 October 1999. 
8 See, for example, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines, New York: 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2008, p. 15; United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual 
Volume I, Department of Peacekeeping Operations/ Department of Field Support, August 2012, pp.50 
and 102; and ‘UN Tactical Level Protection of Civilians Training Modules’, Peacekeeping Resources 
Hub, 
http://peacekeepingresourcehub.unlb.org/pbps/Pages/Public/viewdocument.aspx?id=2&docid=1368, 
accessed 10 March 2014. 
9 Evaluation of the implementation and results of protection of civilians mandates in United Nations 
peacekeeping operations Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services, UN Doc A/68/787, 7 
March 2014, para 52. 
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A peacekeeping force is not a war machine. From the semantic viewpoint, the 
expression ‘peacekeeping’ can give rise to no misunderstanding. Whatever the 
adjective attached to it–‘friendly’, ‘robust’, etc.– it is still keeping the peace!10 
 
As was discussed in Chapter Six, it appears that MONUSCO did in fact become a party to the 
conflict it was sent to try and help to resolve in the DRC.  This was recognized by the 
Security Council when it authorized ‘offensive operations’ to ‘neutralize’ armed opposition 
groups,11 and when it implicitly recognized that MONUSCO peacekeeping soldiers no longer 
enjoyed legal protection against attacks.12  While some have argued that this should be a 
model for future UN peace operations, others are strongly opposed to using it as a precedent 
and the High Level Panel report of 2015 urged ‘extreme caution’ before other missions were 
given such mandates.13 
 
If UN peacekeeping missions do not become a party to the conflict, however, it is difficult to 
see how IHL could provide the appropriate legal framework governing the use of force for 
POC purposes. In such circumstances, it is submitted that, international human rights law 
appears to provide more appropriate guidance.  As discussed in Chapter Four, this may be 
concurrently applicable with IHL and does impose obligations when States exercise power or 
effective control over people not situated within their territory.  While the extent to which the 
UN considers itself bound by the provisions of international human rights law remains 
unclear, a growing number of reports, resolutions and statements do accept that it imposes 
obligations on the Organization.  This includes internal advice by the UN Office of Legal 
                                                 
10‘Interview with Lieutenant General Babacar Gaye United Nations Military Adviser for Peacekeeping 
Operations’, International Review of the Red Cross, Volume 95 Number 891/892 Autumn/Winter 
2013, p.492 
11 UN Security Council Resolutions 2098, 28 March 2013; 2147, of 28 March 2014 and 2211 of 26 
March 2015.   
12 UN News, ‘Security Council Press Statement on Democratic Republic of Congo’, 29 August 2013.  
The press release stated that‘ intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, 
units or vehicles involved in a peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the 
international law of armed conflict, constitutes a crime under international law.’ 
13 Report of the High Level Panel on Peace Operations, 2015, para 116-9. 
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Affairs in 2009, the endorsement of the ‘human rights due diligence policy’ by the UN 
General Assembly and Security Council in 2013  and the launching of the Human Rights Up 
Front the same year.  Security Council resolutions have also called on some UN-authorized 
operations, such as the missions in Somalia and Mali, to comply with international human 
rights law.14  The most recent policy guidance on POC issued by DPKO in 2015 states that: 
 
Protection of civilians mandates are a manifestation of the international community’s 
determination to prevent the most serious violations of international human rights, 
humanitarian and refugee law and related standards, and they should be implemented 
in both the letter and spirit of these legal frameworks.  The POC mandate is therefore 
complementary to and reinforces the mission’s mandate to promote and protect 
human rights. When using force peacekeeping operations must abide by customary 
international law, including international human rights and humanitarian law, where 
applicable.15 
 
Security Council mandates have also become increasingly detailed in spelling out the POC 
tasks of missions and calling for their prioritization.  In 2009 it stressed, for all missions, that 
‘mandated protection activities must be given priority in decisions about the use of available 
capacity and resources, including information and intelligence resources, in the 
implementation of mandates’ and recognized, that POC ‘requires a coordinated response 
from all relevant mission components’.16  Nevertheless, as the OIOS Protection Evaluation of 
2014 noted, it is widely perceived that ‘gaps’ remain at the tactical level on ‘how to respond 
to complex and ambiguous situations that might require the use of force.’17 
                                                 
14 Security Council Resolution 2100 of 25 April 2013, para 24; and Security Council Resolution 2093 
of 6 March 2013, para 12. 
15 DPKO/DFS Policy on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping, Ref. 2015.07, 1 
April 2015, p.5-6. 
16 Security Council Resolution 1894 of 11 November 2009, para 19. 
17 Evaluation of the implementation and results of protection of civilians mandates in United Nations 
peacekeeping operations Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services, UN Doc A/68/787, 7 
March 2014, para 52. 
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Such decisions will, in fact, have to be primarily based on the judgement of individual 
commanders in the field.  Attempting to provide central guidance to cover each individual 
scenario could even be counter-productive, since there will always be situations that could 
not have been foreseen and in which mission personnel will need to use their own initiative.18  
What is most important is for everyone who serves in such a mission to be aware that they are 
under a ‘positive obligation’ to provide protection, based on reasonable judgement about how 
to do so, and a clear understanding of the legal framework within which mission personnel 
are permitted, or even required, to use force.  The central point of a POC mandate can be 
easily understood and comprehensively explained as analogous to the positive obligations to 
protect people from threats to their rights to life and physical integrity, while respecting – that 
is not infringing – these rights in the process.   
 
The provisions of international human rights law regarding the right to life and protection 
against torture, and other forms of ill-treatment, have been developed through international 
jurisprudence and soft-law instruments.  These specify that lethal force can be used for 
protective purposes, but only as a last resort, when strictly necessary, and its use should be 
proportionate to the sought objective.  A positive obligation arises if the appropriate 
authorities knew, or ought to have known at the time, of the existence of a real and 
immediate risk to civilians and failed to take measures within the scope of its powers 
which, judged reasonably, might be expected to have avoided or ameliorated the risk.  It 
also requires the appropriate authorities to exercise due diligence to prevent, punish, 
investigate or redress the harm caused by such acts, even when carried out by private 
persons or entities.   
 
                                                 
18 The author of this thesis was the main author of UNDPKO’s scenario-based protection training and 
the facilitators notes stress that discussions of such scenarios should aim to explore the options and 
issues involved, while stressing certain core principles, rather than providing ‘answers’ to be handed 
out like instructions. 
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During a ‘public emergency which threatens the life of the nation’, it is possible for States 
to derogate from certain rights, but unless and until they do so even derogable rights 
remain applicable. Each derogation, for each right, must be justified by the extent that is 
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.  Some rights, including protections 
against torture and the right to life, are considered so fundamental that they are non-
derogable.  Others, such as the right to liberty, have a potentially non-derogable core.   
 
As discussed in Chapter Five, the situations in which the Security Council exercises its 
powers under Chapter VII may be analogous with situations in which States may need to 
derogate from some of their human rights obligations.  If this is accepted then applying the 
standards of international human rights law to UN peacekeeping missions with POC 
mandates could be based on principles similar to the presumptions set out by Rodley in 
Sayadi and Vinck.  These are that when the Security Council authorizes missions to use 
force for protective purposes, it does not intend them to violate peremptory norms of 
international human rights law (jus cogens) or non-derogable rights, which are not jus 
cogens and that it does intend them to abide by the principles of necessity and 
proportionality should it require derogations.  As Lauterpacht noted in the Bosnia 
Genocide, provisional measures, even the Security Council’s decisions are subject to 
norms of jus cogens.19  Wood has also observed that while there is still debate about which 
norms have attained jus cogens status, it ‘seems inconceivable’ that the Council would 
impose an obligation to contravene such norms.20   
 
Yet, as discussed in Part III of this thesis, UN peacekeeping missions have frequently 
failed to intervene to protect civilians against mass killings.  They have sometimes failed 
                                                 
19 Further Requests for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Order of 13 September 1993, Separate 
Opinion of Judge Lauterpacht paras 89 – 97, ICJ Report 2007. 
20 Michael Wood, ‘The UN Security Council and International Law’.  Second lecture: ‘The UN 
Security Council and International Law’, Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lectures, Lauterpacht Centre 
for International Law, University of Cambridge, 8 November 2006, para 45. 
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fully to investigate and report on egregious violations of IHL and international human 
rights law committed by host state forces.  On at least one occasion, a mission provided 
logistical support to national forces that carried out grave violations of IHL and 
international human rights law.  On another a mission provided transport facilities to a 
senior government official under indictment by the ICC.  Missions have also detained 
people without access to a court and there are currently no independent mechanisms by 
which those who suffer human rights violations as a result of the actions or inactions of 
these missions can obtain effective redress from the UN itself.   Individual sanctions issued 
for POC purposes have also been overturned on human rights grounds.  
 
POC itself developed in a largely reactive process out of discussions on the Security Council 
on the experiences of UN peacekeeping missions, informed by reviews and ‘lessons learned’ 
exercises carried out by the UN Secretariat and the missions themselves.  Indeed POC’s 
normative significance derives from the fact that the Security Council has been endorsing 
practices developed in the field rather than abstract statements of principle about 
‘responsibility’ and ‘protection’.  One measure of its progress is that – in contrast with its 
abdication during the genocides in Rwanda and at Srebrenica – the UN feels at least under a 
moral obligation to protect the civilians currently sheltering on its bases in Darfur and South 
Sudan.  Nevertheless, the lack of clear guidance about the legal framework within which the 
UN expects its peacekeeping missions to act, particularly when using force for protective 
purposes, contributes to a fatal ambiguity about the tasks involved.  When civilians fleeing 
violent conflict encounter UN troops with a POC mandate it is not unreasonable that they 
should consider themselves actually entitled to physical protection and that the UN should 
consider itself legally obliged to provide this. 
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